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Abstract 
 
The ‘smart’(ly) disruptive world of the consumer internet of things (CIOT) is here. Australian consumers 
are poised to live in ‘smart’ homes, monitor their ‘smart’ selves and ride in ever- ‘smart’er cars, while 
smart(er) cities, transport and industrial IOT brilliance changes their world, and the world around them, 
irretrievably. This thesis both celebrates and exposes this radical, impending CIOT-driven disruption in 
all its consumer-abusive, privacy-intrusive glory. It posits that consumers and regulators do not yet 
understand the adverse implications of this new panopticon technology which surveys everything and 
blurs traditional understandings of human autonomy and privacy, nor has consumer law yet properly 
tackled the many adverse implications of an expanded big data universe: from ubiquitous collection to 
consumer profiling and analytics, anonymisation failures, data breach and so on. With the coming of the 
consumer IOT, there is a perfect consumer-adverse storm, in which multiple fast-paced and little-
regulated technologies collide - seismically. As one of the first few legal studies of the consumer internet 
of things in Australia, this thesis partly fills a vast gap in scholarly literature by scoping the Australian 
CIOT and its stakes, identifying potential gaps in Australian consumer protective laws, and adapting the 
Australian Consumer Law Policy Framework (Framework) to the critical question of whether the CIOT 
exhibits consumer detriment sufficient to warrant  regulatory action now, using the smart car, home and 
self contexts as rapidly-evolving reference-points. Informed by aspects of behavioural economics, 
regulatory theory and the first international CIOT cases and defect   reports, this thesis is a confronting 
snapshot which concludes with a call for strategic policy and various regulatory and self-regulatory 
actions. It also proposes a simple series of draft principles for CIOT policy and regulation which 
synthesise established best practice by design and default, conform to the normative Framework values 
and offer an improved prospect of protecting and realising the indisputable public interest in a principled, 
morally-grounded1 and trusted CIOT world. 
 
Key objectives and the research outline are detailed in Annex. A. 
Key words: Internet of things – IoT - consumer law – privacy law – smart - policy   
                                                          
1 Accenture, ‘Connections with leading thinkers: Rebecca Schindler’ (2015 accessed 10 Jan 2016) 
https://www.accenture.com/t20151105T110549__w__/us-en/_acnmedia/Accenture/Conversion-
Assets/DotCom/Documents/Global/PDF/Dualpub_2/Accenture-Institute-Conversations-Rebecca-Schindler.pdf> This 
proposition is accepted by policy-makers the world around; and is a cornerstone of the Australian IOT Alliance (IOTAA) 
approach – that consumer “trust” is essential. 
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3 That rule states: “When a meeting, or part thereof, is held under the Chatham House Rule, participants are free to use the 
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revealed.” 
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Research question  
 
This research is designed to address the following question: 
 
These sub-questions4 are considered throughout:  
 
Research scope & limitations are detailed in Annex. A.  
                                                          
4 The Australian Consumer Policy Protection Framework is described in Ch. 2.  
 
1. What is the nature, potential and significance of the consumer internet of things (CIOT) for 
Australian consumers? * 
2. How does the consumer internet of things respond to analysis using the Australian Consumer 
Policy Framework; including the question of ‘consumer detriment’, such as: 
a. What consumer data may be generated by the CIOT, who owns it and do consumers 
provide informed consent as to its collection and use? If not, what are the legal 
implications of this in Australia? 
b. Is the CIOT (and consumer data generated by it) secured in a manner which is private 
and safe, and if not, what are the legal implications of this in Australia?  
c. Can consumers understand their rights in the interactive, autonomous consumer CIOT 
context, based upon traditional (internet) assumptions as to rational choice, market forces 
and self-autonomy, or is a new paradigm necessary? 
3. Are Australian consumer protection laws adequate to protect consumers in an CIOT context, and 
if not, what (if any) are the appropriate regulatory and policy responses to that?  
4. Are there any principles or guidelines which might guide a public policy and regulatory approach 
to the CIOT in Australia? 
 
 
How can Australian regulators and policy makers best fulfil the objectives of the Australian 
Consumer Policy Framework to improve consumer wellbeing through empowerment and 
protection, cognisant of Australian consumer laws and privacy principles, while fostering the 
twenty-first century consumer internet of things, as exemplified by smart cars, home and 
self? 
 
[xiii] 
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Terminology clarification 
Terminology in the internet of things is evolving.  
This thesis uses certain recognised terms, acronyms or initialisms,6 but in the interests of consistency, is 
selective and avoid others. To clarify, uses are explained below.  
 
Term Other(s)  Rationale 
 
CIOT; 
consumer 
IOT 
 
consumer IoT preference: it is more usual to use upper case in an initialism, and it aids 
reading flow (if mentally read as the acronym, ‘cyot’) Consumer IOT is 
becoming a recognised IOT sub-category, differentiated from industrial IOT. 
IOT IoT preference: it is more usual to use upper case in an initialism 
data  data (plural); 
datum (singular) 
preference:7  the broad use has entered the lexicon because ‘datum’ (like 
agendum) is now rarely used. The Oxford English Dictionary describes it as 
a plural and ‘mass noun’, like ‘information’. The Wall Street Journal, The 
Guardian and other respected newspapers use it in the latter sense. Hence, 
the more modern, consumer-friendly form is preferred. 
device thing 
object 
preference: allows legal ‘thinghood’ to be separated from the overall 
elements which make it smart which go beyond the ‘object’ itself. It is also 
more reflective of consumer language. 
‘smart’ 
[device] 
‘connected’ 
[device] 
The term ‘smart’ is used to prefix and distinguish consumer internet of 
things products, devices and related services which form part of the CIOT. 
The rationale is that ‘smart’ is already analogously in the lexicon (for 
example, ‘smartphones’) and is more consumer friendly, but reminds 
consumers that these products are both revolutionary and qualitatively 
different. 
                                                          
6 ‘Acronyms’ are abbreviations usually pronounced as a word. ‘Initialisms’ are often fully-capitalised abbreviations 
pronounced letter by letter. 
7 See Simon Rogers, Data are or data is?’ The Guardian (8 July 2012 accessed 10 Feb 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2010/jul/16/data-plural-singular> The author apologises in advance to those 
who dislike this non-traditional usage. 
[1] 
 
Part I LOCATING THE STATUS QUO   
Prologue 
Seismic events happen, sometimes at the darkest hour, when people are unprepared. 
Suddenly, people stir, and awaken… heavy heads lift from pillows, and sleepy eyes widen in awareness. 
Adrenalin surges. Heart rates lift. Pulses accelerate. And people move. So too, the bursting pulse of 
information surging from early morning Californian wrists to Aliphcom’s massive always-on data centre. 
As an information-laden spike shot unusually, alarmingly north in the early hours, the corporation detected 
a suddenly wakeful population– and through simple analysis, could discern the very moment a magnitude 
6.0 earthquake struck - at 3.20am. In the few following hours until dawn, the company also came to 
calculate the earthquake’s epicenter to within a 15-mile radius, as biometric and geolocation data 
amassed, recording exactly how long each alert or anxious or possibly annoyed, data-generating person 
took, to finally, slip back to sleep.  
Aliphcom make Jawbone; one of the world’s most popular consumer smart fitness devices. The pulse of 
data they received that earthquake-night, enabled them to see, with insight, into the wee hours lives of 
their customers - and to know, precisely who woke up at that shaky moment, how each reacted 
physiologically, and where those reacting people lived – and if they chose, to speculate analytically upon 
the intimate personal traits revealed by the fact that only they came to know: that almost half of their 
customers within the epicentre, never went back to sleep at all. 
Consumers ‘wearing’ the internet of things. 
 
 
Graphic P.1 Jawbone data; Source: Jawbone Blog & The Economist8 
                                                          
8 Eugene Mandel, ‘How the Napa Earthquake affected Bay Area sleepers’, The Jawbone Blog (25 Aug 2014 accessed 5 Jan 
2016) <https://jawbone.com/blog/napa-earthquake-effect-on-sleep/> The earthquake struck Northern California on 24 
August 2014.  
[2] 
 
Introduction 
On the cusp of the twenty-first century, Neil Gross imagined a poetically predictive analogy for the innately 
disruptive, technological organism known as the Internet of Things (IOT):  
 
In the next century, planet earth will don an electronic skin. It will use the Internet as a scaffold 
to support and transmit its sensations…stitched together [by] millions of embedded electronic 
measuring devices: thermostats… cameras, microphones…. These will probe and monitor … 
our conversations, our bodies – even our dreams…9 
 
By 2016, the ‘smart’ world of IOT disruption is here.10 No longer “science fiction”11 or “scientific concept”,12 
it is “happening now”,13 a revolutionary14 “transformational shift”15 which is “inevitable and inescapable”,16 
“on the rise”17 and “here to stay”.18  Dubbed the “second digital revolution”19 or  the “third”,20 or “fourth”,21 
                                                          
9 Neil Gross, ‘21 Ideas for the twentieth-first century’ Businessweek Online (30 Aug 1999 accessed 16 Mar 2016) 
<http://www.businessweek.com/1999/99_35/b3644024.htm> 
10 Karen Rose, Scott Eldrige, Lyman Chapin, ‘The Internet of Things: An Overview Understanding the issues and challenges 
of a more connected World’ The Internet Society (Oct 2015 accessed 18 Mar 2016): 3 
<https://www.internetsociety.org/sites/default/files/ISOC-IoT-Overview-20151014_0.pdf>  
11 MSV Janakiram, ‘5 Companies that will Dominate Consumer IoT Market- Parts 1 and 2’ Forbes (26 May 2015 accessed 3 
Apr 2016) < http://www.forbes.com/sites/janakirammsv/2015/05/26/5-companies-that-will-dominate-consumer-iot-market-
part-2/#6d22440c1930> 
12 Ivan, ‘Things You Need to Know about Internet of Things’ The Cloud Infographic (7 Jan 2016) 
<http://www.thecloudinfographic.com/2016/01/07/things-you-need-to-know-about-internet-of-things.html>  
13 Cisco, ‘Embracing the Internet of Everything to Capture your Share of $14.4 trillion’ White Paper (2013 accessed 11 Apr 
2016): 2 < http://www.cisco.com/c/dam/en_us/about/ac79/docs/innov/IoE_Economy.pdf>; Rose, above n 10: 3.  
14 Charles Arthur, ‘The “things” are smart and will work for us’ in Raconteur, 'Internet of Things' The Times (30 Mar 2016 
accessed 30 Mar 2016): 3 <http://raconteur.net/internet-of-things> 
15 Daniel Burris, a technology futurist, uses this term: Daniel Burris, ‘The Internet of Things is far bigger than anyone realises 
(Part 2)’ WIRED  (Nov 2014 accessed 1 April 2016) http://www.wired.com/insights/2014/11/iot-bigger-than-anyone-realizes-
part-2/. “Transformational is an overused word, but I do believe it properly applies to these technologies…”: David Petraeus, 
‘Excerpts from Remarks Delivered by Director David H. Petraeus at the In-Q-Tel CEO Summit’ (1 Mar 2012 accessed 1 Apr 
2016) <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2012-speeches-testimony/in-q-tel-summit-remarks.html>  
16 Joel Lee, ‘What Is the Internet of Things & How Will It Affect Our Future [MakeUseOf Explains]’ (28 Jun 2013 accessed 18 
Mar 2016) <http://www.makeuseof.com/tag/what-is-the-internet-of-things-and-how-will-it-affect-our-future-makeuseof-
explains/> 
17 EC, ‘IOT Privacy and Security Workshop’ AIOTA (13 Jan 2017 accessed 20 Feb 2016) 
<https://europa.eu/newsroom/events/internet-things-%E2%80%93-privacy-and-security-workshop_en>, and Report (10 Apr 
2017 accessed 15 Apr 2017):1 <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/internet-things-privacy-security-
workshops-report>  
18 International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, ‘Mauritius Declaration on the Internet of Things’ 
(14 Oct 2014 accessed 12 Apr 2015): 1 <http://www.privacyconference2014.org/media/16596/Mauritius-Declaration.pdf; 
See also IDC & TXT, ‘Definition of a Research and Innovation Policy Leveraging Cloud Computing and IoT Combination’ 
European Commission (13 May 2015  accessed 10 Feb 2016): 9 <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-
market/en/news/definition-research-and-innovation-policy-leveraging-cloud-computing-and-iot-combination> 
19 (UK) Government Office for Science, ‘The Internet of Things: making the most of the Second Digital Revolution’ (18 Dec 
2014 accessed 20 Apr 2016) <https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/internet-of-things-blackett-review> (Blackett 
Review) 
20 Theodore Forbath, ‘The third wave of computing’ Forbes (3 Oct 2015 accessed 25 Apr 2016) 
http://fortune.com/2013/13/1003/the-thrid-wave-of-computing/> 
21 IDC, ‘The Digital Universe of Opportunities: Rich Data and the Increasing Value of the Internet of Things’ EMC Digital 
Universe (April 2014 accessed 29 Apr 2016) <http://www.emc.com/leadership/digital-universe/2014iview/executive-
summary.htm>  
[3] 
 
and fueled by “hype”,22  Moore’s and several other ‘laws’,23 and industry money, it expands the digital 
universe exponentially –  into human life itself.24 It is Gross’ big idea of a global connective electronic 
network, organically and systemically recording, processing, regulating and controlling almost infinite 
amounts of sensory and experiential data. Across the globe, billions of embedded IOT devices will 
metaphorically recreate the sensory capabilities of that skin, with an almost infinite capacity to probe, 
gauge, monitor, control, record and analyse a myriad of detectable, measurable, human ‘sensations’.  An 
IOT world is one in which every physical, geographic and personal interaction or experience is 
translatable into data, and every conceivable human sensation is monitored, recorded, trackable, 
analysable, ‘advertise-able’ – and monetizable. For consumers, it is one in which the possibility of an 
intimately personal and digitally-noiseless moment – an unpredicted thought - becomes almost 
unimaginable.25 But while the greater vision has Benthamite utopian potential, it is also potentially 
Orwellian26 - spanning benign utilitarian oversight, to the dystopian extremity of institutionalized global 
surveillance. Such potential encapsulates the public policy and legal dilemma that is the consumer 
internet of things: how to appropriately control and human-centre a metastasizing technological organism, 
which by promise and threat, is a globally- ‘disruptive innovation’.27  
                                                          
22 The term is often used; see for example: James Manyika, Michael Chui, Peter Bisson, Jonathan Woetzel, Richard Dobbs, 
Jacques Bughin, and Dan Aharon, ‘The Internet of Things: Mapping the Value Beyond the Hype’ McKinsey & Co (June 2015 
accessed 26 Nov 2015) http://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-insights/the-internet-of-things-the-
value-of-digitizing-the-physical-world. Gartner graphs IOT at the “peak of overinflated expectations” in 2015: i.e., a “phase of 
overenthusiasm and unrealistic projections, a flurry of well-publicized activity by technology leaders results in some 
successes, but more failures, as the technology is pushed to its limits. The only enterprises making money are conference 
organizers and magazine publishers”: Alfonso Velosa,  W. Roy Schulte and  Benoit J. L’Heureux, ‘Hype Cycle for the 
Internet of Things, 2015’ Gartner (21 Jul 2015 accessed 6 Mar 2-016) < https://www.gartner.com/doc/reprints?id=1-
2M904VI&ct=150901&st=sb>  
23 These are “rough empirical description”, not an immutable physical or scientific law. Moore’s Law came from Gordon 
Moore of Intel who observed that overall computer processing power doubles every two years or so. Metcalfe’s Law 
suggests that communications network value is proportional to user numbers, squared, but is criticised: Bob Briscoe, 
Andrew Odlyzko and Benjamin Tilly, ‘Metcalfe's Law is Wrong’, IEEE Spectrum (1 Jul 2016 accessed 4 Feb 2016) 
<http://spectrum.ieee.org/computing/networks/metcalfes-law-is-wrong> 
24 Accenture Digital, ‘The Era of Living Services’ (2016 accessed 23 Mar 2016): 5 <https://www.accenture.com/us-
en/insight-living-services-from-accenture-digital.aspx> 
25 This sounds hyperbolic; but the intrusion extends daily. For example, “connected sex tech” exists, including “pleasure 
chips”, “VR teledildonics” & “haptic deviants”. The smart condom detects “thrust velocity and pace, how many calories 
you've burned, skin temperature and girth”, position numbers adopted and sex frequency. App users upload data to share 
statistics with friends or the public: Conor Alison, This smart condom ring will track your sexual activity’ WAREABLE (3 
March 2017 accessed 7 Mar 2017) https://www.wareable.com/wearable-tech/smart-condom-sex-activity-tracker-4012 See 
also non-therapeutic ‘smart’ toilet analysis, menstrual cups, fertility monitors and so on.  
26 Lux Research, ‘The Internet of Everyone: Consumer Relationships in the Age of IoT’ (2015 accessed 15 May 2016). 
Bentham’s panopticon prison design enabled 360-degree surveillance to motivate prisoners to always do their best. The 
Orwell reference invokes the police state and human oppression critiqued in his sci-fi classic,’1984’. 
27 Clayton M. Christenson, The Innovator’s Dilemma: The Revolutionary Book that will Change the Way You Do Business 
(Collins Business Essentials) 2003. ‘Disruptive innovation’ means (simply) an innovation which helps to create new markets 
and value networks, but eventually disrupts the existing market and displaces the existing technology. The US National 
Intelligence Council lists IOT as one of six ‘‘Disruptive Civil Technologies” with prospective influences on US national power: 
Clinton Fernandes & Vijay Sivaraman, ‘It’s only the beginning: Metadata Retention laws and the Internet of Things’ 
Australian Journal of Telecommunications and the Digital Economy, 3(3) (2015) 
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Australian consumers are poised to live in ‘smart’ homes, monitor ‘smart’ selves and ride in ever - smarter 
cars. By 2020, analysts predict that globally, there will be 30 billion smart devices and one in five cars will 
be ‘smart’, with a global economic impact “up to” eleven trillion US dollars.28  While Australia’s CIOT 
market is small,29 analysts claim that over 3.5 million Australians (14%) wear smart self devices today,30 
and predict that smart home spending will rise 66% to a projected $383 million across 2015- 2016.31 The 
growing consumer IOT market features a myriad of smart self ‘wearables’32 - fitness bands, jewellery, 
glasses, clothing and even “sex-tech”33 - while smart home34  devices are (slowly) appearing in-store, 
connecting smart TVs, whitegoods, security, thermostats, dog-feeders, baby monitors (etc.), and 
increasingly smart(er) cars35 are connecting via GPS, C-ITS and telematics systems,36 on road and in 
every showroom. Soon, more Australians will work in smart buildings, ride in smart transport directed by 
smart traffic management systems, through smart cities, and ride in smartly self-driving cars. And the 
rapidly evolving global market promises a myriad of other smart devices; driven by the world’s largest 
                                                          
<http://telsoc.org/ajtde/index.php/ajtde/article/view/21> In 2017, the EC state: “the IoT is transforming and disrupting our 
daily lives faster than any other technology before”: EC, above n 17.  
28 McKinsey & Co., ‘The Internet of Things: Sizing up the Opportunity’ (2014 accessed 2 Feb 2016) 
<http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/high_tech_telecoms_internet/the_internet_of_things_sizing_up_the_opportunity>;                                               
McKinsey & Co, ‘The road to 2020 and beyond: What’s driving the global automotive industry?’(2013 accessed 2 Feb 2016) 
<http://www.mckinsey.com/~/media/mckinsey/dotcom/client_service/automotive%20and%20assembly/pdfs/mck_the_road_t
o_2020_and_beyond.ashx>; McKinsey & Co, ‘Unlocking the Potential of the Internet of Things’ (2015 accessed 2 Feb 2016) 
<http://www.mckinsey.com/insights/business_technology/the_internet_of_things_the_value_of_digitizing_the_physical_worl
d> 
29 See Chapter 1as to publicly-available Australian data. Some paid research exists but is inaccessible for cost reasons. 
30 Telsyte, ‘Australian Smartphone & Wearable Devices Market Study 2016-2020’ (6 Sept 2016 accessed 20 Sept 2016) < 
https://www.telsyte.com.au/announcements/2016/9/6/smartwatch-market-gathering-steam-as-australians-turn-to-wearable-
gadgets-amid-flat-smartphone-sales>  
31 Telsyte, ‘Australian IOT@ Home market to reach $3.2 Billion by 2019 embedding smart technology into Everyday Life’ (10 
Aug 2015 accessed 22 Apr 2016) <http://www.telsyte.com.au/announcements/2015/8/10/australian-iot-home-market-to-
reach-32-billion-by-2019-embedding-smart-technology-into-everyday-life-1>  
32 ‘Smart Self’ refers to devices attached to or implanted inside the human body – examples include devices which monitor 
human health and wellness, promote fitness, improve productivity and improve disease management and identification: 
McKinsey, above n 28: 3. 
33 Gareth May, ‘The future of sex tech: Pleasure chips, VR teledildonics & haptic deviants’ WAREABLES (30 Nov 2016 
accessed 16 Jan 2017) <https://www.wareable.com/wearable-tech/future-sex-tech-888> 
34 A “smart home” is one“…fitted or equipped with a range of interconnected sensors to read external elements such as 
light, temperature, motion, moisture of systems such as heating, lighting, security; and of devices such as media devices 
and appliances, which can be automated, monitored and controlled through a computer or smart phone, including from 
outside the home, or via the Internet::  ENISA, ‘Threat Landscape for Smart Home and Media Convergence’ (9 Feb 2015 
accessed 2 Nov 2015): 5  <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/threat-landscape-for-smart-home-and-media-
convergence> 
35 ‘Smart cars’ is used here to collectively include automated, autonomous, self-driving and driverless vehicles. These entail 
a spectrum with increasing degrees of connectivity and autonomy. ‘Connected’ usually refers to C-ITS systems (traffic 
management and V2V communications) whereas ‘autonomous’ refers to on-board driving systems: EU, ‘Research for TRAN 
Committee – Self-piloted cars: the future of road transport’ (2016 accessed 2 Jul 2016): 19 
<http://www.europarl.europa.eu/supporting-analyses> 
36 P. Lawson,‘The Connected Car: Who is in the Driver's Seat?’ FIPA (2015 accessed Aug 2016) 
<https://fipa.bc.ca/connected-car-download/> 
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IT,37 tech,38 cloud,39 manufacturing entities,40 and the burgeoning data analytics industry41   right through 
to tiny crowd-funded, start-ups sustained by a smart idea, and a buy-out dream.42  With powerful drivers, 
industry convergence43 and international government support, CIOT will inevitably and irrevocably affect 
consumers, right around the globe. But the consumer protection implications of this smart technology 
may not legally, be so ‘smart’ right now,44 much less into the future.  Australian consumers and regulators 
are unprepared, and at 2016 end, seem unaware of the scope, scale and stakes45 of a looming consumer 
IOT, much less envisaging regulatory responsiveness to diverse risks impacting consumer rights, 
privacy,46 safety, data security, autonomy and “sovereignty”.47 While US authorities report that CIOT legal 
problems are “different in important aspects”,48 the EU finds many “novel liability aspects”49 and 
                                                          
37 E.g. Google, Amazon and Apple. 
38 E.g. IBM, Cisco and Intel. 
39 E.g. AT&T, GE, Microsoft and Oracle. 
40 E.g. Ford, Samsung, Bosch, Hitachi, GE and IBM. See IDG UK, ’15 Most Powerful Internet of Things Companies 2016’ 
Computerworld UK (16 Dec 2015 accessed 10 Mar 2016) http://www.computerworlduk.com/galleries/data/12-most-powerful-
internet-of-things-companies-3521713/#7; Jacob Morgan, ‘Which Companies Dominate the “Internet of Things?”’ CloudAve 
(16 Jul 2014 accessed 2 Jan 2016) <https://www.cloudave.com/35202/companies-dominate-internet-things/> 
41 Executive Office of the President (EOP), ‘Big Data: Seizing Opportunities, Preserving Values’ Interim progress report (May 
2014 accessed 10 May 2016) < 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/big_data_privacy_report_may_1_2014.pdf>; EOP, ‘Big Data: a Report 
on Algorithmic Systems, Opportunity, and Civil Rights’ (May 2016 accessed 10 May 2016) 
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/microsites/ostp/2016_0504_data_discrimination.pdf> 
42 E.g. (Alphabet) Google bought out Nest, then later bought out Revolv home hub. Samsung brought out Smart things, 
which is now its principle smart home vehicle. 
43 GE CEO Jeff Immelt stated that GE would soon have to change its production and business model: "Every industrial 
company, will be a software company": Malcolm Turnbull, ‘Opening Address to AIIA Summit: Navigating the Internet of 
Things’ (26 Mar 2015 accessed 11 May 2016) 
<http://www.minister.communications.gov.au/malcolm_turnbull/speeches/internet_of_things_summit> 
44 Consumers International, ‘Connection and Protection in the Digital Age: the Internet of things and challenges for 
consumer protection’ (11 Apr 2016 accessed 18 Apr 2016) 
<http://www.consumersinternational.org/media/1657273/connection-and-protection-the-internet-of-things-and-challenges-
for-consumer-protection.pdf> For a graphic depiction of the ‘household name’ corporations which have “lost” data, see: 
Information is Beautiful, ‘World's Biggest Data Breaches: selected losses greater than 30,000 records’ (updated 30th Mar 
2015 accessed 2 Apr 2016) <http://www.informationisbeautiful.net/visualizations/worlds-biggest-data-breaches-hacks/>  
45 Ch. 1 evidences this contention (largely) relying upon international studies.  
46 Boston Consulting Group, ‘The Value of our Digital Identity’ (Nov 2012 accessed 2 Feb 2016) 
<https://www.bcgperspectives.com/content/articles/digital_economy_consumer_insight_value_of_our_digital_identity/>; 
Accenture, above n 24. Acquity Group,‘The Internet of Things: The Future of Consumer Adoption’ (2014 accessed 3 Mar 
2016) <http://quantifiedself.com/docs/acquitygroup-2014.pdf> 
47 Erik Laykin, Duff & Phelps digital forensics specialist cited in Rob Lever, ‘Secrets from smart devices find path to US legal 
system’ PhysORG (19 Mar 2017 accessed 15 April 2017) https://phys.org/news/2017-03-secrets-smart-devices-path-
legal.html Note that this concept has multiple meanings depending upon one’s philosophical bent:  
48 National Telecommunications and Information Commission (NTIA), ‘Green Paper: Fostering the Advancement of the 
Internet of Things’ (12 Jan 2017 accessed 15 Jan 20917): 3 <https://www.ntia.doc.gov/other-publication/2017/green-paper-
fostering-advancement-internet-things> 
49 EU, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 8/2014 on Recent Developments on the Internet of Things’ (16 
Sept 2014 accessed 16 Mar 2016): 21 http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp223_en.pdf.; EC, ‘Internet of Things Privacy & Security Workshop's Report’  (10 Apr 2017 
accessed 15 Apr 2017) <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/internet-things-privacy-security-workshops-
report>  c/f an early 2015 AIOTA Report “…the rapid development of IoT technology may raise certain product compliance, 
product liability and insurance-related issues in the future. At present, we believe that these issues can be managed within 
the existing legal and regulatory framework. We propose that the emphasis should, in the main, be on the development of 
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Consumers International warn of both exacerbated and new legal contexts,50 recent Australian enquiries 
largely ignore serious consumer-relevant CIOT challenges. This thesis snapshots the CIOT ecosystem 
and Australian consumer protection laws in 2016 and evidences international concerns, but within an 
Australian context. Absent pressing policy formulation informed by a national debate, consumer and 
privacy protections may struggle. That  difficulty amplifies within the CIOT ecosystem: as traditional 
models of the rational consumer51 and self-correcting systems52 such as notice and choice- based 
consent53 dismantle, freemium devices or apps disguise unconscious rights-sacrificial behaviours;54 
unfair contractual terms legitimise data (ab)use55 and rights transfer; big data analytics and algorithms 
systematise consumer profiling, manipulation and discrimination; and artificial intelligence launches its 
predicted “unprecedented attack”.56 But these fraught social and legal potentials seem abstractions when, 
at present, most consumer IOT devices seem over-hyped IT-hybrids, bearing hefty price tags, fancy 
packaging and (questionable)57 consumer convenience, service and utility. What is less apparent in these 
‘pretty products’, are systemic potentials for personal, cyber and financial consumer risk,58 dire national 
security implications,59 and an exponentially large and latent, surveillance-based, privacy intrusive, data-
fuelled, backend value chain. Indeed, few consumers perceive ethicists’ and futurists’ warnings of data 
mining without duty, autonomy without control, surveillance without sanction, superintelligence without 
                                                          
policy solutions to these potential challenges”: AIOTA, ‘Report AIOTI Working Group 4 – Policy’ (15 Oct 2015 accessed 3 
Mar 2016) <https://aioti-space.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/AIOTIWG04Report2015-Policy-Issues.pdf> 
50 CI, above n 44.  
51 Charles Oren Bar-Gill, ‘Seduction by Contract: Law, Economics, and Psychology in Consumer Markets’, 2012 
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199663361.001.0001 
<http://www.oxfordscholarship.com.ezproxy.bond.edu.au/view/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199663361.001.0001/acprof-
9780199663361>; M. W. Bailey, ‘Seduction by Technology: Why Consumers Opt Out of Privacy by Buying into the Internet 
of Things’ Texas Law Review (Apr 2016) 94(5): 1023-1054.  
52 European Commission (EC), ‘Europe’s policy options for a dynamic and trustworthy development of the IOT’ Rand 
Corporation, SMART 2012/ 0053 (31 Dec 2012 accessed 12 Jul 2016) 
<http://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RR356.html> 
53 Chris Hoofnagle, Chris & Jennifer M Urban, ‘Alan Westin’s Privacy Homo Economicus’ (1 Jun 2014 accessed 5 Apr 2016) 
49 Wake Forest L. Rev. 261 <http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/facpubs/2395> 
54 Bailey, above n 51: 1024 
55Chris Hoofnagle and Jan Whittington, ‘Free: Accounting for the Costs of the Internet's Most Popular Price’ (2013-2014) 61 
UCLA L. Rev. 606 <http://www.uclalawreview.org/pdf/61-3-2.pdf>; Bailey, above n 51. 
56 James Barratt, ‘Why Stephen Hawking and Bill Gates Are Terrified of Artificial Intelligence’ Huffington Post (9 Sept 2015 
accessed 25 May 2016) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/james-barrat/hawking-gates-artificial-intelligence_b_7008706.html> 
57 As to smart self fatigue, see Aaron Pressman, ‘Why you probably won’t be getting a Fitbit this Christmas’ Fortune.Com (4 
Nov 2016 accessed 4 Nov 2016) < http://fortune.com/2016/11/04/probably-wont-fitbit-this-christmas/>; Mike Feibus, ‘Face It, 
You’re Bored of the Smartwatch You Got last Christmas’ Fortune (10 Apr 2016 accessed 11 Apr 2016) < 
http://fortune.com/2016/04/10/wearables-smartwatch/> 
58 Health device and smart car hacks pose consumer danger: FTC, ‘Comments of the Staff of the FTC’s Bureau of 
Consumer Protection and Office of Policy Planning, ‘In the Matter of the Benefits, Challenges, and Potential Roles for the 
Government in Fostering the Advancement of the Internet of Things’ Docket No. 160331306-6306-01(2 June 2016) 5- 6 
<https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/advocacy_documents/comment-staff-bureau-consumer-protection-office-
policy-planning-national-telecommunications/160603ntiacomment.pdf>   
59 Widespread IOT hacking is a threat - from national infrastructure attacks, to smart (self driving) car(s) used as terrorist 
Trojan horses.    
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safeguard … and even, the potential destruction of humanity.60 It sounds over-dramatic, and that (final) 
end game aside, it is incontrovertible now that the CIOT offers transformational societal and individual 
benefits61 if properly understood, enabled and controlled commensurate with social expectation and 
consumer-protective standards. But at this moment, it is difficult not to perceive a complex industry in 
hyperbolic money-making overdrive, threatening to run amok.  
 
By 2016 end, the Australian government has no official IOT strategy, nor is it proactively developing 
one.62 In 2015, the Prime Minister romantically proclaimed that IOT limitations lie solely within Australia’s 
“imagination and vision”, and that in its regulation, “less is better”.63 Contemporaneously, the US National 
Security Advisory Committee officially warned President Obama that the traditional pacing  “gap” 64  
between technological advance and effective policy development and governance - the Collingridge 
dilemma65 - was turning into a “chasm”.66 NSTAC named 2019 as the tipping point for government IOT 
influence, warning that thereafter, regulatory policy could only effect “change at the margins”.67 But while 
European regulators are leading funding,68 research,69 and innovating privacy protection,70 and American 
regulators are rushing to catch up,71 the Australian government appears sanguine or at best, inactive. 
                                                          
60 Giovani Buttarelli, ‘Ethics at the Root of Privacy and as the Future of Data Protection’ Presentation at Harvard & MIT (19 
April 2016 accessed 4 Sept 2016) <https://Secure.Edps.Europa.Eu/Edpsweb/Edps/Cache/Offonce/Edps/Ethics> 
61 Examples are numerous: the capacity to better monitor and respond to health issues; improved energy management and 
use; efficient lower emissions transport – and so on. The industrial IOT promises infrastructure monitoring, vastly improved 
manufacturing efficiencies and so on. 
62 Communications Minister Mitch Fifield has attended Australian IOT Alliance (IOTAA) functions, the Communications 
Department, ACCC and OAIC attend IOTAA workstreams as observers. But the author finds little government lead or 
research investment.  
63 Angus Kidman, ‘Malcolm Turnbull: The Internet Of Things relies on imagination, not regulation’ Lifehacker (26 Mar 2015 
accessed 11 May 2016) <http://www.lifehacker.com.au/2015/03/malcolm-turnbull-the-internet-of-things-relies-on-
imagination-not-regulation/> He has put this view for some years: Turnbull, above n 43.   
64 The “pacing problem” or “gap” is identified in Gary E Merchant, Braden R Allenby and Joseph R Heckert (eds), The 
Growing Gap between Emerging Technologies and Legal-Ethical oversight: The pacing problem’ (Springer, 2011).  
65 Coliingridge wrote: “When change is easy, the need for it cannot be foreseen; when the need for change is apparent, 
change has become expensive, difficult and time consuming.": David Collingridge, The Social Control of Technology 
(Pinter, 1980). 
66 National Security Telecommunications Advisory Committee (NSTAC), ‘NSTAC Report to the President on the Internet of 
Things’ (19 Nov 2014 accessed 7 Apr 2016) <https://www.dhs.gov/publication/2014-nstac-publications> 
67 Ibid.They referenced areas such as adoption, device design and technical use protocols. 
68  Funding includes €192 million from 2014 to 2017: European Commission, ‘Digital Single Market, Research and 
Innovation’ (9 Jun 2016 accessed 2 Mar 2017) <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/research-innovation-iot> 
69 The EU first recognised the need to address IOT regulatory issues by 2006, via its workshop ‘From RFID to the Internet of 
Things’ cited in Rolf H. Weber, ‘Internet of things - Need for a new legal environment?’ (2009 accessed 2 Jan 2016) 25:1 
Computer Law & Security Review 522- 527: 523. Since that time the EU has led international policy and technical research 
– e.g. Commission Staff Working Document, ‘Future Networks and the Internet- Early Challenges regarding the Internet of 
things’ (2010) <http://ec.europa.eu/information_society/eeurope/i2010/docs/future_internet/swp_internet_things.pdf> 
70 EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2016/679 (27 Apr 2016)  
71 US public policy work accelerated in 2015-6, with the FTC’s enquiry and Congressional/ House hearings: see Mohana 
Ravindranath, ’Who’s in charge of regulating the internet of things?’ Nextgov (1 Sept 2016 accessed 16 Oct 2016) 
http://www.nextgov.com/emerging-tech/2016/09/internet-things-regulating-charge/131208/. In early 2017, the NTIA Green 
Paper is instigating national policy development: above n 48. 
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Aside from recent attack-driven attention to public cybersecurity and an industry-led push for public sector 
open data, there is no government-led IOT planning or focus. It is a policy ‘gap’ which industry has rushed 
to fill in the past twelve months through the Australian IOT Alliance – but unfunded volunteerism, even 
from specialist sectoral groups72 - is no substitute for formal government-led democratic policy 
development processes and Australia remains well behind international approaches. Arguably, from a 
regulatory and policy perspective, the federal government is either unaware, or has assumed an 
ideologically-founded, non-interventionist posture, eschewing IOT strategy,73 ignoring IOT risks74 and 
presumably, assuming without justification, that Australian tech-neutral consumer laws are adequate to 
meet an undefined challenge.  This thesis examines that assumption, identifies aspects of the challenge 
and seeks to evidence otherwise. 
 
As one of few legal studies of the consumer internet of things in Australia, this work fills a gap in scholarly 
literature by analysing the Australian legal literature, selectively synthesising voluminous overseas 
materials, and applying the normative values of the Australian Consumer Law Policy Framework 
(Framework) to the important question of whether the CIOT evidences problems which warrant regulatory 
action, based upon the smart car, home and self contexts.  In responding to this question, this thesis 
makes three assertions; each is fresh to Australian legal literature, timely in its contribution to a socio-
legal debate growing in urgency, and important to future consumer law and policy making in this country:  
- firstly, Australian consumers and regulators do not understand the adverse implications of this 
new panopticon technology75 which surveys almost everything and blurs traditional 
understandings of human autonomy and privacy, nor do consumers understand the adverse 
implications of CIOT through its related intertwined technologies. As Australia is on the cusp of 
widespread adoption, time for an informed debate in Australia is pressing;  
- secondly, Australian consumer and privacy law is inadequate to comprehensively address CIOT 
consumer detriments; and  
                                                          
72 The IOTAA formed in May 2015 under Communications Alliance auspices. It became a separate not-for-profit entity in 
July 2016, and describes itself as “the primary IoT industry body in Australia with members being drawn from a wide cross-
section of IoT service providers, vendors, consultants and suppliers as well as business, universities and consumer groups”: 
<http://www.iot.org.au/> 
73 Communications Alliance, ‘Internet of Things Think-Tank Highlights Need for National Strategy’ (May 2015 accessed 5 
Mar 2016) <http://www.commsalliance.com.au/about-us/newsroom/Internet-of-Things-Think-Tank-Highlights-Need-for-
National-Strategy> 
74 The 2016 Cybersecurity Strategy barely mentioned the IOT: ComputerWorld ANZ, ‘Cyber Threat looms large: is Australia 
doing enough to ensure cybersecurity?’ (July 2016 accessed 11 Jul 2016) 
<http://docs.media.bitpipe.com/io_13x/io_132733/item_1376580/ANZ_ISM_0716_ezine_FINAL.pdf 
75 Lux, above n 26.  
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- thirdly, there are practical, risk-management-based approaches to address CIOT policy making 
and better shape industry practices, if responsive ‘alliance-based’ regulatory and self-regulatory 
positioning is adopted, and enforcement adequately funded and implemented.  
Informed by aspects of behavioural economics, regulatory theory and the first emerging CIOT cases and 
product failure reports, this thesis concludes with a call for strategic policy and various regulatory and 
self-regulatory actions. It also proposes a series of draft principles for CIOT policy and regulation which 
synthesise established best practice by design, conform to the normative values expressed within the 
Framework and offer an improved prospect of protecting and realising the commercial and public interest 
in a principled, morally-grounded76 and trusted CIOT world. Through this approach, the thesis both 
celebrates and exposes the IOT in all its privacy-intrusive, consumer-abusive glory, and cast in the light 
of ACPF norms, puts the fundamental question – how, if at all, to best regulate an Australian consumer 
IOT – to the test. 
 
Thesis Structure  
The thesis has four parts, with eight chapters plus this introduction and conclusion.  
Part I defines important concepts and briefly outlines a macro perspective of the Australia’s CIOT 
economy; revealing the exponential projections which frame it as so economically attractive, and which 
may underlie less-interventionist political approaches to CIOT regulation. Chapter 1 proposes and 
justifies a(nother) definition to focus upon consumer interests. It discusses the scale and scope of the 
CIOT including the ‘monumental”,77 “mind boggling and ridiculous”78 projections to assess its potential 
consumer impacts, and takes an Australian consumer awareness snapshot of current and projected 
adoption, risk perception and prevalence, and consumer trust.  It also introduces smart car, home and 
self, as practical examples of CIOT adoption through which certain legal themes are later explored, 
including via the gap analysis in Part III. These ‘smart’ categories were chosen as they are contextually 
familiar, socially significant, and illustrate the phases of Australian consumer adoption (self), transitioning 
adoption (cars) and threshold adoption (homes).  Part II chapter 2 then adopts an analytical framework 
within which to consider the consumer IOT, which is used to explore and substantiate the evaluations in 
Part III and recommendations in Part IV.  Following that framework, Part III chapter 3 commences an 
                                                          
76 Above n 1. This proposition is accepted by policy-makers the world around; and is a cornerstone of the IOTAA approach – 
that consumer “trust” is essential. 
77 Linklabs, ’16 Ridiculous Internet of Things Statistics as we head into 2016’ (2 Dec 2015 accessed 11 Apr 2016) < 
http://www.link-labs.com/internet-of-things-statistics-2016/> 
78 Ibid.  
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analysis of CIOT ‘consumer detriment’, including certain structural vulnerabilities and complexities, such 
as (in)security, and big data (mis)use and breach, and intertwined adverse attributes of algorithms, 
analytics, anonymisation, corporate acquisition and the cloud. Chapters 4, 5 and 6 then address the 
efficacy of consumer law, privacy and contract consumer protection regimes against identified CIOT 
consumer detriments. Chapter 4 tests the ACL against known but also in novel or nuanced CIOT 
contexts; for example, a smart car hypothetical adapts a real-life crash scenario to illustrate legal 
deficiencies and impending challenges. Chapter 5 examines privacy in a similar vein, referencing recent 
cases, data breach occurrences and CIOT research; while chapter 6 analyses the detriments implicit 
within online CIOT contracting, using behavioural economics as an explanatory prism.  Part IV then 
concludes the Framework analysis in chapter 7 to recommend a policy-making approach and chapter 8 
details recommendations designed to meet the policy objectives. It also proposes a simple set of draft 
principles, reflecting accepted CIOT best practice approaches, and which might inform any regulatory 
approach. Finally, in conclusion, the thesis recommends that Australian governments and regulators 
engage in the international debate actively, conduct the national policy debate as a priority, assess 
potential CIOT issues early, work with stakeholders closely, and embed industry best-practice-by-default 
across the Australian CIOT marketplace. As the great electronic skin expands around the globe, it is to 
be hoped that Australian policy-makers and regulators will seek to ensure that Australian consumers are 
wherever practically possible, protected, as well as educated and informed, before venturing forth into 
the vast, waiting CIOT universe. 
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Chapter 1.  Scoping an Australian consumer internet of things  
We always overestimate the change that will occur in the next two years and underestimate the 
change that will occur in the next ten. Don’t let yourself be lulled into inaction.  – Bill Gates79  
 
There is a danger of trivialising the importance of the Internet of Things…80 
 
Capturing the Australian consumer internet of things (consumer IOT or CIOT) practically and 
conceptually, is not as easy as one might expect. There is no accepted IOT or CIOT definition 
internationally, 81 nor is there Australian-specific market research or studies, either as to overall status or 
future projection. Nevertheless, it is important to contextualize the CIOT from an Australian perspective 
to better understand its potential impacts: this chapter therefore briefly reviews selected IOT definitions 
and descriptions, proposes a more consumer-centric descriptive alternative, identifies CIOT scope, scale 
and stakes82 and outlines a brief macro perspective of the potential Australian CIOT economy and its 
place in the digital world.  
 
Its purpose is to define our terms as best we may, starting with the ‘internet of things’ to which the 
‘consumer’ will be attached, whether they like it or not.  
 
1.1 What’s in a name: the consumer ‘internet of things’ 
 The Nine Billion Names of God…83  
 
The internet of things84 has multiple names,85 a “global buzz”86 and no accepted definition.87 So too, its 
consumer incarnation, sold by its distinctive ‘connectivity’ and convenience. In this thesis, the terms IOT, 
                                                          
79 Internet Society, ‘Global Internet Report 2015’ and 2016 (2016 accessed 2 Sept 2016): 9 < 
https://www.internetsociety.org/globalinternetreport/2016/> 
80 Blackett, above n 19: 6. 
81 This view is incontrovertible at present.  
82 This analytic approach is derived from the NTIA, above n 48.   
83 Arthur C. Clarke, ‘The Nine Billion Names of God’, Star Science Fiction Stories No.1 (1953).  
84 No one really knows who first coined the phrase ‘Internet of things’ although Kevin Ashton first used it in 1989, so is the 
default inventor: Kevin Ashton, ‘That ‘Internet of Things’ thing’ RFID Journal (22 Jun 1999 accessed 3 Apr 2016) 
<http://www.rfidjournal.com/articles/view?4986> Cisco’s Chief Futurist prefers ‘IOE’ as it includes “people, process, data and 
things” - wearable/ health devices (people), systematisation or improved services (process), increased information capture 
(data) and greater internet connectivity via sensors (things): Dave Evans, ‘The Internet of Things: Connected in Four 
Dimensions’ Huffington Post (24 Sept 2014 accessed 2 Mar 2016) <http://www.huffingtonpost.com/dave-evans/cisco-
beyond-things-the-interne_b_3976104.html> 
85 Largely-synonymous terms include: industrial or physical or future internet, situated, pervasive or ubiquitous computing, 
cyber physical systems, ambient intelligence, Wireless Sensor Networks, smart object networking, machine-to-machine 
(M2M) communications, sensor-driven analytics,  ‘Everyware’,  the Web of Things, the ‘Internet of Everything’,  ‘Internet of 
Everyone’,  ‘Living Services” and amusingly, “bar code on steroids”.   
86 Rose, above n 10: 11  
87 Rolf H. Weber, ‘Internet of things – Governance quo vadis?’ Computer Law & Security Review 29 (2013) 341- 347 < 
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0267364913001015; IEEE, ‘Towards a definition of the Internet of things 
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CIOT, and ‘smart’ and ‘data’ are used as outlined in Terminology above. The author has sought 
consistency, reader ease of reference and consumer friendly terms over some which may otherwise, be 
more generally adopted in the literature. ‘Smart’ is adopted to prefix and distinguish consumer devices 
which form part of the CIOT; it is a term which locates them as connected akin to smartphones, is 
consumer friendly and both reflects and reminds consumers that these products, are both revolutionary 
and qualitatively different. 
  1.1.1 A simple description 
It is easier to describe what the CIOT is, than to locate a useful consumer-focused definition in the 
literature. At its simplest, the consumer IOT may be described as an expanding network of everyday 
consumer devices which are internet-enabled, 88 and so are described as ‘smart’.89  A slightly more 
sophisticated version is used by the European Commission: “all-embracing heterogeneous networks of 
smart [consumer] devices hyper-connected with each other via the Internet”.90 Those networks consist 
of a constellation of inanimate consumer objects – such as smart cars, fridges, TVs and watches -  
designed with built-in wireless connectivity, so they may conveniently be linked, monitored and controlled 
via the internet by consumers (often) using a mobile app on a smartphone or tablet.91  These devices are 
unique as they can record, collect, process, transfer and store consumer data continuously, unobtrusively 
and seamlessly,92 while relaying information back to consumers, cloud-based applications and amongst 
devices, through design features such as ubiquitous connectivity,93 intelligence, interactivity and 
autonomy,94 and unique95  internet-identification.96 Collected ‘data’ may include anything sensate, 
                                                          
(IOT)’ (27 May 2015 accessed 22 Mar 2016) <http://IOTbusinessnews.com/download/white-papers/IEEE-IOT-Towards-
Definition-Internet-Of-Things.pdf> 
88 Christina Mercer, ‘What is the Internet of Things? Everything you need to know about IOT’ Techworld (7 Dec 2015 
accessed 13 Mar 2016) http://www.techworld.com/big-data-what-is-internet-of-thingss-361109/; Note some IOT devices do 
not use IP or directly connect to the internet: Kayleen Manwaring and Roger Clarke, ‘Surfing the third wave of computing: A 
framework for research into networked eObjects’ Computer Law and Security Review 31 (2015) 186- 203 (accessed 9 Aug 
2016) <http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2015.07.001> 
89 Griffith Hack, ‘The Internet of Things: Smart Objects, Not-So-Smart Users?’ (16 May 2016 accessed 19 May 2016) < 
http://griffithhack.com/ideas/insights/the-internet-of-things-smart-objects-not-so-smart-users/> 
90 EC, above n 17: 2 
91 Walt Mossberg cited in Bonnie Cha, ‘A Beginner's Guide to Understanding the Internet of Things’ recode (15 Jan 2017 
accessed 20 Jan 2017) <https://www.recode.net/2015/1/15/11557782/a-beginners-guide-to-understanding-the-internet-of-
things> 
92 EU, above n 49.  
93 EC, ‘Commission Staff Working Document: Advancing the Internet of Things in Europe’ (19 Apr 2016 accessed 3 Jun 
2016): 6 <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/staff-working-document-advancing-internet-things-europe> 
94 Andy Mulholland, Constellation Research cited in Mercer, above n 88: 19. 
95 ‘Unique identifiers’ include RFID or (micro)processors embedded within products or on inventory by label and tracks 
products using radio waves. RFID will replace barcoding as it enables individual product identification- which vegemite jar 
amongst all the vegemite -  for example: Ava Itzkovitch, ‘The Internet of Things and the Mythical Smart Fridge’ UX Magazine 
(18 September 2013 accessed 10 Jun 2016) < http://uxmag.com/articles/the-internet-of-things-and-the-mythical-smart-
fridge> 
96 Mercer, above n 88.   
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measurable  or detectable: from the temperature of a home, to how fast a driver drives or the 
(geo)locations where a runner likes to jog. In this way, CIOT devices are uniquely intrusive; operating 
within many hitherto private spheres and specifically designed ‘always on’ to collect a consumer’s 
‘personal information’. That extends from geolocation, biometrics, personal habit markers, health or 
lifestyle information to detecting implicit ‘signals’ revelatory of preferences, interests, behaviours and 
inferable characteristics. In the simplest data flow, consumer data travels human-to-device- to-app-to-
cloud, and provides the consumer with a service, such as automation or data in a conveniently analysed 
and quantified form.  
Consumers provide personal ‘consent’ to data storage and uses by activating devices and/ or 
downloading apps subject to ‘terms’; usually by ‘accepting’ often linked, legalistic and lengthy device and 
app terms and privacy statements. Like all data in a (very) big data world, those consents usually enable 
consumer information to be analysed, amalgamated, anonymised, used for predictive analytics, 
behavioural marketing or simply, shared, traded, on-sold or transferred, across corporations, countries 
or across the world, in a multitude of transactions and for a multitude of purposes. It is a highly monetized, 
opportunistic, backend process largely unknown to and likely, unimaginable by, the average Australian 
consumer.   
1.1.2 A complex debate 
 
Now we have one name but can't agree on what it means.97 
 
IOT seems to be the accepted ‘name’, although ‘internet of everything’ is gaining traction.98 There is an 
encyclopedia99 of  “evolving, overlapping and inconsistent”100 definitions for the IOT, each a stakeholder 
prism of the “..infrastructure of the information society”.101 The IEEE studied over fifty authoritative 
                                                          
97 Bernard Cole, ‘Namedropping: the Many Names of the Internet of Things’ EE Times (20 Jan 2015 accessed 22 Mar 2016) 
<http://www.eetimes.com/author.asp?section_id=36&doc_id=1325245> 
98 E.g. Terrell McSweeny, ‘Consumer Protection in the Age of Connected Everything’ Keynote remarks, New York Law 
School (3 February 2017 accessed 5 Feb 2017) <https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2017/02/consumer-protection-age-
connected-everything>; Peter Leonard, ‘The Internet of Things (aka The Internet of Everything): What Is It About and Who 
Should Care’ (4 Aug 2016 accessed 8 Aug 2016) <https://www.gtlaw.com.au/?q=internet-things-aka-internet-everything-
what-it-about-and-who-should-care>; Cisco, ‘Internet of Everything: A $4.6 trillion Public-Sector Opportunity’ White Paper 
(2013 accessed 8 Apr 2016) 
<http://internetofeverything.cisco.com/sites/default/files/docs/en/ioe_public_sector_vas_white%20paper_121913final.pdf>  
99 The IEEE recently cited fifty(+) authoritative definitions: IEEE, above n 87: 10.  
100 Manwaring, above n 88. 
101 The IEEE identify definition focus points: sensing and actuation capability, ubiquity, architectural principles, platform or 
infrastructure layer, connectivity, data, enabler technologies, structural aspects (protocols, security features), architectural 
aspects (domains and abstractions, standardization network and communications factors), and so on: above n 87: 90. 
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definitions-  from the ITU,102 EU Research Cluster,103 NTIA,104 IEFT,105 to Cisco, 106 IBM,107 (and so on) 
– and then carefully, wrote two more.108 From the author’s review, it seems clear that each quite properly 
reflects stakeholder priority and ecosystem perspective, but few reflect consumer experience. Device 
technical attributes109 or connectivity predominate: for example, the European Research Cluster’s oft-
cited definition: 
 
A dynamic global network infrastructure with self-configuring capabilities based on standard and 
interoperable communications protocols where physical and virtual “things” have identities, 
physical attributes, and virtual personalities and use intelligent interfaces, and are seamlessly 
integrated into the information network.110  
While scrupulously accurate, the consumer-as-stakeholder or even as reader perspective seems 
particularly absent. Vodafone adds, “. that connects to smart things…111 after ‘protocols’, while other 
definitions insert elements such as security: “…the use of network intelligence, convergence, 
                                                          
102 “A global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting (physical and virtual) 
things based on, existing and evolving, interoperable information and communications technologies”: Global Standards 
Initiative on Internet of Things (IoT-GSI) ‘Recommendation ITU-T Y.2060’ (06/2012 accessed 2 Feb 2016) 
http://www.itu.int/en/ITU-T/gsi/iot/Pages/default.aspx  
103 Cited at n 110 supra: European Research Cluster on the Internet of things (IERC), ‘Internet of Things’ (2013 accessed 2 
Jan 2016) <http://www.internet-of-things-research.eu/about_iot.htm> 
104 “…the connection of physical objects, infrastructure, and environments to various identifiers, sensors, networks, and/or 
computing capability…”: NTIA, above n 48. 
105 The “… basic idea is that IOT will connect objects around us… to provide seamless communication and contextual 
services”: cited in IEEE, above n 87.   
106 Its definition (reflecting its commercial interests) is: “…the use of network intelligence, convergence, orchestration, and 
analytics added to a secure connection between devices”: Cisco, ‘Connected Athlete’ (2013 accessed 17 Apr 2016) 
http://www.cisco.com/c/en/us/solutions/collateral/service-provider/mobile-internet/white_paper_c11-711705.html  
107 IBM, ‘Submission to NTIA’ (2 June 2016 accessed 20 Mar 2017): 9 
<https://www.nist.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2016/09/16/ibm_rfi_response.pdf> cited in NTIA, above n 48. 
108 The IEEE adopted: “Large environment scenario: A self-configuring, adaptive, complex network that interconnects 
‘things’ to the Internet through the use of standard communications protocols… things have physical or virtual representation 
in the digital world, sensing/ actuation capability, a programmability feature and are uniquely identifiable. The representation 
contains information including the thing’s identity, status, location or any other business, social or privately relevant 
information. The things offer services, with or without human intervention, through the exploitation of unique identification, 
data capture and communication, and actuation capability. The service is exploited through the use of intelligent interfaces 
and is made available anywhere, anytime, and for anything, taking security into consideration.” “Small environment scenario: 
An IoT is a network that connects uniquely identifiable “Things” to the internet… [which]… have a sensing/ actuation and 
potential programmability capabilities. Through the exploitation of unique identification and sensing, information about the 
‘thing’ can be collected and the state of the “Thing” can be changed from anywhere, anytime, by anything.”: IEEE, above n 
87. 
109 “The set of physical objects embedded with sensors or actuators and connected to a network…” Center For Data 
Innovation, ‘NTIA Comment’ (13 Mar 2016 Accessed15 Jan 2017) https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/cdi-
comments.pdf at 8 <https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/cdi-comments.pdf> 
110 IERC, above n 103. This definition is adopted in Alexander Vulkanovski, ‘“Home, Tweet Home”: Implications of the 
Connected Home, Human and Habitat for Australian Consumers’ ACCAN (Feb 2016 accessed 17 Apr 2016): 10 
111 As cited in NTIA, above n 48: 6.   
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orchestration, and analytics added to a secure connection between devices…112 (Cisco) or identify the 
roles of software, big data and analytics (GSMA113 and IBM):  
The growing range of internet-connected devices that capture or generate an enormous amount 
of data every day along with the applications and services used to interpret, analyse, predict and 
take actions based upon information received…114 
In Australia, the Communications Alliance adopts the ITU definition:115  
A global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by 
interconnecting (physical and virtual) things based on existing and evolving interoperable 
information and communication technologies. 
NOTE 1 – Through the exploitation of identification, data capture, processing and communication 
capabilities, the IOT makes full use of things to offer services to all kinds of applications, whilst 
ensuring that security and privacy requirements are fulfilled. 
NOTE 2 – From a broader perspective, the IOT can be perceived as a vision with technological 
and societal implications.116  
 
This thesis acknowledges salient arguments against a non-sectoral117 or indeed, any IOT definition 
altogether,118 but given its nascent status in Australia, a definition is useful as an educative starting point, 
and this high-level definition allows for evolution, refined by important “qualifications”119 as to data, 
security, privacy and societal implications reflective of current consumer law and policy concerns. Of 
course, this begs the question as to defining the ‘consumer’ IOT itself. As an internationally accepted IOT 
                                                          
112 Cisco, above n 106.  
113 GSMA, ‘IoT Security Guidelines Overview Document’ (Feb 2016 accessed 2 Apr 2016):6 
<http://www.gsma.com/connectedliving/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/CLP.11-v1.1.pdf> 
114 IBM, above n 107: 9.  
115 “A global infrastructure for the information society, enabling advanced services by interconnecting (physical and virtual) 
things based on existing and evolving interoperable information and communication technologies”: ITU, above n 101.  
116 ITU, Ibid.  
117 Refined or sectoral definitions for CIOT categories such as smart home, self or cars (for example) may be more 
meaningful, given the diverse ecosystem of industries, devices, technologies and applications involved in each:  the NTIA 
propose that policy is better directed at “categories’ of uses and/ or devices, rather than all of IoT”. NTIA, above n 48: 7. 
118 The caveat is (at least) twofold: firstly, ‘consumer’ meanings vary internationally and which defects/ people attract legal 
recourse. The FTC approach implies this view: they define IOT descriptively: “…day-to-day consumer products and services 
that connect to the internet”, and communicate with other devices, us or others...”: FTC, ‘Careful Connections: Building 
Security in the Internet of Things’ (Jan 2015 accessed 23 Feb 2016) <https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-
center/guidance/careful-connections-building-security-internet-things>; their recent NTIA submission adds: “…the ability of 
everyday objects to connect to the Internet to send and receive data…”: FTC, ‘Comment of the Staff of the Bureau of 
Consumer Protection of the Federal Trade Commission before the Federal Communications Commission’ (27 May 2016 
accessed 30 Jun 2016): 3 <https://www.ftc.gov/policy/policy-actions/advocacy-filings/2016/05/comment-staff-bureau-
consumer-protection-federal> Secondly, device-based, use- based or other classification approaches are evolving. NIST’s 
2017 ‘foundational science’ creates a composability ‘building-block’ model identifying IOT or network of things (NOT) via 
“…sensing, computing, communications and actuation” attributes. It defines the “primitives” injecting “thing” behaviours, 
rather than a definition: Jeffrey Voas, ‘Networks of ‘Things’’ NIST Special Publication 800- 183 (Jul 2016 accessed 2 Oct 
2016) <http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/SpecialPublications/NIST.SP.800-183.pdf> See also Manwaring and Clarke, above n 
88.  
119 Communications Alliance, ‘Enabling the Internet of Things in Australia’, Geof Heydon & Frank Zeichner (Oct 2015 
accessed 3 Jan 2016): 116 <http://www.commsalliance.com.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0007/51991/Enabling-the-Internet-of-
Things-for-Australia.pdf> 
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subset, deemed useful to distinguish differing industrial: consumer policy concerns,120 the author thus 
proposes a simple descriptive snapshot definition: 
 
 
The approach attempts to define consumer experience within the ecosystem and to identify consumer 
law access points within the current boundaries of the consumer IOT. Those points include four structural 
aspects: the tangible element (the device), its embedded software and related maintenance 
requirements; the supply of digital infrastructures or services (via long-term contracts) and finally, the 
capture and exploitation of consumer data.121 Consumer law applies to CIOT by dissecting many of these 
elements or contractual layers: 
[C]IOT is not itself a ‘thing’, device or product … it is a conceptual structure consisting of tangible 
things (e.g. commercial and consumer goods containing sensors) ... plus intangibles (e.g. 
software and data), plus a range of services (e.g. transmission, development, access contracts, 
etc.…)”122 
This is assumed in this thesis,123 at least until the Part III critique, when those boundaries may be 
practically challenged and the extent to which Australian consumer law offers CIOT protection, may be 
tested.  
 
 
 
                                                          
120 NTIA stakeholder submissions support ‘consumer IOT’ as a category distinct from the industrial IOT for policy reasons, 
given differing concerns and implications over matters such as safety, privacy and security: NTIA, ‘Comments on Fostering 
the Advancement of the Internet of Things’ (15 Mar 2017 accessed 20 Mar 2017): 7 <https://www.ntia.doc.gov/federal-
register-notice/2017/comments-fostering-advancement-internet-things>. See e.g. Association for Computing Machinery US 
Public Policy Council Comment at 3; Cisco Systems Comment at 25; CompTIA Comment at 5-6; State of Illinois Comment 
at 20; Bugcrowd Comment at 3; Motorola Solutions Comment at 5; Secure ID Coalition Comment at 2; BSA The Software 
Alliance Comment at 5; and CDI Comment, at 11-12.     
121 EC, above n 17: 3. 
122 American Bar Association Section of Science and Technology Law, Comment to NTIA: 15. 
123 Smart health evidences that the distinction is complicating; when does a consumer device become medical or vice versa. 
At law, therapeutic goods requirements should apply, but may require refinement as device complexity increases. 
The consumer internet of things (CIOT) consists of day-to-day consumer devices connected 
to the internet which collect consumer information through sensors, often store that 
information in the cloud and provide analysed data to consumers on-device or through 
software apps, while enabling device and app providers to any of use, aggregate, anonymise, 
analyse, transfer or on-sell such information and data into the big data ecosystem for myriad 
purposes, subject only to applicable contractual and privacy terms, and consumer laws. 
 
[17] 
 
1.1.3 What’s in a name: the ‘consumer’ in CIOT 
‘Consumer’124 has many nuanced meanings internationally.125 especially in the multiple-layered, 
horizontally and vertically-integrated, IOT context.126 In this thesis, its meaning is drawn from colloquial 
usage and consumer law, as the context indicates. The principal legal definition derives from the 
Australian Consumer Law (ACL), with incarnations as ‘consumer contract’ in the Parts 2-3 unfair 
contracts terms regime,127 ‘consumer guarantee’ in Part 3-2 consumer guarantees,128 and in the 
‘consumer goods’ definition in Parts 3-3 and 4-3 as to product safety standards.129 Specifically,  ACL 
section 3 presumes130 an acquiring entity a “consumer” if the price131 of goods or services acquired132 is 
$40,000 or less; or alternatively, the goods133 or services134 (objectively assessed)135 are of a kind 
                                                          
124 ACL section 3 (1)(a)(i) states a person is taken to have acquired goods as a ‘consumer’ if the price is $40,000 or less, or 
where greater (b) the goods were of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use or consumption; (c) 
… consisted of a vehicle or trailer acquired for use principally in the transport of goods on public roads. The definition 
excludes acquisitions for the purpose of: (a) …re-supply; (b) … using them up or transforming them, in trade or commerce 
(as defined); or (i) in the course of a process of production or manufacture; or (ii)  in the course of repairing or treating other 
goods or fixtures on land. Goods includes ‘software’: section 2(e) and ‘consumer contracts’ are defined in section 23(3). 
“Services” are acquired as a consumer if they cost $40,000 or less, or are of a kind ordinarily acquired for ‘personal, 
domestic or household use or consumption’ 
125 Margus Kingisepp and Age Värv, ‘The Notion of Consumer in EU Consumer Acquis and the Consumer Rights 
Directive—a Significant Change of Paradigm?’ Juridica International (2011) XVIII 
<http://www.juridicainternational.eu/?id=14841>; Martin Ebers ‘The Notion of Consumer in Community Law’ Comparative 
Analysis (n.d. accessed 10 Aug 2014) <http://www.eu-consumer-law.org/consumerstudy_part3a_en.pdf>;  Waller, Weber, 
Brady, Acosta and Fair, ‘Consumer Protection in the United States: An Overview’ European Journal of Consumer Law (May 
2011 accessed 20 Feb 2016) <https://ssrn.com/abstract=1000226>; CI, above n 44.  
126 CI, above n 44.  This cites multiple tech factors which contribute to its pervasive consumer interaction. 
127 ACL section 23(3): “consumer contract” is a supply of goods or services … “to an individual, whose acquisition…. is 
[subjectively] wholly or predominantly for personal, domestic or household use or consumption’. This now includes a ‘small 
business’ contract’, for supplies of goods or services where one party employs less than 20 people and either the upfront 
price payable is $300,000 or less or the contract lasts over a year with an upfront price payable of $1 million or less: s 23(4). 
128 ACL consumer guarantees cover undisclosed securities (s. 53), acceptable quality (s. 54), fitness for any disclosed 
purpose (s. 55), supply of goods by description (s. 56), supply of goods by sample or demonstration (s. 57), repairs and 
spare parts (s. 58), express warranties (s. 59) and as to “services”: due care and skill (s. 60), fitness for a particular purpose 
(s. 61), and reasonable time for supply (s. 62). 
129 ACL s. 2(1) provides that ‘consumer goods’ are those either intended to be used or likely to be used for personal 
domestic or household use or consumption, if a mandatory or voluntary recall notice has been issued for those goods. 
130 ACL section 3(10) imposes a rebuttable presumption that a person is a ‘consumer’ if it is asserted that goods or services 
are acquired in that capacity. 
131 Sections 3 (4)- (9) provide for calculation of the “amount paid or payable”: acquisition not by purchase: ss (4); acquired 
together without allocation of amount: ss(5)- (8) and where credit is obtained in their regard: ss (9).   
132 The section refers to ‘acquired’ or ‘to be acquired’. 
133 ACL section 3(1). 
134 ACL Section 3(3). 
135 The court’s ‘objective’ assessment means that commercial grade carpet and insulation, and commercial alarm systems 
are consumer purchases, even where subjectively purchased by businesses for commercial uses or premises: see Carpet 
Call v Chan (1987) ASC 55- 553; (1987) ATPR (Digest) 46-025; Bunnings v Laminex [2006] FCA 682 and Crawford v 
Mayne Nickless Ltd (1992) ASC 56-144; (1992) ATPR(digest) 46-091, respectively. In that latter case, the court said that 
carpet does not lose its character as a personal, domestic or household item, due to any ‘commercial’ quality. Likewise, 
inherently commercial products or services do not become a consumer item just because their (subjective) use is of a 
personal domestic or household nature (e.g. a large tractor: Atkinson v Hastings Deering (Qld) Pty Ltd (1985) 8 FCR 481; 71 
ALR 93).  
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ordinarily acquired for ‘…personal domestic or household use or consumption’,136 subject only to limited 
use exceptions for goods137 (ACL definition). The objective nature of the assessment is expansive:138  
‘ordinarily acquired’ means commonly or regularly139 acquired, not predominantly,140 and the courts have 
found business purchases of carpet and insulation for commercial premises and uses are included.  As 
such, the focus of the second limb, is on the objective nature of the good itself, not its acquirer or their 
subjective purpose.   
While there is no industry definition of what comprises consumer IOT ‘goods’ or ‘services’,141 one 
European survey found fourteen types,142 of which the four most important are healthcare143 (e.g. ‘smart’ 
wearables such as fitness bands), home (e.g. ‘smart’ home whitegoods, heating, lighting, watering and 
security devices), transportation (e.g. ‘smart’ cars’) and personal/ social (e.g. smartphones, which through 
‘apps’ become vital CIOT consumer control and information components).  These are the CIOT 
exemplars used in this thesis. There seems little doubt that these devices are of the ‘kind’ of goods or 
services contemplated in the ACL definition:  smart self and home devices such as fitness bands and 
smart fridges will usually fall within the price threshold, smart cars mostly will144 or  will fall under the 
objective ‘personal, domestic or household use’ limb.145 ‘Goods’146 also inclusively147 mean software148 
which clarifies previous uncertainty as to whether ‘unboxed’ software internet downloads fall within the 
ACL,149 and is important given the app- integration of most CIOT devices and the related information and 
                                                          
136 Similar to that in section 4B of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth). 
137 Section 3 excludes certain acquisitions: above n 124. These are unlikely to be relevant to smart self, car or home, so are 
not examined further. 
138 It has been expansively interpreted by the courts: above n 135.  
139 Bunnings Group Ltd v Laminex Group Ltd [2006] FCA 682. 
140 Crago v Multiquip Pty Ltd [1998] ATPR 41-620. 
141 Bailey, above n 51: 1028. 
142 Pasi Pussinen and Hanna Okkonenm ‘Scenarios for IoT’ in Oleksiy Mazhelis et al (eds), Internet of Things Market, Value 
networks and business models: State of the Art Report (2013) 63, 64: cited in Ibid. 
143 As noted, healthcare may straddle the consumer ‘good’ divide; increasing device sophistication and reduced cost may 
mean medical profession purposes and personal domestic or household uses overlap - for example, a medical grade 
diagnostic smart self device versus smart self devices of increasing capability and accuracy. 
144 This assumes cars retain their present social role – questionable – given changing (shared or licensed) ownership 
models, and the proliferation of tangible goods embedded with manufacturer-owned licensed software. 
145 This includes a vehicle purchased for use principally in public road, goods transportation irrespective of price. 
146 ACL section 2 defines ‘services’ similarly to CCA section 4. As to ‘goods’, section 2 added computer software, second-
hand goods and any component part or accessory to, goods. 
147 The definition supplements the ordinary meaning: ASX Operations Pty Ltd v Pont Data Australia Pty Ltd (No 1) (1990) 27 
FCR 460, 468. 
148 Prior to the clarification, software supplied on a physical medium like a CD rom was a ‘good’:  Amlink Technologies Pty 
Ltd and the Australian Trade Commission (2005) AATA 359 c/f digitally downloaded software: Gammasonics Institute for 
Medical Research Pty Ltd v Comrad Medical Systems Pty Ltd [2010] NSWSC 267.  There is little consumer-protection 
rationale for this distinction: Jay Forder & Dan Svantesson, Internet & Ecommerce Law (Oxford University Press, 2010) [87]. 
Valve may have clarified the point with respect to software licensed and supplied online, overcoming Gammasonics.  
149 Prior to the clarification, there was doubt as to whether unboxed software would constitute a ‘good’:  Amlink Technologies  
Pty Ltd and the Australian Trade Commission (2005) AATA 359. As pointed put by Forder & Svantesson, Forder, above n 
148: [87] there can be little rationale for a consumer-protection distinction between software purchased from a shop and 
software purchased online. 
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other ‘services’ (in a non-ACL sense)  they provide.150 While the author speculated otherwise 
analogously,151 the recently decided (but on appeal) ACCC v Valve case affirms that software retains the 
character of a ‘good’ despite multiple service-like attributes such as internet downloads, auto updates, 
cloud storage, ongoing provisioning and a plethora of other “service-like” deliverables.152 This discussion 
continues in Ch. 4. So too, the legal point that many ‘apps’ are licensed free and are essentially, a license 
by subscription, which (despite no case authority on point) seems likely to mean that the inclusive ACL 
definition of “acquire”153 is broad enough to include the latter concept, and even the former -  where the 
mutual ‘free’ exchange is (effectively) commercially-valuable personal information or privacy-trading in 
nature. As this suggests, the CIOT acquisitions discussed will likely render the purchaser an ACL 
‘consumer’, such that the consumer guarantees, and unfair terms provisions will apply to CIOT devices, 
apps and any ‘services’. Further, consumers commonly use other ACL provisions – such as those 
proscribing provider misleading and deceptive conduct, unconscionability and false representations –  
even though not referred to specifically. As such, the ACL generally covers most individuals and SME 
businesses154 across the range of CIOT contexts contemplated here. To summarize, this thesis adopts 
the ACL ‘consumer’ definition when referring to the ACL, but ‘consumer’ may be broader in other 
chapters, to mean any individual who may be exposed to or affected by the consumer IOT -  for example, 
a person whose privacy is infringed, or one who uses non-consumer specific ACL clauses.155 While most 
consumers and businesses acquiring CIOT devices and apps within the smart self, home and car 
categories are ACL ‘consumers’ as acquirers of ‘goods’,156 others who ride in or alongside another’s 
smart car, or visit or work in smart homes or who may borrow smart self devices, are all (colloquially) 
‘consumers’ here too. Finally, reflecting that contextual, collective approach, the term ‘provider’ includes 
CIOT manufacturers, retailers, app suppliers, cloud and analytics services and other entities within the 
complex CIOT supply chain, unless the context requires more specific reference. 
A corollary to the definitional dilemmas above is the underlying regulatory question: whether the 
consumer IOT poses novel consumer social or technological issues, or those different enough to warrant 
                                                          
150 Most people experience apps, data analytics and downloads as ‘services’ – but only in the colloquial sense. 
151 See Kate Mathews-Hunt, ‘CloudConsumer: contracts, codes and the law’ Computer Law & Security Review 31 (2015) 
450- 477 http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.clsr.2015.05.006 The musing was in the context of cloud services: especially SaaS. 
152 ACL section 2: ‘services’ include rights, benefits or privileges or facilities to be provided, granted or conferred under “… a 
contract for or in relation to the performance of work … whether with or without the supply of goods…” 
153 ACL section 2: ‘acquire’ includes (a) in relation to goods – acquire by way of purchase, exchange or taking on lease, on 
hire or hire purchase; and (b) in relation to services – accept. Under section 11 references to acquisition are broadly 
interpreted to include the acquisition of property in, or rights in relation to, goods pursuant to the supply and includes mixed 
acquisitions including goods, property and/ or services. 
154 SME is used in the sense of sole traders, unincorporated businesses, up to corporations which are unlisted. 
155 For example, ACL sections 18 and 29 may apply if a tenant sharing a smart home is misled or deceived over personal 
data collection, or via misleading manufacturer advertising. 
156 Four Square Stores (Qld) Ltd v ABE Copiers Pty Ltd [1981] ATPR 40-232. 
[20] 
 
specific policy and/ or regulatory attention. Put simply, is there anything unique about the CIOT 
necessitating response or is it just “old problems squared”.157 This is considered next, as is the CIOT in 
its Australian context, to foreground the risk assessments in Part III and the regulatory responses 
proposed in Part IV. 
1.2 Scope, scale, stakes  
 
[C]IOT poses qualitatively different opportunities and challenges from those that society has dealt 
with before… because existing opportunities and challenges of the internet are emerging in new 
contexts, with greater reach and impact…158 
It is often asserted that the IOT is evolutionary not revolutionary,159 so at worst, may exacerbate existing 
legal and policy problems, but requires no government intervention or IOT-specific or even, regulatory 
change,160 until serious consumer problems eventuate.161 This justifies the ‘wait, innovate then regulate’ 
mantra162 - one which is rapidly growing thin, as the wait lengthens, known problem amplification expands 
and innovation strains legal boundaries. A more moderate approach is the view that there is no need for 
IOT-specific regulation, but as risks change across differing sectors, problems (evidenced market 
failures) may require industry self-regulation or principles-based approaches.163 This thesis argues that 
smart consumer IOT regulation needs both – and remedial legislative action -  because the CIOT is 
revolutionary for multiple reasons: it is global, it is ‘here’ already164 driven by provider industries and 
                                                          
157 Amy Collins, Adam Fleisher, Reed Freeman & Alistair Maughan, ‘The Internet of Things: The Old Problem Squared’, 
Morrison & Fleisher, Society for Computer & the Law (24 Mar 2014 accessed 22 Apr 2016) 
<https://www.scl.org/articles/3055-the-internet-of-things-the-old-problem-squared>  
158 NTIA, above n 48.  
159 Steve Case, The Third Wave (Simon and Schuster, April 2016); For a manufacturer’s perspective, see Samsung, ‘’Letter 
to the NTIA, US Department of Commerce On the Benefits, Challenges and Potential Roles for the Government in Fostering 
the Advancement of the Internet of Things’ (2 June 2016 accessed 26 Jun 2016) 
<https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/samsung_ntia_iot_letter_6-2-16-c1.pdf>; Part 2 
<https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/vc-kwon-keynote-remarks-6-2116.pdf> and Part 3 < 
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/samsung_iot_framework_paper_july_2016.pdf> 
160 Vulkanovski, above n 110. He concludes that CIOT has a “synergetic effect”, so will not raise (m)any new consumer 
issues – which justifies his largely consumer-beware, permissionless innovation-style recommendations. 
161 See the comprehensive work of US academic, Adam Thierer: Adam  Thierer, Permissionless innovation: the Continuing 
Case for Comprehensive Technological Freedom, (2016 accessed 5 Mar 2016) 
http://mercatus.org/publication/permissionless-innovation-continuing-case-comprehensive-technological-freedom; Adam 
Thierer, ‘The Benefits, Challenges, and Potential Roles for the Government in Fostering the Advancement of the Internet of 
Things’ Testimony Before the NTIA (1 Jun 2016 accessed 12 Jun 2016) <http://mercatus.org/publication/benefits-
challenges-and-potential-roles-government-fostering-advancement-internet-things>; Adam Thierer, ‘15 Years On, President 
Clinton's 5 Principles for Internet Policy Remain the Perfect Paradigm’ Forbes Opinion (12 Feb 2012 accessed 2 Feb 2016) 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamthierer/2012/02/12/15-years-on-president-clintons-5-principles-for-internet-policy-remain-
the-perfect-paradigm/print/>; Adam Thierer, ‘Technopanics, threat inflation and the danger of the precautionary principle’ 14 
Minn. J. L. Sci. & Tech. 309 (2013) <http://purl.umn.edu/144225> 
162 Ibid; Vulkanovski, above n 110. 
163 AIOTA, above n 49: 4. “Any regulatory proposal targeting the IoT should address only well-defined market failures that 
cannot be addressed through existing law and self-regulatory measures.” In contrast, their 2017 workshop acknowledges 
that such failure is sufficiently evidenced by a range of ‘problems’: EC, above n 17.  
164 EC, above n 17: 1.  In a consumer context, the IOT “will become reality within the next five years.” 
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almost before consumers or regulators have drawn breath, it is ‘urgent’ that it be acted upon to shape its 
future parameters and to protect the public interest, and it is contextually, qualitatively and quantitatively 
different in terms of its scope, scale and stakes.165 Further, CIOT consumer risk, legal and policy 
problem ‘exacerbation’ is of itself so quantitatively significant, as to also justify the epithet revolutionary. 
 
This section briefly considers these metrics - scope, scale and stakes -  illustrating each by reference to 
smart self, home and car - to support the conclusion that the CIOT poses qualitatively and quantitatively 
different challenges, with greater reach and impact and in new contexts, from those which Australian 
consumer law has faced before.166 
 
1.2.1 Scope  
In the near future, the IOT ultimately will touch nearly every economic sector and break every 
regulatory silo…167 - Samsung 
The IOT entails convergence between the economy and ICT on a “grand scale”,168 via the integration of 
more systems, devices, sectors and technologies than ever before.169 As the ITU suggest, the IOT has a 
unique capacity to “greatly integrate leading technologies” including those related to advanced  M2M, 
data mining and decision-making, cloud computing,170 privacy and security protections, as well as 
advanced sensing and actuation technologies.171 To those one might specify fields such as artificial 
intelligence, automated contracting, and big data analytics. This complexity, both interdisciplinary and 
cross-sectoral in scope, is transformational: impacting government,172 business, industry, consumers and 
civil society, nationally and internationally.173 It promises consumers benefits of increased efficiency, 
safety, cost, comfort and convenience. It presupposes new methods of information and awareness, 
                                                          
165 The criteria, not the analysis, are drawn from NTIA, above n 48 and Vulkanovski, above n 110. 
166 Australian data is used wherever affordably publicly available, but recourse to international studies is necessary. 
167 Samsung, ‘Comment to NTIA’ (13 Mar 2017 accessed 15 Mar 2017): 5 
<https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/samsung_commerce-iot_comments_2017-03-13-c1.pdf> 
168 OECD, Digital Economy Outlook, 2015 cited in Communications Alliance, above n 119.   
169 Four recent technical ‘trends’ are significant CIOT enablers:  (1) cheaper, smaller semiconductors which enable complex 
data collection;  (2) increased internet network capabilities from 3 billion users (2015)  to some 340 trillion, trillion, trillion via 
IPv6 by 2050;  (3) improved data management and increased storage using the cloud, open-source software and 
“commoditised hardware” to fuel “big(ger) data”;  and (4) increasing data analytics capabilities, machine-learning and 
algorithms.  Emerging CIOT-significant developments include artificial intelligence and dynamic human-bandwidth user 
interfaces – fingerprints, voice and facial recognition technologies. These rapidly-evolving technologies intersect with CIOT 
and increasingly intertwine within it, to create new forms of CIOT value and risk: Blackett, above n 19. 
170 Linking increasing data with the cloud “…makes the IoT so interesting.”: Phillip Branch, ‘Are we ready for a world even 
more connected to the internet of things’ The Conversation (20 Nov 2015 accessed 3 Mar 2016) 
<http://theconversation.com/are-we-ready-for-a-world-even-more-connected-in-the-internet-of-things-50889> 
171 ITU, above n 101, Definition NOTE 2. 
172 Increased scope requires “new forms” of cross government, cross-sector knowledge-sharing, alignment and 
collaboration: NTIA, above n 48: 4. 
173 For example, agriculture efficiency and productivity increases affect domestic industry (with related economic flow-ons 
internally) but also, international inter-state trade, especially where one country has a more integrated IOT culture. 
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through ubiquitous consumer sensor and device data collection, sharing and analysis, via “… every 
mobile, every auto, every door, every room, every part, on every parts list, every sensor on every device 
in every bed, chair or bracelet in every home, office, building or hospital room in every city and village on 
Earth…”174  Those methods enable far greater reach to intimate consumer data – inside home 
management and family habits, inside car driving ‘style’ and entertainment systems, and even, inside the 
human body. Its nature is pervasive, but also seamless and covert, such that consumers may never 
know - or may lose awareness - that sensitive personal information is collected at any time, by any thing 
and in any place”.175 
 
 
Graphic 1.1 (C)IOT creates a new dimension 
Source: ITU-T176 
 
CIOT’s contribution to (formerly) big data warrants special mention: from “3 V”177 to “5 V”,178 via vast 
volume, wide variety, variable veracity, high velocity and higher value. 179 By definition, ‘big data’ is “…any 
voluminous amount of data that has the potential to be mined for information…”,180 involves “gigantic 
                                                          
174 OASIS is a non-profit consortium which inter alia produces open international standards in areas such as the IOT, cloud 
computing and so on:  IEEE, above n 87: 21. 
175  ITU-T, ‘Overview of the Internet of things’, ITU Former ITU-T Y.2060 renumbered as ITU-T Y.4000 on 2016-02-05 
without further modification and without being republished. (2012) ‘<http://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-Y.2060-201206-I> 
176 Ibid.   
177 Data analyst, Doug Laney first named “3V’, that is, data that is large in volume, diverse in variety or moving with extreme 
velocity: Executive Office of the President, ‘Big Data’, above n 41 [4].  
178 Bernard Marr, ‘The 5V’s of Data’, (9 Apr 2015 accessed 10 Dec 2015) Data Science Central < 
http://www.datasciencecentral.com/profiles/blogs/the-5-v-s-of-big-data-by-bernard-marr> 
179 The world is becoming ‘datafied’, through vast data Volume, high data Velocity, wide data Variety, (variable) data 
Veracity – to create a (potentially high) Value data ecosystem, comprised of activity data, photo/ video/ image data, 
conversation data and sensor data: Ibid. 
180 Productivity Commission, ‘Data Availability and Use’ Issues Paper (April 2016 accessed 26 Apr 2016): 3 
<http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/current/data-access/issues> 
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digital datasets”181 and a “confluence” of near-ubiquitous collection, cheap storage and powerful new 
analytics capabilities – especially as to data fusion,182 inferences and predictions.  Data is” big 
business”183 -  the twenty-first century “oil” firing the combustion engine of data analytics.184 And big data 
was indeed ‘big’185 – until the IOT.186 From 4 zettabytes187 globally in 2013,188  it will generate a predicted 
44 zettabytes of data - annually.189 CIOT adds a novel, accelerating190 dimension: the capacity to detect 
functionally unknown, ‘dark’ personal information and to make it visible. From a consumer analytics, 
machine-learning191 and marketing perspective, the ‘any time, any place, always-on’192 CIOT, leveraging 
upon “open data”, 193 social media,194  other platforms195 and the internet, will be integral to harvesting 
more personal, hitherto private, consumer data than ever before. Big (projected) revenues support big 
player investment by Google, Amazon, Microsoft and Facebook,196 as well as a raft of IT, automotive and 
                                                          
181 Peter Hustinx, ‘Executive Summary of the Preliminary Opinion of the European Data Protection Supervisor on privacy 
and competitiveness in the age of big data’ (26 Mar 2014 accessed 6 Dec 2016) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:52014XX0716(01)&from=EN> citing the Art 29 WP, Opinion 03/2013: 35.    
182 Data “fusion” means combining data from two or more contemporaneous sources, to gain greater depth of insight – for 
example, combining smart home data with smart self and smart car data – plus public social media information (etc). 
183 OAIC, ‘Big data and privacy: a regulator’s perspective’ (10 Jun 2015 accessed 1 Sept 2015) 
<https://www.oaic.gov.au/media-and-speeches/speeches/big-data-and-privacy-a-regulators-perspective> 
184 Peter Sondengaard, Senior VP Gartner Research. 
185 Kate Mathews-Hunt, ‘CookieConsumer: Tracking online behavioural advertising in Australia’ Computer Law & Security 
Review 32(2016): 55- 90. Over 90% of global data has been generated since 2011, created by web behaviour, RFID data, 
location / geo data, environmental data, private/ public organisational operational data, user generated content, and 
research-based data: SINTEF. "Big Data, for better or worse: 90% of world's data generated over last two years." 
ScienceDaily (22 May 2013 accessed 2 Feb 2016) <www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2013/05/130522085217.htm>  
186 Tom Krazit, ‘The Internet of Things Will Make Big Data Look Small’ Forbes (3 Mar 2-16 accessed 3 Mar 2-16) 
http://fortune.com/2016/03/03/internet-data-structure/ 
187 A zettabyte is one sextillion bytes; that is equivalent to every person in the US taking a photo every second for a month or 
every letter in War and Peace multiplied 323 trillion times: EOP, ‘Big data’, above n 41 [2]. 
188 This includes voluntarily-uploaded data such as over 500 million photos and 288,000 video hours uploaded daily: above 
n 41 [2]. Another estimate suggests 2.5 exabytes globally daily (or 30,000 times US Congress library content): TechAmerica 
‘Mining the Big Data Gold Mine’ Time News Group Advertising Feature (2013 accessed 10 Apr 2015) 
<http://www.timeincnewsgroupcustompub.com/sections/120409_CloudComputing.pdf> 
189 44 zettabytes = 44 billion terabytes. The IOT will generate approximately twenty times the sum of all data existing in 
2013: Verto, above n 45.   
190 Productivity Commission (PC), ‘Data Availability and Use’ Draft Report (October 2016 accessed 2 Nov 2016) 
<http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/current/data-access/draft/data-access-draft.pdf> 
191 Tesla receives real-time vehicle data flows as to driver, driving, vehicle and road information, which it uses to improve its 
software, improve autonomy and (anonymised) as a revenue-source. 
192 International Telecommunications Union -T (ITU), ‘Overview of the Internet of Things’ (15 Jun 2012 accessed 3 Mar 
2016): 3 <http://www.itu.int/ITU-T/recommendations/rec.aspx?rec=y.2060> 
193 The recent Australian Public Data Policy Statement, mandates “non-sensitive” government data is open by default; it  has 
increased ‘discoverable resources’ from 500 to 20,000 since 2013: Malcolm Turnbull, ‘Australian Government Public Data 
Policy Statement’ (7 Dec 2015 accessed 30 May 2016) <https://www.dpmc.gov.au/sites/default/files/publications/open-
government-nap-consultation-print.pdf>  See also www.opendata.gov.au. 
194 In January 2015 alone, over 18 million Australians were online, viewing 28 billion webpages, over 39 million minutes.  
Social media use reveals 95% of Australians are amongst the 1.23 billion global users of Facebook, contributing to its 3.4 
trillion tracked ‘likes’ and to the mass of ‘personal information’ shared every second around the world: above n 185.  
195 For example, software apps enable geolocation and other personal data collection. 
196 The “fifteen most powerful IOT companies” are Amazon Web Services, AT&T, Axeda, Cisco, Facebook, GE, Google, 
IBM, Intel, Microsoft, Oracle, SAP, Salesforce and Qualcom: IDG UK, above n 40.   
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component suppliers. Like electricity,197 the CIOT will be less visible but increasingly socially embedded, 
such that most human internet interaction will occur through “passive” smart device engagement.198 Put 
simply, the CIOT is a data “goldmine.”199  
 
There are no Australian statistics as to CIOT scope. But by mid-2016, 46.1%200 of the world’s population 
and 85.1% of Australians are home internet users,201 and 18.5 million cars are registered in Australia.202 
By inference, this represents a baseline CIOT smart home and smart car market, which can only expand 
with industry maturity, through improved devices, marketing and consumer value-definition. The smart 
sectors examined in this thesis are briefly introduced here by way of scope, to illustrate how each sector 
so significantly, expands the whole.  
 
 
(a) Scope: smart self 
 
Smart self wearables straddle two converging legal categories: fitness and therapeutic goods (smart 
health), but this paper focuses upon the former, which are not specifically regulated.203 Devices such as 
watches, bands, jewellery and other ‘wearables’ collect human data as diverse as geolocation, daily steps 
taken, altitudinal (stair) data, heart rate, pulse, blood glucose levels, respiration, body temperature, 
galvanic skin response, REM, light and deep sleep quality and statistics, swim and bike tracking, 
kilojoules consumed and other physiological measures. Devices also seek manual inputs as to food 
consumption, mood, specific activities and personal goals, as well as create social-media networks via 
                                                          
197 OECD, ‘Internet of Things: Seizing the Benefits and Addressing the Challenges’ (May 2016 accessed 2 Aug 2016): 5 
<http://www.oecd.org/officialdocuments/publicdisplaydocumentpdf/?cote=DSTI/ICCP/CISP(2015)3/FINAL&docLanguage=E
n> 
198 Rose, above n 10.  
199 Kenneth Cukier cited in EuroActiv.com, ‘Economist editor: Big data is a goldmine for companies’ (6 May 2014 accessed 
10 Apr 2015) < http://www.euractiv.com/sections/eskills-growth/economist-editor-big-data-goldmine-companies-301933> 
200 Population projection is 7.432 billion, with 3.424 billion defined as “internet users”. 
201 ‘Internet users by country (2016) (accessed 10 May 2016) http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-users/ Note that the 
Sensis 2015 study showed 99% but that figure seems too high: Sensis, ‘Yellow Social Media Report’ (May 2015 accessed 
29 Mar 2015) [11] <https://www.sensis.com.au/learn/yellow-social-media-report-2014> ABS statistics show that 12.7 million 
Australian internet subscribers by 2014 end: Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘Internet Activity- Dec 2014) < 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/mf/8153.0/> 
202 ABS, ‘9309.0 - Motor Vehicle Census, Australia’, (31 Jan 2016 accessed 2 Sept 2016) < 
2016http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/mf/9309.0> 
203 Smart health devices are subject to therapeutic goods regulation – but smart self are not. The US FDA has an advisory: 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Food and Drug Administration, ‘General Wellness: Policy for Low Risk 
Devices’ (2016 accessed 2 Nov 2016) 
<https://www.fda.gov/downloads/MedicalDevices/DeviceRegulationandGuidance/GuidanceDocuments/UCM429674.pdf>   
Such devices fall within a non-regulated Australian category at the time of writing.  
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social rankings, challenges and discussion.204 This data is then (usually) subjected to the multiple 
provider transfers:205    
 
 
Graphic 1.2 Simple IOT data flow 
Source: GSMA206 
 
Smart self devices promise to revolutionise consumer health awareness by enabling continuous, real 
time health monitoring and analytics. Benefits include improved health outcomes through better 
consumer information., fitness and weight loss motivation and greater health status self- awareness and 
reduced life and health insurance premiums.207 Device data can also through wider connectivity, provide 
medical information accessible by doctors and others or trigger alerts through analytics, to enable 
improved diagnostics and medical services.208 In case of therapeutic apps, that data should be medically 
reliable; in contrast, smart fitness devices generally avoid that claim, though marketing representations 
and consumer expectation may differ. Recent cases on this issue are discussed in chapter 4.209  
                                                          
204 Andrew Hilts, Christopher Parsons & Jeffrey Knockel, ‘Every Step You Fake: A Comparative Analysis Of Fitness Tracker 
Privacy And Security’, Open Effect & Citizen Lab (2 Feb 2-016 accessed 16 Aug 2016) 
<apo.org.au/files/Resource/every_step_you_fake.pdf> 
205 As to apps, Fitbit is compatible with 37 different apps while Jawbone lists over 30: Thomas H. Davenport and John 
Lucker, ‘Running on Data: activity trackers and the internet of things’ Deloitte Review (26 Jan 2015 accessed 2 Apr 2016)16: 
9 <https://dupress.deloitte.com/dup-us-en/deloitte-review/issue-16/internet-of-things-wearable-technology.html> 
206 GSMA, above n 113.  
207 In Australia, Qantas ‘Assure’ offers health insurance via a third party provider which is allied to the Qantas fitness 
tracking program, and while premiums are not reduced, consumers are offered access to an incentivized points program, 
which includes recognition of their tracked success levels:  <https://www.qantaspoints.com/earn-points/qantas-assure> In 
the US, one insurer provides a free Misfit flash tracker to consumers who receive health insurance discounts or credits if 
they meet daily fitness goals: Charles Orton-Jones, ‘Ingenious ways wearables can enhance life and enterprise’ Raconteur 
Wearable Technology  (3 Sept 2015 accessed 2 Feb 2016) <https://www.raconteur.net/wearable-technology> Aside from 
brand enhancement and possibly commissions upon insurance sales, these schemes seem created to gather data. 
208 Australia has (arguably prematurely) established a national health database but controversially, has no resolved policy as 
to secondary use of health data and the National Digital Health Strategy is under review: Australian Digital Health Strategy, 
‘My Health Record’ (accessed 20 Mar 2017) <https://myhealthrecord.gov.au/internet/mhr/publishing.nsf/content/home> 
209 The most significant health data issues are security, accuracy and to whom it is accessible – discrimination is always a 
possibility. For example, consumers with device-detected, data-inferred health issues may face premium penalties or even 
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(b) Scope: smart home 
 
Smart home devices promise to revolutionise consumer home management and monitoring by offering 
improved comfort, efficiency and security through automation, as well as increased consumer 
convenience, savings,210 safety and sustainability.211 Foreshadowing data-informed learning and AI-
informed predictive capacities,212 smart homes will soon  “intuitively learn our habits, likes and dislikes 
and become tailored to our individual and changing needs…”213 For the elderly or disabled, smart homes 
offer improved independent living, by automating home functioning, and monitoring and reporting upon 
occupant wellbeing. Smart homes are born by either integrated design or the gradual connection of 
interconnected components;214 and hundreds, if not thousands, of smart home devices, are on the 
market, 215 from the banal to the eccentric.216 Most are individually controlled via a smartphone-as-
remote217 or via branded device ‘hubs’.218 For example, Google bought Nest for $3.2 billion to establish 
its smart home ecosystem,219 which is billed as self-learning, programmable and Wi-Fi enabled, operated 
remotely via its own and third party “Works with Nest”220 smartphone apps. Interoperable Nest devices 
                                                          
be denied (private) health insurance. Even were health insurers not able to access such data, query whether mandatory 
policy disclosure obligations may (in some cases) oblige revelation of such data. 
210 “By 2020, the connected kitchen will contribute at least 15 percent savings in the food and beverage industry, while 
leveraging big data analytics”: Gartner, ‘Gartner Says by 2020, a Quarter Billion Connected Vehicles Will Enable New In-
Vehicle Services and Automated Driving Capabilities’ (26 Jan 2015 accessed 3 Dec 2015) 
<http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2970017 
211 Atlantic Council, ‘Smart Homes and The Internet of Things’ Issue Brief (30 Mar 2016 accessed 2 Jun 2016): 1 
<http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/publications/issue-briefs/smart-homes-and-the-internet-of-things> 
212 “Living Services will intuitively learn our habits, likes and dislikes and become tailored to our individual and changing 
needs: Accenture, above n 24: 5.  
213 Ibid.   
214 ENISA, above n 34.  
215 Examples include smart TVs, security systems, thermostats, locks, smoke and CO2 detectors, lighting, home 
appliances215 (fridges, washing machines, toasters, fans, blinds, dog feeders, etc), meters, wireless key finders, power 
outlets, wi-fi sprinklers, garage doors and scales, door locks, smart light bulbs, plant sensors and include many other 
electronic items. ‘Smart TVs’ run entertainment apps (such as web browsers, on-demand internet radio, video stream 
services) as well as stream media. TVs may include built-in video cameras, microphones and voice-gesture recognition 
technology: Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘An introduction to privacy issues with a focus on the retail and 
home environments’, Research paper prepared by the Policy and Research Group  (February 2016 accessed 16 Aug 2016) 
<https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/1808/iot_201602_e.pdf>  
216 Postscapes, ‘Connected Home” <http://postscapes.com/connected-home> For example, water filters, sofas, menstrual 
cups and umbrellas… readers may pick which if any, fit either category. 
217 Lux, above n 26.   
218 Hubs include (for example) Samsung’s SmartThings, Google’s Nest and (Apple’s new) HomeKit. 
219 Nest’s products consist of the Nest Learning thermostat, Nest protect and the Nest cam. 
220 This is an API or “app program interfaces” program, which is the technical method to make devices ‘talk’ to each other. 
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include electricity meters,221 thermostats, alarm systems, appliances,222 air fresheners, beds, fans, blinds, 
lighting, garage doors, locks, leak detectors, sprinklers, toys, baby monitors, showers, lawns,223 TrackR 
for lost items, as well as offer syncing capacities with smart self devices and smart cars.224 For example, 
smart fridges can order food,225 and systems such as Amazon’s Dash and Echo offer automated re-
ordering systems,226 where routine home purchases are approved via smartphone and made M2M.227 
Similarly, Jawbone, can tell Nest you are asleep so it turns down the heating, while Mercedes smart car 
geolocation can alert the oven,228 lights and garage door when to operate, during the drive home.  More 
recently, Amazon’s Echo,229 Apple’s HomeKit and others deploy voice-enabled home assistants, but also 
record consumer voice communications to increase the collected data mix. For ease of operation, these 
devices seem likely to supersede non-voice devices in their direct consumer interaction capabilities.  
 
(c) Scope: smart car 
 
Smart cars enjoy substantial industry investment,230 inter-industry partnerships and supply chains, 
hyperbolic market expectation and international government support. As Delphi comment: 
 
                                                          
221 Smart metres have industry-changing potential: Victorian Government, ‘Victoria’s future industries new energy 
technologies’, Discussion Paper (Dec 2016 accessed 2 Feb 2016) 
<http://yoursay.business.vic.gov.au/futureindustries/application/files/8114/4823/4306/9186_dedjtr_vfi_document_new_energ
y_technologies_web.pdf> 
222 For example, hot water heaters, fridges, kettles and washing machines. 
223 See for example, the Edyn soil sensor that claims to monitor and wirelessly stream data such as pH, nutrient content, 
temperature, moisture and humidity data to the cloud. The efficacy of such newer products often face very critical reviews; 
e.g. Michael Brown, ‘Edyn smart garden probe review: A promising idea that needs time to blossom ‘ Techhive (23 Jun 2015 
accessed 13 Jun 2016) <http://www.techhive.com/article/2939022/edyn-smart-garden-probe-review-a-promising-idea-that-
falls-short-on-delivery.html>. Others include Parrot’s Flower Power, Rachio and Oso’s PlantLink. 
224 BBC, ‘Apple stops selling Nest products in its US stores’ (24 Jul 2015 accessed 2 Jun 2016) 
<http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-33655417> 
225 Keith Wagstaff, ‘Out of Milk? LG’s new smart fridge will let you know’ NBC News (7 May 2014 accessed 4 Mar 2016) < 
http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/gift-guide/out-milk-lgs-new-smart-fridge-will-let-you-know-n99531> 
226 https://www.amazon.com/Dash-Buttons/b?ie=UTF8&node=10667898011 
227 Note this is not M2M contracting; which involves no consumer involvement. But as consumer confidence grows, the 
transaction ‘approval’ step might be discarded; reflecting for example, current practices as to direct debiting bills. 
228 Interestingly, Australian regulation does not permit an oven being turned on remotely: Jennifer Dudley-Nicholson, ‘The 
Internet of Things is coming to Australia: Samsung plans to launch SmartThings Down Under’ news.com.au (23 Sept 2015 
accessed 20 Mar 2016)<http://www.news.com.au/technology/home-entertainment/the-internet-of-things-is-coming-to-
australia-samsung-plans-to-launch-smartthings-down-under/news-story/4d85fb3c24d6446543f104df6f5abb3e> 
229 <https://www.amazon.com/Amazon-Echo-Bluetooth-Speaker-with-WiFi-Alexa/dp/B00X4WHP5E>  Alexa can play music 
from Prime Music, Spotify, Pandora, iHeartRadio, TuneIn, and more; answers questions, reads audiobooks and the news, 
reports traffic and weather, gives local business information, provides sports scores and schedules, (etc) using the Alexa 
Voice Service, controls lights, switches, and thermostats with compatible WeMo, Philips Hue, Samsung SmartThings, Wink, 
Insteon, Nest, and ecobee smart home devices. New features are added regularly. 
230 General Motors purchased a self-driving startup called Cruise for $600M and spent half a billion dollars on ride-share 
company Lyft in January 2016: Alex Davies, ‘The Startup that could help GM beat Google to the Self-driving car’ WIRED (11 
Aug 2015 accessed 13 Aug 2016) <https://www.wired.com/2016/08/gm-cruise-automation-self-driving-vogt/> 
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"This trend is being driven by several factors, including regulators wanting fewer injuries and 
fatalities, city planners who want reduced congestion and reduced need for parking, and 
commuters want less traffic and the ability to more productively use their time during their 
commute."231  
 
Smart cars offer consumers safety, economic, environmental (energy), mobility and land use benefits.232 
Safety is their greatest public policy attraction:233 globally,1.25 million fatalities and 20- 50 million injuries 
occur annually.234 In Australia, 600 thousand car accidents annually cost the economy $27 billion,235 1200 
Australians die and an estimated 32,500 people are seriously injured.236 “Human error” is by far the 
dominant cause of accidents,237 and fully autonomous smart cars will largely ‘solve’ this problem238 - and 
more. Conventional driving entails driver costs,239 and substantial negative externalities.240 Smart car 
safety will increase with autonomy and C-ITS use,241 as the fleet242 changes over, and as road 
                                                          
231 Andrew J. Hawkins, ‘Delphi and Mobileye are teaming up to build a self-driving system by 2019’ The VERGE (23 Aug 
2016 accessed 15 Aug 2016) < http://www.theverge.com/2016/8/23/12603624/delphi-mobileye-self-driving-autonomous-car-
2019> 
232 Rand Corporation, ‘Autonomous vehicle technology: A Guide for Policymakers’ by James M. Anderson, Nidhi Kalra, 
Karlyn D. Stanley, Paul Sorensen, Constantine Samaras, Oluwatobi A. Oluwatola, (accessed 2 Feb 2016) 
<http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR400/RR443-2/RAND_RR443-2.pdf> 
233 Car & Driver writes with some irony: “Brainless driving is closing in on us like a meteorite because of its potential to avoid 
accidents. Sadly, we are a nation of mediocre drivers, distracted … and few of us are able to use the accident-avoidance 
capabilities built into every new car. Our driving errors cause crashes, injuries, and fatalities.”: Don Sherman, ‘Semi-
Autonomous Cars Compared! Tesla Model S vs. BMW 750i, Infiniti Q50S, and Mercedes-Benz S65 AMG’ Car & Driver (2 
Feb 2016 accessed 3 Jun 2017) <http://www.caranddriver.com/features/semi-autonomous-cars-compared-tesla-vs-bmw-
mercedes-and-infiniti-feature> 
234 WHO, ‘Road Traffic injuries’ (May 2016 accessed 10 Jun 2016) <http://www.who.int/mediacentre/factsheets/fs358/en/> 
Note that there are no clear global estimates of the costs of injury, but 2010 research suggests a 3% GNP cost, rising to 5% 
in certain lower and middle-income countries. 
235 Australian Automobile Association (AAA), ‘Benchmarking the Performance of the National Road Safety Strategy June 
2016’ (July 2016 accessed 20 Aug 2016):5 <http://www.aaa.asn.au/news-and-publications/reports/> Crash reduction 
reduces the emotional toll and societal costs – fatalities, personal injury, medical and rehabilitation costs, work-days lost, 
property damage and so on,  – that total $billions lost annually.   
236 No statistics exist: Joshua Dowling, ‘Australian road toll hits 69-year low but serious injuries from car crashes are rising’ 
news.com.au  (19 Jan 2015 accessed 20 Jul 2016) <http://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/motoring/australian-
road-toll-hits-69year-low-but-serious-injuries-from-car-crashes-are-rising/news-
story/24a1ad61b2cbccea58af36384ee15ecb>  
237 A MUARC Study identifies driver error - intoxication (13.5%), falling asleep (11.8%), fatigue (10.9%) as the dominant 
causation - the US Department of Transport claims (questionably) that 94% of accidents are attributable to driver error: 
Vanessa Beanland, Michael Fitzharris, Kristie L. Young, Michael G. Lenné, Corrigendum to “Driver inattention and driver 
distraction in serious casualty crashes: Data from the Australian National Crash In-depth Study” Accid. Anal. Prev. 54C 
(2013) 99–107 [626].  The remaining 6% are attributed to poor maintenance and environmental error. Product defects are 
the “unique cause” in less than 1% of accidents.  
238 Google research experience is that with a mixed fleet, baseline accidents will remain “unavoidable”, due to human error 
causing accidents and challenging smart intelligence adaptability.   
239 For example,  a Toyota Corolla costs $152.79 per week and Holden Commodore costs 214.42 per week, or $7,945 and 
$11,149 per annum over 5 years: RACV, ‘2016 Motoring Cost Report’, (2016 accessed 2 Aug 2016)  
http://www.racv.com.au/wps/wcm/connect/racv/internet/primary/my+car/Operating+Costs but in the UK,  average car use is 
approximately  only 5% daily: AA, Motoring Costs, UK (2014 accessed 2 Jan 2016) < 
http://www.theaa.com/resources/Documents/pdf/motoring-advice/running-costs/diesel2014.pdf> 
240 Rand, above n 232.   
241 These include V2V (vehicle-to-vehicle) and V2I (vehicle-to-infrastructure) communications technology. 
242 This is currently at 10.2 years. As such there will be some ‘changeover period’ unless people are incentivized to adopt 
smart cars or if a ‘bolt-on’ system can be utilised.  
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infrastructure is upgraded. Other benefits include:  improved driver convenience, services and 
entertainment, increased traffic efficiency, and increased car ownership and sharing economy value – a 
vehicle might independently uber-it by day until its owner wants it to leave work, for example.  It also 
promises less congested243 and greener traffic,244 and reduced consumer insurance premiums as liability 
shifts to manufacturers.245 The aged, disabled, young and immobile will enjoy improved quality of life. 
Aside from reducing the significant human and societal246 road toll cost, all these factors offer substantial 
economic and social benefits, which address negative externalities and pressing public policy issues: 
from the environment, to reducing health costs, improving recall efficacy,247 to improved transport and 
product safety. Further, there is concern that current safety strategies are flatlining: the 2011 target to 
reduce road deaths by 30%+ by 2020, sits at 6.1% by 2016 end.248  
 
Consumer experience promises reduced driving stress, greater convenience - and information. Just-in-
time data about vehicle safety, operation, maintenance, road systems, traffic; as well as a preference-
driven car environment, much like one giant smartphone. Google’s proprietary smart car algorithm is 
described as “…the connective tissue that combines the software, data, sensors and physical asset into 
                                                          
243 Rand, above n 232.  
244 V2V and C-ITS will utilise real-time data analysis to reduce traffic congestion, lower carbon emissions and increase 
transport efficiency through route selection. Vehicle control systems which manage acceleration in traffic flow will reduce fuel 
consumption and congestion caused by accidents on-road, and consequently improve air quality and decrease emissions.    
245 Thatcham Research estimates that premiums could fall by 50% by 2025 and 80% by 2040. Although claims will fall, 
insurer revenues may shrink: Neha Jain, James O’Reilly & Nicholas Silk, ‘Driverless Cars: Insurers Cannot be Asleep at the 
Wheel’ Bank Underground  (19 Jun 2015 accessed 2 Aug 2016) (https://bankunderground.co.uk/2015/06/19/driverless-cars-
insurers-cannot-be-asleep-at-the-wheel/>  
246 The lead 2010 US National Highway Traffic Safety Administration study suggests that the societal costs significantly 
exceed the economic harm:  societal harm totals $836 billion, identifying 71% of that harm to be “lost quality of life” and 29% 
($242 billion), to be from more direct economic impacts. Economic impacts of 242 billion include lost productivity ($77.4B) 
and costs such as: medical ($23.4B), legal, court, emergency service costs, insurance costs, congestion impacts ($28B), 
property damage ($76.1B), and workplace losses. At page 9, the Report states “Most researchers agree that the value of 
fatal risk reduction falls in the range of $5 to $15 million per life saved” and evaluates comprehensive costs (e.g. economic 
impacts and lost quality-of-life) using the 2013 DOT risk reduction value guidance.: L. J. Blincoe, T.R. Miller, E. Zaloshnja, 
E., & B.A. Lawrence, ‘The economic and societal impact of motor vehicle crashes, 2010’ NHTSA (Revised May 2015) 
(Report No. DOT HS 812 013). Washington, DC <https://crashstats.nhtsa.dot.gov/Api/Public/ViewPublication/812013> 
247 The speed, convenience and reduced cost of over-the-air software updates will greatly increase recall success rates. 
Note however that more traditional product defects – a defective tyre for example, will still require the car to be physically 
rectified, subject to robotic repairs. The average Australian consumer goods recall return rate is only 56.75%, Of 10,000 
recalls over 23 years, car recalls comprise 19%: ACCC, ‘Review of the Australian product safety recalls system’ (2010 
accessed 3 Apr 2016): 16 < 
https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Review%20of%20the%20Australian%20product%20safety%20recalls%20system.pdf> 
248 Ibid. In 2015-16 financial year, fatalities totalled 1,269. Australian figures (0.005% of the population) are dwarfed by US 
figures (0.012%): the US National Safety Council estimated 38,300 American fatalities in 2015 with 4.4 million “sustained 
injuries” resulting in medical consultations. The cost totalled $412.1 billion: (US) National Safety Council, ‘Motor Vehicle 
deaths Increase by largest Percent in 50 Years’ (17 Feb 2016 accessed 5 May 2016) 
<http://www.nsc.org/Connect/NSCNewsReleases/Lists/Posts/Post.aspx?List=1f2e4535-5dc3-45d6-b190-
9b49c7229931&ID=103&var=hppress&Web=36d1832e-7bc3-4029-98a1-317c5cd5c625> The NSC believes an increase in 
miles driven of 3.5% is behind an 8% increase in fatalities year-to-year. 
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a true leap forward in transportation.”249 That leap is already underway, despite some regulatory disarray: 
Tesla’s Model S is level 3- 4, and others are currently on-road,250 and in test phase. In the US, Google 
have 58 cars driving 20,000 miles a week,251 Uber are on-road in Pittsburgh,252 and Tesla stream over 
one million miles of data every ten hours.253 Software giants Baidu254  and Apple255 plan smart car 
releases by 2019, while Delphi and MobilEye plan an off-the-shelf self-driving system by 2019,256 Google, 
Nissan and Mercedes plan for 2020,257 with Ford and BMW for 2021.258 Tesla wunderkind Elon Musk 
describes full autonomy as ‘problem- solved’,259 and claims that subject to regulation, their Model X smart 
car will be on road between 2018- 2021.260 It is a Goliath’s race to see who first puts a fully autonomous 
vehicle into the consumer marketplace, one which pits silicon valley against traditional ‘auto’ 
manufacturers, but which may ultimately, find its resolution in alliance over competition.261 
  
 
1.2.2 Scale 
 
 “Why the IOT heralds a new era of computing is a matter of math…”262 
                                                          
249 Peter Sondergaard, ‘Big Data Fades to the Algorithm Economy’ Gartner Inc., Forbes (14 Aug 2015 accessed 6 Dec 
2015) <http://www.forbes.com/sites/gartnergroup/2015/08/14/big-data-fades-to-the-algorithm-economy/print/> 
250 Examples include the top range vehicles for most prestige marques, though there is no specific ‘level’ ranking: Sherman, 
above n 233. 
251 Waymo (formerly Alphabet/ Google autonomous vehicle project) drove 2 million autonomous miles by October 2016. 
252 Samuel Gibbs, ‘Uber riders to be able to hail self-driving cars for the first time’ The Guardian (19 Aug 2016 accessed 21 
Aug 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/18/uber-riders-self-driving-cars;  
253 Michael J. Koren, ‘Tesla has 780 million miles of driving data, and adds another million every 10 hours’ Quartz (May 28, 
2016 accessed 20 Nov 2016) <http://qz.com/694520/tesla-has-780-million-miles-of-driving-data-and-adds-another-million-
every-10-hours/> In May 2016, Tesla had driver data covering 780 million miles over 18 months. 
254 Baidu are a Chinese technology company. In March 2016, their plan was to put “commercial, self-driving cars on the 
roads by 2018”: Andrew Ng & Yuanqing Lin, ‘Self-driving Cars won’t work until we change our roads – and attitudes’ WIRED 
(15 Mar 2016 accessed 2 Aug 2016) < https://www.wired.com/2016/03/self-driving-cars-wont-work-change-roads-attitudes/> 
255 Alex Davies, ‘Apple better be ready for the mad world of Car Regulations’ WIRED (21 Sept 2015 accessed 2 Aug 2016) < 
https://www.wired.com/2015/09/apple-better-ready-mad-world-car-regulations/> 
256 The system is SAE level 4. The CSLP system is radar- and camera-centric, with LIDAR as a redundant sensor. Mobileye 
claim this will reduce costs to “only a few thousand dollars”: Hawkins, above n 231.  
257 Danny Yadron, ‘Two years until self-driving cars are on the road – is Elon Musk right?’ The Guardian (3 Jun 2016 
accessed 5 Jun 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jun/02/self-driving-car-elon-musk-tech-predictions-
tesla-google 
258 Hawkins, above n 231. 
259 Yadron, above n 257; Mike Ramsey, ‘Tesla’s Elon Musk says autonomous driving not all that hard to achieve’ WSJ (17 
Mat 2015 accessed 2 Aug 2016) < http://www.wsj.com/articles/teslas-elon-musk-says-autonomous-driving-not-all-that-hard-
to-achieve-1426624848> 
260 Elon Musk cited in Fred Lambert, ‘Tesla CEO Elon Musk drops his prediction of full autonomous driving from 3 years to 
just 2’ (21 Dec 2015 accessed 2 Aug 2015) https://electrek.co/2015/12/21/tesla-ceo-elon-musk-drops-prediction-full-
autonomous-driving-from-3-years-to-2/; Danny Yadron, above n 257. By mid 2016, Ford predicted a five-year time frame for 
its fully autonomous fleet on road: Alex Davies, ‘Ford say’s it’ll have a fleet of fully autonomous cars in just 5 years’ WIRED 
(16 Aug 2016 accessed 20 Aug 2016) <https://www.wired.com/2016/08/ford-autonomous-vehicles-2021/> 
261 Recent Navigant research suggests that traditional manufacturers are ahead of IT companies as to autonomous vehicle 
development, see Alex Davies, ‘Detroit is stopping Silicon Valley in the self-driving car race’ WIRED (3 Apr 2017 accessed 4 
Apr 2017) < https://www.wired.com/2017/04/detroit-stomping-silicon-valley-self-driving-car-
race/?mbid=nl_4317_p2&CNDID=> 
262 IDC, above n 21.  
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The number of connected devices in a rapidly expanding and changing international ecosystem poses 
significant challenges technically (infrastructure, stability, capacity, and resilience, etc.)263 but also, in 
terms of policy, regulation and governance.264 The scale is hitherto unimaginable: IOT projections are 
“monumental”,265 “at the peak of inflated expectations”,266  “staggering”,267 and possibly, “ridiculous”.268  
From one connected toaster (1990),269 to devices exceeding the global population (2017),270 and 
somewhere between six to ten billion today,271 the growth and future expectation, is exponential:  
 
 
 
Graphic 1.3  
Source: Adam Thierer & Andre O’Sullivan272  
                                                          
263 Communications Alliance, above n 119.   
264 For some important early articles, see Weber, above n 69; Weber, above n 87.  
265 Link Lab, ’16 Ridiculous Internet of Things Statistics as we head into 2016’ (2 Dec 2015 accessed 11 Apr 2016) 
<http://www.link-labs.com/internet-of-things-statistics-2016/> 
266 Gartner, above n 22. This means that early publicity produces success stories — though often scores of failures.  
267 Syed Zaeem Hosain ‘Reality Check: 50B IoT devices connected by 2020 – beyond the hype and into reality’ RCR 
Wireless News (28 Jun 2016 accessed 2 Aug 2016) < http://www.rcrwireless.com/20160628/opinion/reality-check-50b-iot-
devices-connected-2020-beyond-hype-reality-tag10>  
268 Link Lab, above n 265.  
269 Created by John Romkey, the toaster that could be turned on and off over the Internet. 
270 Gartner (2017) report 3.96 billion consumer devices in 2016 and a projected 5.2 billion in 2017. Total IOT devices are 
projected at 8.38 billion by year end: Liam Tung, ‘IoT devices will outnumber the world's population this year for the first 
time’ ZDNet (7 Feb 2017 accessed 26 Feb 2017) <http://www.zdnet.com/article/iot-devices-will-outnumber-the-worlds-
population-this-year-for-the-first-time/> 
271 ‘Internet of Everything Market Tracker’ in ABI Research, ‘The Internet of Things will drive Wireless Connected devices to 
40.9 Billion in 2020’ Press Release (20 Aug 2014 accessed 26 Mar 2016) <https://www.abiresearch.com/press/the-internet-
of-things-will-drive-wireless-connect/> 
272 Adam Thierer & Andre O’Sullivan, ‘Projecting the Growth and Economic Impact of the Internet of Things’ Mercatus 
Centre (15 Jun 2015 accessed 25 September 2017) <https://www.mercatus.org/publication/projecting-growth-and-
economic-impact-internet-things>            
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Respected analysts estimate between 15273 and 75 billion274 connected devices globally by 2020,275 and 
Statista project a 30% CIOT growth rate to 13.5 billion devices globally by 2020.276  
 
 
 
 
Graphic 1.4 Consumer & business IOT units globally 
Source: author using adapted Statista data277  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
273  See Statista, ‘Internet of things units installed base worldwide by category from 2014 to 2016 and in 2020 (in million 
units)’ (2016 accessed 20 Jun 2016) < http://www.statista.com/statistics/485203/iot-units-installed-base-by-category-
worldwide/>; Gartner are also commonly cited and predict 26B units by 2020: Gartner, ‘Gartner Says the Internet of Things 
Installed Base Will Grow to 26 Billion Units By 2020’ (12 December 2013 accessed 3 Mar 2016) 
<http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2636073 
274 Morgan Stanley cited in Hosain, above 267. 
275 Analysts use differing methodologies and definitions, which (partly) explains the disparities. For example: IBM (1 trillion 
by 2015), Ericsson (50B), Morgan Stanley (75B), Intel (31B), Cisco (40B), ABI Research (35B), IDC (31.8B), Gartner (19B 
excluding smartphones), Machine Research (7.2B M2M only), BII (23.3 B). Sources: ABI Research, above n 273; Irena 
Bojanova, ‘IoT and the ever expanding web’ IEEE Computer Society (14 Jul 2015 accessed 21 Mar 2016) < 
https://www.computer.org/portal/web/sensing-iot/content?g=53926943&type=article&urlTitle=iot-and-the-ever-expanding-
web->; Gartner, above n 273. This is thirty times the 0.9 billion installed in 2009, and as a result of their definitions, excludes 
a projected 7.3 billion market in PCs, tablets and smartphones; Intel, ‘A Guide to the Internet of Things Infographic’ (2014 
accessed 11 Apr 2016) < http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/internet-of-things/infographics/guide-to-iot.html>. See also 
Adam Thierer and Andrea Castillo, ‘Projecting the Growth and Economic Impact of the Internet of Things’ Mercatus Center 
(15 Jun 2015 accessed 3 Mar 2016) http://mercatus.org/print/1594637 and Hosain above n 267. 
276 There are no Australian CIOT projections; but taking smart meters as an example, 94 million were shipped worldwide in 
2014, with projections to 1.1 billion by 2020: Statista, ‘Smart Home’ (2016 accessed 30 Jun 2016) 
<https://www.statista.com/outlook/279/100/smart-home/worldwide#> 
277 Statista, above n 273 and Ibid.   
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(a) Scale: smart self:   
 
By March 2015, around 20.8 million people owned a Fitbit globally.278  Telsyte estimate 14% or 3.5 million 
Australians wear a smart wearable device, and forecast growth to 37% by 2020.279 Wearables 
(implantables and ingestibles) are by far the most visibly adopted, used, purchased and commercially 
successful CIOT devices: from smart fitness,280 to smart watches, smart glasses, ‘hearables’, head-
mounted displays,281 smart jewellery282 and smart clothes.283 A Fitbit can track steps, kilojoules and sleep 
patterns, and leads a billion dollar industry of over fifty brands284 tracking fitness and health data ranging 
from steps to heart rates, blood pressure, 285 temperature, haemoglobin levels,286 blood alcohol levels,287 
                                                          
278 “As of March 31, 2015, we have sold over 20.8 million devices since inception. According to The NPD Group, we held the 
leading position in the U.S. fitness activity tracker market, with a 68% share, by dollars, in 2014”: United States Securities 
and Exchange Commission, Fitbit Inc., Form S-1 Registration Statement (2015 accessed 31 Mar 216) 
(<http://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1447599/000119312515176980/d875679ds1.htm> 
279 Telsyte, above n 30. Examples included “Adidas, Apple, Asus, Fitbit, Garmin, Huawei, Jawbone, LG, Microsoft, Motorola, 
Nike, Pebble, Samsung, Sony, TomTom and others.” 
280 Market range (with features in brackets) includes:  Fitbit Blaze (Step tracking, sleep monitoring, 24/7 heart rate 
monitoring) or Alta, Garmin Vivosmart HR+ (Steps, sleep monitoring, 24/7 heart rate monitoring, GPS) , Garmin Vivoactive 
HR (Daily steps, 24/7 heart rate, GPS run/bike/golf tracking, notifications.),  Jawbone UP2 (Step tracking, sleep monitoring, 
smart alarm) and UP3 (monitors bpm, respiration rate, body temperature and galvanic skin response, it can give you your 
REM, light and deep sleep stats - Heart rate, steps, sleep) , Misfit Shine 2 (Step tracking, sleep monitoring, smartphone 
notifications, swim tracking), Moov Now (Steps, sleep, advanced sports coaching, run/bike tracking); Xiaomi Mi Band Pulse 
(HR tracking, steps, sleep, smart alarms, incoming call alerts); Samsung Gear Fit2 ( Steps, sleep, GPS and optical heart 
rate). For fashinistas, the Misfit Swarovski Shine (Daily steps, sleep monitoring and calorie counting) is remarkable; and for 
smartwatches, Swiss watch manufacturers such as Mondaine Helventica No 1 Smart (Steps, sleep, long battery life) and 
Withings Activite Steel (Steps, sleep, calories, alarm) are traditional but smart. For those who dislike a wrist-worn tracker, 
there are a range of ‘clip-ons’ such as the Jawbone UP Move (Steps, sleep, basic sports tracking). See Wareable, ‘Fitness 
trackers” <http://www.wareable.com/fitness-trackers> 
281 HMDs include virtual reality (gaming) devices such as Oculus Rift, HTC Vive, Sony PlayStation VR, and Microsoft 
HoloLens. HMD uses include equipment repair, inspections, maintenance; as well as viewing instructions and directions 
while performing a task hands free. The technology also enables car driving simulators, travel and retail experiences and 
any other application in which placing the consumer ‘there’ has a tangible impact. Lexus uses a driving simulator to test 
safety features: Orton-Jones, above n 207.  
282 ‘Leaf’ is a women’s health tracker which monitors activity (steps taken and calories burned), mindfulness (meditation), 
sleep (movement, duration, quality) and menstrual cycle (period tracker, fertility calendar) and has a six month battery: 
BellaBeat, ‘Leaf’ <https://www.bellabeat.com/>  
283 Examples include:  the Mimo ‘smart onesie’ analyses a baby’s respiration rate, movement, temperature and sleep 
patterns: http://shop.mimobaby.com/products/mimo-smart-baby-monitor;  Spinall towels and bikinis monitor sun exposure 
and remind users to reapply their sunscreen: Scott R. Peppet, ‘Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward 
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security and Consent’ Texas Law Review (2104) 93 (1) 85- 178: 88; Orton-Jones, above 
n 207: 5. Sensoree’s GER Mood Sweater measures galvanic skin response and depicts emotion via coloured lights - it is 
designed for Alzheimer patients to ‘verbalse’ their emotions and may improve care and carer workplace safety. 
284 This example is drawn from those on sale at the Rebel website on 18 April 2016: see 
<http://www.rebelsport.com.au/store/heart-rate-monitors/heart-rate-monitors-watches/41201?page=1&pageSize=12&sort=-
ProductSummaryViewsWeighted%2C-ProductSummaryViewsTotal> 
285 Withings cuff will monitor and graph blood pressure: <https://www.withings.com/eu/en/products/blood-pressure-monitor> 
286 Scanadu Scout can measure temperature, heart rate and haemoglobin levels <https://www.scanadu.com/devices.html> 
287 Breathometer was withdrawn after an FTC action as to its (in)accuracy (discussed supra) so the company is focussing 
upon its smart toothbrush MINT:  Jonah Comstock, ‘FTC: Shark Tank star Breathometer must offer full refunds for 
inaccurate smartphone breathalyzer’ mobihealthnews (24 Jan 2017 accessed 22 Feb 2017) 
<http://www.mobihealthnews.com/content/ftc-shark-tank-star-breathometer-must-offer-full-refunds-inaccurate-smartphone-
breathalyzer>    
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oral health,288 blood glucose levels,289 offer GPS speed, distance and route tracking,290 to women’s 
fertility and PMS.291  Training devices use real time “kinetic feedback”292 to detect acceleration, jump 
height, speed, spin and ball strike point,293 record work-out data, prescribe training plans, as well as 
calories and work-out intensity.294  In 2016, Gartner forecast 18.4% growth in worldwide sales, to reach 
274.6 million wearable electronic devices.295 Forecast revenue is $28.7 billion296 and fitness wearables 
continue to increase in popularity due to growing smart watch sales and improving functionality.297   
 
(b) Scale: smart home 
 
In Australia, smart homes are on the cusp. So, there are no statistics298 and few predictions, save for 
Telsyte’s estimate for smart household device growth from 9299 to 28.7 by 2020,300 which roughly equates 
to 25 million smart home devices nationally in two short years.301  Frost & Sullivan predict the smart home 
                                                          
288 iBGStar <http://www.bgstar.com.au/web/ibgstar> 
289 Glow <https://glowing.com/glow> 
290 Adidas offer a miCoach Smart Watch Run with music, heart rate sensor, recorded work-out data, training plans together 
with for runners; C-Cell tracks heart rate, acceleration and jump height; their heart rate monitor measures calories and work-
out intensity and their Smart Ball provides “instant feedback on the speed, spin and strike point of dead ball kicks”.     
291 Glow monitors via thermometer devices and analytic apps. Kindara is another fertility app which is essentially a “smart” 
rhythm method via IOT thermometers, and are the second most downloaded apps on itunes. 
292 For example, Adidas Smart Ball provides “instant feedback on the speed, spin and strike point of dead ball kicks”:  
Adidas, ‘Fit Smart’ (n.d. accessed 17 Apr 2016) < http://www.adidas.com.au/micoach> Others include LifeBEAM bike helmet 
which tracks blood flow, oxygen saturation and heart rate for cyclists. Sensors are now in shoes, racquets and golf clubs – 
which all measure and monitor performance: Stephen Pritchard, ‘The Internet of things is revolutionizing the world of sport’ 
The Guardian (2 Mar 2015 accessed 17 Apr 2016) < https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/02/internet-of-
things-sport-six-nations> 
293 Adidas miCoach Smart Watch Run. 
294 Adidas C-Cell tracks heart rate, acceleration and jump height; their heart rate monitor measures calories and work-out 
intensity 
295 Note this still lags behind smartphone sales which are projected to reach $374 million in 2016: Gartner, ‘‘Gartner Says 
Worldwide Wearable Devices Sales to Grow 18.4 Percent in 2016’ Press Release (2 Feb 2016 accessed 29 Mar 2016) < 
http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3198018> 
296 Ibid.   
297 Gartner predict that smartwatch sales will overtake smart bands significantly 2016-17, subject to the latter developing 
mobile payments, safety, access, health and wellness, to increase their market penetration: Ibid.  
298 As previously noted, there may be paid reports including such data unavailable to the author. 
299 The figures exclude: home computers (1.9), smartphones (1.9) and tablets (1.3), but include game consoles (0.7), smart 
TV (0.3), toys (0.2), smart appliances (0.1) and other (1.6).  For contrast, in the US, Altimeter found that 75% of Americans 
own a smartphone containing 7- 14 sensors, and 70% own at least one other CIOT device, with 87% owning three or fewer 
such devices - including smart game consoles (28%), smart TV (23%), wearables (7%), connected car or appliance (4%), 
home automation (3%) and other ‘smart’ product (15%).  
300 Telsyte, ‘Internet Uninterrupted Australian households of the Digital Future’ (2015 accessed 3 Dec 2015): 
http://www.nbnco.com.au/content/dam/nbnco2/documents/Internet%20Uninterrupted%20Australian%20Households%20of%
20the%20Connected%20Future.pdf> 
301 The calculation uses ABS statistics as to household numbers (9.2 in 2016 to 10.1M in 2021) multiplied by 24: ABS, 
‘Household projections’ (2015 accessed 2 Jun 2016) < 
http://www.abs.gov.au/ausstats/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/3236.0Main%20Features42011%20to%202036?opendocument&t
abname=Summary&prodno=3236.0&issue=2011%20to%202036&num=&view=>. Telsyte predict that value chain vendors 
will include manufacturers, retailers, ISPs, cloud software providers, utilities, electricians and security consultants. 
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market will reach $200 million by 2020,302 while Telsyte add (broad) value-chain ‘services’ to predict 
growth to $3.2 billion by 2019.303 In scale, Australia’s market is nascent: SmartThings and Google Nest 
will launch in 2017, bringing more of a global smart home industry projected to reach US$53.45 billion in 
2022.304 Voice assistants are the latest trend, with a recent report predicting 33 million in US homes by 
2017 end.305 
 
(c) Scale: smart car 
 
Valued at $18 billion in 2012, the smart car market is predicted to triple by 2018. Predictions are that 20% 
of cars will be internet-connected by 2020,306  and by 2025, all new cars will exhibit IOT connectivity 
through the ‘black box’ Event Data Recorder (EDR), C-ITS and/ or telematics.307 There are no ‘smart car’ 
statistics for Australia yet: though most new models exhibit connectivity and premium marques have level 
3 and (possibly) 4 autonomous vehicles on road. Estimates suggest 583- 600 Tesla vehicles were on-
road in Australia by January 2016,308 with around 150,000 sold internationally at 2016 end.309  Smart car 
connectivity is also an important feature as to scale: these systems record vehicle data, “talk” together, 
alert drivers to accidents, communicate with road infrastructure such as traffic lights as to traffic updates 
and re-routing alerts – as well as monitor the driving and vehicle function, communicate with the 
                                                          
302 Stuart Corner, ‘Aussie IoT in the home spend tipped to top $200m in 2020’ (6 November 2015 accessed 2 Feb 2016) 
https://www.iotaustralia.org.au/2015/11/06/iot-facts-and-forecasts/aussie-iot-in-the-home-spend-tipped-to-top-200m-in-2020/ 
citing Frost & Sullivan study. 
303 Telsyte, above n 300. ‘The CIOT value chain includes ISPs, manufacturers, retailers, (cloud) software-as-a-service 
providers, utilities, tradespeople and consultants. 
304 14.5% CAGR between 2017- 2022: Zion Market Research, ‘Smart Home Market (Smart Kitchen, Security & Access 
Control, Lighting Control, Home Healthcare, HVAC Control and Others): Global Industry Perspective, Comprehensive 
Analysis and Forecast, 2016-2022’, (18 Jan 2017 accessed 2 Mar 2017) 
<https://www.zionmarketresearch.com/report/smart-home-market> 
305 Voicelabs, ‘The 2017 Voice Report’ (15 Jan 2017 accessed 2 Mar 2017) <http://voicelabs.co/2017/01/15/the-2017-voice-
report/> 
306 This is 20% of the fleet: Gartner, above n 210, cited in BusinessWire, ‘Automotive Industry Adopts GSMA Embedded Sim 
Specification To Accelerate Connected Car Market’ (10 Feb 2016 accessed 3 Mar 2016) 
<http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160210005587/en/Automotive-Industry-Adopts-GSMA-Embedded-SIM-
Specification> Machina Research predict over 693 million car connections by 2020: Machina Research, 
<https://machinaresearch.com/> cited in BusinessWire, ‘Automotive Industry Adopts GSMA Embedded Sim Specification to 
Accelerate Connected Car Market’ (10 Feb 2016 accessed 3 Mar 2016) < 
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20160210005587/en/Automotive-Industry-Adopts-GSMA-Embedded-SIM-
Specification> 
307 GSMA, ‘Connected Car Forecast: Global Connected Car Market to Grow Threefold Within Five Years’ (3 Feb 2013 
accessed 10 Dec 2015) <https://www.gsma.com/iot/wp-content/uploads/2013/06/cl_ma_forecast_06_13.pdf> 
308 Harry Trucker, ‘This is how many Tesla cars are in Australia’ The Australian Business Review (4 Jan 2016 accessed 22 
Jan 2017) <https://www.businessinsider.com.au/this-is-how-many-tesla-cars-are-in-australia-2016-1> 
309 There are no VFACTS figures for Tesla’s Australia sales as it does not participate, but electric vehicle sales are generally 
low due to insufficient charging infrastructure (beyond NSW and Victoria) and price. 
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manufacturer, and to the vast smart world beyond. Lawson’s fine analysis depicts the scale of this 
information ecosystem as follows: 
  
 
 
Graphic 1.5 Connected car data flows 
Source: P. Lawson310 
 
 
In other words, smart car scale, influence and systems are extensive. Complex data flows and supply 
chain interactions allow important data as to car systems, driver style (e.g. braking severity, response 
times etc.) and functioning, geolocation, and driver smartphone information such as social media and 
contacts, to flow seamlessly to car manufacturers, dealers (retailers) and others. Where it goes thereafter 
remains technically, subject to contracts, consents and voluntary industry practice. 
 
 
(d) Scale: on the money…  
                                                          
310 Lawson, above n 36. Graphic licensed to the public through a Creative Commons Attribution NonCommercial 2.5 Canada 
license (CC BY-NC 2.5 CA) < https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc/2.5/ca/>  
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Overall CIOT economic projections are exponential, but also conflicting.311 Internationally, Verizon 
predicts $1.3 trillion (2019), 312 Gartner $1.9 trillion (2020) 313 and McKinsey $11.1 trillion (2025) or 11% 
of the global economy. 314 The expected EU market value exceeds one trillion euros in 2020.315 As no 
useful Australian data exists,316 a rather questionable adaption of international projections317 yields a 
$165 billion benefit by 2022318 and a total potential annual impact of $45 - 116 billion by 2025.319 Of this, 
CIOT value across only three settings is $9.5 – 39 billion: the smart home ($3- 5 billion),320 smart 
(autonomous) vehicles ($4 – 10 billion) and smart health and fitness ($2.5 – 24 billion).321 
Communications Alliance report that consumers may gain most, and infers “a potentially realizable $100 
billion” benefit to the Australian economy by 2025.322 Today, that represents almost 10% of Australian 
                                                          
311 Put simply, these depend on multiple factors including how the analyst defines the IOT and economic value, as a start. 
Note also that Metcalfe’s Law is said to apply to IOT “value”; that is, that the telecommunications network value is 
proportional to the square of the number of connected users of the system; so IOT’s connectivity presages its value. 
312 Figures are based upon an estimated compound annual growth rate of 17%. See Verizon, ‘2016: ready, set, go for the 
Internet of things’ (2016 accessed 11 Apt 2016) < http://www.verizonenterprise.com/verizon-insights/state-of-market-
internet-of-things/2016/>; Verizon, ‘Impact of the Internet of things on Consumers’ Insights podcast with Ohad Zeira  (2016 
accessed 11 April 2016) http://www.verizon.com/about/sites/default/files/state-of-the-internet-of-things-market-report-
2016.pdf; Verizon, ‘Value of IoT: The next step for IoT is predictive and prescriptive data analytics’  Insights podcast with 
Ashok Srivastava  (2016 accessed 11 April 2016) < http://www.verizon.com/about/sites/default/files/state-of-the-internet-of-
things-market-report-2016.pdf>; Verizon, ‘State of the Market: Internet of Things 2016’ (2016 accessed 11 April 2016) 
<http://www.verizon.com/about/sites/default/files/state-of-the-internet-of-things-market-report-2016.pdf> 
313 Gartner also include “incremental value”, “value adds” and “value at stake”, whereby IOT product and services will 
generate over $300 billion in incremental value. Of the $1.9T, sectoral breakdown includes manufacturing (15%), healthcare 
(15%) or insurance (11%) as the leading “verticals”: Gartner, above n 273. For businesses, benefits will include increased 
efficiency (82%), product quality (49%) and customer satisfaction (45%): Verizon, above n 312.  
314 McKinsey, above n 22 and 28. 
315 IDC Italia S.r.L and TXT e-solutions S.P.A., Definition of a Research and Innovation Policy Leveraging Cloud Computing 
and IoT Combination (13 May 2015 accessed 2 Feb 2016) <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/news/definition-
research-and-innovation-policy-leveraging-cloud-computing-and-iot-combination> 
316 Recent Australian Government Asia-Pacific figures project that by 2030, “disruptive business models” including the IOT, 
could collectively create up to $625 billion pa, or 12% of total regional GDP: Australian Government, ‘Australia’s Cyber 
Security Strategy’ (2016 accessed 22 Apr 20-16): 8 <https://cybersecuritystrategy.dpmc.gov.au/assets/pdfs/dpmc-cyber-
strategy.pdf> 
317 Assumptions include using McKinsey estimates and a GDP of 1.15%: Communications Alliance, above n 119: 67.  
318 Cisco cite five main values which fuel the $14.4 trillion figure: asset utilization/ cost reduction ($2.5 trillion); employee 
productivity/ labour efficiency ($2.5 trillion); eliminating waste in supply chain and logistics ($2.7 trillion), customer increase 
($3.7 trillion) and innovation(n.d.):  Cisco, above n 13: 68.   
319  Using a nine-industry sectoral view:  vehicles (autonomous vehicles and condition-based maintenance), home (chore 
automation and security), offices (security and energy), factories operations and equipment optimization), retail 
environments (automated checkouts), worksites (operations optimization and health and safety), human (health and fitness), 
outside (logistics and navigation) and cities (public health and transport): Ibid 67.  
320 Telsyte forecast that by 2019, Australian home spend will grow from $289 million to $3.2 billion, driven by new products 
and services – and reflecting the increasing “bake in” of new device connectivity:  Telsyte, above n 31. Telsyte identify five 
key home market segments: smart lifestyle (appliances, gardening) – $1.2B, smart home services (installation, management 
and cloud services) - $812M, smart security (alarms, cameras, sensors, smart locks) - $416M, smart energy (sensors, 
outlets, light bulbs) - $658M and smart hubs (such as Google’s Nest) - $64M. To put the $3.2B  in context, Australia’s overall 
retail spend in 2014 was $275 billion: Ferrier Hodgson, ‘Australian retail 20915: Welcome to the Hunger Games!’ (Feb 2015 
accessed 26 Apr 2016): 6.  
321 Ibid. 
322 Observation 22, Ibid 68. Note that the Report makes it clear these are estimates and does not suggest they are anything 
other than the best they can do, absent an Australian economic study. 
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GDP.323 In summary, most if not all analysts agree that there will be billions of CIOT devices by 2020, 
yielding billions in revenue across the globe; and it seems that most discrepancies in how many billions 
relate to how each analyst defines the IOT, CIOT or economic value,324 - not whether or not, those billions 
will exist. 
 
 
1.2.3 Stakes  
 
50 billion connected things by 2020 means 50 billion data collection points, attack platforms, 
vulnerabilities, and opportunities…325 
 
From a consumer perspective, the CIOT ecosystem more than amplifies internet problems and stakes. 
326 The NHTSA finds “… unprecedented effects”:327 the NTIA finds a “qualitative change” in connectivity, 
the “"inextricable mixture of [connected] hardware, software, data and service"328 poses new legal issues, 
and greater personal data volume, retention, accessibility and processing adds to greater granularity as 
to individual and collective behaviours, analysed and manipulated via big data and emerging technologies 
analysis. While collectively ‘synergetic”,329 these factors combine with rapidly growing connectivity to 
create new potentials for consumer physical and financial harms through device malfunction or analytic 
error, data breach or national security attacks, and shift the privacy and security paradigm. Legally, the 
EU Article 29 Working Party locate many “novel liability aspects”:330  
➢ systemic dependence upon the cloud, with its known vulnerabilities;331 
➢ wi-fi/ Bluetooth and apps with their associated vulnerabilities,332  
                                                          
323 Trading Economics, ‘Australia Economic Forecasts 2016-2020 Outlook’ (2016 accessed 10 Nov 2016) 
<http://www.tradingeconomics.com/australia/forecast> 
324 For example, Gartner excludes PCs, tablets and smartphones from its definition. See the discussion as to defining the 
IOT above. 
325 Alexander Vulkanovski, “Presentation to ACCAN Conference, Connecting the Future Consumer” (2016 accessed 2 Oct 
2016) Email to author. 
326 Collins, above n 157.  
327 NHTSA, ‘Federal Automated Vehicles Policy: Accelerating the Next Revolution in Road Safety’ (Sept 2016 accessed 22 
Nov 2016): ES-3 <https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/AV%20policy%20guidance%20PDF.pdf>  
328 Guido Noto La Diega & Ian Walden, ‘Contracting for the ‘Internet of Things’: Looking into the Nest’, Queen Mary 
University of London, School of Law, Legal Studies Research Paper No. 219/2016 (1 Feb 2016 accessed 3 Mar 2016) 
<SSRN:http://ssrn.com/abstract=2725913> 
329 Vulkanovski, above n 110: 5.  He used a five-tier analysis: scale, reach, method, nature, and depth, but concludes the 
effect is issue amplification only. More recent reports and this author differ from that conclusion. 
330 EU’s Article 29 Working Party (WP29) consists of 28 national data protection authorities formed for the ‘protection of 
individuals with regard to the processing of personal data’: Art 29 WP, above n 49: 22. 
331 See Mathews-Hunt, above n 151.  
332 Ibid.  
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➢ a complex liability chain involving multiple international actors;  
➢ multiple hybrid goods/ services with dispersed responsibility;  
➢ doubts as to ongoing product safety, maintenance issues, update capacities, and causation 
generally; and  
➢ complexity little clarified by a long supply chain involving extensive contractual arrangements.  
 
While exhibiting those aspects above, different CIOT market segments entail differing consumer risk 
profiles and attributes, as follows:  
 
(a) Stakes: smart self 
 
Smart self devices exhibit unsustained consumer use patterns333 and device use issues – most measure 
a limited number of activities, many lack accuracy,334 most are technically challenging to operate, many 
provide limited interpretative analytics, and most lack integration with important health devices or 
resources.335 Critics also warn that allowing employers336 or health insurers337 to monitor or access health 
data, even for overall economic338 or financial incentives339 such as reduced premiums or employment 
benefits, is privacy intrusive340 and potentially, invites geo-fenced and behavioural advertising,341 
consumer discrimination342 and may create long-lasting (in)accurate datasets as to changeable personal 
                                                          
333 Endeavour Partners, ‘Wearables abandonment rates are not improving materially’ (May 2015 accessed 26 Mar 2016) < 
http://endeavourpartners.net/wearables-abandonment-rates-are-not-improving-materially/> 
334 See US cases impugning device data accuracy in Ch. 4. For similar Australian findings, see Tony Ibrahim, ’Flatlining 
Monitors’ ‘testing fitness trackers with heart rate monitors – what we found’ CHOICE (8 Sept 2016 accessed 20 Sept 2016) 
< https://www.choice.com.au/health-and-body/diet-and-fitness/sportswear-and-shoes/articles/fitness-trackers-with-heart-
rate-monitors-what-we-found> 
335 Davenport, above n 205: 5- 6. 
336 Mark Burdon and Paul Harpur, ‘Re-conceptualising Privacy and Discrimination in an Age of Talent Analytics’ (2014) 37 
UNSWLJ 679 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UNSWLawJl/2014/26.html#fn1> 
337 Peppet, above n 283. In Australia, GIO seeks access to consumer health data, usually for ‘flybuys’ style consumer 
incentive programmes.  
338 RJ Krawiec, Jessica Nadler et al, ‘No appointment necessary: How the IoT and patient-generated data can unlock health 
care value’ Deloitte University Press (27 Aug 2015 accessed 25 Apr 2016) <http://d27n205l7rookf.cloudfront.net/wp-
content/uploads/2015/08/DUP-885_IoT_PatientGeneratedData_MASTER_082715.pdf> 
339 Issie Lapowski, ‘The Insurance Company That Pays People to Stay Fit’, WIRED (8 Dec 2014 accessed 12 Jul 2016) < 
http://www.wired.com/2014/12/oscar-misfit/>; Rosalind McNamara, ‘Insurance tracker apps: good for the consumer?’ 
CHOICE (6 Oct 2016 accessed 8 Oct 2016) <https://www.choice.com.au/electronics-and-technology/phones/mobile-
phones/articles/insurance-tracker-apps> 
340 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, “Wearable Computing — Challenges and opportunities for privacy 
protection” (Jan 2014 accessed 4 Apr 2016) <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-actions-and-decisions/research/explore-privacy-
research/2014/wc_201401/>; Jennifer Elias, ‘6 Ways to Protect Your Data in the Age of Wearables’ 1.0’  (15 Dec 2015 
accessed 10 Apr 2016) <http://www.forbes.com/sites/jenniferelias/2015/12/15/6-ways-to-protect-your-data-in-the-age-of-
wearables-1-0/#3c10b0b74405> 
341 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘The Internet of Things’, Policy & Research Group (Feb 2016 accessed 
12 Apr 2016): 11 <https://www.priv.gc.ca/information/research-recherche/2016/iot_201602_e.pdf> 
342 Peppet, above n 283.   
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behaviours.343 Further, device data admissibility in personal injury,344 sexual assault345 and other court 
cases, is emerging; most device manufacturer terms permit subpoena compliance, and (some) courts 
are starting to admit such evidence. Other questions as to geolocation data,346 device security and data 
management (collection, storage, processing and sharing) approaches of manufacturers and their cloud 
providers, as well as third party disclosure practices and risks, remain unsettled. So too, does the impact 
of CIOT-based “data-veillance”347 upon individual behaviour, especially when consumers know to whom 
their data may flow, or where recipients include the police, finance and health companies and insurers, 
or even employers; involving potential personal or economic consequences for consumers. The impact 
of this upon free will,348 and human autonomy is an often-ignored ethical question in Australia, and applies 
implicitly across CIOT categories. 
 
(b) Stakes: smart home 
 
Smart home devices face empirically-verified criticisms: a lack of standards,349 pervasive security 
flaws,350 interoperability issues, device redundancy,351 orphan device security,352 and ‘data-veillance’ 
                                                          
343 McNamara, above n 339.   
344 In Canada Fitbit data was admitted to prove a personal trainer was less active after her accident: Jennifer Brown, ‘Data fit 
for the Courtroom?’ CanadianLawyer (2 Feb 2015 accessed 6 Apr 2016) <www.canadianlawyermag.com/5450/Data-fit-for-
the-courtroom.html> 
345 In Pensylvamia, a woman who alleged rape was prosecuted for false reports, when her fitbit activity record contradicted 
her claim that she was asleep when attacked: Affidavit of Probable Cause, Risley (Defendant) CR 15215 (7 Apr 2015) < 
http://online.wsj.com/public/resources/documents/2016_0421_PAvRisley.pdf>   and  Jacob Gershman,‘Prosecutors say 
Fitbit Device Exposed Fibbing in Rape Case’ The Wall Street Journal Law Blog (21 Apr 2016 accessed 2 May 2016) < 
http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2016/04/21/prosecutors-say-fitbit-device-exposed-fibbing-in-rape-case/> See also Laura P. Paton, 
Sarah E. Wetmore and Clinton T Magill, ‘How wearable devices could impact personal injury litigation in South Carolina’ 
South Carolina Lawyer (Jan 2015 accessed 6 Apr 2016) < 
http://mydigitalpublication.com/publication/?i=286946&article_id=2365717&view=articleBrowser&ver=html5#"complete"> 
346 Mason Hayes and Curran, ‘Location, Location, Location – New DPC Guidance’ (4 November 2016 accessed 5 Nov 
2016) < https://epic.org/privacy/ftc/EPIC-FTC-IoT-Cmts.pdf>; Data Protection Commissioner (Ireland), ‘Guidance Note for 
Data Controllers on Location Data’ < https://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/Guidance-Note-for-Data-Controllers-on-Location-
Data/g/1587.htm>; Article 29 WP, Opinion 13/2011 on Geolocation services on smart mobile devices’ (16 May 2011 
accessed 2 Jan 2016) < https://www.dataprotection.ie/docs/Guidance-Note-for-Data-Controllers-on-Location-
Data/g/1587.html> 
347 David Lindsay uses the term “data-veillance” in McNamara, above n 339.  
348 Ibid.  
349 Unlike other platforms, Apple HomeKit has security standards for app developers plus data collection limits: Dave Lee, 
‘Tony Fadell flies from faltering Nest’ (4 Jun 2016 accessed 5 Jun 2016) BBC <http://www.bbc.com/news/technology-
36450762> 
350 See Andy Greenberg, ‘Flaws in Samsung’s ‘Smart’ Home let hackers unlock doors and set off fire alarms’ WIRED (5 May 
2016) < https://www.wired.com/2016/05/flaws-samsungs-smart-home-let-hackers-unlock-doors-set-off-fire-alarms/>; ENISA, 
above n 34.   
351 Nick Statt, ‘Nest is permanently disabling the Revolv smart home hub’ THE VERGE (4 Apr 2016 accessed 8 Apr 2016) 
<http://www.theverge.com/2016/4/4/11362928/google-nest-revolv-shutdown-smart-home-products> 
352 Orphan devices are those no longer supported by their manufacturers as to updates or patching; and pose risk to the 
connected system. Microsoft, ‘Response to Request for Comment’: 4 
<https://www.ntia.doc.gov/files/ntia/publications/microsoft_corporations_response_to_the_green_paper_-_march_2017.pdf> 
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privacy, fusion-based discrimination potentials353 and consent issues.354 Many smart device markets are 
“embryonic”, entailing limited product choice, high costs and ill-defined consumer value.355  Others like 
smart TVs are already market-ingrained, despite questionable surveillance attributes,356 analogous to 
smart voice recognition and assistant technologies.  ENISA identify a range of partial legal gaps requiring 
resolution:  
 
➢ liability for consumer injury or damage;  
➢ data breach liability;  
➢ the time within which vulnerabilities are required to be fixed or software updated; and 
➢ liability for failures to do so.357 Some form of safe harbour scheme for security researchers to 
foster disclosure and redress of vulnerabilities, as well as disclosure for failure to do so.  
 
Consumer inconvenience will arise if devices are defective, go offline or ‘rogue’. Smart homes innately 
collect and store extensive personal information, which may not occur with data subject consent,358 
unless deemed ‘implied’ by entry. Non-consenting persons may include visitors, tradespeople, passers-
by or employees; and includes real time covert surveillance like the ‘nanny cam’ and ‘peep-hole 
camera’,359 both of which produce remotely stream-able images. Critics also point to profiling and 
discrimination which may arise from home data analysis, including home insurance premiums, which 
already (un-controversially) offer lower rates for smart homes security.360  Detriment questions arise if 
employers, health insurers or others seek home data access, even if consumers consent inspired by 
                                                          
353 Peppet, above n 283. 
354 Diega, above n 328.  
355 Above n 340, 334. 
356 Samsung and Vizio TVs have been especially criticised (Ch.4 and 5). EPIC allege: “When the voice recognition feature is 
enabled, everything a user says in front of the Samsung SmartTV is recorded and transmitted over the internet to a third 
party regardless of whether it is related to the provision of the service”: EPIC, ‘Samsung Smart TV Complaint’ (24 Feb 2015 
accessed 11 Aug 2016) <https://www.epic.org/privacy/internet/ftc/Samsung/EPIC-FTC-Samsung.pdf> and commentary 
<https://epic.org/privacy/internet/ftc/samsung/>; California has enacted laws to address smart TV privacy and disclosures: 
Assembly Bill No. 1116, 2015-16, <https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1116> 
c/f Samsung deny the accusation: Samsung, ‘Samsung Smart TVs Do Not Monitor Living Room Conversations’ Press 
Release (10 Feb 2015 accessed 10 May 2016) <https://news.samsung.com/global/samsung-smart-tvs-do-not-monitor-living-
room-conversations> 
357 ENISA, ‘Security and Resilience of Smart Home Environments: Good practices and recommendations’ (Dec 2015 
accessed 2 Apr 2016) <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/security-resilience-good.../at.../fullReport> 
358 Most systems do not seek consents after the initial set-up stage and then, only that person is likely to be aware of them.  
359 Alexandra Gibbs, ‘Internet of Things: Peeple tells you who's at the door’ CNBC (13 Jan 2015 accessed 28 Jan 2016) 
<http://www.cnbc.com/2015/01/13/internet-of-things-peeple-tells-you-whos-at-the-door.html> > These devices attach a small 
camera inside a front door peephole, and take an image when anyone knocks, sending it via the home Wi-Fi system to the 
owner’s smartphone.  
360 Association of British Insurers, ‘How data makes insurance work better for you’ (2015 accessed 2 Jul 2016) 
<https://www.abi.org.uk/~/media/Files/Documents/Publications/Public/2015/Data/How%20data%20makes%20insurance%2
0work%20better%20for%20you.pdf> 
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financial incentives.361 As for smart self, smart home data potentially, fuels consumer discrimination362 
and may create long-lasting (in)accurate datasets as to infinitely changeable personal behaviours.363 
Smart home device data and profiled inferences are also starting to appear in court.364 Competitive 
industry behaviours have emerged which may not promote consumer interests: for example, Google 
‘bricked’ Revolv leaving consumers with a ‘dumb’ device and Apple stopped selling Nest once HomeKit 
launched - claiming its privacy was superior. 365 Questions as to manufacturer and cloud provider data 
management (collection, storage, processing and sharing), as well as third party disclosure practices and 
risks remain open: for example, while Samsung claims that consumers retain their data ownership, their 
terms reserve extensive use rights to themselves.366 Finally, CIOT “data-veillance” may ultimately affect 
individual will, as discussed above. 
 
 
(c) Stakes: smart car 
 
 “The automotive industry views driverless cars as the evolution of cars leveraging computers. 
The computer industry views driverless cars as computers with wheels…”367 
   
Connected cars will be the ultimate Internet of Things. They will collect and make sense of 
massive amounts of data from a huge array of sources… Cars will talk to other cars, exchanging 
data and alerting drivers to potential collisions. They’ll talk to sensors on signs on stoplights, bus 
stops, even ones embedded in the roads to get traffic updates and rerouting alerts. And they’ll 
communicate with your house, office, and smart devices, acting as a digital assistant, gathering 
information you need to go about your day.”368 
 
                                                          
361 Lapowski, above n 339; McNamara, above n 339.   
362 Peppet, above n 283.   
363 McNamara, above n 339.  
364 There appears to be no evidence yet of smart home data use yet in court, but police routinely examine home security 
cameras and other home devices should it be relevant to their enquiries.  
365 “HomeKit introduces a new way for you to control supported devices in your home… and we’ve taken great care to make 
sure that the convenience… doesn’t come at the expense of your privacy…” 
366 Consumers may retain data ‘ownership’: W.P. Hong, ‘Samsung shows that the internet of things is now “in sync with real 
life’ Samsung Newsroom (8 Jan 2016 accessed 11 May 2016) <https:www.news.samsung.com/global/Samsung-shows-
that-the-internet-of-things-is-now-in-sync-with-real-life> but Samsung reserve extensive ‘use’ rights: see Sched. 1: 
Samsung, ‘Samsung Smart Home Terms of Service (Aust)’ (n.d. accessed 2 Aug 2016) 
<https://account.samsung.com/membership/etc/specialTC.do?fileName=smarthome.html> 
367 Chunka Mui, ‘28 Primers on Driverless Car Innovation and Disruption’ Forbes (updated 5 Apr 2016 accessed 26 May 
2016) <http://www.forbes.com/sites/chunkamui/2016/03/10/primers-on-driverless/print/> 
368 IBM’s Dirk Wollschlaeger, “What’s Next? V2V (Vehicle-to-Vehicle) Communication with Connected Cars” (9 Oct 2014) 
<https://www.wired.com/insights/2014/09/connected-cars/> cited in Lawson, above n 36.   
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The auto industry is “on the brink of a revolution…”369, and the smart car future is a highly disruptive370 
inevitability. A typical modern smart(ish) car now contains over 100 million lines of code – more than a 
Boeing 787 (6.5M) or F-22 jet fighter (1.7M).371 With such complexity, potentials for software error and 
vulnerabilities increase. “Smart” is a relative concept, spanning a spectrum of increasingly-autonomous 
technologies,372 from human control to self-driving vehicles,373 across SAE’s six automation levels374  
below:  
 
 
 
 
 
Graphic 1.6 Levels of autonomous vehicles 
Source: Kelley Blue Book (2016) 375  
                                                          
369 Simon Ninan, Bharath Gangula, Matthias von Alten & Brenna Sniderman, ‘Who owns the road’ Deloitte (2015 accessed 5 
Apr 2016) < http://dupress.com/articles/internet-of-things-iot-in-automotive-
industry/?id=us:2em:3na:dup1161:eng:dup:060816> 
370 It smashes the traditional auto industry model – towards software-driven, data-gathering products, which conceivably, 
may disrupt traditional car self-ownership models towards a more sharing economy approach. It is not difficult to imagine a 
system of efficiently autonomous drones, collecting and depositing passengers seamlessly on demand, parking themselves 
and skilfully avoiding traffic, human error and through V2V communications, each other. 
371 A Boeing 787 passenger aircraft contains 6.5 million lines of code, and an F-22 U.S. Air Force jet fighter contains 1.7 
million lines:  U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, GAO-16-350, ‘Vehicle Cybersecurity: DOT and Industry  
Have Efforts Under Way, but DOT Needs to Define Its Role in Responding to a Real-world Attack 8–9’ (Mar. 2016 accessed 
11 May 2016) < http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/676064.pdf> 
372 Expert Missy Cummings cites GPS position information, internal navigation maps, outward-facing cameras, and laser 
(and other) range-finding systems, form a part of autonomy: M.L. Cummings, M.L.  & J.C. Ryan, ‘Who is in Charge? 
Promises and Pitfalls of Driverless Cars’, TR News (May-June 2014 accessed 20 Mar 2016) 
<http://hal.pratt.duke.edu/sites/hal.pratt.duke.edu/files/u7/TR%20news%20Cummings%20MAR14.pdf>   
373 Note that some reports distinguish between connected cars and autonomous technology, but the industry reality is that 
these technologies coexist in most new models. See for example, Rand, above n 232.   
374 There are: none (level 0), driver assistance (1), partial automation (2), conditional automation (3), high automation (4) 
and full automation (level 5). 
375 Kelley Blue Book, ‘Future Autonomous Driver Study’ (Sept 2016 accessed 25 Sept 2016) 
<http://mediaroom.kbb.com/future-autonomous-vehicle-driver-study>; & Standard: SAE International, ‘Automated Driving’ 
(2014 accessed 5 Aug 2016) <https://www.sae.org/misc/pdfs/automated_driving.pdf> 
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The control “tipping point” – or “no man’s land”376 - spans levels 2 to 4, through which humans are 
variously expected to drive and/ or ‘monitor’ the dynamic driving task,377 and to respond promptly to 
system ‘requests to intervene’,378 or if necessary, to override the system itself. The question of “proper 
control” between car ‘driver’ and manufacturer, is a liability controversy which remains unresolved by 
Australian regulators.379 While liability might shift with ‘control’ – in practice, that ‘shift’ is less clear until 
full autonomy is reached; especially where vehicle systems require an alert driver to override their actions. 
This issue, manufacturers’ liability and ‘state of the art’ is explored further in chapter 4. 
 
Smart cars also present potentially unquantifiable external costs, involving economic and social 
disruption:380 adverse effects on public transport use and investment,381 road congestion, urban sprawl; 
vehicle size,382 reduced ‘car’ 383 and ‘crash’ industry employment;384 disruption to insurance385 and related 
industries;386 parking revenue decline387 and increased road infrastructure costs.388 Social equity issues 
                                                          
376 Keith Naughton and Dana Hull, ‘Ford Plans Leap from Driver’s Seat with Autonomous Car by 2021’ Bloomberg 
Technology (17 Aug 2016 accessed 18 Aug 2016): <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-08-16/ford-aims-to-offer-
fully-autonomous-ride-sharing-vehicle-by-2021> 
377 ‘Dynamic driving task’ includes the operational (steering, braking, accelerating, monitoring the vehicle and roadway) and 
tactical (responding to events, determining when to change lanes, turn, use signals. etc) aspects of the driving task, but not 
the strategic (determining destinations and waypoints) aspect of the driving task: SAE International, ‘Automated Driving 
International Standard J3016’. 
378 ‘Request to intervene’ is notification by the automated driving system to a human driver that s/he should promptly begin 
or resume performance of the dynamic driving task: Ibid. 
379 The NTC is conducting further consultation in Australia on the question of ‘proper control’, though seems likely to resolve 
via national enforcement guidelines that cars remain under human control until they are designated fully autonomous. One 
of the reasons for this is simplicity, as well as keeping the onus upon drivers to remain alert. NTC, ‘NTC seeks feedback on 
proposal for drivers to allow hands off the wheel in some automated vehicles’ (12 April 2017 accessed 13 Apr 2017) 
<https://www.ntc.gov.au/about-ntc/news/media-releases/ntc-seeks-feedback-on-proposal-for-drivers-to-allow-hands-off-the-
wheel-in-some-automated-vehicles/> 
380 As this non-comprehensive list suggests, the many uncertainties raise multiple unknowns, justifying additional research 
as to the nature and potential magnitude of costs and benefits of smart cars, especially during the fleet transitional phase. 
381 These may adversely impact public transport utilization, reduce fare income leading to reduced services or increased 
fares, and perpetuate transport inequities, in favour of “our individualistic car-centred society”: Rand, above n 232: 39. 
382 Some speculate vehicles will become more of a “living space”. 
383 Employment disruption may occur in fields like emergency services, car servicing, taxi, parking and chauffeuring 
services: Allison Arieff, ‘Driving Sideways’ The New York Times Opinionator (23 Jul 2013 accessed 3 Mar 2016) 
<https://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/07/23/driving-sideways/#more-146616> 
384 Driving-related jobs, employment in public transport, logistics, insurance, etc; and in the “crash-related” economy 
(emergency services personnel, doctors and other health professionals, hospitals, investigators and lawyers, automotive 
sales and repair industry, etc) may be affected. 
385 The insurance industry will (ultimately) be significantly affected through reduced premiums as costs for accidents (and 
possibly theft) decline. But car manufacturers and suppliers will change their insurance profiles as crash liability shifts to them, 
and costs will be passed on to consumers. Tesla self-insures its cars as do many other manufacturers (at least indirectly). 
Insurers will find themselves dealing with vehicle manufacturers, rather than drivers, as accident liability shifts: James Titcomb, 
‘Motor insurers form alliance to tackle driverless cars’ The Telegraph (18 Jan 2016 accessed 26 Mar 2016) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/news/12106757/Motor-insurers-form-alliance-to-tackle-driverless-cars.html> 
386  Adverse impacts upon insurance, health and other sectors (together with their investment practices) will potentially affect 
markets and shareholders.  
387 Declining municipal parking and fine-related revenue may occur as smart cars can park further away, in smaller spaces. 
388 Smart cars require better and more standardised road infrastructure to ensure C-ITS operation and so they can for 
example ‘read’ the road signs (etc) consistently. This poses cost problems for large countries such as Australia and the US, 
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will (initially)  be exacerbated – poverty may increase an individual’s accident risk, and public transport 
may become more expensive. Culturally, people may miss driving.389 Of course, the worst ‘known’ 
detriment is that consumers will die in smart cars,390 due to inadequate road infrastructure, product liability 
(design or software defects, mechanical or systems failures), hacking (deliberate or accidental security 
breach or terrorism) and human error (via the perils of transitioning autonomy, instructional or 
maintenance failures, and a mixed road fleet). Hackers have demonstrated significant software 
vulnerabilities,391 and in a worst-case software update defect scenario, for example, an entire model may 
literally, suddenly, ‘crash’.392 Current systems ‘limitations’ already disclaim smart car flaws as common 
road-use scenarios, such as ‘bright light’ or  ‘bad weather’, policemen’s hand signals and minor 
programming glitches, can confuse current technology.393 Further, inexpensive equipment can threaten 
system integrity: researchers have shown jammers can cause GPS navigation problems and cheap laser 
devices can deceive systems into seeing false objects. Experts also suggest that other road users – 
drivers, cyclists and pedestrians – may behaviorally ‘game’ smart car technology, just for fun or to exploit 
predictable vehicle behavior, like giving way.394 Conversely, subtle human road user signals395 (nods, 
waves etc.) will need to be ‘unlearnt’. Inter-disciplinary studies reveal human physical, psychological and 
behavioral attributes which affect safety-systems design efficacy:  driver distractibility, technology over-
confidence, reaction time, attention span and so on,396 all of which should influence both design practice 
                                                          
with significant rural populations and large road networks. This may confine smart car use to specific geographic locations – 
such as cities – until such time as the cars become sufficiently ‘smart’ to cope beyond. 
389 They refer to lost personal autonomy and enjoyment of car driving plus lost cultural motifs such as the ‘road trip’ 
adventure: Rand, above n 232: 40. 
390 Professor Missy Cummings critiques as “utilitarian” the argument that smart cars will save lives as demonstrating “an 
insensitivity to a deontological perspective that causes many people to be uncomfortable with such a significant shift in 
responsibility and accountability to computers… A deontological approach could assert that machines should not be allowed 
to take the lives of humans under any circumstances, which is similar to one of Asimov’s three laws governing robots.”  
Cummings, above n 372: 1. See also n 394 supra. 
391 For example, see Mark Anderson, ‘Black Hat 2014: Hacking the Smart Car,’ IEEE Spectrum (6 Aug 2014 accessed 16 
Mar 2016) 
<http://spectrum.ieee.org/cars-that-think/transportation/systems/black-hat-2014-hacking-the-smart-car 
392 Rand, above n 232: 6. It is however likely that recalls will be more effective due to the ease with which software updates 
are implemented over the traditional requirement that consumers bring cars into dealers for recall-related fixes. 
393 Other commonly cited ‘limitations’ include poor road markings, standing water, sudden downpours and snow; all of which 
are commonly expected motor vehicle uses. 
394 Testimony of Mary Cummings, ‘Hands Off: the Future of Self-Driving Cars” (15 Mar 2016 accessed 20 Mar 2016) 
<https://governmentrelations.duke.edu/wp-content/uploads/Cummings-Senate-testimony-2016.pdf>; M.L. Cummings & J.C. 
Ryan, ‘Who is in Charge? Promises and Pitfalls of driverless Cars’, TR News (May-June 2014 accessed 20 Mar 2016) 292 
<http://hal.pratt.duke.edu/sites/hal.pratt.duke.edu/files/u7/TR%20news%20Cummings%20MAR14.pdf> UK trials will be 
conducted using unmarked cars, for fears that drivers will ‘game’ them on-road: Julia Kollewe, ‘Volvo to seek volunteers for 
self-driving car trial in UK’ The Guardian (2 Feb 2017 accessed 7 Feb 2017) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/feb/02/volvo-seeks-volunteers-for-self-driving-car-trial-in-west-london-public-
roads>  
395 Most drivers are familiar with pedestrians who show an interest in crossing the road and may use eye-contact to ‘okay’ 
that manoeuvre, and vice versa, drivers may gesture to pedestrians to cross, even where there is no strict legal right to do 
so. These are to some extent an extra-legal etiquette of road use. 
396 Cummings, above n 394: 1- 2. 
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and legal considerations as to what is reasonable ‘warning’ in a safety context. But while many safety 
issues may decline as the fleet, technology and experience matures and road infrastructure improves, 
shorter term risks as to consumer (lack of) adaptability, the tipping point and fleet changeover delays, 
pose unique challenges for consumer welfare. Further, information asymmetry risk -  such as consumer 
instructional conflicts between voluminous manuals, systems, in-car prompts versus smart car sales, 
marketing and risk perception – will take time to resolve. Aside from design and driving context issues,397 
Australia’s state-based fault and no-fault personal injury compensation schemes, may be unworkable 
without legislative reform.398   
  
Smart car issues common to CIOT generally include voluminous vehicle data collation and privacy policy 
issues a lack of mandatory international data use standards,399 software security flaws,400 anti-
competitive third party data access,401‘data-veillance’,402 data discrimination potentials403 and 
questionable consumer consents.404  Further, in-car data collection consent is complicated by different 
drivers and passengers, or may be deemed ‘implied’ by vehicle entry. Even if passenger identity is not 
initially discernible, geolocation alone can constitute personal information:405 for example, a car which 
regularly visits a cancer treatment clinic may generate certain health information inferences.406 Profiling 
and discrimination may arise from other car data analysis; while car insurers already offer lower rates or 
                                                          
397 NTC, ‘Regulatory Options for Automated Vehicles’ Discussion Paper (May 2016 accessed 30 May 2016) 
<https://www.ntc.gov.au/Media/Reports/(049B1ED1-5761-44D5-9E3C-814A9195285D).pdf> 
398 Kieran Tranter, ‘The Challenges of Autonomous Motor Vehicles for Queensland Road and Criminal Laws’ 16:2 (2016) 
QUT Law Review 59- 81 <https://lr.law.qut.edu.au/article/view/626/591>  
399 Note the US-based global car manufacturers have released certain approaches to privacy and security, which are lower 
than Australian Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) standards: Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers Inc., and Association of Global 
Automakers, Inc. (Auto Alliance), ‘Consumer Privacy Protection Principles’, (12 November 2014 accessed 16 Mar 2016) 
http://www.autoalliance.org/index.cfm?objectid=CC629950-6A96-11E4-866D000C296BA163>; and  ‘Framework for 
Automotive Cybersecurity Best Practices’ (19 Jan 2016 accessed 2 Mar 2016) 
<http://www.autoalliance.org/index.cfm?objectid=1E518FB0-BEC3-11E5-9500000C296BA163> 
400 Mark Anderson, above n 391; Andy Greenberg, ‘Hackers reveal Nasty New Car Attacks – with me behind the Wheel’ 
Forbes (24 Jul 2013 accessed 3 Mar 2016) < http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/07/24/hackers-reveal-nasty-
new-car-attacks-with-me-behind-the-wheel-video/#6741c6765bf2>; Andy Greenberg, ‘The Jeep Hackers are back to prove 
car hacking can get much worse’ WIRED (1 Aug 2016 accessed 2 Aug 2016) < https://www.wired.com/2016/08/jeep-
hackers-return-high-speed-steering-acceleration-hacks/>; Andy Greenberg, ‘A New Wireless Hack can Unlock 100 Million 
Volkswagens’ WIRED (10 Aug 2016 accessed 12 Aug 2016) https://www.wired.com/2016/08/oh-good-new-hack-can-unlock-
100-million-volkswagens/> 
401 Australian Automobile Aftermarket Association, (AAAA) ‘AAAA Demands Better Consumer Law Protection for Car 
Owners’ (15 July 2016 accessed 30 June 2016) <https://www.aaaa.com.au/news.asp?id=242> Without data access, after-
market repair and maintenance if hindered, reducing competition in that industry 
402 Lawson, above n 36. 
403 Peppet, above n 283. 
404 Lawson, above n 36. 
405 Article 29 WP, above n 346.   
406 Mason Hayes and Curran, above n 346; Data Protection Commissioner (Ireland), above n 336.  In contrast, the NTC 
recommended no change to the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) including as to geolocation data: NTC, ‘Cooperative Intelligent 
Transport Systems Policy Paper’ (December 2013 accessed 2 Jan 2016):17 
<https://www.ntc.gov.au/Media/Reports/(55AFE902-73F4-073B-E6ED-AE684E3BE595).pdf> 
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incentives for drivers who allow insurers ‘black box’ data access,407 such data may reveal vehicle 
direction, date, time, latitude, longitude and speed, is accessible upon any court order and may 
cumulatively create long-lasting (in)accurate datasets as to often-changeable personal behaviours.408 
Car use and location data, accident data and profiled inferences are currently used by law enforcement 
and accident investigation agencies and may soon become commonplace in court.409 Finally, questions 
as to data management (collection, storage, processing and sharing) approaches of manufacturers and 
their cloud providers, as well as third party disclosure practices and risks have largely been left to the 
manufacturers to resolve within privacy legislation, but arguably reflect a commercial interest in data 
exploitation potentials.  
 
Conclusion  
 
CIOT exacerbates multiple ‘known’ issues and tendencies, but its scope, scale and role in integrating a 
raft of rapidly-emerging technologies, and consumer reach, represents a qualitative and quantitative 
change. That change will affect many previously ‘known’ tech-related issues such as: privacy, data use 
and abuse, breach or hacking, security, anonymisation, disclosure and transparency; the ‘notice and 
choice’ consent fallacy; complex liability chains and product/ data internationalisation; as well as lesser 
known issues surrounding tech lock-in to products and systems, interoperability, hybrid device/ software 
products, erosion of ownership norms;410 emerging industry-frustrating technical constraints411 and 
evolving consumer smart device (M2M) contracting. As these complex ‘knowns’ evolve and expand in 
concert with CIOT, they foreground a myriad of “unknowns” as the technology permeates society, 
                                                          
407 Car insurers offer consumers a chance to reduce premiums though monitoring their driving patterns. Australian examples 
include comprehensive (only) policies from GIO, Progressive and ‘Insurance Box’ (underwritten by QBE): the latter requires 
consumers to ‘rent’ a black box, records speed, braking, acceleration and night driving, ranks these over time (via a 
dashboard consumers can access to modify their behaviour) and premiums “settle once driver rating data ‘settles’. The 
related app privacy documents states “our App will record the direction you are heading, date, time, latitude, longitude and 
speed and that this information is collected and stored by us or by third parties on our behalf. You understand that by using 
our App it is possible to identify your location and the speed at which you are travelling: Insurance Box, ‘Journey data 
privacy policy’ <http://insurancebox.com.au/documents/privacy-promise.pdf>   See also Association of British Insurers, 
above n 360; Jain, above n 245.  
408 McNamara, above n 339. 
409 For example, Tesla data was used by the NHTSA investigation. Location data can be used to place suspects at the 
scene of a crime or corroborate other factors circumstantially.   
410 Kyle Weins, ‘We Can’t Let John Deere Destroy the Very Idea of Ownership’ WIRED (21 Apr 2015 accessed 2 Apr 2016) 
< http://www.wired.com/2015/04/dmca-ownership-john-deere/> The manufacturer asserted tractor owners did not ‘own’ their 
vehicle; rather they were licensed to use it for its life cycle only. 
411 Issues commonly cited by technical experts include spectrum availability, network coverage, standardisation and 
interoperability: Communications Alliance, above n 119: 14.  
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vulnerabilities emerge and error informs trial. Combined, industry analysts confirm that these ‘problems’ 
will require regulatory involvement on an ongoing basis.412 
In this turbulent social and legal environment, consumers are reportedly exhibiting CIOT security 
overconfidence413 while experiencing a trust crisis,414 as well as facing disruptive social impacts upon 
transport, home, health, education, and the workforce. Combined, the consumer stakes appear 
significant and long-lasting. Against those stakes, the next question is to examine the current baseline: 
to what extent are Australians adopting the consumer IOT and does it inspire consumer trust? 
 
1.3  Status: consumer uptake & adoption 
…apart from wearable devices and the odd car with a mobile app … it hasn’t been something 
which consumers have not picked up on…415 
 
IOT will only take off once consumers understand what it means on a basic, emotive level…416  
Australians are generally “early [tech] adopters”417 and adoption is “inevitable”, 418 but there are no 
Australian studies as to consumer IOT awareness levels, market participation or current spend as at 2016 
                                                          
412 McKinsey, above n 22 and 28; Verizon, above n 312 and Cisco, above n 98: 13, all of which are pro-CIOT but 
recommend that regulatory change will be required. McKinsey argue that the digitization of physical systems will require  
both updating and strengthening of privacy and property policy, to regulate entirely new “forms of activity in the public 
sphere” (such as autonomous vehicles),  privacy security, data ownership and sharing regulations require review and to be 
“updated” and governments will need to coordinate efforts to create interoperability  standards, incentivized policy settings 
(eg in health), and to balance privacy, data protection, IP with national security imperatives.  Cisco likewise contends that 
government retains a policy and regulatory role with respect to IOT, “governments will need to help ensure the safety and 
security of the systems themselves, whilst also protecting users’ personal information and privacy”, together with ensuring 
“social cohesion and inclusion”.  Verizon has called for greater technology-expertise amongst regulators to cope with 
increasing IOT products and services, whilst consumer-focused academics have called for specific regulation and soft law.  
UK’s Blackett Report recommends regulation to “anticipate and respond to new challenges” as well as to support privacy 
and other regulatory objectives (though recommends it be “kept to a minimum”): Blackett, above n 19.  
413 A 2016 ISACA study found a major confidence gap as to the security of connected devices between the average 
Australian consumer and cybersecurity IT professionals: ISACA, ‘ISACA Survey: Wide Gap between Australian Consumers 
and Global IT Professionals on Internet of Things Security’ Press Release (14 Oct 2015 accessed 3 Jan 2016) < 
http://www.isaca.org/About-ISACA/Press-room/News-Releases/2015/Pages/ISACA-Survey-Wide-Gap-between-Australian-
Consumers-and-Global-IT-Professionals-on-Internet-of-Things-Security.aspx> 
414 ‘Hacking’ is used in this paper to mean any person who without authorisation, breaks into a computer or software system. 
It includes those who do so for personal amusement, research or criminal purposes such as terrorism, data theft, attack or 
denial of service. The important point, when considering CIOT security, is that the system can be breached, rather than the 
intent of the person involved. Sead Fadilpašić, ‘Consumers do not trust Internet of Things’ betanews (April 2016 accessed 
11 May 2016) <http://betanews.com/2016/04/08/internet-of-things-consumer-trust/> 
415 Alex Talevski, ‘Why people don’t care about the internet of things’ The Australian (26 Apr 2016 accessed 29 Apr 2016) < 
http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/technology/why-people-dont-care-about-the-internet-of-things/news-
story/2670ec1d7c9bc4017e10e632d1a8f90c> 
416 Ibid.  
417 Telsyte, ‘Internet Uninterrupted Australian households of the Digital Future’ Research Paper (2015 accessed 3 Dec 2015) 
http://www.nbnco.com.au/content/dam/nbnco2/documents/Internet%20Uninterrupted%20Australian%20Households%20of%
20the%20Connected%20Future.pdf> 
418 Accenture, ‘The Internet of Things: The Future of Consumer Adoption’ (2014 accessed 23 Mar 2016) < 
https://www.accenture.com/t00010101T000000__w__/au-en/_acnmedia/Accenture/Conversion-
Assets/DotCom/Documents/Global/PDF/Technology_9/Accenture-Internet-Things.ashx#zoom=50> 
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end. Recent US and UK studies may be indicative, though their markets are more advanced.419  These 
conclude that consumer awareness is low: two years ago, 87% of US consumers had not heard of the 
internet of things.420 Of those, 64% were unaware of the smart device market, and 7% or less owned a 
smart self or home device.421  One year later, only 16% of US adults knew what the consumer IOT is, 
though 48% had “heard of it”,422 which confirms European findings.423 By mid-2016, Deloitte found that 
smart home awareness and interest was improving, but that people did not understand device operation 
or capabilities, and purchase disinterest (70%) remained high.424  Further, consumer awareness was 
clustered in traditional entertainment categories (in green below), with few owning newer ‘smart’ home 
devices and most not planning a ‘smart’ purchase 2016- 2017. This suggests that baked-in connectivity 
(where all new devices are built ‘smart’) and natural replacement cycles are likely to be significant market 
drivers in the evolution of smarter homes, rather than consumer demand, at least initially. 
 
 
 
Graphic 1.7 UK consumer smart home device ownership by category 
Source: Deloitte 2016425 
                                                          
419 This reflects the draw of larger consumer markets for manufacturers. Several smart home manufacturers have indicated 
2017 will be their Australian ‘launch’ year. 
420 Altimeter’s study concluded that IOT is an industry term of art, and that there is a high degree of consumer ignorance as 
to the IOT generally: Accenture, above n 418.  
421 40% did not know what ‘wearables’ were. Of the 13% who were IOT-aware, reasons not to buy-in included due to a lack 
of perceived value (36%), privacy (23%) and price (23%): Ibid. See also Bernard Marr, ’17 Internet of Things Facts Everyone 
Should Read’ Forbes (27 Oct 2015 accessed 10 Mar 2016) http://www.forbes.com/sites/bernardmarr/2015/10/27/17-mind-
blowing-internet-of-things-facts-everyone-should-read/#6381e8161a7a 
422 To the question “Do you know what the IOT is?”, 36% responded No and only 13% said Yes. Verto, above n 45.   
423 Statista report that 12% of German consumers are ‘aware’ of the Internet of Things as at June 2015: Statista, ‘Share of 
consumers who are aware of the Internet of Things in Germany in June 2015’ (2015 accessed 6 Aug 2016) 
<https://www.statista.com/statistics/458159/consumers-awareness-of-the-internet-of-things-in-germany/> 
424 Deloitte, ‘Switch on to the connected home’  The Deloitte Consumer Review (May 2016 accessed 10 Oct 2017) 5-8  < 
https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/uk/Documents/consumer-business/deloitte-uk-consumer-review-16.pdf> 
Respondents indicated that smart devices “had the potential’ to maker their lives easier and Deloitte conclude retailers need 
to demonstrate the value proposition more clearly – demonstrate how it works and what it will do for people, for example. 
Note interest diminished with age: 18- 24 yo (91%), 37% (65 years +). 
425 Deloitte, above n 424: 6  
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Current global trends also reveal the market is underperforming expectation. Sales are “sluggish”426 and 
device demand is “not growing fast enough”427  to meet 2020 predictions.428 Consumers complain that 
devices are too expensive (62%), insecure (47%) and confusing (17%),429 and identify purchase 
barriers:430 known security problems (67%) made consumers more cautious (27%), stopped device use 
(18%),and postponed purchase (14%).431 International research largely concurs: globally, 60% of 
consumers ‘worry’ about CIOT technology, citing trust (62%), security (54%) and physical safety (27%). 
Accenture warn: 
  
The consumer technology industry does not have the fundamentals in place – and the consumer 
trust established – to push into more personalised and sensitive areas …”432  
 
Speculatively, these figures may suggest that many consumers do not understand CIOT terminology, or 
how it works and thus, mistrust persists: consumers may perceive risk but not understand why (see 1.4 
below). This perception, and BE factors such as ‘overconfidence’ (Ch. 6) may explain why consumers 
buy-in to some CIOT devices (smart fitness for example) but resist others – such as smart car autonomy. 
Critics also explain slow adoption as an industry failure to market to things consumers “actually care 
about”433 – and rampant information asymmetry. As to smart cars for example, most consumers (51%) 
do not know what an ‘autonomous’ vehicle is, but 79% recognise ‘self-driving’;434 most (62%) believe full 
                                                          
426 Deloitte, above n 424: 5.  Note the potential role of ‘baked-in’ connectivity with the entertainment devices: it is harder to 
buy a non-smart TV or games console etc. these days. This situation will inevitably flow on into whitegoods as models 
change over. 
427 Accenture, ‘Igniting Growth in Consumer Technology’ 2016 Accenture Digital Consumer Survey (2016 accessed 24 Mar 
2016): 5 < https://www.accenture.com/_acnmedia/PDF-3/Accenture-Igniting-Growth-in-Consumer-Technology.pdf> 
Accenture predict that the consumer technology industry’s decade-long unprecedented growth is coming to an end, pointing 
to (relatively) sluggish growth across all traditional categories such as smartphones, laptops, tablets etc. The study involved 
thousands of consumers in 28 counties. 
428 This survey involved 28,000 participants across 28 countries (including Australia). Accenture say it reveals a healthy but 
static market; with growth static on fitness monitors (13%), home surveillance cameras (11%) and home thermostats (0%). 
429 Ibid: 2. The survey identified “prices, security and ease of use”, lack of a “compelling value proposition”, ease of use or 
experience concerns and product abandonment due to security concerns. 
430 Ibid: 2.  
431 Security also features in terms of price: over five years in the fitness wearables/ smartwatch category, there is a US7.4 
billion price differential between what consumers who value security want to pay versus those who do not want to pay: Ibid: 
9. 
432 Accenture, above n 427: 7. 
433 For example, ‘fitness’ not ‘wearables’; car ‘safety’ over ‘autonomy’. See Talevski, above n 415.  
434 Kelley, above n 375: 11. 
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autonomy lies beyond their lifetime,435 would not buy a level 5 smart car (84%),436 and 80% still want to 
drive - which suggests a serious disconnect between industry and consumers.437  
 
In summary, CIOT is unlikely to live up to its 2020 hype. Aside from technical viability issues,438 it suffers 
from four fundamental problems: over optimistic industry-led rather than consumer value perceptions,439 
industry failure to design products consistent with consumer wants (price, security, functionality, etc.),440 
a failure to identify and explain consumer product value,441 and a brittle assumption that exponential 
predictions are accurate, regardless.442 Despite these (and other)443 concerns, most consumers (90%) 
                                                          
435 Ibid: 12. While this varies with generations, all over 16 agreed. This suggests consumers know little about smart car 
development or industry progress. 
436 Andrew J. Hawkins, ‘Self-driving cars will have to pry the steering wheel from our cold, dead hands, poll says’ (28 Sept 
2016 accessed 2 Oct 2016) < http://www.theverge.com/2016/9/28/13076948/self-driving-car-poll-autonomy-kelley-blue-
book> 
437 Accenture identify a lack of “well-articulated consumer solutions so far…” and say technology-led innovation should be 
driven by “core consumer needs”, and respond to “primal human needs”.   To improve industry ‘value’, Verto point to 
creating “consumer-ready” devices and connecting scalable CIOT populations, while Accenture highlight expanding data 
use and exploitation to increase industry value. Accenture, above n 427: 6.  Deloitte argue that IOT technology is 
predominantly for business or industrial application – rather than consumer use. They suggest that much technology (citing 
large-screen smartphones, tablets, faster telecommunications network-capability, VOIP and desktop video-conferencing) 
was driven by consumer-led demands, as opposed to enterprise-led innovation. They suggest that this may explain why IOT 
innovation has not proceeded as rapidly as initially predicted: Deloitte, ‘The Internet of Things ecosystem: Unlocking the 
Business Value of Connected Devices’ (2014 accessed 8 Mar 2016) <www2.deloitte.com/global/en/../internet-of-things-
ecosystem.html> Note as to improving manufacturer returns, Verto, above n 45. See also Accenture, above n 427: 10. 
438 Unless resolved, these will adversely impact upon consumer experience. For example, spectrum availability and 
licensing, IP address availability requires IPv6, standards and interoperability, which are key to device compatibility, 
convenience and efficiency - yet are not a practical reality in a presently fractured CIOT marketplace.  Finally, the lucrative 
question as to which software platform will (eventually) be the one upon which all vertical applications of the IOT will be built 
remains unknown. None of these uncertainties are resolved, though the industry is incentivized to do so as each may 
constrain CIOT uptake, benefits and value for consumers into the future. Zeichner et al, above n 119  :80. The report 
observed: “IoT policy areas under review or development coalesce around a few areas, which are: spectrum management, 
personal privacy, use of IPv6, network resilience and security, open Government data, interoperability and national 
innovation and competitiveness.” ; “Australia is quite behind in take-up and deployment of IPv6 compared to rest of world…”: 
Zeichner, above n 119: 99; The question is well-posed in Matt Turck, ‘Making Sense of the Internet of Things’ TechCrunch 
(25 May 2013 accessed 8 Feb 2016) < http://techcrunch.com/2013/05/25/making-sense-of-the-internet-of-things/>  
439 Critics also explain adoption issues by suggesting that the CIOT industry needs to start marketing its products to things 
consumers “actually care about” - ‘fitness’ rather than “wearables”, for example: Talevski, above n 408. 
440 Accenture identify a lack of “well-articulated consumer solutions so far…” and say technology-led innovation should be 
driven by “core consumer needs” and respond to “primal human needs”: Accenture, above n 427: 6.   
441 Ibid.  
442 Consumer information seems deficient: 51% of consumers do not know what an ‘autonomous’ vehicle is, but 79% 
recognise ‘self-driving’.  When explained, most consumers (62%) do not believe they will see full autonomy in their lifetime, 
would not purchase a fully smart car (84%), and 80% still want the option to drive: Kelley, above n 375: 11 – 12. It all 
suggests information asymmetry and an industry well ahead of consumer markets: Hawkins, above n 436.  
443 The technical challenges remain significant and substantially unresolved, which is a dampener to increased consumer 
adoption. Issues of consumer inconvenience, cost and confusion prevail. Evans refers to the “fractured” consumer 
experience created by product silos or individual apps controlling disparate devices, the costs incurred as a result of 
separate device ecosystems and an  “alphabet soup of [competing] protocols”: Dave Evans, ‘We Need to get the Internet of 
Things right’ TechCrunch (19 Apr 2015 accessed 11 Apr 2016) http://techcrunch.com/2015/04/19/we-need-to-get-the-
internet-of-things-right/  
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can see ‘potential’ benefits,444 and a “future” purchase (65%).445 Indeed, both metrics considered - 
consumer intent and actual purchase  – suggest that CIOT devices, pushed by industry, will continue to 
increase in prevalence. If industry can build consumer trust. 
 
1.4 Consumer Trust: ending before it begins?  
… risks to privacy and security undermine consumer trust. And that trust is as important to the 
widespread consumer adoption of new IOT products and services as a network connection is 
to the functionality of an IOT device…”446   
 
If “…trust in the internet is over”,447 it is questionable if trust in the consumer IOT has even begun.  As a 
critical enabler identified by industry,448 regulators449 and analysts alike, a lack of consumer trust or 
confidence will hinder adoption and threaten future success.  Research suggests that consumer 
confidence is decreasingly450 “low”,451 privacy and security are a “top barrier” and data-use practices 
make consumers “uneasy”.452  Analysts predict a looming “privacy class divide”,453 describe current 
security models as “obsolete”454 and report that consumers perceive, though do not yet fully understand, 
the risk and threat implications of a smart world.455 Further, as consumer awareness increases, other 
trust-barriers may emerge. For example, ACMA identify three main cloud-industry trust-related barriers: 
privacy, security and data management, interoperability, vendor lock-in and cross-service portability with 
                                                          
444 Mobile Ecosystem Forum (MEF), ‘The Impact of Trust on IoT’ Global Consumer Survey (2016 accessed 11 May 2016) 
<http://www.mobileecosystemforum.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/IoT_Exec_Summary.pdf> 
445 Accenture, above n 427. Perhaps seeking a positive, they perceive an overall consumer perception shift, a newfound 
openness to adoption and that CIOT will have major B2B and B2C implications by 2020. 
446 Edith Ramirez, ‘Opening remarks to the International Consumer Electronics Show” (6 Jan 2015 accessed 5 Jan 2016) < 
https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2015/01/privacy-iot-navigating-policy-issues-opening-remarks-ftc-chairwoman-edith>; 
See also ICDPPC, above n 18; J. Brill, ‘The Internet of Things: Building Trust and Maximizing Benefits through Consumer 
Control’ Fordham Law Review (2014) 83: 1 205- 217 (26 Feb 2014 accessed 28 Feb 2016)  
<https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/289531/140314fordhamprivacyspeech.pdf>  
447 Paul Brody and Veena Pureswaran, ‘Device Democracy Saving the Future of the Internet of things’ IBM Institute for 
Business Value, Executive Report (2015 accessed 23 Mar 2016) <http://iotbusinessnews.com/download/white-papers/IBM-
Saving-the-future-of-IoT.pdf> 
448 The Australian IOT Alliance is very conscious of the trust imperative: see http://www.iot.org.au/ 
449 Edith Ramirez, above n 446; FTC, Internet of Things Privacy and Security in a Connected World, Staff Report (Jan 2015 
accessed 26 Nov 2015) <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/federal-trade-commission-staff-report-
november-2013-workshop-entitled-internet-things-privacy/150127iotrpt.pdf> 
450 42% of Americans were more concerned than in the previous year:  
451 J. Groopman and Susan Etlinger, ‘Consumer Perceptions of Privacy in the Internet of Things’ Altimeter (June 2015 
accessed 12 Apr 2016): 8 <http://www.altimetergroup.com/pdf/reports/Consumer-Perceptions-Privacy-IoT-Altimeter-
Group.pdf> Altimeter’s 2016 survey received 6900 responses across 24 countries, including Australia (500).   
452 Jeff Evans, ‘The Opt-Out Challenge’ Black & Veatch (March/April 2012) Electric Light & Power 
<http://bv.com/docs/articles/the-opt-out-challenge.pdf> 
453 Mark Thompson cited in KPMG, ‘Creepy or cool? Staying on the right side of the consumer privacy line’ (Nov 2016 
accessed 9 Nov 2016) <https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/nl/pdf/2016/advisory/creepy-or-cool.pdf> 
454  Brody, above n 447.  
455 A 2016 MEF survey showed that 60% of consumers have concerns about the “perceived risks and threats” of a 
connected world:  above n 444. The MEF survey studied 5000 mobile media users in eight markets (UK, USA, Brazil, 
France, Germany, China, India and South Africa) to discover consumer perceptions as to the future of a connected world.  
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consequent loss of data control, and finally, data sovereignty456 and inadequate redress mechanisms.457 
These are all also CIOT concerns; it may just be that consumers do not know it, yet. 
 
Most Australians (60%) will cease doing business with companies they do not trust.458 Studies suggest 
that almost half of consumers do not trust the IOT,459 and 85% want to understand data collection 
practices before using CIOT devices.460 Consumers privilege trust over user issues such as device ease 
of use (94%).461  While Australian research is limited, Fortinet’s smart home study reports that 65% of 
Australians are concerned about data breach, 60% see privacy as important and don’t trust IOT data use, 
60% agreed they would feel “completely violated…, extremely angry”  if smart devices secretly collect 
and share their information (even anonymously), and 66% want to control their data access and use.462 
KPMG’s international study agrees that “indiscriminate personal data collection risks alienating 
consumers”, and that most people are ‘concerned’ about use of their data (56%).463 Nielsen concurs; 
finding that unknowing or non-consensual use is the greatest CIOT concern (53%),464 and Altimeter 
reports that 60% are uncomfortable with companies ‘selling’ their data.465 Consumers are “distinctively 
wary” about smart home information, which may slow uptake, and potentially constrain industry ‘value-
add’ capabilities. For example, most consumers do not want to disclose their online search history, 
location, address and medical records (80%), or use apps collecting their personal data (66%) or have 
their online-shopping data sold (75%) and surprisingly, only half would trade privacy for incentives such 
                                                          
456 ‘Data sovereignty’ refers to data ownership and access, including where data is stored overseas. 
457 ACMA, ‘The cloud: services, computing and digital data—Emerging issues in media and communications’, Occasional 
Paper 3 (June 2013); ‘Cloud computing- emerging issues’ (2015) <http://acma.gov.au/theACMA/emerging-issues-cloud-
computing>  
458 OAIC, ‘Community Attitudes to Privacy’ Research Report & Survey (2014 accessed 8 Apr 2016) 
<https://www.oaic.gov.au/resources/engage-with-us/community-attitudes/oaic-community-attitudes-to-privacy-survey-
research-report-2013/2013-community-attitudes-to-privacy-survey-report.pdf> 
459 Accenture, above n 427.   
460 TrustE, ‘2014 TRUSTe Privacy Index: Internet of Things Edition’ (February 2014 accessed Mar 2016) 
<https://www.truste.com/resources/privacyresearch/> 
us-internet-of-things-index-2014/. 
461 Deloitte, ‘Deloitte Australian Privacy Index 2016: Trust without Borders’ (2016 accessed Jun 2016): 19- 21 
<http://www2.deloitte.com/au/en/pages/risk/articles/deloitte-australian-privacy-index-2016.html>  
462 For Australian statistics see Electrical Connection, ‘Fortinet reveals Internet of Things: Connected Home survey results’ 
connected. (27 May 2014 accessed 4 Apr 2016) <http://www.connectedhome.com.au/fortinet-reveals-internet-things-
connected-home-survey-results/> For the global and US statistics, see Fortinet, ‘Fortinet Reveals Internet of Things: 
Connected Home’ Survey Results (23 Jun 2014 accessed 2 Jun 2016) < 
http://investor.fortinet.com/releasedetail.cfm?releaseid=855992> Australian: US figures (in brackets) for these metrics were: 
65% (68%) are concerned about data breach, 60% (57%) see privacy as important and do not trust how their IOT data 
would be used, 60% (67%) agreed they would feel “completely violated…, extremely angry” and take action if smart device 
were anonymously or secretly collecting and sharing their information,  and 66% (70%) of people want to control both 
access to and use of their data.   
463 Brody, above n 447.  
464 Nielsen, ‘The Internet of Things: Can It Find a Foothold with American Audiences Today?” (Nov 2014 accessed 3 Mar 
2016) <http://www.affinnova.com/resource-story/internet-of-things/> 
465 Groopman, above n 451: 10. 45% are “very or extremely” uncomfortable with companies ‘using’ their data. 
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as free or cheaper products.466 Turow identifies this as a “fallacy”, but this does not necessarily override 
consumer perception.467 Indeed, consumers see many CIOT capabilities as “creepy”, not “cool”. “Creepy” 
includes: a free fitness tracker sharing data with the wearer’s employer (55%); smart car telematics 
reducing insurance premiums but informing police of dangerous driving (55%); smart meter home 
occupant analytics468 or a cheap TV which monitors viewing habits (53%); smart device apps accessing 
contacts, photos and browsing history (84%);  smart car geo-location data being used to offer nearby 
services, and  device advertising using a consumer’s name [78%].469 Studies confirm that consumers are 
uncomfortable with data use absent personal consent and very uncomfortable with their data being sold. 
While discomfort levels do increase with age and decrease with technology exposure,470 incentives471 or 
other variables;472 the conclusions still hold firm - even with millennials.473  
 
Analysts assert that trust solutions lie in industry hands. (Mis)trust is a business reputational risk with a 
financial cost: customers avoid non-privacy protective companies,474 data as ‘currency’475 needs 
rethinking, as does communicating CIOT benefits and its business models.476 Clearly, CIOT providers 
must better “articulate and notify” consumers of data use: for example, most Australians (67%) do not 
                                                          
466 See Joseph Turow, Michael Hennessy & Nora Draper, ‘The Tradeoff Fallacy: How Marketers are Misrepresenting 
American Consumers and Opening Them Up to Exploitation’, University of Pennsylvania Annenberg School of 
Communications (5 June 2015 accessed 3 Mar 2016) <https://www.asc.upenn.edu/sites/default/files/Turow>  Turow points 
to the ‘trade-off fallacy’ whereby consumers express clear concerns as to data collection, use and sale, yet want the 
features which are usually used to incentivize data sharing or collection practices. 
467 An Accenture online survey found 60% want ‘real-time promotions’ (which often involve tracking) but do not want retailers 
to know their location (80%) and only 14% were prepared to share browsing history. Only 20% percent want retailers to 
know their location and just 14% are comfortable sharing their browsing history. 
468 Evans, above n 452; Brody, above n 447: 9  
469 Ibid.  
470 Other factors such as environmental and age differences vary. The rural and older segments report higher discomfort 
with data use and sales than the general population. In contrast, Lux Research suggest a generational change in privacy 
attitude to “embrace and accept”, c/f Altimeter, Deloitte, above n 461. 
471 Turow, above n 466. 
472 Analysts and academics are grappling with conflicting consumer evidence depending upon variables such as to the data 
or use involved, consumer attitude and age, and international / regional differences - which KPMG suggest, presents an 
unwelcome prospect for data collectors and advertisers alike. 
473 Altimeter’s study shows that while older generations express a more extreme concern as to privacy, “even for the 
youngest segment, well over 40% indicated concern or extreme concern for each type of data use”: Above n 451: 14. c/f Lux 
Research above n 26 which speculates (e.g. the go-pro / selfie generation) that younger generations embrace and live a 
‘lifelog’ experience and are therefore far less caring of ‘privacy per se: Lux, above n 26. Deloitte found that people complain 
more about privacy with age: Deloitte, above n 461: 11.   
474 Altimeter, above n 451; TRUSTe, ‘US Consumer Data Privacy Study: Consumer Privacy Edition’ (2014 accessed 4 Apr 
2016) <http://www.slideshare.net/trusteprivacyseals/2014-usconsumer-data-privacy-study-consumer-privacy-edition-
fromtruste> 
475 Timothy Morey, Theodore Forbath and Allison Schoop, “Customer Data: Designing for Transparency & Trust,” Harvard 
Business Review *May 2014 accessed 3 Mar 2016) <https://hbr.org/2015/05/customer-datadesigning-for-transparency-and-
trust> 
476 Accenture believe this will require an ethical framework: “…a framework for ethical communications businesses can 
adopt to better engage, build trust, and educate consumers around the use of their connected device data.”  
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want their data sent overseas, but 81% of apps in one study did so,477 including technology478 and smart 
self apps. IBM warn that current CIOT ecosystem trust may be a “fantasy”, arguing that trust is “very hard 
to engineer and expensive, if not impossible, to guarantee”.479 They recast responsibility upon providers, 
and CIOT consumers may agree: a recent Canadian study found that only 27% of consumers thought 
smart car benefits outweighed privacy risks and most (74%) believed that car manufacturers should be 
required to “…design technology that would mean consumers wouldn’t have to choose between the 
benefits of technology and protecting privacy..”480 These consumers do not believe industry assurances 
that CIOT data collection, storage and analysis, and anonymised data sold is privacy-safe, or that data 
sold will be de-identified - and with good reason.481 Also in the privacy context, Deloitte identify five trends: 
firstly,  more discerning consumer expectations, secondly, consumers want best practice personal 
information management as an “ethical obligation”, thirdly, that contractually-controlled third party data 
practices entail risks, fourthly, that privacy is a globalised expectation, and finally, a growing need to 
improve the data-commercialisation versus consumer choice (im)balance.482 It is a salient warning for 
industry trust, one where long-term industry trust collides with short term financial benefits of data 
collection and exploitation.  
CIOT consumer mistrust is on the industry radar, and with much-publicised security and privacy flaws, 
negative consumer awareness is rising. Remarkably, despite the many powerful players involved, the 
industry has yet, failed to disprove its consumer costs, market its benefits or to enhance the image of a 
smart world with consumers.  
 
 
                                                          
477 These were government, banking and finance, social media, energy, health and fitness, insurance, retail, 
telecommunications, higher education, travel and transportation, real estate, technology and media. 
478 All data collected by this sector was sent overseas: Deloitte, ‘Global Mobile Consumer Survey: Southeast Asia Survey’ 
(Dec 2015 accessed 8 Mar 2016): 9 <https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Technology-Media-
Telecommunications/gx-tmt-2015-global-mobile-consumer-survey-southeast-asia-edition.pdf>:  
479 Brody, above n 447.   
480 Canadian Automobile Association, ‘Survey’ cited here: https://fipa.bc.ca/connected-car/> 50% of respondents thought 
that smart car technologies put their privacy at risk while offering little benefit to consumers. Only 37% of respondents would 
agree to monitoring in exchange for an insurance discount, while 53% would not. 
481 Accenture’s 2014 online study suggests that 80% of consumers aged 20-40 in the US and the UK believe total privacy in 
the digital world is over: Accenture, ‘Eighty Percent of Consumers Believe Total Data Privacy No Longer Exists, Accenture 
Survey Finds’ (28 May 2014 accessed 2 Jun 2016) <https://newsroom.accenture.com/news/eighty-percent-of-consumers-
believe-total-data-privacy-no-longer-exists-accenture-survey-finds.htm> This is not the Zuckerberg line that privacy is ‘dead’ 
as some controversially assert; as Svantesson comments, “To say that we do not need a right of privacy because our 
modern information society does not cater for privacy is akin to saying that we do not need a right to water in a desert – the 
removal of a fundamental right is justified by reference to the environment being hostile to, or making difficult the exercise of, 
such a right…”: Dan Svantesson, Extraterritoriality in Data Privacy Law (Denmark Narayana Press, 2013) :30.  
482 Deloitte, above n 461: 19- 21. 
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1.5 Conclusion – chapter one 
Futurist Daniel Burris says that people do not think “big enough” when thinking about the internet of 
things.483  As this chapter suggests, CIOT is set to change the world as we know it. But the predictions 
and their exponential-ities attract serious criticisms worth factoring into the debate: initial predictions failed 
to meet expectation by 2016; tech adoption rates often spike during initial production periods and then 
growth rates slow;484 new technology may emerge and carve into or reshape a market rather than adding 
to it;485 needed enablers may become disablers (for example, Australian road infrastructure)486 and finally, 
a ubiquitous CIOT vision without commercial justification, is “…stretching the concept”. Arguably, every 
consumer device embedded with an IP address is, without a commercial justification, not inevitable – 
consumer disinterest in the ‘smart fridge’ or smart device contracting487 are oft-cited.488 Finally, global 
internet access remains an issue –  while increasing,489 it is still only 50%490 - so no matter how sensed-
up, unconnected consumer ‘things’ are dead. But even if 2020 projections are half true, it is difficult to 
comprehend the social impacts of its pervasive nature, the complex technology-mix involved and 
business – consumer impacts. Overlaid by the myriad privacy, trust, data sovereignty and security 
implications of the “panopticon economy”491 – these factors all collide to create “one of the biggest 
challenges of the next century”.492  
 
  
                                                          
483 Daniel Burris, ‘The Internet of Things is far bigger than anyone realises’ Wired (Nov 2014 accessed 1 April 2016) 
http://www.wired.com/insights/2014/11/the-internet-of-things-bigger/ and Burris, above n 15 (Part 2).  
484 For example, smartphone sales were 1B units worldwide in 2014, but Q5 2015, showed slowest sales growth since 2008 
at 9.7%: Hosain, above n 267.  There is evidence of slowing demand and reduced market share across all vendors 
(excluding Apple) and even Apple’s growth has declined after three quarters of declining sales 
485 Chinese fit band products retail at $25 c/f Fitbit price points start at $60- 250 USD ranging to hundreds of dollars: 
Pressman, above n 57.  
486 NTC, above n 397 and 408. 
487 Deloitte, above n 461: 10. 
488 Jamie Carter, ‘Forget smart fridges: The Industrial Internet of things is the real revolution’ techradar.pro (10 Mar 2015 
accessed 8 Apr 2016) <http://www.techradar.com/au/news/world-of-tech/forget-smart-fridges-the-industrial-internet-of-
things-is-the-real-revolution-1287276> “Many people out there have overestimated the market size for wearables and most 
importantly have overestimated the need for them”: Creative Strategies cited in Pressman, above n 57. 
489 192 countries have active 3G mobile networks. By 2019 forecasts predict mobile internet penetration will reach 71% and 
use per device will more than triple: Internet Society, above n 79.  
490 World internet penetration rates as at 30 June 2016 are:  Nth America (89%), Europe (73.9%), Australia/ Oceania 
(73.3%), Latin America/ Caribbean (61.5%), Middle East (57.4%), Asia (45.6%) and Africa (28.7%). World average is 50.1%: 
Miniwatts Marketing Group, ‘Internet World Penetration Rates by Geographic Regions- June 2016’ (accessed 2 Nov 2016) 
<http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm> See also Ibid. Well over 1 million apps are available globally, which have 
been downloaded more than 100 billion times. 
491 Steve Ranger, ‘Inside the panopticon economy: The next internet revolution, privacy and you’ ZDNet (2 Mar 2015 
accessed 7 Apr 2016) < http://www.zdnet.com/article/inside-the-panopticon-economy-privacy-the-iot-and-you/> 
492 Ibid.  
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PART II A NORMATIVE FRAMEWORK TO IDENTIFY KEY ISSUES  
Chapter 2. Adopting a policy framework 
Part I of this paper has contextualised the Australian CIOT “market” including its scale, scope, stakes 
and predicted trajectory. This Part II sets up a policy-based approach to evaluating that market and to 
informing potential responses, by enabling a review of its detrimental impacts upon consumers 
collectively as well as specifically. It commences with the research question, justifies the smart category 
approach, adapts an analytic Australian policy framework, and then identifies smart home, car and self 
experience locally and internationally, to illustrate potential consumer ‘detriment’. In summary, Parts II 
and III locate the problems which justify the conclusions and recommendations set out in Part IV. 
2.1 Research Question 
This thesis considers the following research question: 
 
 
 
2.2 Scope & smart category justification   
This thesis has a limited consumer IOT and consumer protection law scope delineated in Annex. A.1: 
briefly, it excludes the industrial IOT, and consumer IOT contexts beyond the smart home, car and self. 
This decision does not reflect perceived consumer risk or that ‘smart’ issues do not overlap.493 Rather, 
the selected smart categories represent the dominant CIOT purchase sectors internationally, and 
illustrate three 2016 Australian snapshots: one already market-established by consumer demand (smart 
self), one poised for implementation largely through provider decision-making (smart home) and one 
which is gradually but inevitably filtering into the market through supplier and government impetus (smart 
cars). The smart self evidences consumer demand shaped by fashion and utility, with evolving uses in 
health,  insurance and other sectors,  the smart home lacks discernible consumer demand but is driven 
                                                          
493 As the discussion later suggests, the Part IV draft principles may apply in differing CIOT contexts. 
 
How can Australian regulators and policy makers best fulfil the objectives of the Australian 
Consumer Policy Framework to improve consumer wellbeing through empowerment and 
protection, cognisant of Australian consumer laws and privacy principles, while fostering the 
twenty-first century consumer internet of things, as exemplified by smart cars, home and 
self? 
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by whitegoods and software manufacturers baking-in smart capacities494 while entities such as insurers 
and utilities embrace the technology for economic and efficiency reasons, and finally, smart cars 
represent an industry-led public policy preference: smart(est) cars will save lives and benefit non-drivers, 
the environment and traffic management, which is in the public interest, and therefore embraced 
internationally, regardless of current consumer demand or preference. As this demonstrates, these three 
categories comprise three significant consumer markets which will affect most Australians, and thus, offer 
ample scope to examine CIOT in Australia. 
The thesis focusses solely upon the main consumer protection laws in Australia: the federal Australian 
Consumer Law and the Australian Privacy Principles. As one of the first Australian studies of its kind in 
terms of close legal analysis of the consumer IOT, it is both useful and relevant to examine the principal 
legislative instruments and to identify any deficiencies in the frontlines of consumer and privacy protection 
in Australia.495 To that end, the thesis adopts the recently reaffirmed496 Australian Consumer Policy 
Framework (ACPF or Framework) objective as the underlying normative theme and to adapt selected 
regulatory policy assessment processes which are international best practice consumer policy-making 
methodologies.497 This section briefly explains the Framework, commences an analysis and plots the 
course for the consideration of potential CIOT detriments throughout Part III and the recommendations 
in Part IV. 
 
2.3 ACPF objectives 
Consumer policy is “…a suite of government policies that deal with purchase of and use of consumer 
goods and services”.498 It focuses upon consumer market interaction, and is often informed by economic 
                                                          
494 Samsung announced that by 2017, “90% of all Samsung products will be IoT devices — and that includes all our 
televisions and mobile devices… And five years from now, every single piece of Samsung hardware will be an IoT device, 
whether it is an air purifier or an oven.": Samantha Murphy, ‘Samsung: By 2020, all of our products will be connected to the 
web’ Mashable Australia (6 Jan 2015 accessed 20 Feb 2016) < http://mashable.com/2015/01/05/samsung-internet-of-
things/#4PJcq4DVGGqR> 
495 Of course, this excludes many potentially relevant legal areas: see Annex. A1.3.   
496 Consumer Affairs Forum (CAF) consists of all Cth, State and NZ ministers in the areas of fair trading and consumer 
affairs, with the task to consider matters of national significance and develop a consistent approach where practicable: CAF 
(Legislative and Governance Forum on Consumer Affairs with Consumer Affairs New Zealand), ‘Strategic Agenda 2015- 
2017’ (2015 accessed 2 Jan 2016): 4 <http://consumerlaw.gov.au/files/2015/09/CAF_strategic_agenda_2015.pdf> One 
aspect of the 2016 ACL review process was to consider the policy framework, which appears to be well regarded:  ACCC, 
‘Australian Consumer Law Review Interim Report’ (Oct 2016 accessed 8 Oct 2016) http://consumerlaw.gov.au/review-of-
the-australian-consumer-law/have-your-say/  
497 These derive from five main sources: OECD Recommendation on Consumer Policy Decision Making, Europe Economics 
(EE) reports to the European Commission, the OECD Consumer Policy Toolkit (Toolkit), the Australian Government Toolkit 
Companion ‘Consumer Policy in Australia’ (Companion) and the Australian Consumer Law Review Interim Report. 
498 Productivity Commission, ‘Review of Australia’s Consumer Policy Framework’ (30 Apr 2008): II.2 
<http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/consumer-policy/report/consumer2.pdf> 
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analysis and consumer problem identification.499 Consumer policy is also increasingly concerned with 
non-economic factors; such as political, social and moral aspects relevant to policy issues.500  In 2009, 
the Intergovernmental Agreement for the Australian Consumer Law501 adopted a national policy 
framework to enhance consumer protection and policy development, implementation and enforcement in 
Australia. Recently strategically reaffirmed,502 the National Consumer Policy objective503 states the 
normative policy aspiration underlying this thesis: 
 
 
 
The Framework has six operational objectives504 which are recast here under three main goals: 
Goal (1): to empower and protect consumers 
- to ensure that consumers are sufficiently well-informed to benefit from and stimulate 
effective competition; 
- to meet the needs of those consumers who are most vulnerable or are at the greatest 
disadvantage 
Goal (2): to improve consumer confidence and wellbeing 
- to promote goods and services as safe and fit for their purposes  
- to provide accessible and timely redress where consumer detriment has occurred 
Goal (3): to foster a fair and competitive consumer marketplace 
- to prevent practices which are unfair 
- to promote proportionate, risk-based enforcement 
 
These objectives also presuppose four concepts accepted by this thesis:  
                                                          
499 Australian Government, ‘Consumer Policy in Australia. A companion to the OECD Consumer PolicyToolkit’ (2011 
accessed 2 Mar 2016): 9 
<http://www.consumerlaw.gov.au/content/consumer_policy/downloads/Companion_to_OECD_Toolkit.pdf> 
500 Ibid: 11. 
501 In 2009, the Intergovernmental Agreement for the Australian Consumer Law adopted a national policy framework: 
Intergovernmental Agreement for the Australian Consumer Law, (2 Jul 2009) 
www.coag.gov.au/sites/default/files/IGA_autstralian_consumer_law.pdf This provides in para. C that the ACL is jointly 
administered by federal and state/territory consumer law regulators. 
502 CAF is tasked to consider matters of national significance and to develop a consistent approach where practicable: CAF 
above n 496: 4. 
503 Ibid, paragraph D.  
504 Intergovernmental Agreement, above n 500: Recital C. 
…to improve consumer wellbeing through consumer empowerment and protection, to foster effective 
competition and to enable the confident participation of consumers in markets in which both 
consumers and suppliers trade fairly…”   
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➢ that consumer wellbeing505  (as opposed to economic exploitation) is a laudable social, political 
and economic policy objective, and is enhanced by empowered506 and educated control and 
choice, as well as regulatory protection (hard or soft law and/ or other protective mechanisms);  
➢ that effective competition is good for markets and produces desirable consumer outcomes; 507  
➢ that consumers have the right to be confident within the marketplace; and  
➢ finally, that fairness is a desirable marketplace objective.   
 
2.4 Adapting a consumer policy framework approach 
Australia uses the OECD Consumer Policy Toolkit to guide its consumer policy development, which is 
detailed by flowcharts in Annex. C and summarized below: 508 
 
Graphic 2.1 Six-Step process for Consumer policy-making 
Source: OECD509 
                                                          
505 The EC assert that “consumer protection is at the heart of well-functioning markets”: OECD, ‘Consumer policy toolkit’ 
(OECD Publishing, 9 Jul. 2010): 112 <http://www.oecd.org/sti/consumer/consumer-policy-toolkit-9789264079663-en.htm> 
506 This is found in the European Consumer Agenda and funded by its Consumer Programme:  European Commission, ‘A 
European Consumer Agenda-Boosting confidence and growth’ (2012): 225 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/archive/strategy/docs/consumer_agenda_2012_en.pdf> 
507 The 2008 Australian Productivity Commission Review found that educated and informed consumers are a best defence 
against predatorial firms, as well as create effective demand for competitive and innovative markets: above n 498.  
508 Australian Government, above n 499. 
509 OECD, above n 505: 11. OECD (2010), Consumer Policy Toolkit, OECD Publishing, Paris.  
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These steps are a guide and not prescriptive.510 It is therefore proposed to adapt this approach – to 
identify problems, measure detriment (as practicable) and discern its (potential) significance, and to 
propose policy options – as the guiding methodology of this thesis.511 The process requires and justifies 
the lengthy exploration of CIOT detriment and legal ‘gaps’ throughout Part III  (Ch. 3 – 6), the process of 
formulating policy proposals (Ch. 7) and the ultimate recommendations and draft principles in chapter 8.   
 
2.5 Applying the adapted Framework 
2.5.1 Step 1: Problem definition & source 
The first step involves determining the consumer problem from the consumer’s perspective, and its 
source, using three questions:   
(1) What is the problem from a consumer’s perspective? 
(2) What is its source – for example, business conduct, informational, behavioural, market or 
regulatory failure? 
(3) Which agencies are best equipped to address the problems, if any?512 
Consumer ‘problems’ which may require regulatory intervention, include price, quality or safety, lack of 
timely consumer redress or evidence of consumer decisions “…inconsistent with their personal 
preferences and self-interests”.513  This thesis identifies six main potential problems: complexity, security, 
performance and safety, privacy, consent and big data discrimination.  Problem identification may occur 
through a range of resources: in this thesis, recourse is made to international cases and research by 
public, 514  private, consumer or international bodies; public hearings; academic commentary and the 
media.515 Consumer cases are yet few and complaints data not readily available. While these may be the 
source most suggestive of consumer problems, it seems probable that in a nascent, complex and high 
tech environment, consumers are less able to identify or be alerted to problematic issues relating to CIOT 
                                                          
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264079663-en> Graphic licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-
ShareAlike 3.0 IGO (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 IGO) 
510 Above n 499: 7.  
511 As Annex C. suggests, these steps ordinarily require substantiating economic analysis (where practicable) at various 
steps, as well as a post-implementation policy evaluative process for step 6; obviously, there is little of the former as to the 
Australian market, so neither step is fully completed. 
512 This questions addresses capacity and resources which are not relevant here: OECD, above n 505: 114. 
513 OECD, above n 505: 116. 
514 See for example, McKinsey, above n 22 and 28; Verizon, above n 312 and Cisco, above n 98: 13, all of which are pro-
CIOT but recommend that regulatory change is required.  
515 Ibid. 
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product information, performance and quality, and potentially questionable market practices affecting 
their wellbeing. As such secondary resources assume greater significance, as identified in Annex. B. and 
discussed in Part III. 
 
 
Problem 
 
 
Possible source(s) 
 
Agency & 
chapter 
Complexity: Consumers 
confused by product and 
industry complexity  
 
 
Business conduct (design issues) 
Informational failure (complexity and cognitive 
overload) 
Consumer behaviour (heuristics, overconfidence, 
framing)  
Regulatory failure (low consumer education or 
proactive enforcement) 
 
ACCC 
(limited) 
Ch. 1 
Security: Consumers 
confused by complex 
product security – is it 
secure or how to make it 
secure? 
 
Business conduct (design issues) 
Business conduct (framing) 
Informational failure (complexity and volume) 
Consumer behaviour (heuristics, overconfidence, 
framing, defaults) 
Regulatory failure (low consumer education; legal 
gaps; low enforcement) 
ACCC 
(limited) 
Ch. 3 
Performance & safety: 
Suppliers or products do 
not fulfil their promises or 
meet consumer 
expectation 
 
Business conduct (fraudulent sale deceptive sales; 
unfair contract terms, unconscionability; competitive 
issues) 
Consumer behaviour (overconfidence, framing) 
Regulatory failure (low enforcement, international 
supply chains) 
Consumer behaviour (heuristics, overconfidence, 
framing)  
 
ACCC 
Ch. 4 
Privacy: Consumers 
confused by complex 
product data flows and 
privacy – who has it, is 
data private or how to 
make it so? 
 
Business conduct (informational issues) 
Informational failure (complexity and volume) 
Consumer behaviour (heuristics, overconfidence, 
framing)  
 
OAIC 
Ch. 5 
Consent: Consumers do 
not understand product 
‘legals’ (terms and 
conditions, instructions, 
privacy and software 
terms) 
 
Business conduct (misleading/unfair terms; 
exploitation of ‘consent’) 
Business conduct  
Informational failure (complexity and overload) 
Regulatory failure (complexity, length & access may 
make terms unfair or beyond consumer competence 
to understand; inadequate enforcement) 
OAIC 
ACCC 
Ch. 6 
Data analytics & 
discrimination: 
Business conduct (informational and disclosure 
issues) 
ACCC, 
OAIC, & 
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Consumers unaware that 
data is stored and may be 
used by others or how it is 
used 
 
Business conduct (security and anonymisation 
failures) 
Regulatory failure (low consumer education or 
proactive enforcement) 
Consumer behaviour (heuristics, overconfidence, 
framing)  
 
Anti-
discrimination 
Commissioner  
(all limited) 
Ch.3 (briefly) 
   
Table 2.1 Consumer ‘problem’ identification 
Source: author 
 
 
The final question is which regulator is appropriate to address these problems. Consumer policy 
responsibility lies with Treasury,516 with the ACCC and related state bodies as regulators. Given the 
privacy implications of CIOT policy and regulation, the OAIC is also significant, ACMA is relevant as to 
consumer telecommunications issues, as may be ASIC, police and others in (respectively) corporate 
regulation and criminal law contexts.517 Given the consumer focus, and reflecting the Productivity 
Commission’s recommendations for (open) data consumer regulation,518 this paper concentrates upon 
the ACCC and OAIC as principal regulators hereafter. 
 
 
2.5.2 Step 2: Measure consumer detriment 
“…the growing collection, processing and use of consumer transaction data for commercial 
ends …is proving an increasingly important source of competitive advantage [which could be] 
an increasing source of consumer detriment…”519  - UK CMA 
 
                                                          
516 ACL and consumer policy issues are generally referred to the Policy and Research Advisory Committee of the Standing 
Committee of Officials of Consumer Affairs. See www.treasury.gov.au. where Infrastructure, Competition and Consumer 
Division has general consumer policy responsibility. The ACCC is the relevant regulator. For telecommunications, the 
relevant regulator is the ACMA, and for therapeutic goods, see the Therapeutic Goods Administration.    
517 In a privacy context, complaints resolution crosses over sectoral external resolution schemes. For example, both ACMA 
and Telecommunications Industry Ombudsman operate in telecommunications issues.  
518 The PC recommends a Data Sharing and Release Act which proposes to increase individual control over data held about 
them via a new Comprehensive Consumer Right, with the ACCC as key regulator, which it justifies by asserting that 
“competition and consumer policy lies at the heart of the proposed changes”:  PC, above n 190: Ch. 9.   
519 David Currie, ‘The new Competition and Markets Authority: how will it promote competition?’ Beesley Lecture (7 Nov 
2013 accessed 10 Dec 2016) < https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/the-new-competition-and-markets-authority-how-
will-it-promote-competition> 
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 ‘Consumer detriment’ is an outcome of a consumer problem which is often difficult to measure. The EU 
defines it as consumer “... harm or damage”,520 while the OECD refers to a reduction in economic 
welfare.521 The Companion cites market outcomes falling short of their potential, resulting in consumer 
“welfare losses”.522 Examples include where consumers are misled into purchases, pay more than they 
would have “had they been better informed”; experience unfair contract terms; or where goods or services 
are dangerous or defective, fail to meet reasonable expectations as to quality, performance or delivery, 
or fail to meet operational expectation, information provided or where delivery is not timely. 523 It has many 
forms, and its effects may be uniform, individual or variable:524 
Consumer detriment … can be structural525 in nature (i.e. affecting all consumers) or personal; 
526 apparent to consumers or hidden; and financial or non-financial. Consumer detriment may be 
apparent to consumers immediately, 527  may take time to emerge528  or remain hidden. 529”  
 
 
Personal and structural detriments may interact and overlap. As this paper is not an economic analysis, 
it does not distinguish between the two, as both prima facie affect consumers detrimentally.530  While 
non-financial detriments are not readily measurable, their cost is as high as 25% of all economic costs.531 
Examples include:  
 
                                                          
520 European Commission, ‘Handbook to Assess Consumer Detriment’ (n.d.) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_evidence/market_studies/docs/handbook_consumer-detriment.pdf> 
521 OECD, above n 505: 52  
522 Australian Government, above n 499: 19. 
523 OECD, ‘OECD Recommendation on Consumer Policy Decision Making’ (Mar 2014 accessed 5 Jun 2016) 
<http://www.oecd.org/sti/consumer/Toolkit-recommendation-booklet.pdf> 
524 It may affect one group but not others, or exhibit a ‘waterbed effect’, so that some consumers benefit while others lose:  
OECD: above n 505: 56. 
525 Structural detriment involves the “ex ante reduction of consumer surplus” rather than on ex post outcomes of consumers 
in aggregate: Ibid 4. 
526 Personal detriment involves “ex post outcomes for those consumers who have a negative experience” (based upon 
reasonable expectations) and comprises both financial and non-financial detriment (which includes time lost and 
psychological detriment. EE comment: “We suggest that personal detriment should be assessed against a counterfactual of 
“reasonable expectations” rather than “expectations”, partly because the latter might lead to under-estimation of the 
detriment suffered by vulnerable groups who may have low expectations.”: Ibid: 4. 
527 The OECD use an (obviously) defective good as an example of this. 
528 Experience goods. 
529 Credence goods. An example might be a good that is leaching a chemical, of which a consumer is unaware. 
530 Structural detriments can flow on from personal detriment; OECD suggest that personal detriments may decrease 
consumer confidence in a market which may decrease transactions occurring in that market and so a decline; and decrease 
consumer confidence in a particular sales channel – thereby decreasing the range of product choice and / or weaken 
competition within that channel” OECD, above n 505: 76. 
531 This was applied by the Productivity Commission, ‘Consumer policy framework’ Inquiry Report (8 May 2008 accessed 20 
Jan 2016) <http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/consumer-policy/report> 
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Financial detriment 
(tangible – inconvenience time and money) 
Non-financial detriment 
(intangible -  limit choice & opportunity) 
 
Lost income due to injury/ time 
Cost to repair or replace 
Inflated prices 
Flawed product cost (e.g. where products fail 
to meet reasonable expectations based upon 
misleading information) 
Reduction in asset value (e.g. defective smart 
car is worth less) 
Other consequential costs: fire damage to 
property etc. 
Cost of expert advice 
Administrative, postage and travel costs to 
seek redress 
 
Psychological or emotional (anger, stress, 
embarrassment, disappointment etc.) 
Injury or adverse health effect 
Reduced choice 
Privacy breach or compromise of personal 
information 
Time to seek redress 
Inconvenience 
Table 2.2 Financial & non-financial detriments 
Source: Adapted from Europe Economics & the OECD532 
 
Consumer detriment measurement tools include: 
➢ Commissioned research providing qualitative appraisals and quantitative data; 
➢ Statistics as to consumer behaviours, complaints data, enforcement data, other market 
comparison and information from international bodies; 
➢ Information from specific interest groups (noting their bias and focus); 
➢ Court judgements and enforcement actions may illustrate legal problems, market failures or 
“persistent market problems”.533 
The OECD cites other common signs and (market) situations likely to evidence detriment,534 as follows:  
➢ Consumer complaints data; 
➢ Evidence of unfair contract terms, or misleading advertising or unfair marketing practices like 
fraud; 
➢ Complex products: complexity makes comparison difficult and may result in sub-optimal 
purchase decisions; 
                                                          
532 Europe Economics, ‘Assessing the Impact of Policy on Consumer Detriment’ (2007 accessed 4 Jan 2016) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_evidence/market_studies/docs/handbook_consumer-detriment.pdf>and OECD, 
above n 505: 55. 
533 Australian Government, above n 505: 19- 20. 
534 OECD, above n 505: 57. 
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➢ Products with high switching costs or where search/ switching rates are low: detriment may arise 
where switching products costs consumers (e.g. through contractual costs or interoperability 
issues); and may inhibit changing to better/ cheaper options; 
➢ Defective or unsafe product sales: safety may be measured through accidents, injuries and 
‘dangerous’ products; 
➢ Price dispersion for apparently alike products (across geographic areas) 
➢ Inadequate consumer redress response upon complaints; 
➢ Commission payments upstream: these may not operate in consumer’s best interests as advice 
may be tainted; 
➢ Goods or services with ‘experience’ or ‘credence’ characteristics, or are purchased infrequently; 
and 
➢ Customer dissatisfaction: re choice, quality, after-sales service etc.535 
Other ways used to detect detriment include consumer and consumer organisation/ stakeholder 
complaints or consultations; feedback or research from such groups; business firm reports and research; 
and the media.536 Chapters 3 to 6 are an analysis of potential consumer problems and detriment within 
the CIOT, and cite a range of resources drawn from those detailed above. Chapter 7 then uses those 
findings to complete the Framework analysis and to form the basis for the recommendations in Part IV.  
 
2.5.3 Further steps overview: Steps    3- 6 
The remaining steps are explained briefly here, to complete the CPF discussion, justify why certain steps 
are excised and to foreground the practical Step 4 and 5 discussion once consumer detriment is 
established. 
Step 3 Determine if detriment warrants policy action 
This involves five sub-questions, which examine the scale of the detriment, who is experiencing it, 
assesses its expected duration; considers the likely consequences of taking no policy action and 
considers “other substantial costs to the economy”.537 As Part I reveals, the scope, scale and stakes of 
the CIOT are substantial, which suggests that detriment arising from it is also likely to be widespread and 
                                                          
535 The OECD note that these may reveal problems otherwise difficult to quantify: above n 505: 57. 
536 OECD, above n 505: 58. 
537 Australian Government, above n 499: 23. 
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substantial. This would be balanced against significant factors such as stifling innovation, adverse 
international impacts or impeding CIOT implementation in Australia.  
The determination requires a decision as to whether to proceed to Step 4, or whether more evidence as 
to steps 1 and/ or 2 are required, or whether no action is required at all. While contrary to the 
recommendations in this thesis, it is likely an Australian Government entity would require evidence as to 
real detriment within the Australian market, before committing to substantive policy action (other than 
perhaps encouraging industry-driven self-regulation). This thesis however, promotes a more pre-emptive 
approach having regard to the global nature of CIOT markets, providers and technology, international 
experience and research, and its significant adverse potential and long-lasting consumer impacts.  
As such, this question is not addressed again and the dissertation assumes that the detriments identified 
in Chapters 3- 6 justify policy action. 
Step 4 Set policy objectives and identify the range of policy actions 
A clear policy objective is specified to identify what is intended to be achieved for consumers and the 
market. The range of practically-possible policy options are also identified, using both supply and demand 
side tools, and include new actions together with refocusing extant approaches. The options also identify 
responsible entities for policy implementation and communication.538 This is undertaken in chapter 7. 
Step 5 Evaluate Options and select policy action 
Policy option evaluation seeks to ascertain the most appropriate and cost effective method to achieve 
the objectives outlined in step 4. Often policy-makers will conduct a cost: benefit analysis, or trials, 
research and stakeholder consultation is undertaken. These useful approaches are again beyond scope, 
so the evaluation in chapter 7 is made using available information and evidence, including the scope-
scale-stakes in chapter one and the gaps and conclusions identified in Part III.  
Step 6 Develop a policy review process 
After a reasonable time, the policy actions and tools recommended in Part IV should be reviewed to 
determine if the objectives are being achieved in a cost-effective manner. This is included within the 
recommendations to ensure responsiveness.539  
                                                          
538 It is common practice for government departments to undertake a Regulatory Impact Assessment using the Best practice 
Regulation handbook. This is an analogous process to the ACPF, repeats much of its process and is therefore, beyond 
scope: Australian Government, above n 499: 27- 28. 
539 New laws are reviewed within five years of commencement, while periodic ACL reviews, surveys and related data are 
collected to allow new issues to be identified, consumer detriment evaluated and effectiveness assessed: Department of 
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2.6 Conclusion 
In summary, the search to establish consumer detriment across CIOT security issues, consumer law, 
privacy law and online contracting follows in Chapters 3- 6. The Framework is followed hereafter as 
tabulated below: 
 
TRACKING CONSUMER POLICY THROUGHOUT THIS PAPER  
 
Consumer detriment may be personal and/ or structural, and can be defined as harm or 
damage to consumers that occurs in connection with a transaction between the consumer 
and particular sellers or suppliers.   
(London Economics, 2009) 
 
 
Step 1: Problem definition Parts 1 and II 
 
Step 2: Measure consumer detriment Part III 
 
Step 3: Does the detriment warrant policy action? Parts III and IV 
 
Step 4: Define a policy objective and identify a rage of 
policy options 
 
Part IV (Table 7.2) 
Step 5: Evaluate options and select policy action Part IV 
 
Step 6: Implement and then evaluate after time Part IV  
 
  
Table 2.3 ACPF steps 
Source: Author. 
 
Part III commences the legal evaluation of extant Australian consumer regulation pertinent to the CIOT, 
how it responds to known and unknown examples of CIOT consumer detriment, and identifies certain 
‘gaps’ within Australia’s current consumer protection framework, which Part IV offers strategies to 
redress.     
                                                          
Finance, Office of Best Practice Regulation, ‘Best practice regulation handbook’ 
<http://finance.gov.au/obpr/ptroposal/handbook/appendix-A-five-yeasrly-reviews.html> 
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PART III CONSUMER LAW GAP ANALYSIS 
 
“…a major challenge facing the uptake of the IOT in the EU are the gaps in the legal framework 
governing consumer protection and data. The regulation covering the IOT has not kept up with the 
speed at which the technology is developing…”540 
 
Part III is a selective assessment of Australian consumer laws and their capacity to respond to consumer 
IOT issues and consumer problems.  Chapter 4 reviews the Australian Consumer Law from a CIOT 
consumer perspective, chapter 5 evaluates privacy law gaps and chapter 6, contractual issues from a 
behavioural economics perspective. It is impossible to conduct a risk or detriment assessment without 
scoping these systemic risks, which innately permeate the consumer law, privacy and contract analyses 
to follow; this is the task in this chapter. 
 
 
Chapter 3 CIOT ‘complexity’: an overview of (in)security, big(ger) data 
analytics, & (artificial) intelligence  
 
“…a significant opportunity and a very real threat…”541 
 
The consumer internet of things is complex, which of itself presents challenges for consumer protection 
and regulation. Recent enablers are accelerating CIOT risk:542 ‘big data’ cloud storage;543 increasingly 
powerful data analytics via machine-learning and algorithms, and rapidly-growing artificial intelligence, 
and biometric (voice, facial and fingerprint recognition) technologies.544These technologies all liberate 
CIOT value, but suffer innate flaws which become CIOT flaws; and so, create new forms of consumer 
                                                          
540 Rebecca Schindler, above n 1. The EU has made significant strides since 2015 in this regard. 
541 Communications Alliance, above n 119.   
542 Technically, these include smaller cheaper complex-data-collecting semiconductors and increased IPv6 network 
capabilities. The former are sensors, transmitters, and controllers: Ibid: 15. This development was driven largely by the 
rapidly-growing mobile phone and tablet markets. Morgan Stanley indicate sensors cost around $1 and Bluetooth chips 
even less: Morgan Stanley, ‘The Internet of Things is Now’ (2014 accessed 10 Feb 2016) < 
http://www.technologyinvestor.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/internet-of-Things-2.pdf> The latter will grow from 3 billion 
users (2015)  to a projected 340 trillion, trillion, trillion by 2050:  Internet Society, above n 79. See also Blackett Report, 
above n 19: 15; Accenture, above n 24; Rose, above n 10.  
543 The Blackett Report cites the cloud, open-source software and “commoditised hardware”: above n 19: 15. 
544 These are known of as ‘dynamic human bandwidth interfaces’. Other factors relevant in an IOT development context (but 
not enablers per se) include 3D printing: Turck, above n 438. Also, crowd funding through sites like Kickstarter or Indiegogo 
lessen early-phase hardware development costs by creating demand and financing: Matt Turck, ‘The Internet of Things Is 
Reaching Escape Velocity’ TechCrunch (2 Dec 2014 accessed 8 Feb 2016) <http://techcrunch.com/2014/12/02/the-internet-
of-things-is-reaching-escape-velocity/    
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risk and new challenges for consumer protection and regulation.  Structural545 (systemic) detriments may 
generate potential misuses of market power, imperfect consumer information or information asymmetries, 
consumer information and choice overload, and even, regulatory failure.546 This chapter places this 
complex ecosystem in its risk context to illustrate largely piecemeal and gap-ridden Australian legal 
responses, current pressing consumer threats and detriments, and a policy vacuum as to those which 
are rapidly, on their way. 
 
3.1 (In)Security is complex… and pressing 
 “The time to address IOT security is right now…”547 
Our nation cannot afford a generation of IOT devices deployed with little consideration for 
security. The consequences are too high given the potential for harm to our critical 
infrastructure, our personal privacy, and our economy.548 
 
“In the ever-growing Internet of Things, attackers already outpace the defenders. If developing 
solutions for software liability does not become more of a priority for everyone—including tech 
developers, manufacturers and consumers—there may be no winning this technological 
war…”549 
The CIOT exacerbates an internet ecosystem security ‘crisis’: cyberspace is a “national emergency”,550  
the IOT is systemically “indefensible”;551 and “innovation is outpacing security”.552  McAfee find a “trillion 
points of vulnerability…”,553 which exponentially increase the “attack surface” – to physical (device) 
access, local Wi-Fi/ Ethernet or cloud infrastructure attacks, software viruses and malware. Any internet-
                                                          
545 Structural consumer detriment involves the “ex ante reduction of consumer surplus” which affects consumers in 
aggregate; this is, the loss in consumer welfare due to market or regulatory failures (rather than on ex post outcomes of 
consumers). ‘Consumer surplus’ means the difference between what a consumer is willing to pay for a product and what 
they actually do pay: OECD, Toolkit, above n 505: 75. “We argue that if consumers are fully informed and rational, then 
structural detriment fully captures the risk of ex post psychological detriment, because this risk will be taken into account in 
consumers’ willingness to pay (and will thus be captured in consumer surplus). In our view, there is no perfect candidate to 
use as the counterfactual for structural detriment, although possibilities include perfect competition or “well-functioning 
markets” (which is more realistic but less easy to define)”: OECD, above n 523: 4. 
546 OECD, above n 505: 75. 
547 US Department of Homeland Security, ‘Strategic principles for Securing the Internet of Things’ (Nov 2016 accessed 15 
Nov 2016): 3 
<https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Strategic_Principles_for_Securing_the_Internet_of_Things-2016-1115-
FINAL....pdf> 
548 Ibid: 13. 
549 Lillian Ablon, ‘Keeping Hackers Away from Your Car, Fridge and Front Door’ The National Interest (7 Dec 2015 Accessed 
10 Jun 2016) < http://nationalinterest.org/feature/keeping-hackers-away-your-car-fridge-front-door-14525?page=show> 
550 The US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) warned in September 2015 of IOT cybercrime risks, including personal 
data vulnerability as well as the potential for “compromising the IoT device to cause physical harm.”   
551 NSTAC, above n 66. 
552 Greg Austin, Australian Centre for Cyber Security, quoted in ComputerWorld ANZ, ‘CyberThreat looms large: is Australia 
doing enough as to cybersecurity?’ (July 2016 accessed 11 Jul 2016) 
<http://docs.media.bitpipe.com/io_13x/io_132733/item_1376580/ANZ_ISM_0716_ezine_FINAL.pdf> 
553 Raj Samani, ‘3 Key Security Challenges for the Internet of Things’ McAfee Intel Security Blog (29 Oct 2014) 
<https://blogs.mcafee.com/business/3-key-security-challenges-internet-things/> 
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connected CIOT device is a potential ‘attack surface’ and may become a compromised attack ‘backdoor’. 
Cyber criminals will use them to cross the network “laterally” –  to hard drives, laptops, phones and tablets 
-  to steal personal information, credit card numbers, bank account log-ins, digital (data) eavesdropping 
or to send malicious or spam emails.554 
The Australian Government has no mandated cybersecurity standards.555   
 
3.1.1 Ecosystem flaws & data breach 
Consumer IOT flaws are systemic: devices lack security-by-design, evidencing basic security flaws in 
design and operation; software apps suffer ssecurity vulnerabilities and innumerable cases of data breach 
and ‘hacking’; 556 and features such as social media integration imports user behavioural and settings-
related risk. Finally, consumer data stored in the cloud  carries its many risks:557 interface insecurity;558 
outage potentials; offshore data processing and storage, and cross- jurisdictional data transfer;559 
potential data breach and devolved data security governance.560 Consumer data breaches are 
                                                          
554 FBI, ‘Cyber Tip: Be Vigilant with your Internet of things (IoT) devices’ (13 Oct 2015 accessed 2 Mar 2016) < 
https://www.fbi.gov/news/stories/cyber-tip-be-vigilant-with-your-internet-of-things-iot-devices> 
555 There are relevant (non-mandatory) ISO standards and the US President has signed an Executive Order mandating 
compliance with the NIST CSF for Federal agency compliance with the NIST Cybersecurity Framework: Sean Field, ‘NIST 
Cybersecurity Framework Workshop - Day 1’ Maddocks (17 May 2017 accessed 18 May 2017) 
<https://www.maddocks.com.au/blog/nist-workshop/> 
556 Art 29 WP, ‘Opinion 02/2013 on apps on smart devices’ (adopted 27 Feb 2013 accessed 2 Feb 2016) < 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2013/wp202_en.pdf> 
557 Mathews-Hunt, above n 151. ACMA and recent ABS research supports this view; suggesting that actual cloud usage far 
exceeds awareness levels:  while 55% of those surveyed had ‘heard’ of cloud computing, only 26% realised they were using 
the cloud. It is a statistic which is likely to increase in the CIOT context, obscured by a device-focus, and questionable app 
privacy consents or terms and conditions.  
558 OWASP describes its aims to help consumers, manufacturers and developers to better understand IoT security issues 
and to enable better security decisions in “building, deploying or assessing IoT technologies”: OWASP ‘Internet of Things 
Project’ and OWASP, ‘Internet of Things Top Ten Project’ (n.d. accessed 7 Apr 2016) 
<https://www.owasp.org/index.php/OWASP_Internet_of_Things_Top_Ten_Project> ACMA and ABS research suggests that 
actual cloud usage  far exceeds consumer awareness levels:  while 55% of those surveyed had ‘heard’ of cloud computing, 
only 26% realised they were using the cloud,  a statistic likely to increase in the CIOT context, where cloud use is obscured 
by a device-focus, and questionable app privacy consents or terms and conditions. 
559 Australian Cyber Security Centre (ACSC), ‘2015 Threat Report’ (2015 accessed 9 Mar 2016): 22 
https://acsc.gov.au/publications/ACSC_Threat_Report_2015.pdf> ACSC   identifies these as “significant risks”. 
560 Ibid. Data in foreign jurisdictions may lawfully be accessed by foreign governments such as the US, which may occur 
without ‘owner’ notification. 
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commonplace -  affecting the most ‘secure’ global operators561 - like Google562 and Apple.563 Cloud 
attacks are increasing564 and the recent Heartbleed virus, for example, affected one third of cloud 
services.565 Most CIOT data is cloud-stored and much not encrypted, though experts warn that  "…storing 
sensitive, unencrypted information in the cloud is foolish, no matter how you slice it."566  Finally, CIOT 
apps on smartphones import device vulnerabilities: the 2016 Quadrooter567 bug568 gave hackers potential 
access to 900 million smartphones - and their connected CIOT apps and data  – while the industry 
increased consumer risk through fix delays.569 Industry explanations for security and data breach events 
are rarely comforting: detection and voluntary public disclosure is rare570 and explanations often 
symptomatic of lax security risk assessments and practices generally: from poor designed-in device 
insecurity to a stolen laptop, to an employee with weak password security571 or international contractor 
staff data theft. Inadequate industry corporate compliance, information provision, staff training, chain-of-
                                                          
561 These have affected most major online platforms - Gmail, twitter, dropbox, Facebook, Apple iCloud, Google Apps, 
Amazon, Microsoft Office 365, Outlook.com, Bing, Azure Cloud, Xbox, Cloudfare (including 750,000 other sites), 
Outlook.com mail, Amazon (Pinterest, Netflix, instagram) - affecting millions of users worldwide. Many are part of or supply 
services to, the CIOT data storage and processing ecosystem. 
562 Gmail users have experienced over a dozen outages since 2009. The most serious affected ‘most’ of 500 million users: 
Adrian Covert, ‘Gmail at 10: How Google dominated e-mail’ CNNTech (1 April 2014 accessed 28 June 2014) < 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/04/01/technology/gmail> 
563 Users were advised to change their passwords and not to pay a ransom demanded when malware locked Apple users out 
in Australia: Chris Griffith, ‘Malware cripples Australian Apple iCloud accounts’  The Australian (29 May 2014 accessed 29 
July 2014) <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/technology/malware-cripples-australian-apple-icloud-accounts/story-e6frgakx-
1226935680356> Wired reporter Matt Honan’s macbook air, ipad and iphone data was remotely wiped, when an Apple 
employee reset his iCloud password: Ted Samson, ‘Dropbox fiasco serves as reminder of cloud-storage insecurity’ Infoworld 
(2 Aug 2012 accessed 30 July 2014): 108 <http://www.infoworld.com/t/cloud-security/dropbox-fiasco-serves-reminder-of-
cloud-storage-insecurity-199197> 
564 The volume and persistence of attacks is increasing and are “moving to the cloud”. Alert Logic, Cloud Security Report 
(Spring 2014 accessed 10 July 2014) [12] < http://www.findwhitepapers.com/force-download.php?id=37838> 
565 James Bourne ‘ One in three cloud services was susceptible to Heartbleed, research shows’ Cloudtech (12 May 2014 
accessed 7 June 2014) <http://www.cloudcomputing-news.net/news/2014/may/12/one-three-cloud-services-was-susceptible-
heartbleed-research-shows/>  
566 InfoWorld, ‘Popular cloud sync app raises security fears’ Tech Watch (8 Nov 2011 accessed 30 July 2014) < 
http://www.infoworld.com/print/157776> 
567 Phones affected include Samsung’s Galaxy S7 and S7 Edge, HTC’s One M9 and HTC 10, and Google’s Nexus 5X, 6, 
and 6P.  
568 Security firm Check Point identify ‘Quadrooter” as a series of four “interconnected flaws” whereby hackers can access the 
“root” android operating system and control the device – including tracking every action its operator takes and uploading that 
data anywhere - in up to 900 million smartphones worldwide: Alex Hern, ‘QuadRooter Android bug could affect almost 1bn 
phones, researchers claim’ The Guardian (8 Aug 2016 accessed 9 Aug 2016) < 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/aug/08/quadrooter-android-bug-phones-hackers-smartphone>  
569 Hern, Ibid: “Just because manufacturers know of the bug and how to fix it, doesn’t mean consumers are safe: each 
individual manufacturer still has to create a specific fix for their model of phone, and in many cases individual mobile carriers 
then have to themselves agree to roll that fix out to their customers…” He cites CheckPoint: “Critical security updates must 
pass through the entire supply chain before they can be made available to end users. Once available, the end users must 
then be sure to install these updates to protect their devices and data.” Google now pre-vets Store apps, but has no Chinese 
store and malicious apps can “slip between the cracks”. 
570 Australia has recently passed mandatory data breach reporting; see Chapter 5. 
571 This occurred (in different ways) in both the Dropbox and Apple iCloud cases. 
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contractor liability and insurance is a data loss risk, just as much as hacking. And CIOT device and app 
providers are of course, best placed to assess and control each of these risks.  
Of course, data breach572 - and misuse - happens.573 It is lucrative,574 expensive,575 technologically 
challenging,576 damaging to consumer trust577 and can occur at any link in a long CIOT supply chain.578 
Detrimental consumer outcomes include identity theft579 and fraud,580 stalking, embarrassment or 
discrimination, and financial loss.581 It is a fundamental issue to CIOT security, data integrity and a trust 
barrier, but Australian regulatory action is lagging. Further, credible solutions such as those advanced by 
                                                          
572 “Data breach” means “…when personal information … is lost or subjected to unauthorised access, modification, 
disclosure, or other misuse of interference…”: OAIC, ‘Guide to Information Security’ (April 2013 accessed 10 Apr 2015) [2] 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-guides/guide-to-securing-personal-information> 
573 Corporate security and consumer data breach may arise the hostile attack or hacking, as well as inadvertently through 
accidental data disclosure, lost or stolen computers and human or programming error, as well as systemic corporate failure, 
such as latent system vulnerabilities, poor employee training, systems or undetected misconduct, inadequate corporate 
compliance, deficient anonymisation and poor product design, risk assessment and security practices.  Anywhere that data 
is collected, collated, used or stored is a potential target or source of breach. 
574 An Australian driver’s license is valued at $417- 450 on Agora and passport is worth $5110. While noting dark web data 
sale marketplaces, the Government did not quantify the likely example value: Commonwealth Parliament House of 
Representatives, Privacy Amendment (Notifiable Data breaches) Bill 2016 Explanatory Memorandum (2016 accessed 2 Oct 
2016): 17 [60] < http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r5747.> 
575 In 2015 (c/f 2014), the average breach involved 20,000+ records at $158 (154) each, tallying to a total cost of $4 (2.82) 
million dollars per company: Ponemon Institute LLC, ‘2016 Cost of Data Breach Study: Australia’ (Oct 2016 accessed 20 
Oct 2016) < http://www-03.ibm.com/security/data-breach/> Data breach costs consumers in terms of lost privacy and 
potential economic exposure to identity theft and other criminal activity.  
576 OAIC, above n 572: 16.  
577 OAIC, ‘Data Breach Notification Guide: A Guide to handling personal information security breaches’ (Aug 2014 accessed 
3 Apr 2015) [9]< http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-guides/data-breach-notification-a-guide-to-
handling-personal-information-security-breaches>. For example, in 2015, UK phone company TalkTalk lost 250,000 
customers’ data: Rene Millman, ‘TalkTalk loses 250,0000 customers post-breach – now supplier scam too’ SC Magazine 
(30 Jan 2016 accessed 20 Oct 2016) http://www.scmagazineuk.com/talktalk-loses-250000-customers-post-breach--now-
supplier-scam-too/article/469535/>< 
578 Randall Rothenberg, ‘IAB Head: 'The Digital Advertising Industry Must Stop Having Unprotected Sex'’ Business Insider (6 
Feb 2014 accessed 9 Apr 2015) <http://www.businessinsider.com.au/iab-randall-rothenberg-supply-chain-2014-2> 
579 One definition is the ‘knowing transfer, possession or use of any name or number that identifies another person with the 
intent of committing or aiding and abetting a crime’: US Identity Theft and Assumption Deterrence Act 1998. In first half 
2016, identity theft was the leading type of global data breach (64%), and malicious outsiders were the leading cause (69%): 
George Nott, ‘Australia leads APAC for data breaches’ (21 Sept 2016 accessed 29 Sept 2016) CIO 
http://www.cio.com.au/article/607231/australia-leads-apac-data-breaches/  Healthcare  industries had 27% of breaches but 
5% of compromised records, versus government, which suffered 14% of breaches but 57% of record loss.  For the costs 
which establish consumer detriment see: Alessandro Acquisti, Curtis R. Taylor and Liad Wagman, ‘The Economics of 
Privacy’, Journal of Economic Literature, 52:2, (8 Mar 2016) Sloan Foundation Economics Research Paper No. 2580411, 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2580411 at page 37. 
580 Identity theft means the acquisition or collection of an individual’s PI for criminal purposes and for the first half of 2015, 
53.2% of breaches were caused by identity theft which constitutes 74.9% of compromised records. The crime is “one of the 
most common and costly crimes in Australia”: Commonwealth Parliament House of Representatives, Privacy Amendment 
(Notifiable Data breaches) Bill 2016 Explanatory Memorandum (2016 accessed 2 Oct 2016): 16 [60] < 
http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Bills_Legislation/Bills_Search_Results/Result?bId=r5747.> The estimated 
economic impact exceeds $2B annually and 4- 5 % of those affected experience financial loss: Attorney-General’s Dept, 
‘Identity Crime and Misuse in Australia’ (2013- 4 accessed 5 Aug 2016): 4 < 
https://www.ag.gov.au/RightsAndProtections/IdentitySecurity/Documents/Identity-Crime-and-Misuse-in-Australia-2013-
14.pdf> 
581 Above n 574: 13 [60] 
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OWASP (Annex. D),582 GSMA,583 the FTC,584 OECD,585 or non-governmental activist groups586 remain 
largely ignored or ill-implemented voluntary recommendations or guidelines587 – while some experts 
assert that no clear solutions exist.588 In the past decade, costly589 database breaches of consumer data 
have reached pandemic levels.590 Governments,591 the world’s largest companies592 and supposedly, the 
most secure entities in the world593 have fallen victim – as have hundreds of millions of consumers.594 
                                                          
582 OWASP above n 558.  
583 GSMA, above n 113; GSMA, ‘Automotive IoT Security: Countering the Most Common Forms of Attack’ (22 March 2016 
accessed 2 Apr 2016) < http://www.gsma.com/connectedliving/automotive-iot-security-countering-the-most-common-forms-
of-attack/> 
584 FTC, above n 118.  
585 OECD, ‘Guidelines for the Security of Information Systems and Networks’ (2002 accessed 2 Apr 2016) 
<https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/15582260.pdf>; OECD, above n 197. 
586 I Am the Cavalry, ‘Five Star Automotive Cyber Safety framework’ (2015) <https://www.iamthecavalry.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/08/Five-Star-Automotive-Cyber-Safety-February-2015.pdf>; I Am The Cavalry, ‘Hippocratic Oath for 
Connected Medical Devices’, (19 Jan 2016 accessed 2 Sept 2016) <https://www.iamthecavalry.org/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/I-Am-The-Cavalry-Hippocratic-Oath-for-Connected-Medical-Devices.pdf> It describes itself as “a 
global grassroots organization that is focused on issues where computer security intersects public safety and human life. 
We strive to ensure that these technologies are worthy of the trust we place in them”, and focus on cars, medical devices, 
home electronics and public infrastructure. 
587 GSMA, above n 108; NIST, ‘Framework for Improving Critical Infrastructure Cybersecurity’ (12 Feb 2014 accessed 2 
Sept 2016) version 1.0 < http://www.nist.gov/cyberframework/upload/cybersecurity-framework-021214-final.pdf>;  
588 Bruce Schneier, ‘Data is a toxic asset, so why not throw it out?’ CNN (1 Mar 2016 accessed 26 Mar 2016) 
<http://edition.cnn.com/2016/03/01/opinions/data-is-a-toxic-asset-opinion-schneier/index.html 
589 In 2015 (c/f 2014), the average breach involved 20,000+ records at $158 (154) each, tallying to a total cost of $4 (2.82) 
million dollars per company: Ponemon, above n 575.  In addition to cost data, the global study puts the likelihood of a 
material data breach involving 10,000 lost or stolen records in the next 24 months at 26%. 
590 Information is Beautiful, above n 43.   
591 Australian Government breaches have been severe: in 2012, almost 10,000 asylum seekers’ details leaked online, in 
2014, G20 leader’s details (e.g. including passport details, dob and visa details) but did not notify victims of the breach (e.g. 
caused by human error, not systemic, the received email and deleted mail box content was (it was claimed) deleted, and the 
recipients deemed it “unlikely” that the email would be “…accessible, recoverable or stored elsewhere on their system”:   
Paul Farrell and Oliver Laughland, ‘Asylum-seeker data breach to be investigated by privacy commissioner’ The Guardian 
(19 Feb 2014 accessed 9 Apr 2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/feb/19/asylum-seeker-data-breach-to-be-
investigated-by-privacy-commissioner>  
592 LinkedIn suffered compromise to 167 million accounts (login and password),  and  427 million MySpace passwords which 
have been decrypted and are onsale on the dark net as at mid 2016,  and Tumblr lost some 65 million login (not password) 
credentials: Roger Hackett, ‘Linkedin Lost 167 Million Account Credentials In Data Breach’ Fortune (18 May 2016 accessed 
4 Jun 2016) < http://fortune.com/2016/05/18/linkedin-data-breach-email-password/> While the breach occurred in 2012, it 
was originally believed that 6.5 million encrypted passwords had been stolen, but the data has recently been offered for sale 
on a dark market website in 2016. Most passwords were cracked within days of the theft as they were not ‘salted’: 
https://haveibeenpwned.com/. LinkedIn’s Chief Information Security officer indicates their response is to invalidate the 
passwords and to contact users to reset them. He claimed stated that LinkedIn now salts passwords (adds random data to 
passwords prior to encryption to make them less able to be ‘cracked’). Older examples include: in 2013, SnapChat lost 4.7 
million user details; eBay lost 145,000 member details; Adobe lost 38 million customer IDs; Apple lost 12 million user details,  
America’s second largest insurer lost 80 million health records. In 2014, retailer Target lost 40 million credit card numbers 
(which led to US prosecutions settled in May 2017 for $18.5 million settlement with 47 states and Washington, D.C.) and 
Sony lost 100 terrabytes of data.  top US data brokers, Lexis Nexis, D & B and Altegrity each lost millions of social security 
records  - despite “…iron-clad means of protecting their data:”  Enigma Software, ‘Cyber Attacks Aimed at Data Brokers 
D&B, Altegrity and LexisNexis Claim Theft of Important Data’ (2013 accessed 9 Apr 2015) < 
http://www.enigmasoftware.com/cyber-attacks-data-brokers-db-altegrity-lexisnexis-theft-important-data/> These included 
social security number, name, and other personal data. 
593 For example, the Snowden revelations as to the US NSA.   
594 Recent examples include Friend Finder Network (412 million), Anthem (80 million) which is the second largest US health 
insurer, MySpace (164 million) 
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Australian cases are multiplying.595 While systems flaws or failures are commonly the cause, the public 
face of breach is hacking; that is, any of  criminal access to steal data for black market sale, hacktivism,596 
state-based political or terrorist purposes,597 or simply, to prove that it can be done.598  
 
"There are two types of companies. Those that have been hacked and know it and those that 
have been hacked and don't know it…"599 
 
While most CIOT hacks to date have been white hat in origin, the CIOT has been implicated not only for 
its patent security vulnerability as a source of consumer data disclosure, but also, as a means to effect 
attacks on other systems. From a risk management alert perspective, it should be enough to cite 
authoritative government600 and security experts601 who warn of serious CIOT vulnerabilities across every 
link in the CIOT chain – from device to software to cloud platform. So, while court cases as to CIOT 
security issues are only starting to emerge internationally, there is ample evidence already that its chain-
of-operation entails significant vulnerability and potential for consumer detriment. CIOT attacks 
compromise network privacy and security, and increase the likelihood of data and property theft, burglary 
and other criminal activity (e.g. ongoing malicious control602 or ‘smart’ robberies603), increases consumer 
surveillance, tracking and stalking risk, reduces consumers’ ability to control personal or (business-
related) proprietary information dissemination,604 and impairs the peaceful enjoyment of (for example) a 
                                                          
595 In 2016, the Gemalto Breach Level index reveals that Australia led the APAC region for data breach with 22 incidents 
(followed by India (13) Japan & NZ (7)).  
596 For example, Anonymous members attacked PayPal, Mastercard and Visa in 2011 to protest their refusal to process 
Wikileaks donations: Kim Zetter, ‘Hacker Lexicon: What are the Dos and DDOS attacks?’ WIRED (16 Jan 20916 accessed 
22 Oct 2016) <https://www.wired.com/2016/01/hacker-lexicon-wha-are-dos-and-ddos-attacks/> 
597 US authorities confirm that Russia hacked Podesta’s emails, which were then leaked via Wikileaks to damage Clinton’s 
unsuccessful bid for president in 2016. In 2007, Estonian sites were attacked allegedly by Russian ‘nationalists’, and in 
2008, Georgia claimed Russia has initiated DDoS attacks, just a few weeks before Russia invaded: Zetter, above n 596. 
598 In 2016, Krebs security was attacked using DDoS, in the then biggest such attack known. Google assisted them to 
recover as their own provider could not due to cost: KrebsonSecurity, ‘Who makes the IoT Things under Attack?’ 
https://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/10/who-makes-the-iot-things-under-attack/; Eduard Kovacs, ‘Over 500,000 IoT devices 
vulnerable to Mirai botnet’ SecurityWeek (7 Oct 2016 accessed 7 Oct 2016) <http://www.securityweek.com/over-500000-iot-
devices-vulnerable-mirai-botnet> 
599 Andreas Baumhof, ThreatMetrix chief technology officer quoted in Acohido, above n 140.   
600 For example, the EU Art 29 WG, the ACCS, and the US NHTSA. 
601 For example, Cisco, HP, IEEE, McAfee (and many others) as well as popular sources such as Securityweek, Krebs on 
Security, Schneider, etc. 
602 Colin Neagle, ‘Scary stories of hacking Internet of Things devices are emerging, but how realistic is the threat?’ 
NetworkWorld (2 Apr 2015 accessed 2 Sept 2016) < http://www.networkworld.com/article/2905053/security0/smart-home-
hacking-is-easier-than-you-think.html> In 2015, one Honeywell wi-fi thermostat user reviewed the product favourably, 
reporting that he was maliciously controlling it to adjust temperature settings to inflict discomfort and cost on his wife and her 
new boyfriend.  Another is an attack based upon scanning local IP space, finding IP cameras and then being able to 
observe inhabitants to learn their behaviours – and rob their house “intelligently”.   
603 Ibid.  
604 In the 2014 TrendNet case (discussed Ch 4) the FTC pleaded that the camera video, audio streams or images may be 
used in business contexts which exposed commercial information as well as private information.  
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smart home. Further in many cases, consumers have no way to detect breach, so its impacts may be 
long term and extend to third parties, who may unwittingly be affected too. 
 
Consumer CIOT cases are few, but emerging. As there are no explicit CIOT consumer or privacy law 
cases in Australia,605  the next section uses research and cases from various jurisdictions. These cases 
are of course, not a coherent body of law, nor would they necessarily be decided the same way in 
Australia. But they are illustrative and possibly, predictive of potential future Australian CIOT cases or 
regulatory activity. 
 
3.1.2 ‘Smart’ (in)secure examples 
(a) Smart Home  
 
“…media hype over theoretical demonstrations at DefCon and Black Hat…are soon spun into 
too many fantastical, sky-is-falling scare stories…”606 
Smart home systems have shown significant security vulnerabilities.607 The Canadian Privacy 
Commission report that 80% of devices use factory defaults and do not require strong passwords, 70% 
did not encrypt devices and 60% lacked software update encryption or had insecure web interfaces.608 
Symantec’s609 2015 report found no integrated security software in devices tested, leaving consumers 
unprotected, uninformed and unable to detect malware. Of CIOT mobile apps, 20% did not use industry-
standard Secure Sockets layer (SSL) encryption in cloud communications,610 “many” CIOT cloud 
platforms exhibited “common web application vulnerabilities” and two thirds of apps had “security issues”, 
of which six were “serious”.611 The study concluded that known mitigation techniques are “often 
neglected”, leaving “…millions of people at risk of cyberattacks…”612 A 2015 HP study found that smart 
                                                          
605 See Google Inc. v Australian Competition and Consumer Commission [2013] HCA 1. 
606 Tom Paterson, Chief Trust officer of UNISYS, quoted in Jeff John Roberts, ‘Volkswagens, Voting Machines and Hype 
over Hacking’ Fortune (14 Aug 2016 accessed 15 Aug 2016) < http://fortune.com/2016/08/14/volkswagens-voting-machines-
and-hype-over-hacking/> 
607 HPE, ‘How safe are home security systems? An HPE study on IoT security’ (Nov 2015 accessed 6 Apr 2016)  
<http://www8.hp.com/h20195/V2/GetPDF.aspx/4AA5-7342ENW.pdf> 
608 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, above n 215.   
609 In July 2016 the world’s largest antivirus firm had its entire product line-up of 17 enterprise products and eight Norton 
antivirus products, exposed as containing “critical vulnerabilities” with “potentially devastating consequences”. In 
combination, a hacker could hijack a consumer’s machine or compromise “an entire enterprise fleet” – and use its self-
replicable ‘wormable’ remote code execution nature to hijack other devices purely by sending an email or a link (which did 
not even need to be clicked). Vulnerabilities have been also identified in security software of Intel, FireEye, Kaspersky, 
McAfee to Trend Micro: Travis Ormandy, ‘How to compromise the Enterprise Endpoint’ Google’s Project Zero (28 Jun 2016 
accessed 3 Jul 2016) < http://googleprojectzero.blogspot.com.au/2016/06/how-to-compromise-enterprise-endpoint.html>    
610 Ibid: 3. 
611 ‘Serious’ means they enabled unauthorised access to backend systems: Ibid: 5. 
612 Ibid. 
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TVs, webcams, thermostats, remote power outlets, door locks, home alarms, scales, garage door 
openers and home hubs show an “alarmingly high average number of vulnerabilities per device”,613 and 
confirmed mobile and cloud concerns”,614 concluding ominously, that smart home consumers may not be 
alone in monitoring their home.615 Security researchers have since shown that light bulbs,616 baby 
monitors,617 refrigerators, smart TVs and wi-fi enabled toys like ‘Hello Barbie”618 and Smart Bear619 are 
all hackable, exposing consumers to data breach. In 2015, toy manufacturer VTech lost 4.6 million adult 
and 6.4 million children’s details through hacking.620  One study found all leading baby monitor devices 
“trivial” to exploit, exhibiting “critical, highly exploitable vulnerabilities”,621 allowing hackers to monitor live 
feeds, change camera settings, and authorise a third party to remotely control and view the monitor.622 
The authors cautioned that security did not increase with price (in fact risk increased with features) and 
that devices were insecure by default, difficult to patch and security status impossible to monitor, creating 
both an in-home security risk but also increasing business vulnerability with merging home and office 
work environments.  Researchers have also triggered home alarms, unlocked doors and taken control of 
Samsung’s SmartThings platform.623 Other proven hacks include Belkin WeMo, Samsung fridges, Hue 
                                                          
613 HPE, ‘Internet of things research study 2015 report’ (2015 accessed 6 Apr 2016) 
<http://www8.hp.com/h20195/V2/GetPDF.aspx/4AA5-4759ENW.pdf> these included weak passwords (80%) and a lack of 
encryption (70%). 
614 HPE, above n 607: 3.   
615 HPE, above n 607.  
616 Security researchers demonstrated how LIFX smart bulbs could be exploited enabling theft of Wi-Fi usernames and 
passwords. 
617 Mark Stanislav and Tod Beardsley, ‘Hacking IoT: A Case Study on Baby Monitor Exposures and Vulnerabilities’ Rapid7 
(Sept 2015 accessed 4 Feb 2016) <https://www.rapid7.com/docs/Hacking-IoT-A-Case-Study-on-Baby-Monitor-Exposures-
and-Vulnerabilities.pdf> 
618 Mattel’s doll is wi-fi enabled to collect and store speech to her, to which she responds. Collection is via a mobile app to a 
cloud server where the voice recording is analysed and stored: Samuel Gibbs, ‘Privacy fears over ‘smart’ Barbie that can 
listen to your kids’ The Guardian (13 Mar 2015 accessed 10 May 2016) < 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/mar/13/smart-barbie-that-can-listen-to-your-kids-privacy-fears-mattel>; 
James Patto, ‘These toys have eyes (and ears too): VTech security breach raises 'Internet of Things' privacy fears’ Minter 
Ellison Blog TMT and IP blog  (21 Apr 2016 accessed 25 Apr 2016) < 
http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=e9fc4a57-4bbb-43d7-a414-24c72b383ac4> 
619 The hacked Bear allowed access to children’s profiles, including name, dob, gender, language and toys played with. 
Zack Whittaker, ‘Two newly-discovered flaws light fire under IoT security’ ZDNet (2 Feb 2016 accessed 7 Apr 2016) < 
http://www.zdnet.com/article/two-newly-discovered-security-flaws-light-fire-under-internet-of-things-again/> 
620 Patto, above n 618.   
621 Stanislav, above n 617. 
622 Chris Matyszczyk, ‘Hacker Shouts at Baby Through Baby Monitor’ CNET (Apr 2014 accessed 2 Jan 2016) 
<www.cnet.com/news/hacker-shouts-at-baby-through-baby-monitor/; Kashmir Hill, ‘Baby Monitor Hack’ Could Happen to 
40,000 Other Foscam Users’ Forbes (27 Aug 2013 accessed 2 Jan 2016) 
<www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/08/27/baby-monitor-hack-could-happen-to-40000-other-foscam-users/> 
623 Earlence Fernandes, Jaeyeon Jung, and Atul Prakash, ‘Security Analysis of Emerging Smart Home Applications’ in 
Proceedings of 37th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, 2016’ (May 2016 accessed 5 May 2016) 
<https://iotsecurity.eecs.umich.edu/>. See also Greenberg, above n 350.  
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lights, Trane624 and Nest thermostats, Kevo locks, MyQ garage, Ubi, Wink Hub, smart cameras625 and 
many others.626 While responsible manufacturers will act to rectify security issues or even withdraw and 
refund unfixable devices, it begs the question why researchers can detect these flaws, instead of 
designers/ manufacturers pre or even, post release.627 
 
Research has translated into real- life cases recently. The US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has 
been an active security advocate: mostly using its wide section 5(a) power prohibiting “unfair or deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce.”628 Factually, those practices are generally either deceptive 
and/ or unfair security representations or more recently, actionably lax corporate security practices.  In 
FTC v Trendnet,629 ‘SecurView’ home security or baby monitoring cameras were hacked due to 
(ironically) poor security, enabling over 700 live internet feeds from people’s homes and unauthorised 
third party surveillance.630  Trendnet had falsely represented its devices as ‘secure’, had not taken 
reasonable steps to secure devices given their use, or to ensure security settings would be observed and 
not provided (overall) reasonable security to prevent unauthorized access to personal information.631 
Specifically, the devices transmitted unencrypted user login credentials in readable text over the Internet, 
stored logins on the mobile app without encryption, failed to employ reasonable and appropriate software 
design and testing  and failed to actively monitor security vulnerabilities to enable early detection.632 The 
settlement required customer update notification633 and a two-decade long security compliance program, 
monitored by bi-annual independent  risk assessments to “…address security risks that could result in 
unauthorized access to or use of the company’s devices, and to protect the security, confidentiality, and 
                                                          
624  Cisco researchers found that Trane ComfortLink devices allow attackers remote access to thermostat controls, but also 
photos and stored on the devices and access to the user’s home (including computer) network:  Krebs, ‘IoT Reality: Smart 
Devices, Dumb Defaults’ (8 Feb 2016 accessed 3 Mar 2016) < http://krebsonsecurity.com/2016/02/iot-reality-smart-devices-
dumb-defaults/> 
625 Irena Bojanova, ‘Hacking IoT’ IEEE Computer Society (12 Feb 2015 accessed 21 Mar 2016) < 
https://www.computer.org/portal/web/sensing-iot/content?g=53926943&type=article&urlTitle=hacking-iot> 
626 See Phil Laplante, ‘Repository of IOT Failures” <http://iotfdb.laplante.io/> and www.nvd.nist.gov.  
627 The FTC suggests several reasons: manufacturers may not be traditional ‘security’ conscious companies, devices may 
be very small which may inhibit security capacity and for example. In one case. researchers have even purchased devices, 
uploaded malware, returned them to store and exerted control immediately upon installation.     
628 Federal Trade Commission Act (FTC Act) (15 USC §45). 
629 Complaint of FTC, TRENDnet Inc., No. C-4426 (7 Feb 2014 accessed 3 Feb 2016) 
<http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/140207trendnetcmpt.pdf>  
630 Ibid: 5. Other devices could be eavesdropped upon by anyone with their internet address. The device marketing claims 
that consumers may use the cameras to monitor ‘‘babies at home, patients in the hospital, offices and banks, and more.’’: 
FTC, Federal Register, Vol 78, No 176 (11 Sept 2013 accessed 2 Mar 2016): 55718 < 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/09/130911trendnetfrn.pdf> 
631 Ibid. 
632 Ibid. This included a failure to monitor security research. 
633 This entailed information as to the device problem, how to update it and two years’ free technical support with respect to 
effecting the update or disabling the device: FTC, ‘FTC Approves Final Order Settling Charges Against TRENDnet, Inc.’ (7 
Feb 2014 accessed 16 Mar 2016) <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/02/ftc-approves-final-order-
settling-charges-against-trendnet-inc> 
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integrity of information that is stored, captured, accessed, or transmitted by its devices”.634 A similar 
outcome635 arose in FTC v AsusTEK,636 which reinforced that CIOT security is not just protecting 
consumer data, but also about consumer information, and protecting a user’s network637 and 
equipment.638 The FTC alleged that Asus routers and cloud service used weak default passwords, failed 
to encrypt data, used poor default settings and that Asus failed to inform consumers or rectify known 
flaws in a timely manner.639 Hackers posted IP addresses of almost thirteen thousand routers online and 
accessed over three thousand AiCloud accounts, enabling identity theft and other demonstrable 
consumer detriments.640 The FTC alleged unfair or deceptive acts or practices as to security failures and 
security misrepresentations, and agreed a detailed long-term settlement. Perhaps in the shadow of Asus 
and spawned by an article,641 several class actions642 were filed, alleging that ADT home security devices 
are marketed falsely, are unencrypted, easily hacked and are not secure or safe.643 These cases were 
settled for $16M in 2017.644 In contrast, the FTC has filed complaint against Taiwanese CIOT 
manufacturer D-Link alleging unfair or deceptive acts or practices ‘in connection with Defendants’ failure 
to take reasonable steps to secure the routers and Internet-protocol cameras they designed for, 
marketed, and sold’ in the United States. The case alleges false and deceptive security marketing/ 
                                                          
634 Ibid.  
635 In the Matter of ASUSTek, File No. 142 3456, Agreement containing Consent Order, (26 Feb 2016) 
<https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160222asusagree.pdf> 
636 ASUSTek, File No. 142 3456, Complaint (26 Feb 2016); Agreement containing Consent Order, (26 Feb 2016) 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160222asusagree.pdf 
637 FTC, ‘ASUS Settles FTC Charges That Insecure Home Routers and “Cloud” Services Put Consumers’ Privacy At Risk’ 
(23 Feb 2016 accessed 23 Feb 2016) <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2016/02/asus-settles-ftc-charges-
insecure-home-routers-cloud-services-put?utm_source=govdelivery>  
638 European Union, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 03/2016 on the evaluation and review of the 
ePrivacy Directive (2002/58/EC)’ (19 Jul 2016 accessed 20 Aug 2016): 18 <http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommendation/files/2016/wp240_en.pdf> 
639 12,900 devices were hacked, due to router and cloud insecurity, including weak default passwords, failure to encrypt 
data, poor default settings and Asus’ failure to address known flaws in a timely manner or to inform consumers of their 
existence: FTC above n 637. See also Lesley Fair, ‘ASUS case suggests 6 things to watch for in the Internet of Things’ (23 
Feb 2016 accessed 23 Feb 2016) < https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/blogs/business-blog/2016/02/asus-case-suggests-6-
things-watch-internet-things> 
640 Specifically, 12,937 routers and 3131 AiCloud accounts were compromised. 
641 Kashmir Hill, How Your Security System Could Be Used to Spy on You, Forbes (Jul. 23, 2014) <www.forbes. 
com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/07/23/how-your-security-system-could-be-used-to-spy-on-you> (accessed Jan. 18, 2016). 
642 Baker v ADT Corporation No 14 cv 8988 Case No. 1:14-cv-08988 Filed 9.11.2014 < 
https://www.truthinadvertising.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/02/Baker-v-ADT-amd-cmpt.pdf> See also Cheatham v. ADT 
CORP., No. CV-15-02137-PHX-DGC, 161 F.Supp.3d 815 (2016); and  
Michael Edenborough & Ors., v. ADT, LLC d/b/a ADT Security Services, INC., United States District Court, N.D. California 
(Filed Feb 27, 2017) 
643 Baker v ADT Corporation No 14 cv 8988 Case No. 1:14-cv-08988 Filed 9.11.2014. See also Cheatham v. ADT CORP., 
No. CV-15-02137-PHX-DGC, 161 F.Supp.3d 815 (2016) 
644 Edenborough, above n 642.  The judge granted a stay, as a Settlement Agreement had been signed to (pending court 
approval) settle all claims as part of a national class settlement in Dale Baker v. The ADT Corporation and ADT, LLC d/b/a 
ADT Security Services, Case No. 15-cv-02038-CSB-DGB (U.S.D.C. C.D. Illinois). 
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informational claims, and the failure to address well-known and easily preventable security flaws.645 While 
the claim would likely succeed in Australia based upon (allegedly) misleading and deceptive security 
representations,646 it is contentious in the US.647  There is no “actual” harm pleaded, rather the FTC allege 
a failure  which placed consumers at “significant risk of harm”648 and is “likely” to cause “substantial 
injury”. 649 However, recent US authority suggests that harm is not “unfair” under section 45(n) if 
“speculative”, less than intangible or a low likelihood occurrence, regardless of its magnitude.650 D-Link 
is defending itself aggressively,651 claiming the case is false, “speculative” and any settlement would 
render it “hostage” to “unrelentingly litigious [FTC] oversight”.652 The Acting FTC Chair agrees 
thematically at least: her FTC reforms will end both ‘speculative’ injury cases as regulatory overreach,653 
                                                          
645 FTC v D-Link Corporation and D-Link Systems, Inc., Case No: 3:17-cv-00039 filed 5 Jan 2017; Complaint for permanent 
injunction and other equitable relief, United States District Court of California, San Francisco Division 
<https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/170105_d-link_complaint_and_exhibits.pdf> unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices in violation of Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(a), in connection with Defendants’ failure to take 
reasonable steps to secure the routers and Internet-protocol cameras they designed for, marketed, and sold to United 
States consumers. 
646 While there is no “law” in Australia that defines CIOT device security, as Ch. 5 suggests, ACL section 18 catches conduct 
‘likely’ to mislead or deceive, which the courts have found, renders it unnecessary to prove that anyone was misled or 
deceived at all: Parkdale Custom Built Furniture Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd [1982] HCA 44.   The word “likely” means a real or 
not remote chance or possibility of conduct being misleading or deceptive “regardless of whether it is less or more than 
50%”: Global Sportsman Pty Ltd v Mirror Newspapers Limited (1984) 2 FCR 82. 
647 Jeremy Goldman, Partner, Frankfurt Kurnit Klein & Selz who specializes in digital law cited in Michael Kan, ‘The FTC IoT 
security case against D-Link is a test of power’ ComputerWorld (6 Jan 2017 accessed 20 Jan 2017) 
<http://www.computerworld.com/article/3155464/security/the-ftc-iot-security-case-against-d-link-is-a-test-of-power.html> 
648 Above n 645: 7. 
649 Above n 645: 27. Acts or practices are unfair under s 5 if they ‘cause or are likely to cause substantial injury to 
consumers that consumers cannot reasonably avoid themselves and that is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to 
consumers or competition: 15 U.S.C. § 45(n)’. 
650 LabMD, Inc. v. The Federal Trade Commission, Petition for Review of a Decision of the FTC’ Case No 16-16270-D, US 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit, (10 Nov 2016) <http://www.thompsoncoburn.com/docs/default-source/default-
document-library/labmddecision8d702626dda26f05acb8ff0000ba5cc9.pdf?sfvrsn=0> Under the FTC Act, section 45(n), an 
action or practice is unfair if it “causes or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers”. The FTC had reversed an 
administrative law finding harm due to an unauthorised file disclosure, a ‘privacy harm’ that may have affected reputations or 
emotions (which is a substantial injury) or alternatively, the unauthorised disclosure was likely to cause substantial injury. It 
interpreted “likely” to mean “a significant risk”, stating that “a practice may be unfair if the magnitude of the potential injury is 
large, even if likelihood of the injury occurring is low.” LabMD appealed, arguing that “likely” means a “high probability of 
occurring” and the 11th Circuit held that the FTC interpretation was not reasonable. It held that speculative, “not even 
intangible” harm was insufficient to be “likely” and therefore not “unfair” as required under section 45(n). It considered 
extrinsic materials (e.g. FTC, Policy Statement on Unfairness (Dec. 17, 1980) 
<https://www.ftc.gov/publicstatements/1980/12/ftc-policy-statement-unfairness>)  which indicate that the term “likely” was 
meant to exclude “emotional impact and more subjective types of harm”: Fredric Roth & Melissa Ventrone, ‘11th Circuit 
better defines FTC’s ‘Unfair’ standard – The details are in the damage’ Thompson & Coburn LLP (29 Nov 2016 accessed 5 
Dec 2016) <http://www.thompsoncoburn.com/insights/blogs/cybersecurity-bits-and-bytes/post/2016-11-29/11th-circuit-
better-defines-ftc-s-unfair-standard----the-details-are-in-the-damage> 
651 D-Link has described the FTC case as false, unwarranted and baseless. D-Link has enlisted anti-regulation group, 
‘Cause of Action’, which has stated that allowing the FTC to target companies based on the potential for a data breach 
potential, without actual or likely consumer harm, will result in limitless corporate liability and chill IOT innovation. 
652 D-Link, ‘D-Link Systems Inc. Enlists Cause of Action Institute to Defend Corporate & Consumer Rights’ Media Release 
(10 Jan 2017 accessed 2 Feb 2017) < http://us.dlink.com/press-centre/press-releases/d-link-systems-inc-enlists-cause-of-
action-institute-to-defend-corporate-consumer-rights/> 
653 She argues FTC enforcement should focus on actual or likely consumer injury, where companies breach promises to 
consumer’s detriment: Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting FTC Chairman  ‘Opening Keynote at ABA 2017 Consumer Protection 
Conference’ (2 Feb 2017 accessed 20 Feb 2017):3 and 6  <https://www.ftc.gov/public-statements/2017/02/opening-keynote-
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and disproportionate FTC settlements “untethered from consumer harm”.654  Ironically, given the oft-put 
industry position that law stifles innovation whereas flexibility enhances innovation, one security firm CEO 
defended D-Link, implying legal uncertainty as to security: 
 “You can’t really hold people accountable, when no one knows what the law is doing…”655 
Of course, the FTC has clear court-affirmed cybersecurity authority, so there is little doubt that US law 
requires companies to use commercially reasonable data protection methods against hacking,656 nor is 
there reason to suppose that their consumer devices and apps ought not afford such protection too. But 
clearly, smart home security has been problematic from inception: WikiLeaks has shown that the CIA 
remotely hacks smart TVs, cars and phones, to activate microphones and cameras for location, audio 
and text communications surveillance657 - even when ‘off’. That such “zero-day vulnerabilities’ were not 
advised to device manufacturers left consumers, government and critical infrastructure vulnerable to 
weaponized device attack.658 Indeed in 2016, the smart home as an attack vector emerged. 659  An 
                                                          
aba-2017-consumer-protection-conference> It is difficult to separate “likely” from “speculative” though it seems that the latter 
is further along the spectrum. 
654 Ohlausen argues that the FTC must answer two questions: How were consumers harmed? And how does this action 
address harm?” She states that consumer harm is necessary to meet their statutory mandate and “good consumer policy”. 
Later however she contradictorily asserts: “The FTC should focus enforcement on matters where consumers are actually 
injured or likely to be injured, or where companies don’t keep their promises, to the consumer’s detriment. The agency 
should focus on cases with objective, concrete harms such as monetary injury and unwarranted health and safety risks. The 
agency should not focus on speculative injury, or on subjective types of harm”:  Ibid: 4.  
655 Robert Graham, Errata Security CEO cited In Kan, above n 647.   
656 FTC V Wyndham Worldwide Corporation, Wyndham Hotel Group LLC, Wyndham Hotels and Resorts LLC And 
Wyndham Hotel Management Incorporated, United States Court of Appeals for the 3rd Circuit, Case No. 14-3514 (Filed 24 
Aug 2015) https://epic.org/amicus/ftc/wyndham/Mem-Op-14-3514.pdf at page 10. 
657 Wikileaks, ‘Vault 7: CIA Hacking Tools Revealed’ (7 Mar 2017 accessed 12 Mar 2017) <https://wikileaks.org/ciav7p1/ > 
‘Vault 7’ as Wikileaks call it, contains 8,7761 pages described as a part of the “the majority of [the CIA’s]   hacking arsenal 
including malware, viruses, trojans, weaponized "zero day" exploits, malware remote control systems and associated 
documentation”. The CIA does not confirm or deny such leaks; but contends “…"legally prohibited from conducting 
electronic surveillance targeting individuals here at home... and CIA does not do so.": Central Intelligence Agency, ‘CIA 
Statement on Claims by Wikileaks ‘ (8 Mar 2017 accessed 12 Mar 2017) <https://www.cia.gov/news-information/press-
releases-statements/2017-press-releases-statements/cia-statement-on-claims-by-wikileaks.html> Wikileaks claim the 
source wishes to "… initiate a public debate about the security, creation, use, proliferation and democratic control of 
cyberweapons.": It is also asserted that the dump describes agency tools, but are not the full programmes and that the latter 
will be handed to the affected tech companies to enable rectification of their products. 
658 Wikileaks claim that by 2016 end, the CIA had created over a thousand “hacking systems, trojans, viruses, and other 
"weaponized" malware”: Ibid. Note that spying on American citizens in this manner is illegal (without a FISA warrant) and the 
CIA denies it has done so.  
659 Danny Palmer, ‘The first big Internet of Things security breach is just around the corner’  ZDNet (1 Jul 2016 accessed 2 
Aug 2016)   < http://www.zdnet.com/article/the-first-big-internet-of-things-security-breach-is-just-around-the-corner/> Note 
that the first alleged  criminal smart home device hack occurred in late 2013, involving 300,000 malicious emails, many sent 
via home routers, multi-media systems, smart TVs and “at least one refrigerator”: MarketWatch, ‘Proofpoint Uncovers 
Internet of Things (IoT) Cyberattack’ Proofpoint Press Release (16 Jan 2014 accessed 2 Feb 2016) < 
http://www.marketwatch.com/story/proofpoint-uncovers-internet-of-things-iot-cyberattack-2014-01-16>  The attack was 
simple- relying largely upon misconfigured devices or those set up using default passwords only. c/f Paul Thomas, ‘Despite 
the News, Your Refrigerator is Not Yet Sending Spam’, Symantec (Jan. 23, 2014), 
<http://www.symantec.com/connect/blogs/despite-news-your-refrigerator-not-yet-sending-spam> 
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‘apocalyptic’660 DDoS661 attack involving tens of millions of hacked smart home devices662  disrupted US 
East Coast internet traffic; crashing sites from Spotify to PayPal, to the New York Times.663 As one wag 
(later) tweeted: 
 
Graphic 3.1: Some Americans retained a sense of humour 
Source: USA TODAY664 
 
 
The attack caused widespread consumer detriment and significant business cost. Security researchers 
advise the best defence is to patch each vulnerable device, in a slow (sometimes impossible) process 
depending upon device age, access and capability. While it was perhaps the first mass consumer 
experience with smart home insecurity, more will follow: 
“It will keep going… Even if there’s a power outage, [the malware] will just be back and re-infect 
the devices. It’s never going to stop…”665 
 
 
(b) Smart self  
 
What kind of loser hacks into Fitbit accounts?666  
 
                                                          
660 Shaun Waterman, ‘FTC, reigning in data actions, is urged to drop D-Link case’ cyberscoop (2 Feb 2017 accessed 20 Feb 
2017) < https://www.cyberscoop.com/ftc-data-actions-ohlhausen-trump-d-link-case/>  
661 The acronym stands for distributed denial of service, which means an attack which overwhelms the system with data, 
usually an overload of a web server through requests to view its pages. While there are other methods, the aim is to shut 
down a site: Zetter, above n 596.  
662 Such as routers, video recorders and security cameras: Jedidiah Bracy, ‘The IoT Zombies are already at your front door’ 
Privacy Tech (29 Sept 20-16 accessed 2 Oct 2016) https://iapp.org/news/a/how-poorly-secured-iot-devices-can-take-down-
your-website/  
663 The attack blocked traffic to the US internet directory servers of Dyn, flooding it with malicious requests which disrupted 
the entire system. It began at 7:10 a.m. ET Friday morning and was resolved by 6.17 pm. It affected Twitter, Spotify, Netflix, 
Amazon, Tumblr, Reddit, PayPal and other sites. It used Mirai software which uses malware in phishing emails to first infect 
a home network or computer, then spreads across the network, taking over set-top boxes, dvrs, routers and security 
cameras used by businesses and retailers: these devices in turn create a robot network, or botnet, to send the millions of 
messages that knocks the out victims' computer systems. Mirai was released on the so-called dark web. 
664 Eli Blumenthal and Elizabeth Weise, ‘Hacked home devices caused massive Internet outage’, USA TODAY (21 Oct. 
2016 accessed 22 Oct. 2016) <https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2016/10/21/cyber-attack-takes-down-east-coast-netflix-
spotify-twitter/92507806/> 
665 Allison Nixon of Flashpoint, cited in DDoS Attacks, ‘IoT malware clashes in a botnet territory battle’ (18 Apr 2017 
accessed 19 Apr 2017) < http://ddosattacks.net/iot-malware-clashes-in-a-botnet-territory-battle/> The latest software is 
Hajime, which is “Mirai on steroids”  infecting around 100,0000 devices internationally in six months. 
666 Ibid, citing a post on the Fitbit community forum. 
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Wearables are highly hackable. Researchers have hacked health-critical smart devices: insulin pumps,667 
pacemakers,668 implantable defibrillators,669 drug infusion drips and even MRI scanners.670 One recent 
study showed that patient lives, privacy and hospital networks are at risk due to device vulnerabilities.671 
In response, the Australian Therapeutic Goods Administration (TGA), ‘reminds’ manufacturers to 
“perform risk assessments”,672  while smart fitness devices673 for “general wellness”674 are non-TGA and 
largely unregulated.  As Fitbit’s CEO explains, “It’s not a medical-grade device; it’s a consumer device.  
In that setting, it works incredibly well.”675 
 
Smart self devices have “severe security vulnerabilities”.676 HPE research found that all smartwatches 
tested had security flaws which exposed user data, and 30% allow user account penetration.677 IEEE 
                                                          
667 Jonathan D. Rockoff, ‘J&J Warns Insulin Pump Vulnerable to Cyber Hacking’ The Wall Street Journal (4 Oct 2016 
accessed 6 Oct 2016) <http://www.wsj.com/articles/j-j-warns-insulin-pump-vulnerable-to-cyber-hacking-1475610989> 
668 Darlene Storm, ‘Pacemaker hack says worm could possibly ‘commit mass murder’ ComputerWorld (17 Oct 2012 
accessed 18 Apr 2016) < http://www.computerworld.com/article/2473402/cybercrime-hacking/pacemaker-hacker-says-
worm-could-possibly--commit-mass-murder-.html> 
669 In December 2016, researchers found security flaws in ten currently-used ICDs:  Eduard Marin, Dave Singelée, Flavio D. 
Garcia, Tom Chothia, Rik Willems and  Bart Preneel,  ‘On the (in)security of the Latest Generation Implantable Cardiac 
Defibrillators and How to Secure Them’ (2016 accessed 2 Dec 2016): 1 
<https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/publications/article-2678.pdf> Hackers may command devices to administer a (fatal) 
shock, disable therapy or steal patient data, and track user location: Jeremy Kirk, ‘Pacemaker hack can deliver a deadly 
830volt jolt’ ComputerWorld (17 Oct 2012 accessed 18 Apr 2016) <http://www.computerworld.com/article/2492453/malware-
vulnerabilities/pacemaker-hack-can-deliver-deadly-830-volt-jolt.html> 
670 Lauren Zanolli, ‘Welcome to Privacy Hell, Also Known As The Internet Of Things’ FastCompany (23 Mar 2015 accessed 
6 Apr 2016) < http://www.fastcompany.com/3044046/tech-forecast/welcome-to-privacy-hell-otherwise-known-as-the-
internet-of-things>; James Niccolai, ‘Thousands of medical devices are vulnerable to hacking security researchers say’ 
PCWorld (29 Sept 2015 accessed 4 Apr 2016) < http://www.pcworld.com/article/2987813/thousands-of-medical-devices-
are-vulnerable-to-hacking-security-researchers-say.html> 
671 Eduard Marin, Dave Singelée, Flavio D. Garcia, Tom Chothia, Rik Willems and  Bart Preneel,  ‘On the (in)security of the 
Latest Generation Implantable Cardiac Defibrillators and How to Secure Them’ (2016 accessed 2 Dec 2016): 1 
<https://www.esat.kuleuven.be/cosic/publications/article-2678.pdf> they proved that remote hacks using off-the-shelf 
equipment is possible,  due to sensor and monitor inter-connectivity, remote monitoring and near-field communications 
technology.  
672 Australian Govt, Department of Health, ‘Device cybersecurity a key issue’ Medical Devices Safety Update 4:2 (Mar 2016 
accessed 16 Jan 2017) <https://www.tga.gov.au/sites/default/files/medical-devices-safety-update-volume-4-number-2-
march-2016.pdf> 
673 The Australian TGA can impose security-related standards but industry product development timelines mean they may 
lag the latest security standards.  
674 See U.S. FDA, above n 203. This non-binding guidance stipulates that : “general wellness products”  are both: (1) 
“…intended for only general wellness use…” and (2) “present a low risk to the safety of users” and others.  
675 Selina Wang, ‘Fitbit's Move into Medical Gadgets Risks Attracting FDA Scrutiny’ Bloomberg Technology (15 Apr 2016 
accessed 20 Aug 2016)   <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-04-15/fitbit-s-move-into-medical-gadgets-risks-
attracting-fda-scrutiny> 
676 Hilts, above n 204. They looked at (inter alia) Fitbit Charge HR, Apple Watch, Jawbone Up 2, Garmin's Vivosmart, 
Withings Pulse O2, Basis Peak, Mio Fuse, and Xiaomi Mi Band. 
677 70% of firmware was unencrypted, data flows went through multiple (unknown) backend destinations via its app, cloud 
interfaces used weak passwords; communications are “trivially intercepted” in 90% of cases: Hewlett Packard (HPE), 
‘Internet of Things Security Study: Smartwatches’ Submission to FTC PrivacyCon 2016 (2016 accessed 6 Apr 2016) 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/10/00050-98093.pdf 
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claim that 9 of 9 reviewed fitness trackers expose user location data.678  While data theft seems less 
common, the ecosystem is of itself a business risk – as each employee logging onto a work network by 
device opens up another system attack point.679 Cases are few, but there is a market for consumer fitness 
device information. Fitbit, 680 recently suffered a spate of fraudulent warranty claims, arising from leaked 
and stolen accounts;681 with hackers682 boasting they accessed leaked account logins and passwords 
(from third party sites) traded online on forums and websites for between 50 cents and $5 per record.683 
Accessible data included name, weight, GPS data, regular running routes, and (possibly) sleeping 
patterns from hundreds of accounts (at least), but there is no public evidence of mass data theft. As such, 
the fraud – obtaining a new Fitbit falsely under warranty - is low level. While Fitbit (belatedly) posted 
additional security advice684 they view this as third party theft - though acknowledge that double 
encryption would have been ‘smarter’ security. These deficiencies may not be significant for an average 
user, unless device data accuracy becomes an issue. Researchers show that apps reveal logins and 
failed to stop data tampering during transmission, which allows hackers to enter false data. Accuracy 
becomes important if device data is admitted in evidence in a court case or for a prosecution, 685 or 
employers adopt a corporate wellness program or life or health insurers use data to assess premiums or 
other incentives.686 False data may yield prejudicial inferences or expose users to personal risk, such as 
for example, placing a person at a crime scene or removing information indicative of a medical condition. 
Consumers may thus face financial and personal injury, discrimination or adverse assumptions based 
upon inaccurate or false data. Consumer guarantee issues as to (in)accuracy are discussed further in 
chapter 5. 
 
 
                                                          
678 Researchers have also hacked into children’s HereO smart watches allowing access to family location and location 
history: Whittaker, above 619. 
679 “Companies that offer service via mobile devices will be vulnerable, as well as organizations where BYOD includes new 
IoT devices.” Richard Kam, 'The security of IoT: Is your Fitbit a key for criminals?' IAPP (22 Jan 2016)  
<https://iapp.org/news/a/the-security-of-iot-is-your-fitbit-a-key-for-criminals/> 
680 PC, ‘Digital Disruption: What do governments need to do?’ Research Paper (June 2016 accessed 10 June 2016) < 
http://www.pc.gov.au/research/completed/digital-disruption/digital-disruption-research-paper.pdf> 
681 One hacker claimed the motivation to be “warranty fraud” and “social engineering”, until the manufacturer improves 
security and/ or changes its policy: Sara Spary, ‘These Fraudsters Say They Broke Into Fitbit Accounts Using Passwords 
Bought For 50 Cents’ BuzzFeedNews (7 Jan 2016 accessed 12 Nov 2016) <https://www.buzzfeed.com/saraspary/revealed-
the-self-styled-hackers-who-defrauded-fitbit?utm_term=.ney9vY8Pq#.ceaXrLZjW> 
682 Fitbit security spokesperson said it was not a hack, but rather fraud – as the data had been purchased from third party 
sites and not stolen from Fitbit.  
683 Ibid.  
684 Fitbit now recommends customers use multi-factor authentication by signing in via Google and avoid reusing passwords 
across different sites: Fitbit, ‘Can someone take over my account?’ Fitbit Help (n.d. accessed 10 Nov 2016) 
<https://help.fitbit.com/articles/en_US/Help_article/1969> 
685 A recent Australian case rejected use of Fitbit sleep data, although it was a family court matter, decided on its facts: 
Oster & Houli [2015] FCCA 398 (25 February 2015) The judge refused to accept Fitbit evidence as to child’s sleep patterns. 
686 Hilts, above n 197.  
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(c) Smart cars 
…the FBI and NHTSA are warning the general public and manufacturers – of vehicles, vehicle 
components, and aftermarket devices – to maintain awareness of potential issues and 
cybersecurity threats related to connected vehicle technologies in modern vehicles…687 
It’s scary to know you could be driving down the highway and a hacker could seize control of 
your car.  Toyota never mentions this risk when extolling its technology to sell you the car...688 
 
There are no Australian smart car security cases or known complaints,689 but US cases are emerging.690 
Bond-like scenarios of cars careening out of driver control, criminal ransomware attacks or assassin/ 
terrorists remotely hijacking vehicles to kill or kidnap occupants, or bomb targets, are suddenly possible 
and alarming. Car hacking691 is simply, the infiltration of vehicle software systems and becomes easier 
as system complexity and software multiplies.692  
 
 
 
Graphic 3.2 Connected Car Attack Surface 
Source: GSMA693 
                                                          
687 FBI, ‘Motor vehicles increasingly vulnerable to remote exploits’ (17 Mar 2016 accessed 11 May 2016) < 
https://www.ic3.gov/media/2016/160317.aspx> 
688 Goldman Scarlato & Penny, P.C., ‘Cahen v. Toyota’ (2 Feb 2016 accessed 11 May 2016) 
<http://iotclassaction.com/cahen-v-toyota/> 
689 Note that most car manufacturers are adept at managing complaints through their dealer network or in-house through 
manufacturer customer-assistance centres. These records, unless sufficient in number or severity to warrant public recall 
action, never become public. 
690 It is standard practice in the automotive industry to rely upon overseas data, as the Australian market is so much smaller 
and potentially, slower to reveal potential problems.  There seems little reason why this principle ought not also apply with 
respect to substantiating consumer detriment. See for example, the recent Toyota Takata airbag recall which began in the 
US and flowed into the Australian market even though there were no Australian incidents: 
http://www.toyota.com.au/news/toyota-australia-recalls-vehicles. In the year to June 2016 end, 2.5 million cars were recalled 
in Australia, with 15 brands announcing 92 recalls: ACCC, ‘Product Safety Australia’, (17 Aug 2016) <www.recalls.gov.au>  
691 A definition is: is the “manipulation of the code in a car's electronic control unit (ECU) to exploit a vulnerability and gain 
control of other ECU units in the vehicle”: Margaret Rousem ‘Car Hacking’ TechTarget 
<http://internetofthingsagenda.techtarget.com/definition/car-hacking> 
692 The average car sold today has 60 microprocessors in it. 
693  GSMA, above n 113.  
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Since 2015, researchers have hacked vehicles such as Jeep Cherokee,694 various VW,  BMW, Audi and 
Toyota,695 Ford and GM,696 Tesla (and other marques)697 the Nissan app,698 and insurance dongles699 - 
enabling remote control700 of steering, braking and/ or disabling of driving features.701 Given the 
catastrophic potential detriment of car hacks, there is no public evidence that it has occurred, but the CIA 
clearly has expertise.702  After the Jeep hacks and despite zero customer reports, Fiat recalled 1.4 million 
cars for software updates, supposedly setting an “important precedent” in security vulnerability 
response,703 although one which is mandatory in Australia with respect to safety-related defects. Recent 
research suggests that VW (allegedly) has ignition704 and keyless entry vulnerabilities affecting almost 
100 million cars,705 ran a Tesla off-road from 22 kilometres away706 and hacked a Jeep in Missouri 
wirelessly - from Pittsburgh.707   
                                                          
694 The infamous Jeep case involved remote control of windscreen wipers, dashboard functions, transmission, speed and 
brakes; the researchers disabled the brakes and crashed the car (gently) into a ditch. The initial hack involved laptops wired 
into the Jeep. By 2015, the hacks could be performed remotely:  Greenberg, above n 400. 
695 Cara McGoogan, ‘BMW, Audi and Toyota cars can be unlocked and started with hacked radios’ The Telegraph (25 Apr 
2016 accessed 25 Apr 2016) <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/technology/2016/03/23/hackers-can-unlock-and-start-dozens-of-
high-end-cars-through-the/> 
696 Joe Acker, ‘Toyota, Ford, GM Topple Car Hacking Claims’ Law360 (25 Nov 2015 accessed 16 Aug 2016) 
<https://www.law360.com/articles/731922/print?section-automotive> 
697 Ibid. The following were susceptible: Audi: A3, A4, A6; BMW: 730d; Citroen: DS4 CrossBack; Ford:; Galaxy, Eco-Sport; 
Honda: HR-V; Hyundai: Santa Fe CRDi; Kia: Optima; Lexus: RX 450h; Mazda: CX-5; Mini: Clubman; Mistubishi: Outlander; 
Nissan: Qashqai, Leaf; Opel: Ampera; Range Rover: Evoque; Renault: Traffic; Ssangyong: Tivoli XDi; Subaru: Levorg; 
Toyota: Rav4; Volkswagen: Golf GTD, Touran 5T.  
698 Pete Bigelow, ‘Nissan disables Leaf app due to hacking concerns’ autoblog (25 Feb 2016 accessed 3 Apr 2016) < 
http://www.autoblog.com/2016/02/25/nissanconnect-ev-leaf-app-hacking-followup/> Researchers found that using the VIN 
and basic web-development knowledge, climate controls and trip logs for any Leaf that used the NissanConnect EV app 
were accessible, anywhere in the world. Aside from privacy breach, theoretically, using heat or air conditioning could drain 
the battery. 
699 Metromile and Progressive dongle hacks have enabled control of the car. 
700 John Markoff, ‘Researchers Show How a Car’s Electronics Can Be Taken Over Remotely’ The New York Times (9 Mar 
2011 accessed 16 Mar 2016) <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/10/business/10hack.html> 
701 Bojanova, above n 625. 
702 Wikileaks, above n 657. 
703 NHTSA Recall Campaign Number 15V461000. There is now a class action pleading that this has reduced vehicle value.  
704 The attack uses cheap radio hardware to intercept key fob signals and use them to clone the key. However, the real-
world potential for the attack has been questioned: the thief must be located within 300 metres of the car and the shared key 
code also required may be found within different components in different model year VWs. A second issue was found with 
the use of HiTag2 cryptography, which is an old “legacy security algorithm, introduced 18 years ago. Its manufacturer no 
longer recommends be used in cars: Andy Greenberg, ‘A New Wireless Hack can Unlock 100 Million Volkswagens’ WIRED 
(10 Aug 2016 accessed 12 Aug 2016) https://www.wired.com/2016/08/oh-good-new-hack-can-unlock-100-million-
volkswagens/ 
705 Flavia D. Garcia, David Oswald, Timo Kasper and Pierre Pavlides, ‘Lock It and Still Lose It – On the (In)Security of 
Automotive Remote Keyless Entry Systems’ Proceedings of the 25th USENIX Security Symposium (10-12 August 2016, 
Austin, TX) <https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity16/technical-sessions/presentation/garcia> 
706 Olivia Solon, ‘Team of hackers take remote control of Tesla Model S from 12 miles away’ The Guardian (21 Sept 2016 
accessed 3 Oct 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/sep/20/tesla-model-s-chinese-hack-remote-control-
brakes> 
707 Pete Bigelow, ‘Jeep in St. Louis hacked from’ autoblog (21 Jul 2016 accessed 3 Sept 2016) < 
http://www.autoblog.com/2015/07/21/jeep-cherokee-hacked/> The researchers remotely controlled braking, transmission 
and steering via a security hole in Chrysler's UConnect infotainment system 
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In the real world, smart car consumers have suffered car theft, data theft, and other forms of cyberattack. 
US police recently arrested hackers who stole over 100 Jeeps in Texas,708 and ransomware attacks have 
occurred whereby malicious code installed in smart cars disables them, until criminals are paid.709 
Computer-based door hacks and decryption or amplification attacks upon car key fobs are now 
recognised methods of car theft.710 Further misuse or theft of manufacturers’ credentials led to over 100 
cars being remotely immobilised in Texas,711 and GPS “spoofing”712 may allow hackers to hijack 
navigation systems.713 Aside from these media-reported examples, EPIC assert that records are “woefully 
inadequate” and that as at 2015, only 6 of 14 manufacturers claimed they could detect wireless 
intrusions.714  Perhaps in response to growing media, security industry715 and regulator concern, US DOT 
released (criticised) Proactive Safety Principles,716 and the Global Manufacturers released 
unenforceable, (low-level) privacy principles717 and “aspirational” (best practice) security principles.718 
The new NHTSA Federal Policy weakly proposes “voluntary” compliance reports, unsanctioned 
                                                          
708 Reese Counts, ‘Hackers arrested after stealing more than 30 Jeeps in Texas’ autoblog (4 Aug 2016 accessed 3 Sept 
2016) < http://www.autoblog.com/2016/08/04/hackers-steal-30-jeeps-houston-texas/> The thieves accessed Fiat Chrysler's 
DealerCONNECT software, then entered the vehicle identification number, and reprogrammed vehicle security systems to 
accept a generic key. 
709 Such code has been installed via mechanics’ diagnostic USBs and remotely: Nora Young, ‘Your Car Can be Held for 
Ransom’, CBCradio (May 22, 2016 accessed 4 Jun 2017) <http://www.cbc.ca/radio/spark/321-life-saving-fonts-ransomware-
cars-and-more1.3584113/your-car-can-be-held-for-ransom-1.3584114>  
710 Nick Bilton, Keeping Your Car Safe From Electronic Thieves, N.Y. Times (Apr. 15, 2015 accessed 4 Jun 2016) < 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/16/style/keeping-your-car-safe-fromelectronic-thieves.html.>; Andy Greenberg, ‘Radio 
Attack Lets Hackers Steal 24 Different Car Models’, WIRED (Mar. 21, 2016) <https://www.wired.com/2016/03/study-finds-
24-car-models-open-unlockingignition-hack/.>; Cadie Thompson, ‘A Hacker Made a $30 Gadget That Can Unlock Many 
Cars That Have Keyless Entry’, Tech Insider (Aug. 6, 2015 accessed 25 Aug 2016) < http://www.techinsider.io/samy-
kamkar-keyless-entry-car-hack-2015-8>; and  
711 Kevin Poulsen, Hacker Disables More than 100 Cars Remotely, WIRED (Mar. 17, 2010) 
<https://www.wired.com/2010/03/hacker-bricks-cars/> The system allows the dealer to disable the ignition system, or trigger 
the horn to remind owners when a payment is due. 
712 Spoofing is “the act of broadcasting a fake GPS signal to fool a device into thinking it’s somewhere else, and/or at a 
different point in time.” 
713 Guy Buesnel, ‘GPS Spoofing Is Now A Real Threat –  Here’s What Manufacturers of GPS Devices Need to Know’ 
Spirent (Sept. 14, 2015 accessed 4 Jun 2016) < 
http://www.spirent.com/Blogs/Positioning/2015/September/GPS_Spoofing_Is _a_Real_Threat> 
714 EPIC, Cahen, ‘Brief of Amicus Curiae Electronic Privacy Information Center in Support of Plaintiffs-Appellants and in 
Support of Reversal’ (5 Aug 2016 accessed 20 Sept 2016) < https://epic.org/amicus/cahen/EPIC-Amicus-Cahen-
Toyota.pdf> 
715 See for example, I Am the Cavalry, above n 586.   
716 Department of Transport (US), ‘Proactive Safety Principles’ (2016 accessed 7 Jun 2016) 
<https://www.transportation.gov/briefing-room/proactive-safety-principles-2016>; Jay W Belle Isle, ‘Claybrook: DOT’s 
“Proactive” Safety Principles Worthless’ Legal Reader (18 Jan 2016 accessed 2 Jun 2016) 
<http://www.legalreader.com/claybrook-dots-proactive-safety-principles-worthless/> 
717 Auto Alliance, above n 399. These “… in many respects fell short of what was required under Canadian privacy laws”: K. 
Thompson and Arie van Wijngaarden, ‘Cybersecurity Best Practices for Connected cars Released’ (16 Aug 2016 accessed 
2 Sept 2016) <http://www.canadiancybersecuritylaw.com/2016/08/cybersecurity-best-practices-for-connected-cars-
released/>; Lawson, above n 36 (Privacy Analysis). The author is of the view they also fall short of the Australian Privacy 
Principle requirements (see Ch. 5).  
718 C-ISAC is an industry-funded body designed to facilitate security information-sharing and will oversee the principles:  C-
ISAC, ‘Automotive Cybersecurity Best Practices’ (2016) https://www.automotiveisac.com/best-practices/> 
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vulnerability disclosures719 and describes evolving cybersecurity as requiring more research before 
“regulatory standard(s)”.720 Australia has not tackled these issues in recent reports either: the NTC avoid 
smart car security issues,721 to focus upon local road rule questions while no doubt, awaiting international 
solutions for the bigger concerns. 
 
As to cases, there is no Australian smart car litigation, though there is a record of safety-related software 
defects necessitating safety-based recall – which are latent product defects of significant concern to 
consumers.722 These represent 60 to 70% of all EU/ US recalls.723 Australia has had over thirty vehicle- 
related software defect recalls since 2014 (Sched. 3) - but no identifiably smart car litigation to date. 
While US consumer laws differ from Australian approaches, in fundamental effect there is sufficient 
thematic similarity to warrant consideration – especially in a litigation-weak CIOT context. The first US 
class action Cahen et al v Toyota et al,724 alleges a failure to ensure “basic electronic security”,725 such 
that basic functions are susceptible to hostile take-over, endangering occupant safety. The case identifies 
information asymmetry and market failure, pleading unfair, deceptive and/ or fraudulent business 
practices by manufacturers726 which cost owners money (through diminution of vehicle value) and for 
failure to inform owners that their cars are hackable, marketing them as ‘safe’ when they knew otherwise, 
and risking “theft, damage, serious physical injury, or death”, while enabling covert insecure data 
collection and transmission:727  
  
                                                          
719 To the industry Auto-ISAC body. This is voluntary and so may depend upon each type and severity of case. 
720 NHTSA, above n 327: 21.   
721 In its C-ITS report, they with some reservation, assert the Privacy Act to be sufficient protection and their recent enquiry 
as to regulatory responses to trials (etc)  does not address smart car security regulation at all: .NTC, ‘Executive Summary, 
Regulatory Options for Automated Vehicles’ Issues Paper (Feb 2016 accessed 30 May 2016) 
<http://www.ntc.gov.au/Media/Reports/(66E42530-B078-4B69-A5E3-53C22759F26E).pdf> as to privacy, see NTC, above n 
406.  
722 A recent recall by GM involved 4.3 million cars for an air bag software defect, which has been “linked” to one death and 
three injuries in the United States. 
723 Bill Fleming, IEEE Vehicular technology magazine cited by Philip Ross, ‘A Cloud connected car is a hackable car, worries 
Microsoft’ IEEE Spectrum, (11 Apr 2014 accessed 5 Sept 2016) < http://spectrum.ieee.org/tech-
talk/transportation/advanced-cars/a-connected-car-is-a-hackable-car> 
724 Cahen, Tompulis, Nisam, Gibbs and Langdon C. v. Toyota Motor Corporation, Toyota Motor Sales, USA Inc., Ford Motor 
Company, General Motors LLC, and Does 1 through 50, Case No 15-CV-01104-WHO (Filed 1 July 2015) < 
https://epic.org/amicus/cahen/Cahen-First-Amended-Complaint.pdf> 
725 Ibid.  
726 The case was pleaded in common law fraud and contract (breach of warranty) plus Californian statutory violations 
including:  Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 17200, et seq.; Consumers Legal Remedies Act 
(“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Cod § 1250, et seq. False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. Prof. Code § 17500, et seq.; Implied 
Warranty of Merchantability, Cal. Com. Code § 2314; Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1791.1 & 
1792; and breach of privacy under the Constitution, Cal. Const. art. I, § 1. FAC ¶¶ 62-138.  
727 Ibid: 3 [6 and 7] 
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“…even though drivers have reasonable expectation of privacy as to such data, defendants 
share it with or sell it to third parties, often without adequate security (making it an attractive 
target for hackers).”728 
The complaint cites the Markey Report (2015) which found a “clear lack of appropriate security measures 
to protect drivers against hackers… or against those who may wish to collect and use personal driver 
information”.729 While initially dismissed for lack of standing and failure to state a claim (‘speculative’ 
injury),730 the plaintiff has appealed.731 In Australia, it is possible such a claim could proceed under ACL 
sections 18 and 29, especially if vehicle security standards conflicted with representations or failed to 
comply with an Australian Standard (Ch 5). A second US case is Flynn732 which (again) alleged 
manufacturer fraud (as to undisclosed, as-yet unmaterialized future risks) which inflated vehicle prices:  
“A vehicle purchased, leased, or retained under the reasonable assumption that it is safe is worth 
more than a vehicle known to be subject to the unreasonable risk of catastrophic accident 
because of defects… Plaintiffs…. are subjected to a continuing increased risk of severe injury or 
death but for the Defendants’ failure to disclose or remedy the defect.”733 
 
It is alleged that the vehicle Uconnect system is defective, unmerchantable and not reasonably safe for 
its intended use within the vehicle. That claim might be argued in Australia relying upon consumer 
guarantees as to acceptable quality and (less likely) fitness for purpose, and strict products liability, which 
are further discussed in chapter 4.  
 
 
 
                                                          
728 Ibid: 3 [6] 
729 Ibid: 1. 
730 Dismissal grounds included a lack of standing, failure to substantiate (future) economic loss and ‘speculative’ injury. 
Federal courts have judicial power over “cases” and “controversies”: US Constitution Art III.  Standing requires plaintiffs 
establish (inter alia) Injury-in-fact, which means the plaintiff suffered an invasion of a concrete, particularized, and actual or 
imminent (and not conjectural or hypothetical) “legally protected interest”: EPIC, ‘Cahen v. Toyota Motor Corporation’ 
Epic.org (n.d. accessed 8 Aug 2016) < https://epic.org/amicus/cahen/#EPIC> 
731 Cahen, above n 723, Appellants’ Opening Brief https://epic.org/amicus/cahen/Appellant-Cahen-Opening-Brief.pdf; EPIC, 
‘Cahen v. Toyota Motor Corporation’ Epic.org Amicus Curiae (n.d. accessed 8 Aug 2016) 
<https://epic.org/amicus/cahen/#EPIC> 
732 Flynn, Brown et al v. FCA US Llc F/K/A Chrysler Group LLC and Harmon International Industries, Inc, US Dist Court 
Sthern Dist Illinois, Case No. 3:15-cv-855, Class Action Complaint: 
https://www.law360.com/dockets/download/55c103f7a36d4660ce000028?doc_url=https%3A%2F%2Fecf.ilsd.uscourts.gov
%2Fdoc1%2F06913233689&label=Case+Filing; Memorandum Of Law In Support Of Its Motion To Dismiss The Amended 
Class Action Complaint: <http://Www.Liabilitydesk.Com/Wp-Content/Uploads/2016/02/15-Cv-00855-Mjr-Dgw-Document-71-
1.Pdf> See also Steven Trader, ‘Drivers in Fiat Car Hacking Suit Say their injuries are real’ Law360 (22 Mar 2016 accessed 
16 Aug 2016) <http://www.law3560.com/articles/774475/drivers-in-fiat-car-hacking-suit-say-ther-injuries-are-
real?article_related_content=1> 
733 Cahen above n 723.  See also Acker, above n 696.  
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3.2 Big CIOT data uses and (ab)uses 
 
It’s kind of amazing that we all settled on the term “big data” before the “Internet of things’ really 
arrived… {it] will generate information on a scale we can’t really comprehend yet…”734 
 
"People give out their data often without thinking about it… they have no idea that it will be sold 
to third parties."735  
   
Big data is significant and absent regulatory control, promises consumers discrimination and algorithmic 
defect. Given their infinite potential for significant future consumer detriment and potential overlaps into 
Chs. 5 and 6, these two significant consumer issues are very briefly considered here. 
 
3.2.1 Big(ger) data can be “discriminating”   
 
 “Internet of things’ sensor data is high in quantity, quality and sensitivity. This means the 
inferences that can be drawn are much bigger and more sensitive….”736  
Profiling technologies are by their very nature discriminatory tools. They allow unparalleled 
kinds of social sorting and segmentation which could have unfair effects…737 
 
“Algorithms, when they are not transparent, can lead to a distortion of our perception, they can 
shrink our expanse of information.”738 
Deliberate or unethical corporate data use and discrimination are another contentious aspect of CIOT 
data collection. Consumers already complain of offensive or ‘creepy’ data collection and targeted 
advertising in online retail739 and social media,740 but with CIOT, that creepiness will increase, because 
                                                          
734 Krazit, above n 186.   
735 EC Vice-President Viviane Reding cited in Aleks Krotowski, ‘Big Data age puts privacy in question as information 
becomes currency’ The Guardian (22 April 2012 accessed 28 Mar 2015) 
<http://www.theguardian.com/technology/2012/apr/22/big-data-privacy-information-currency> 
736 Mauritius Declaration, ‘Resolution on Big Data’ 36th International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy 
Commissioners (15 Oct 2015 accessed 7 Feb 2016) <http://www.privacyconference2014.org/media/16427/Resolution-Big-
Data.pdf> 
737 David Wright, ‘A Framework for the ethical impact assessment of information technology’ Ethics and Information 
Technology (2011) 13:199–226 accessed 3 Mar 2016 http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2035938  
738 Chancellor Angela Merkel cited in Kate Connolly below. They may create “filter bubbles and echo chambers”: Eli Pariser, 
‘Beware online filter bubbles’ TED 2011 (mar 2011 accessed 2 Nov 2016) 
<https://www.ted.com/talks/eli_pariser_beware_online_filter_bubbles/transcript?language=en>  reducing the diversity of 
information or channelling it to fit previous behaviours rather than providing a balanced selection of information.  
739 The infamous Target pregnancy advertising case reveals the dilemma: where Target faced an irate parent, who learned 
of his teenage daughter’s pregnancy – via her purchase history- profiled catalogue advertising in his mailbox. The predictive 
model was based upon consumer spending patterns, applied to its customer database and used to target catalogue coupon 
offers: Charles Duhig, ‘Campaigns mine personal lives to get out vote’ The New York Times (14 Oct 202 accessed 15 Mar 
2014):1 <http://wwww.nytimes.com/2012/10/14/us/politics/campaigns-mine-personal-lives-to-get-out-vote.html?_r=0> 
740 Social media – and especially Facebook - is implicated:  it has tracked user web purchases, posted purchase information 
on that user’s friend’s newsfeeds, and conducted mass ‘emotional contagion’ experiments: Benjamin R. Mulcahy and Dante 
M. DiPasquale ‘Efficiency v. Privacy: is online behavioral advertising capable of self-regulation?’  (14 April 2010 accessed 15 
Mar 2015) http://documents.lexology.com/f7f5451b-f755-4c1e-b855-521f924ee99b.pdf Re experiments, see Adam D. I. 
Kramer, Julie E. Guillory and Jeffery T. Hancock, ‘Experimental Evidence of Massive-Scale Emotional contagion through 
Social Networks’ 111 Proc. Nat’l Acad. Sci. USA 8788 (2014) Note Facebook could not exclude minors from its sample, 
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seemingly unimportant data can “in aggregate reveal a lot about what a person gets up to…”741 Alphabet 
and Facebook make millions annually from user data in a highly successful business plan -  which CIOT 
providers are rapidly positioning themselves to emulate.742 
Data mining enables data analytics: the application of mathematical and statistical modelling of data to 
locate meanings, patterns and draw conclusions, inferences, and even, predictions.  IBM has already 
illustrated that home electricity and sensor data can allow accurate extrapolations as to human behaviour, 
preferences and habits within a smart home.743 Trivial data snippets can reveal when dinner is cooked, 
which rooms occupied, by how many people, and whether someone smokes.744 This can be socially 
beneficial if ‘safely’(?) anonymised745 or by explicit consent,746  but  not if home occupants (and visitors) 
are unknowingly profiled in daily life, or where individual behaviours are modified to avoid “detection” of 
perceived anomaly.747 Smart carmakers can use telematics to track vehicle problems by user behaviour 
and/ or location, and smart self devices monitor user ‘fitness’ patterns -  to gain “actionable insights” for 
product improvement but also, personalised (behavioural) services and marketing, profiling and 
categorization. Add this data trove to publicly available sources, and purchased broker data, and CIOT 
                                                          
which added to allegations that the study was unethical: Kashmir Hill, ‘Facebook Added 'Research' To User Agreement 4 
Months After Emotion Manipulation Study’ Forbes (30 June 2014 accessed 30 July 2014)< 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2014/06/30/facebook-only-got-permission-to-do-research-on-users-after-emotion-
manipulation-study/> Facebook has also done research to determine if users are lonely and whether ads perform better with 
algorithmically-generated (i.e. fake) friend ‘endorsements’: James Grimmelmann, ‘The Law and Ethics of Experimenting on 
Social Media Users’ unpublished working paper provided to the author by email, Mar 2015: manuscript page 4. Professor 
Grimmelmann formally complained to the FTC but there has been no public outcome. 
741 Nick Heath, ‘I know what you ate last supper: What home sensors will reveal about your life’ Techrepublic  (5 Feb 2-014 
accessed 4 Mar 2-16) < http://www.techrepublic.com/blog/european-technology/i-know-what-you-ate-last-supper-what-
home-sensors-will-reveal-about-your-life/> 
742 In Facebook’s case, manipulating users for research purposes was not conducted with user consent beyond their usual 
terms and conditions, which were retrospectively changed: Hill, above n 740.  
743 IBM Human Centric Solutions,’ Innovation for the People of a Smarter Planet’ (2015 accessed 4 Apr 2016) 
<http://www03.ibm.com/able/news/bolzano_video.html> The researchers ‘taught’ the system to recognise which specific 
devices were in use and graphical data enabled them to guesstimate (accurately) when people ate pasta for dinner. Sensors 
read carbon monoxide/ dioxide, temperature and humidity. 
744 Heath, above n 771.   
745 For example, in a smart grid context enabling better deployment of electricity resources. 
746 For example, an Italian seniors ‘Living Safe’ project where sensor data generated home maintenance alerts and even, 
profiled daily routines so that helpers could be sent if a resident inexplicably deviated. The outcome was positive: 
participants reported an improved lifestyle (66%) and the City Council saved 31% in elder care costs: IBM Human Centric 
Solutions,’ Innovation for the People of a Smarter Planet’ (2015 accessed 4 Apr 2016) <http://www-
03.ibm.com/able/news/bolzano_video.html> 
747 Art 29 WG, above n 49: 8. In a smart car context, those modifications are usually perceived as positive: drivers will drive 
more carefully knowing their driving is surveilled. In smart fitness, the view is similar:  people will do more inspired by their 
tracker, or via its social competition apps. In reality, people opt out of the latter if they develop fitness fatigue or just get sick 
of the device: Stephanie Lee, ‘Why Activity Trackers could be Running out of Steps’ BuzzFeed News (28 Feb 2015 
accessed 23 Mar 2016) < http://www.buzzfeed.com/stephaniemlee/why-activity-trackers-could-be-running-out-of-
steps#.cgReqWyJd> 
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offers providers massively increased revenue potentials through data sales and insightful consumer 
knowledge.748 
There are four main concerns whereby the “benign differentiation”749 detected by the CIOT may through 
collection, dissemination and fusion750 and analytics, adversely affect consumer interests: discrimination, 
market distortion through price discrimination,751 data inaccuracy and criminal uses. Firstly, discrimination 
arises through algorithmic profiling which enables digital “redlining” via categorisation; which inevitably 
adversely affects the vulnerable. This may distort the market through differential pricing752 or through 
automated profiling software which ‘scores’ consumers based upon real, inferred or predicted attributes 
as to suburbs, housing, job security, health, insurance, employment, creditworthiness, payment capacity 
and so on.753 Consumers have no control over the facts or inferences754 drawn or their categorisation – 
but may experience latent discriminatory consequences. The CIOT exacerbates this by volume and its 
oft-assumed accuracy. Potentially discriminatory government, employer and insurer already exist: the US 
government assesses individual’s “risk”755 via algorithm, as well as “physiological and behavioural 
                                                          
748 Lawson, above n 36: 29.  
749 Peppet, above n 283.  
750 Jeff Hagins, co-founder of SmartThings stated that 10,000 households alone can generate over 150 million data points a 
day – the information may be mundane (temperature etc) but collectively, can “produce extremely detailed profiles of your 
behaviour”:  
751 Price discrimination is ‘differential pricing’ is and is defined as the practice of charging consumers different prices for the 
same product; usually based upon the goal of pricing based upon what people are prepared to pay, rather than costs. It is 
accepted in some areas: for example, cinemas charge different prices to children, pensioners etc. There are three types: 
“personalized” or “first degree price discrimination” occurs where sellers charge different buyers different prices (e.g. 
individually- negotiated prices); quantity discounts (second degree price discrimination)  is where the “per-unit price falls” 
with amounts purchased; and third degree price discrimination refers to different pricing for different groups (e.g. children’s 
discounts): Executive Office of the President, ‘Big Data and Differential Pricing’ Feb 2015 accessed 10 May 2016) 
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/docs/Big_Data_Report_Nonembargo_v2.pdf. The 
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) formerly prohibited price discrimination in relation to the supply/ acquisition of 
goods of “like grade or quality” but this was repealed in 1995. The rationale was that misuse of market power would address 
any cases of significance. 
752 People in higher-income areas received greater discounts in one study, though it was unclear if this reflected local 
competitive forces legitimately or not: Jennifer Valentino-Devries and Jeremy Singer-Vine, ‘Websites vary prices, deals 
based on User’s information’ The Wall Street Journal (24 Dec 2012 accessed 20 Apr 2015) 
<http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887323777204578189391813881534>  
753 One example involved a US businessman whose credit limit was  reduced after a holiday where he shopped in stores 
with patrons who exhibited a “poor repayment history”: N. Newman ‘How big data enables economic harm to consumers, 
especially to low-income and other vulnerable sectors of the population’ Journal of Internet Law, 18(6), 11-23 (2014 
accessed 3 Apr 2015) <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1639829818?accountid=26503> Google was also found to have 
knowingly allowed illegal pharmacies to target  ill people through its Adwords search engine function.  
754 Ibid. For example, one data broker classified those who responded to sweepstakes offers on a “sucker list” which it 
promoted as an ideal “subprime credit offer” grouping. Categories reveal the concern: “…’ethnic second-city strugglers’, 
‘retiring on empty: singles’, ‘tough start: young single parents’, ‘credit crunched city families’, and ‘rural and barely making 
it’…” 
755 See for example, EPIC v. Customs and Border Protection (Analytical Framework for Intelligence) Complaint (Filed 18 Jul 
2014) Civil Action No. 14-1217 US District Court for the Dist of Columbia  <https://epic.org/foia/dhs/cbp/afi/>  EPIC sought 
CBP disclosure as to a passenger screening program combining detailed personal information with “secret algorithms” to 
devise traveller “risk assessments”, including US citizens. EPIC filed an appeal to a refusal on 6 April 2017. 
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signals” indicative of the likelihood of committing a crime,756 and in criminal sentencing.757 Employers 
may analyse CIOT data in talent analytics and recruitment758  and monitor employees’ behaviour, 
location, whether in the office, company car or via their smartphone use. Employee wellness programmes 
already incentivize data sharing through free fitness monitors and apps, but as Peppet suggests, these 
have unexpected, inferred negative correlations.759 Frequent ‘exercise’ for example, may imply 
impulsivity and self-gratification – which (apparently) correlates to higher credit card debt, drug and 
alcohol abuse, eating disorders and smoking. Sleep problems correlate to poor psychological health, 
poor cognition and depression.760 In smart cars, acceleration, braking patterns or geolocation may 
suggest certain personality traits, smart home data may reveal work hours and mobile phone app use 
has many personal correlations.761  Such inferential, prejudicial conclusions in the hands of government, 
employer, insurer, marketer, financier or others may unfairly elevate consumer risk profiles, adversely 
limit or deny prospects or opportunities – and/ or cost consumers personally and economically. 
 
Secondly, profiling overlaps with price discrimination which may create both “market power [with]in 
product markets” and market inefficiency762 as consumers are not fairly informed of all prices.763 User-
based insurance (UBI) is a contentious case in point. Insurers welcome driver data,764 as do low-risk 
                                                          
756 Jason Tashea, ‘Courts are Using AI to sentence criminals. That must stop now’, WIRED (17 Apr 2017 accessed 18 Apr 
2017) <https://www.wired.com/2017/04/courts-using-ai-sentence-criminals-must-stop-now/?mbid=nl_41717_p1&CNDID=>;  
Mitch Smith, ‘Wisconsin, a Backlash Against Using Data to Foretell Defendants’ Futures’ The New York Times (22 Jun 2016 
accessed 10 Feb 2017) < https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/23/us/backlash-in-wisconsin-against-using-data-to-foretell-
defendants-futures.html?_r=0> 
757 See as to the COMPAC scale, Megan Garber, ‘When Algorithms Take the Stand’ The Atlantic (30 Jun 2016 accessed 10 
Feb 2017) <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2016/06/when-algorithms-take-the-stand/489566/>  Angwin’s 
research suggests that COMPAS predictions had about a 60% accuracy. She concludes it is biased against blacks, and as 
to algorithms:  “We trust them too much”: Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu and Lauren Kirchner, “Machine Bias” (May 23, 
2016) ProPublica < https://www.propublica.org/article/machine-bias-risk-assessments-in-criminal-sentencing> Algorithmic 
predictions are given to judges in Arizona, Colorado, Delaware, Kentucky, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Virginia, Washington and 
Wisconsin “…to inform decisions about who can be set free at every stage of the criminal justice system, from assigning 
bond amounts… to even more fundamental decisions about defendants’ freedom”. ProRepublica analysed risk scores for 
700 People and found that 20% of those predicted to commit violent crimes did so within two years and that when all 
possible crimes (including misdemeanours) were included, the algorithm had a 61% accuracy as to those deemed likely to 
reoffend within two years. The algorithm creator disputes the findings. 
758 Burdon, above n 336.  
759 Peppet, above n 283.  
760 Ibid. 
761 Kaivan Karmi, ‘The Role of Sensor Fusion and remote emotive Computing (Rec) in the Internet of Things 6-7 (2013) 
<http://cache.freescale.com/files/32bit/doc/white_paper/SENFEIOTLFWP.PDF cited Ibid. Mobile phone data such as 
accelerometer/ gyroscope, heart rate data and how a consumer holds their phone, types a message (and so on) may all, so 
analysts assert, reveal certain emotions or mental states. 
762 Newman, above n 753. Sellers increase profits but buyers lose: “Economic models generally show that overall prices in 
the economy will end up higher than any model where consumers know all prices…” 
763 Newman, above n 753 citing Joseph Stiglitz. 
764 Insurers business model seeks to mitigate insurance risk, lower fraud and optimise profit. While traditional car insurance 
premiums may reduce with accidents, it is likely that smart car contents insurance will increase, as will cyber insurance. 
Business opportunities will also boom via existing customer bases, insurance expertise, brand value, fraud department skills 
and price comparison website familiarity – these may add to consumer business models: Jain, above n 245.  
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consumers who welcome premiums reflecting that risk.765 Smart home, car and self data offers insurers 
many benefits766 - including marketable data - but UBI may present unfair price discrimination potentials, 
as well as risks where data may be shared, disclosed, used for investigations, claims surveillance and 
enforcement purposes.767 For example, one Australian UBI insurer promises not to use collected driving 
data in claims or investigations – unless it does: 
Your own data is not used against you in claims unless it supports other compelling evidence of 
fraud or information that leads us to believe that you may have misrepresented the truth.768 
 
The CIOT may exacerbate insurance price discrimination, against vulnerable consumers - the elderly, 
the poor and the sick – resulting in insurance denial or unaffordability. Australian caryard financiers are 
already using GPS dongles to locate and immobilise vehicles if consumers fall behind in payments.769 
Privacy-intrusive tracking is often incentivized: car loans are contingent upon dongle consents, or Oscar 
credit an Amazon gift card $1 every day customers meet an algorithm-driven fitness target.770 In Australia, 
health insurers already partner with brands such as Fitbit to offer consumers points and incentives for 
healthy behaviours, though usually via separate loyalty programmes rather than premium reductions.771 
AAMI’s Safe Driver app collects speed, braking, fatigue and smartphone use data – but consumer returns 
are questionable: consumers may get free roadside assist upon renewal,772 and QBE ‘suggest’ premiums 
may reduce. Behavioural economists assert that incentivized safe driving or fitness is unlikely to change 
those who most need it:  the young and fit are more likely to strive for Oscar’s $1 and millennials are also 
more likely to use UBI (44%).773 How this plays out for those who are less advantaged seems obvious, 
absent specific regulatory protections which can address algorithmic discrimination.774   
                                                          
765 These include ‘pay-as-you-drive’ or ‘pay-how-you-drive’ approaches.  
766 For example, improved fraud reduction, automated notice of loss, improved accident investigations and liability 
determination, stolen vehicle tracking and disabling, vehicle monitoring, geo-fencing, etc. 
767 David Lindsay cited in McNamara, above n 339.   
768 Insurance Box, ‘Journey data privacy policy’ (n.d. accessed 2 Apr 2017) <http://insurancebox.com.au/documents/privacy-
promise.pdf> 
769 Car yards offering finance in most states have begun deploying the devices, which can track the movements of a car and 
even immobilise it if a payment is missed: Tom Cowie, ‘Car yards offering finance in most states have begun deploying the 
devices, which can track the movements of a car and even immobilise it if a payment is missed seat’ The Sydney Morning 
herald (5 Oct 2014 accessed 6 Feb 2016) < http://www.smh.com.au/national/gps-trackers-put-repo-man-in-passenger-seat-
20141001-10os1q.html> 
770 Lapowski, above n 339.   
771 See for example, the QANTAS Assure program which has an insurance component offered by QBE. 
772 McNamara, above n 339.   
773 Nielsen, ‘Usage-based Insurance and telematics’ (2016 accessed 2 Aug 2016) < 
http://www.nielsen.com/us/en/insights/reports/2016/usage-based-insurance-and-telematics.html> 
774 There are potential evidential problems in establishing that an algorithm has a discriminatory effect and hence, specific 
legislation after an inquiry and regulatory gap analysis, would be the best approach. 
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Finally, the risk of data error or inaccuracy is serious: it defeats data ‘relevance’ and may impact 
consumers through inequity and inefficiency.775 Those not feeding data may become socially 
marginalised or fall off the social policy spectrum altogether.776 Further despite privacy rights, data 
correction (much less withdrawal of consent or deletion) is almost impossible when consumers may not 
know which CIOT entities hold or analyse their data. Almost certainly, legal gaps may arise as to extant 
discrimination-protected categories, such as age, disability, race and sex777 but also, that novel or refined 
forms of discrimination will arise needing regulatory protection.778 Though beyond scope here, Australian 
anti-discrimination laws are limited in effect and unlikely to protect against economic (or other) sorting 
based upon data-induced analysis of individual personality, habit and character traits.779 For example, 
while employers are free not to hire those with covertly perceived traits they do not like, data ‘analysis’ 
may provide a scientific gloss to decision-making which overrides interviewer perception; insurers may 
calculate premiums or cover based upon inferences which are not individually accurate, lenders may infer 
creditworthiness likewise, and many other situations may arise where analysed traits provide inaccurate 
inferences or relevance. That these may be prejudicial, wrong or unfair, and taint a person’s record 
(perhaps) indefinitely,780 are all potential issues for consumer discrimination law. Criminal use is also 
ever-present: profiling also enables highly targeted, predatory marketing tactics which prey upon 
                                                          
775 The US right-to-work ‘e-verify’ system is an example where inaccurate results have dire consequences. Errors have been 
found due to multiple surnames, surname changes and the like; but have reduced error rates for US citizens over 60% in the 
past five years – which suggests it may originally have caused some chaos: EOP, above n 41: 52.   
776 An example of this in Boston concerned a mobile app used to repair road potholes (using smartphone GPS and 
accelerometer data) to help the Public Works Dept allocate its resources for repairs. It disproportionately favoured younger, 
wealthier neighbourhoods and discriminated against poorer, more socially disadvantaged areas due to user distribution:  
Baker & McKenzie, ‘Internet of Things: Some Legal and Regulatory Implications’  (Feb 2016 accessed 16 Mar 2016): 
15http://www.bakermckenzie.com/files/Uploads/Documents/Australia/ar_australia_internetofthings_feb16.pdf  
777 Federal legislation is as follows: Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 (Cth), Age Discrimination Act 2004 
(Cth), Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth), Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) and Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).  
State laws are: Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) Anti-Discrimination Act 1996 (NT) Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) 
Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) Equal Opportunity Act 
2010 (Vic) Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) 
778 For example, in NSW, audio recording without consent is a criminal offence, but video recording is lawful.  See the 
federal Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth). States legislation is Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic), Surveillance Devices 
Act 2007 (NSW), (NT), Invasion of Privacy Act 1971 (Qld), Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA), Listening Devices Act 1991 
(Tas), Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas); and the federal, Telecommunications 
(Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015 (Cth).  Use of surveillance devices by the Australian 
Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO), the Australian Security Intelligence Service (ASIS) or the Defence Signals 
Directorate (DSD) are covered by the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) and the Intelligence 
Services Act 2001 (Cth). 
779Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC), ‘A Quick Guide to Australian Discrimination Laws’ (2014 accessed 8 Aug 
2016) <https://www.humanrights.gov.au/employers/good-practice-good-business-factsheets/quick-guide-australian-
discrimination-laws>  
780 As discussed above, the Privacy Act enables access to data for correction purposes, but it may be that an individual does 
not know who holds their data to ask that question, or that the data per se appears unremarkable or unchallengeable but the 
algorithm which interprets it generates what an individual might perceive to be unfair or inaccurate inferences. Access to that 
“value-added” data is not necessarily guaranteed under the PA which again, may be a gap.  
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perceived individual vulnerabilities, and allows unscrupulous scammers to target the vulnerable.781 As 
Peppet suggests, in the consumer IOT, privacy norms are fractured782  and  “…everything may reveal 
everything enough to justify real concern”.783 and the intrusive nature of CIOT data and fusion,784 
analysed via big data/ algorithms, enables context-violating data use which “breaks privacy norms”.785   
 
3.2.2 Artificial intelligence & a brave new consumer world  
“…the development of full artificial intelligence could spell the end of the human race…”786- 
Stephen Hawking 
“Artificial Intelligence implicates a wide range of economic, social, and political issues…”787 
 “I’m sorry Dave I can’t do that…” Hal, 2001 
The CIOT’s future is artificial intelligence.788 Of all aspects of qualitative difference and unlimited scope, 
the “…seemingly all-knowing algorithm”789 and impacts of artificial/ machine intelligence within smart 
cars, homes and self remain exponential and exceptional. Suffice to say, the transformational nature of 
consumer devices which respond to consumer demand but may come to generate demand itself, and to 
control and regulate consumer lifestyle and wellbeing, portends revolutionary societal change with 
potentially unknown scope, scale and stakes.  
 
                                                          
781 An example is where illegal pharmacies targetted ill people through Google’s Adwords search engine function. This cost 
Google a $500 million civil forfeiture settlement, representing gross advertising revenue plus gross revenue made by 
Canadian online pharmacies from illegal drug sales in the US: US Department of Justice, ‘Google Forfeits $500 Million 
Generated by Online Ads and Prescription Drug Sales by Canadian Online Pharmacies’ (24 Aug 2011 accessed 25 April 
2015) <http:////www.justice.gov/opa/pr/google-forfeits-500-million-generated-online-ads-prescription-drug-sales-Canadian-
online>  
782 Nissembaum cited in footnote 239, Peppet above n 283: 124. 
783 Peppet, above n 283:121. 
784 Essentially this means combining data from two or more contemporaneous sources, to gain greater depth of insight – for 
example, combining smart home data with Fitbit data may reveal what a person does at home in greater detail. 
785 Nissembaum cited in footnote 239: Peppet above n 283: 124. 
786 Sonali Kohli, ‘Bill Gates joins Elon Musk and Stephen Hawking in saying artificial intelligence is scary’ Quartz (29 Jan 
2015 accessed 25 May 2016) < http://qz.com/335768/bill-gates-joins-elon-musk-and-stephen-hawking-in-saying-artificial-
intelligence-is-scary/> 
787 EPIC, ‘Testimony to ‘The Promises and Perils of Emerging Technologies for Cybersecurity, 115th Cong.’, U.S. Senate 
Committee on Commerce, Science, & Transportation (22 Mar 2017 accessed 28 Mar 2017): 1 
<https://epic.org/testimony/congress/EPIC-SCOM-IoTandAI-Mar2017.pdf> 
788 Mark Jaffe, ‘IoT Won’t Work Without Artificial intelligence’ WIRED (n.d. accessed 3 Mar 2016) 
http://www.wired.com/insights/2014/11/iot-wont-work-without-artificial-intelligence/; Cade Metz, ‘Artificial intelligence is 
setting up the internet of things for a huge clash with Europe’ WIRED (11 Jul 2016 accessed 12 Jul 2016) < 
http://www.wired.com/2016/07/artificial-intelligence-setting-internet-huge-clash-europe/>; Tom Simonite, ‘Microsoft and 
Google want to let artificial intelligence loose on our most sensitive data’ MIT Technology review (19 Apr 2016 accessed 21 
Apr 2016) <https://www.technologyreview.com/s/601294/microsoft-and-google-want-to-let-artificial-intelligence-loose-on-our-
most-private-data/> 
789 Ed Finn of Arizona State University coined this phrase as to John C. Havens, ‘Heartificial Intelligence: Embracing Our 
Humanity to Maximise Machines’  <http://www.johnchavens.com/#!books/cdzt>  
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Big data, like unsmart devices, is dumb. The entire CIOT design premise is that smart devices will 
seamlessly learn to anticipate and even shape human needs, rather than merely responding to 
preferences or detected patterns. In other words, through AI technology, the CIOT ecosystem may learn 
to shape, manipulate or overtake consumer decision-making.790  But that learning is imperfect: with AI 
comes “copying human biases… embedded in data”791 and the potential encoding of “discrimination in 
automated decisions…”792 – for example, Microsoft’s failed AI chatbot Tay,793 which within hours of online 
interaction, learnt hate-filled, antisocial mores. Indeed, bias potentials may be innate: the “inadvertent 
outcome” of the technologies,794 such that corrective human intervention will be “required”.795 In this way, 
algorithms may create device safety (or other) defects through anti-social decision-making. In February 
2016, Google’s very safe796  smart car797 hit a bus - a trivial ‘bump’798 – which revealed the non-trivial 
difficulty of designing algorithms to safely understand social norms.799 The car’s software required 
refinement to “more deeply understand” the (playground) principle that big buses are less likely to yield 
to little cars (even when they should).800 The root cause was an AI failure to cope with the vagaries of 
human behaviour. But on road, it seems safe to assume that driving variants are virtually infinite, and that 
                                                          
790 Jaffe, above n 788. Microsoft say: ““AI systems feed off both positive and negative interactions with people… In that 
sense, the challenges are just as much social as they are technical.”: Peter Lee, ‘Learning from Tay’s introduction’ Official 
Microsoft Blog (25 Mar 2016 accessed 4 Apr 2016) < https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2016/03/25/learning-tays-
introduction/> 
791 Professor Alan Whitfield cited in the PC, above n 190. He gives the example that if past human decisions as to 
recruitment shortlists may build in bias against age, gender or race. Machine learning that emulates human decisions could 
replicate those biases – e.g. the Tay algorithm that interacted with ‘human’ users, and started spewing Nazi rhetoric. 
792 Saqib Shah and Julian Chokkattu, ‘Microsoft kills AI Chatbot Tay (twice) after it goes full Nazi’ DigitalTrends (30 Mar 
2016 accessed 4 Apr 2016) <http://www.digitaltrends.com/social-media/microsoft-tay-chatbot/> 
793 Microsoft had to apologise and withdraw the bot: “…we’ll look to bring Tay back only when we are confident we can 
better anticipate malicious intent that conflicts with our principles and values.” Peter Lee, ‘Learning from Tay’s introduction’ 
Microsoft Blog (25 Mar 2016 accessed 15 Aug 2016) https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2016/03/25/learning-tays-introduction/ 
Note the implied reference to malicious actors going after the bot; whether or not the case, similar concerns have been 
expressed as to smart car targeting on road as well. 
794 EOP, above n 41. (Algorithmic Systems)  
795 Whitfield, above n 791. 
796  In six years and 1.7 million miles, they tallied only eleven minor accidents and caused none. These were all light-
damage, no injury events, fully reported on their website: Google, ‘Google Self-driving Car project Monthly Report July 2016’ 
(Aug 2016 accessed 14 Aug 2016) 
<https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/en//selfdrivingcar/files/reports/report-0716.pdf>  
797 Unlike Tesla, Google’s self-driving cars remain in test phase since 2009. Their plan is a completely autonomous vehicle, 
rather than a phased-in variant.  As at 31 July 2016, Google report 24 (modified) Lexus RX450h SUVs and 34 of its 
prototypes are driving an average of 20-22 thousand miles per week. These cars are contributing to Google’s AI learning 
and as such, also have a current commercial value to the company.     
798 A Google vehicle (at 2 mph) collided lightly with a transit bus (at 15 mph). 
799 The Google car was in a lane blocked by road works and waiting to merge into the adjacent lane to resume travel. The 
bus could have given way, but it did not. 
800 Google, ‘Google Self-Driving Car Project Monthly Report’ (Feb 2016 accessed 8 Apr 2016) 
http://static.googleusercontent.com/media/www.google.com/en//selfdrivingcar/files/reports/report-0216.pdf> See also Chris 
Ziegler, ‘A Google self-driving car caused a crash for the first time’ The VERGE (29 Feb 2016 accessed 3 Mar 2016) 
<http://www.theverge.com/2016/2/29/11134344/google-self-driving-car-crash-report>      
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there will always been an unlikely, unexpected situation - the consumer safety question is how well 
systems will adapt – until all cars are connectively smart and thereby, presumably, predictable.  
 
 
 
  
Graphic 3.3 Waymo functional prototype self-driving car circa 2016 
Source: Waymo (formerly Google))801  
 
 
It seems likely that smart devices will soon know humans, better than they know themselves. But these 
looming signposts of success are also risk markers,802 of which regulators should be acutely aware and 
which in a precautionary principle context, should already inform regulatory decision-making. The GDPR 
provides that individuals have the right not to be subject to automated process-based and profiled 
decision-making,803 but no such ‘right’ or even a right to ‘review’ exists in Australian law.804  As at 2016, 
                                                          
801 Waymo website <https://waymo.com/> 
802 AI superintelligence is, potentially, an existential threat to humankind: Future of Life, ‘AI Open Letter’ citing Stuart Russell, 
Daniel Dewey and Max Tegmark, ‘Research priorities for Robust and Beneficial Artificial Intelligence’ Association for the 
Advancement of Artificial intelligence’ (Winter 2015 accessed 25 May 3016) <http://futureoflife.org/ai-open-letter >   The 
concern is that once machines can self-program, they have the independent capacity to retrain themselves faster than their 
human developers, in a potentially infinite feedback loop – ending in worst case, in human enslavement or extermination. 
Secondly, like nuclear fission, AI is a “dual use” technology, capable of both great evil and great good.  As physicist Stephen 
Hawking warns, in the short term, the impact depends upon who controls AI, whereas in the long term, the question 
becomes, can it be controlled at all?  If fears as to AI are premised upon computers controlling the world, then the IOT is, 
unless carefully regulated and controlled, a vital stepping-stone to that eventuality. 
803 GDPR Art. 22, subject to (a) where necessary to enter into a contract; (b) as authorised by the Union or State law which 
includes safeguards to address “rights freedoms and legitimate interests”; or (c) is based upon the individual’s explicit 
consent. Note that the US Govt released two White House reports – ‘Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence’ (supra 
815) and the ‘National Artificial Intelligence Research and Development Strategic Plan’. The Senate Commerce Committee 
conducted hearings on "The Dawn of Artificial Intelligence (Apr 2017). 
804 PC, above n 190: 308. The PC notes that additional rights to prevent processing relying upon grounds such as consumer 
distress or an appeal right as to automated decisions “might help engender… community confidence” but points to likely 
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early smart home digital voice assistants like Google Now805,  Microsoft’s Cortana806, Amazon’s Alexa,807  
Apple’s Siri808 and “Viv”, 809 are entering consumers’ homes. As one technologist comments, it heralds a 
shift from obeying human commands to looking after humans like a “family pet”.810 It all poses social, 
ethical and regulatory concerns which loom large over the CIOT: Merkel warns against algorithmic 
secrecy,811 the European Parliament is investigating812 and EPIC has recommended amendments to 
Asimov’s Rules of Robotics to specifically address smart devices,813 while tech luminaries have 
established OpenAI as an ethical research non-profit.814 Other leading thinkers have created a Future of 
Life Institute and Principles.815 Long term, AI  implications must be foremost in CIOT policy maker’s minds.  
AI is an inevitable part of the CIOT future, as it enables far greater value to be extracted from devices 
and data, through its contextual analysis and interpretation - which in turn creates far greater overall 
value. AI will monetize data beyond its collector’s wildest dreams:816 as IBM suggests: “…the value of 
data goes up every day AI advances.”817 Like AI-informed smart cars, smart health value confers massive 
public policy benefits818 and is a consumer benefit argument already won.  
                                                          
business and enforcement costs. Subject to public interest and individual rights balancing, the EU and UK require consumer 
notification if an automated decision is being made and allows them to request it not be made or ask that it be reconsidered. 
805 Google speaks via Google Now and on android smartphones, and in smart cars via the Android Auto app. 
806 Cortana speaks across smartphones, on Windows 10 PCs and tablets, and in smart cars. 
807 Alexa is cloud-based and speaks via Echo wireless speakers and via a (non-Amazon) speaker called Triby. 
808 Siri ‘speaks’ on iphone, Apple TV, Apple watch and in smart cars via a ‘CarPlay’ app. 
809 See the different ‘personalities’ of Siri, Alexa, Google and Cortana here:  Edward C. Baig, ‘Personal digital assistants are 
on the rise (and they want to talk)’ USA TODAY (9 May 2016 accessed 22 May 2016) 
<http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/columnist/baig/2016/05/08/personal-digital-assistants-rise-and-they-want-
talk/83715794/> Note however, that online is a difficult environment.  
810 Teena Maddox, ‘Wozniak talks: Self-driving cars, Apple Watch, and how AI will benefit humanity’ TechRepublic (24 June 
2015 accessed 25 May 2016) < http://www.techrepublic.com/article/wozniak-talks-self-driving-cars-apple-watch-and-how-ai-
will-benefit-humanity/>  
811 Kate Connolly, ‘Angela Merkel: internet search engines are 'distorting perception'’ The Guardian (28 Oct 2016 accessed 
2 Nov 2016) < https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/oct/27/angela-merkel-internet-search-engines-are-distorting-our-
perception> 
812 A cross-party working group will formulate recommendations for submission to the EU Digital Commissioner in 2017, to 
become guidelines.  
813 1. A robot may not injure a human; 2. A robot must obey the orders of a human except (1); 3. A robot should protect itself 
except (1) and (2); 4. A robot must always reveal the basis of its decision (“Algorithmic Transparency”) [NEW]; 5. A robot 
must always reveal its actual identity [NEW]: Mark Rothenberg, Presentation (2016 accessed 2 Nov 2016) 
<https://epic.org/privacy/intl/EPIC-38ICDPPC-kyn-10-16.pdf> 
814 Open AI, <https://blog.openai.com/introducing-openai/> 
815 Future of Life, above n 802 citing Stuart Russell, Daniel Dewey and Max Tegmark, ‘Research priorities for Robust and 
Beneficial Artificial Intelligence’ Association for the Advancement of Artificial intelligence’ (Winter 2015 accessed 25 May 
3016) http://futureoflife.org/ai-open-letter >; Future of Life Institute, ‘Asilomar AI Principles’ (2017 accessed 20 Feb 2017) 
<https://futureoflife.org/ai-principles/> 
816 Experts at Fortune’s ‘Brainstorm Technology Conference’ point out that the relationship is reciprocal: the development 
and improvement of AI is dependent upon big data, which is why Google, Amazon and Facebook are already in the AI field. 
While they provide free (open source) AI software for app developers, its utility is limited:  Jonathan Vanian, ‘Why Data Is 
The New oil’ Fortune (11 Jul 2016 accessed 11 Jul 2016) <http://fortune.com/2016/07/11/data-oil-brainstorm-tech/> 
817 Ibid.  
818 Smart health will revolutionise medical provision, diagnosis and care.  Pressures on health budgets are extreme right 
across the world, third world health is parlous and CIOT offers a systemic potential to reduce costs, without diminution in 
care. CIOT benefits include, reduce hospitalisation and consultation time, enable remote patient care, fully inform acute care 
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3.3 Conclusion 
 
This chapter broadly and briefly scopes sophisticated practices and technologies so intertwined with the 
consumer IOT that soon they will become inseparable from a consumer perspective.819 But while hacking 
is a persistent and problematic criminal activity, improved security and big data practices, and socially-
responsible AI controls,820 seem floating somewhere intangible, beyond the law. This is a serious and 
short-sighted gap. Clearly, hacking can be reduced through better, mandated security practices, just as 
big data management821 and AI development822 can be influenced by clearer constraints and 
enforcement.823 This thesis does not pretend to address these critically-serious questions other than to 
reveal a broader CIOT policy-making context, and to identify related and future consumer detriment. Big 
data and AI risk potentials are perhaps the starkest illustrations justifying a pre-emptive regulatory 
approach. Indeed, rather than allowing continued industry development in a gap-riven environment – 
more of the same but squared over volume and time - regulators are better placed to promote positive 
regulation or self-regulatory practice to address consumer protection issues identified and foreseen, and 
instil industry best practice by collaboratively setting appropriate incentivising laws in place – as carrots 
to create, promote and justify high industry standards. This approach to CIOT regulation is revisited in 
Part IV.  
 
                                                          
and remotely monitored post-acute care: Ibid. An example of the latter is post knee surgery: shoe insole sensors can 
measure walking foot pressure, and paired with accelerometers, can measure stride cadence – data which can enable a 
medical assessment of limping, imbalance, activity levels and recovery program progress and effectiveness.  
819 Jaffe, above n 788.   
820 Metz, above n 789.   
821 Susana Etlinger and Jessica Groopman, ‘The Trust Imperative: A Framework for Ethical Data Use’ Altimeter (25 Jun 
2015 accessed 2 Aug 2016) http://www.altimetergroup.com/pdf/reports/The-Trust-Imperative-Altimeter-Group.pdf 
822 EOP, ‘Preparing for the Future of Artificial Intelligence’ (Oct 2016 accessed Oct 2016) 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/whitehouse_files/microsites/ostp/NSTC/preparing_for_the_future_of_ai.pdf; 
Susan Etlinger, “AI” Altimeter (Jan 2017 accessed 3 Feb 2017) http://www.altimetergroup.com/pdf/reports/The-Age-of-
Artificial-Intelligence-Altimeter.pdf 
823 Future of Life, above n 202.  
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Chapter 4 ACL and CIOT: an overview^ 
We are sceptical that consumer protection as currently conceived and implemented will be 
sufficient to uphold consumer rights in an environment where…devices in our homes, our 
vehicles and about our persons, become smarter and more connected…- Consumers 
International 824 
You are entitled to expect every business you deal with to honour its obligations under the 
Australian Consumer Law...825 
 
The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has not publicly addressed the 
consumer IOT, but has its weather eye, if not resources, on an incoming storm.826 It has cautioned the 
app industry,827 vigorously pursued product defect action and recall actions applicable to ‘devices’,828 but 
enforcement work as to consumer guarantees829 and unfair contract terms830 in either a device or 
software context831 has lagged to the law’s detriment. The recent ACL Review reports that stakeholders 
mostly assume that the ACL is “flexible enough to adapt” to emerging technologies such as CIOT,832 but 
in its final Report, CAANZ implies otherwise, warning that smart devices warrant continuous close 
monitoring.833 Their final proposals recommend limited consumer guarantees-related research into 
“purely digital products” and “emerging technologies” in 2018- 19, 834 in a move unnecessarily narrow and 
                                                          
^Reader note: This section is a basic overview of ACL provisions potentially relevant in a CIOT context; it does not purport 
to summarize all relevant law but rather seeks to highlight any uncertainties or gaps. As a reminder from chapter 2, ACCC 
means Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (the regulator) and CAANZ means Consumer Affairs Australia 
and New Zealand (the policy-maker). 
824 CI, above n 44.  
825 Michael Schaper, ‘Speech to Council of Small Business of Australia National Small Business Summit, Sydney’ Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission (27 July 2011 accessed 17 July 2014) [1] < 
http://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/SPEECH%20-%20M%20Schaper%20-%20COSBOA%20-
%2027%20July%202011%20FOR%20WEB.pdf> 
826 Discussion between Delia Rickard, ACCC Deputy Chair and the author. 
827 See also ACMA, Mobile apps—Emerging issues in media and communications, Occasional Paper 1 (May 2013) 
<http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/Library/researchacma/Occasional-papers/emerging-issues-in-media-and-
communications-occasional-papers-1> 
828 ACCC, ‘Product Safety: A Guide to Testing’ (Oct 2013 accessed 2 Aug 2016) <https://www.accc.gov.au/publications/a-
guide-to-testing-product-safety> 
829 ACCC, ‘2016 ACCC Compliance and Enforcement Policy’ (Feb 2016 accessed 3 Mar 2016) < 
http://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/2016%20ACCC%20Compliance%20and%20Enforcement%20Policy_0.pdf>; ACCC, 
‘The ACCC’s accountability framework for investigations’ (2016 accessed 2 Jun 2016) 
https://foi.accc.gov.au/sites/foi.accc.gov.au/files/repository/ACCC%27s%20accountablility%20framework%20for%20investig
ations.pdf 
830 ACCC, ‘Unfair contract terms under scrutiny’ Media Release (28 Mar 2017 accessed 28 Mar 2017) 
<http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/unfair-contract-terms-under-scrutiny> 
831 The ACCC appears to recognise this in announcing its intent to focus upon these areas throughout its 2017 planning. 
832 See CAANZ, ‘Australian Consumer Law Review Final Report’ (Apr 2017 accessed 20 Apr 2017) 
https://cdn.tspace.gov.au/uploads/sites/86/2017/04/ACL_Review_Final_Report.pdf For example, ACL Review Findings 
2.6.2: 67. “The review generally found that the ACL is sufficiently flexible to address emerging issues, including dynamic 
developments in the online environment”. 
833 CAANZ, above n 496 [Interim Report]: 200. 
834 CAANZ, above n 832.   
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disappointingly delayed.835 Indeed, the policy approach suggests some contextual “regulatory 
disconnection”836 perhaps reflecting all or any of low consumer CIOT complaints,837 slim market 
penetration, information lag, planned priority lock-in, time constraints, 838 awaiting other enquiry 
outcomes, little government impetus839 - and low stakeholder awareness or concern.840 Quite legitimately, 
the ACCC places a resource-honed focus upon risk,841 over costly pre-emptive research, consumer 
education or investigative activities.842 However as this thesis proposes,  the consumer IOT evidences 
such international regulatory concern, research-evidenced detriment, scope-scale-stakes and impending 
social impact, that consumer detriment pre-emption through compliance-based and properly-
resourced843 consumer and provider education, regulatory stocktake and enforcement action becomes a 
justified course.844  
This chapter commences that regulatory stocktake approach. While not purporting to summarize all 
relevant ACL provisions or catch every potential deficiency, this thesis evidences that the recent ACL 
                                                          
835 Such research, given smart market timings into Australia and overlaid by growing consumer detriments identified in other 
jurisdictions, is likely to justify expanding their enquiry to how the ACL and other consumer protection legislation responds 
overall. 
836 Brownswold, cited in Kayleen Manwaring, ‘A Legal Analysis of Socio-Technological Change Arising Out of eObjects’ 
Working Paper (2016 accessed Jun 2016: 3) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2690024>  
837 Consumer complaints are a lead indication of detriment, so triggering resources without them raises legitimate risk: 
benefit questions. There is also evidence that the ACCC’s capacity to consider and escalate complaints is limited: “… only a 
very small proportion of fair trading complaints (approximately 1%) are ultimately escalated to the round table meeting 
and/or the under-assessment meeting, raising the possibility that some matters may be ‘missed’”: Australian Labor Party, 
‘Submission to the Productivity Commission ACL Review’ (Oct 2016 accessed 12 Oct 2016) 
http://www.pc.gov.au/__data/assets/pdf_file/0010/206938/sub001-consumer-law.pdf   It seems likely to the author however, 
that the ACCC is discriminating enough to be alert to potentially unique CIOT complaints. 
838 The ACCC escalates some 60 cases of 10,000 complaints per quarter, which means many cases are being ignored. It 
yields $1.50 back: ALP, Ibid. In contrast the FTC’s enforcement budget is  $50 million (overall for consumer protection, $184 
million) <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/fy-2016-2017-performance-plan-fy-2015-performance-
report/pprfy16-17_0.pdf> The ALP also recommends funding for an independent market study function.  
839 Note the FTC has initiated several important conferences this year, including one which dealt specifically with a cross-
disciplinary examination of notice and choice including from behavioural economics, psychology and other perspectives. 
840 Few submissions to the ACL Review mentioned CIOT, much less addressed its potential harms. This was especially the 
case as to submissions from large law firms, representative legal bodies and others whom the Review might legitimately 
expect would identify legal deficiency. It may be that some of these groups lack sufficient CIOT awareness. For a useful 
submission as to emerging technology, see  ACCAN,  ‘Australian Consumer Law Review Submission by ACCAN’ (May 
2916 accessed 20 Aug 2016) < 
http://consumerlaw.gov.au/files/2016/07/Australian_Communications_Consumer_Action_Network.pdf>; Consumer Action 
Law Centre, ‘Australian Consumer Law Review’ (30 May 2016 accessed 3 Sept 2016) <http://consumeraction.org.au/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/Consumer-Action-ACL-Review-Submission-FINAL.pdf> 
841 For example, the ACCC did not investigate fake online reviews until well after the FTC had exposed a problem: Kate 
Mathews-Hunt, ‘Gaming the system: fake online reviews v. consumer law’ Computer Law & Security Review, 31 (1) (2015): 
3-25 
842 In 2015, ACCC Head Rod Simms foreshadowed a hope to increase sectoral research and market analysis: Rod Simms, 
‘2015 Priorities’ (19 Feb 2015 accessed 2 Aug 20116) <http://www.accc.gov.au/speech/priorities-2015> 
843 Despite the ACCC’s workload ever-increasing, as are enforcement costs - its budget is not. The ACCC has long adopted 
a selective enforcement approach, its litigation budget is a humble $24.5 million, which no doubt explains its highly selective 
(and perhaps conservative) approach to pursuing cases in court.  
844 There is Australian government precedent for this approach in terms of an emerging technology: Australian Government, 
‘Cloud Computing Regulatory Stock Take Report’ (21 Jan 2014 accessed 2 Jan 2016) < 
https://www.communications.gov.au/publications/cloud-computing-regulatory-stock-take-report%C2%A0> 
[103] 
 
review does not go far enough to address emerging or digital technologies. In locating multiple ‘gaps’, 
uncertainties or deficiencies, suggestive of contextual “regulatory disconnection”845 the paper evidences 
how new harms, legal or practical uncertainties, regulatory over/ under-inclusiveness and even, 
obsolescence846 require response.  Recommendations are underlined in Part III. The chapter frames its 
recommendations against selected CIOT cases, two illustrative hypotheticals and current ACL 
interpretations suggestive of required reform. 
 
4.1 An Introduction 
The Australian Consumer Law (ACL) comprises Schedule 2 of the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 
(Cth) (CCA), and is generally regarded as successful,847 well-administered848 and (reasonably) 
internationally-comparative consumer protection legislation.849 Effective on and from 1 January 2011,850 
it is largely technology neutral and prescribes certain normative foundational principles, together with 
specific consumer protections. This reflects that broad ‘safety net regulation’ still requires general and 
specifically prescriptive ‘rule-based’ protections to responsively fill gaps, and to address specific 
undesirable industry practice or forms of consumer detriment.851 The principal provisions relevant to 
consumer IOT issues are prohibitions upon misleading and deceptive conduct and certain false 
representations, unconscionable conduct, unfair contract terms, consumer guarantees and product 
liability. Remedies available to both the regulator852 and successful plaintiffs, are creative, effective and 
extensive. 853   
                                                          
845 See for example, the 2016 review: Stephen Corones, Stephen, Sharon Christensen, Justin Malbon, Allan Asher & 
Jeannie Marie Paterson, ‘Comparative analysis of Overseas Consumer Policy Frameworks’ (April 2016 accessed 26 Jun 
2016) < http://consumerlaw.gov.au/files/2016/05/ACL_Comparative-analysis-overseas-consumer-policy-frameworks-1.pdf>  
846 Manwaring cites Bennet-Moses, above n 836: 4-5 but adds in an additional refinement to include “practical” uncertainty to 
capture whether the law can practically respond, as opposed to “legal uncertainty which is Bennet-Moses’ focus. 
847 Productivity Commission, ‘Draft Consumer Law Enforcement and Administration’ (8 Dec 2016 accessed 8 Dec 2016) 
http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/current/consumer-law/draft/consumer-law-draft-overview.pdf 
848 Ibid. See also the ACCC self-assessment under this framework which records few failures: Australian Government, 
‘Regulator performance framework’ (2014 accessed 29 Nov 2016) 
<https://www.cuttingredtape.gov.au/sites/default/files/files/Regulator_Performance_Framework2.pdf> 
849 Australia, the UK, US, Canada and Singapore have “high levels of convergence” in their consumer policy frameworks: 
Corones, above n 845. Note this enquiry was limited to four issues: unconscionable/ unfair trading practices; e-commerce/ 
peer-to-peer regulation; institutional structures as to administration and enforcement; and consumer access to justice.  
850 The object… is to enhance the welfare of Australians through the promotion of competition and fair trading and provision 
for consumer protection: Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) section 2 ‘Objects’. The unfair contract terms 
provisions of the ACL commenced effective 1 July 2010. 
851 For example, pyramid selling, door-to-door or unsolicited sales. 
852 In addition to the remedies below, ACL Part 5-1 contains non-court imposed enforcement powers including powers to 
accept undertakings, substantiation notices and the power to issue public warning notices. Section 134A CCA enables the 
ACCC to issue infringement notices in lieu of civil penalty proceedings as well. 
853 ACL Ch 5 powers include injunctive relief, pecuniary penalties and compensation orders. 
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4.1.1 Threshold concepts – definitions & other complications… 
 
The ACL will only apply if various threshold matters are satisfied: firstly, the definitions of ‘person’ and ‘in 
trade or commerce’, and secondly, certain jurisdiction and enforcement criteria. Other terms such as 
‘consumer’ and ‘goods’ apply to certain provisions. These warrant a brief discussion for background: 
‘person’ includes corporations under CCA section 131, which captures most CIOT device 
suppliers and natural persons such as company directors under CCA s. 6(3)(b).  Section 6(3)(a) 
also provides that Parts 2-1 (s. 18) and 3-1 (s. 29) apply to corporations as to conduct involving 
the use of the internet as a ‘telephonic” service854 - which means that individuals and corporations 
operating overseas-hosted internet sites intended for Australian consumer access are also within 
ACL scope;855 
‘in856 trade or commerce’857 is defined as “trade or commerce within Australia or between 
Australia and places outside Australia858 and includes any business or professional activity 
(whether or not carried on for profit)”.859 As Australian CIOT purchases or downloads usually 
occur via local retail stores or online from Australia, the criteria are usually satisfied. Grey areas 
as to “free” devices or software (4.1.3 below) may arise, or if an Australian purchases a CIOT 
device or downloads an app whilst overseas, as ACL jurisdiction may not apply (especially where 
overseas devices are not intended for sale or sold into the Australian market). 
‘engage in conduct’ includes ‘doing or refusing to do any act…’860 or any deliberate omission – 
“…refraining (otherwise than inadvertently) from doing that act…”861 This element is often 
                                                          
854 Representations made on the internet fall within the Commonwealth constitutional power as to “postal, telephonic 
services” so the ACL applies: Seafolly Pty Ltd v Madden (2012) 297 ALR 337 at [76]-[79] (Tracey J); ACCC v Jutsen (No 3) 
(2011) 206 FCR 264 at 287 [100] (Nicholas J); ACCC v Jones (No 5) [2011] FCA 49 at [6] and [10] (Logan J); Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission v Homeopathy Plus! Australia Pty Limited [2014] FCA 1412 [ 
855 ACCC v Chen [2003] FCA 897; ACCC v Hughes [2002] FCA 897. The former concerned an individual and the latter, a 
corporation. 
856 The word “in” qualifies and limits the prohibition to the “… ‘central conception’ of trade or commerce and not to the 
‘immense field of activities’ in which corporations may engage in the course of, or for the purposes of, carrying on some 
overall trading or commercial business.”: Concrete Constructions (NSW) Pty Ltd v Nelson (1990) 169 CLR 594: 603 (per 
Mason, CJ, Deane, Dawson and Gaudron, JJ). In that case conduct as to employment conditions was “with respect to “trade 
and commerce but not “in” trade and commerce; such that the Trade Practices Act 1974(Cth) section 52 (now s. 18 ACL) did 
not apply. 
857 Australian Constitution clause 51(i) empowers the Commonwealth to make laws with respect to trade and commerce 
among the States and with other countries. In ACCC v Homeopathy Plus! Australian Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1412 an argument 
that website articles (supportive of its business activities)  
858 CAC section 4(1) definition. 
859 ACL section 2(1) definition, which came into effect on 1 January 2011. Re Ku-ring-gai Co-operative Building Society (No 
12) Ltd (1978) 22 ALR 621 the Court held that “trade or commerce” are words of “the widest import”, not restricted to profit-
making activities. 
860 CCA section 4(2)(a) 
861 CCA section 4(2)(c) 
[105] 
 
satisfied by representations: “…a statement made orally or in writing or which is implied from 
words or conduct.” 862 These may appear in the device or app terms and conditions, or in any 
other form (online or off) whether supplied with a device or software or not, including by device 
website, marketing materials, advertising or any other claims as to its performance;  
“carrying on a business in Australia”: Valve863 has recently affirmed that businesses located 
in a foreign jurisdiction, without a physical presence in Australia, but which supply goods to 
Australia and make representations as to those goods864 into Australia, is “carrying on a 
business” and “engaging in conduct” subject to the ACL [see 4.2 below]. 
‘goods’ are defined in section 2 to include “computer software’ (e.g. apps) and ‘any component 
part of, or accessory to, goods’ (g). It also comprehends tangible ‘things’ such as smart cars, 
home and fitness devices. The distinction is most relevant in considering which consumer 
guarantees apply (4.4 below); 
‘consumer’ was discussed in chapter 1 but for ease of reference, includes where the amount 
payable for goods is $40,000 or less; or the goods are of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal 
domestic or household use or consumption, subject to certain exceptions. The recent ACL 
Review has recommended the threshold be increased to $100,000 which seems sensible given 
it has not been raised for many years. 
 
4.1.2 Choice of law and jurisdiction 
International CIOT device and app providers commonly rely upon contracts with an overseas choice of 
law reflective of their own location, preferred jurisdiction or to deter international litigants – unless a 
consumer’s usual place of residence is the mandated law, as in the EU.865  ACL section 67 (a) provides 
that if the ‘proper law’ of a contract for goods or services to a consumer is Australian, it shall apply 
                                                          
862 Given v Pryor (1978) 39 FLR 437 at 440-441 
863 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No. 3) [2016] FCA 196 per Edelman, J 24 Mar 
2016 accessed at <http://www.judgments.fedcourt.gov.au/judgments/Judgments/fca/single/2016/2016fca0196> 
864 Note the case concerned Valve’s representations as to its warranties, refund rights (etc.) and so the question as to 
whether or not goods were “supplied” into Australia was not relevant. However, the court found that even if Valve did not 
engage in “conduct” in Australia, it engaged in trade or commerce in Australia, and so was subject to the ACL - it liaised with 
2.2 million customers in Australia; had servers for which it paid in Australia; earned significant ongoing revenue from 
Australians; stored consumer data in Australia; had significant personal property in Australia; relied on third party content 
delivery providers in Australia who provide services and content around the world including Australia.  
865 To the extent that the protections under the selected law do not derogate from the protections of the laws of their home 
jurisdiction, consumers are permitted to select the applicable law of a contract: Council Regulation 593/2008 on the Law 
Applicable to Contractual Obligations (Rome I) cited in James J. Healy, ‘Consumer Protection Choice Of Law: European 
Lessons For The United States’ Duke Journal of Comparative and International Law  19: 535 558. 
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regardless of any contrary contractual term.  866  and that (b) despite any term purporting to substitute the 
laws of another country, the non-excludable (section 64) consumer guarantees apply regardless.  As to 
(a), the court must still consider the proper law, based upon the facts of the case, including the parties’ 
location, where the goods or services are provided, where the contract was formed, the location of the 
goods, as well as the contractual terms. For example, Valve held that consumers purchasing an online 
license to stream games may enforce the ACL against a supplier in a foreign jurisdiction, regardless of 
any contrary ‘proper law’ clause in that license,867 and that the proper law is Australian where a foreign 
corporation carries on business in Australia and engages in ‘conduct’ with sufficient Australian context.868 
So while it is not definitive that the ACL applies to all Australian CIOT purchases, most (if not all) 
Australian-based purchases are covered and the courts seem likely to lean towards finding jurisdiction 
for Australian consumers dealing with international entities online.  Australia is obviously a preferable 
forum for cost, convenience and enforcement reasons.  
As Schedule 1 suggests, jurisdiction clauses which uniformly favour the CIOT provider are 
commonplace. Given the possibility that these may infringe section 67 as well as constitute unfair contract 
terms, an ACL sweep of enforcement activity seems required.  
 
4.1.3 ‘Free’ apps & supplier liability 
ACL provisions governing unconscionable conduct or unfair terms869 have higher thresholds, which raise 
several contentious legal issues: firstly, whether there is a defined “consumer”870 and “supply [or 
acquisition] of goods or services”, and secondly, whether the supply of a ‘free’ CIOT device, or app falls 
under the ACL. As Ch. 1 suggests, CIOT acquirers are usually ‘consumers’ as defined,871 and usually, 
each of a CIOT device manufacturer/ supplier, app provider, cloud and data analytics providers are 
                                                          
866 See Laminex (Aust) v Coe Manufacturing Co [1999] NSWCA 270 
867 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No. 3) [2016] FCA 196 per Edelman, J 24 Mar 
2016 accessed at < http://www.judgments.fedcourt.gov.au/judgments/Judgments/fca/single/2016/2016fca0196> 
868 [178]. 
9. Ibid, at [179]- [182]. 
10. ACCC v Valve, above n 863 at [178- 182], [205] per Edelman, J. 
869 Note that false representations (section 29) and statutory guarantees (Part 3-2) could also apply in the event of the 
thresholds being satisfied. These are discussed below as they apply to CIOT. 
870 ACL section 3 defines a ‘consumer’ by reference to acquiring (1) goods, which in this case would include by “exchange” 
(section 2); or (2) services by way of acceptance (section 2). Consumer in terms of acquiring ‘goods’ means (in summary) if 
and only if the amount paid does not exceed $40,000 or the goods were of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic 
or household use or consumption.  
871 ACL section 3 defines ‘consumer’ as to both ‘goods’ and ‘services’. In the latter case, the definition provides a person is a 
‘consumer’ if the services do not exceed $40,000 or are of a kind ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household 
use or consumption. There seems little doubt that the former would apply to an arguably ‘free’ contract, or even one where 
information is exchanged for access; but even if not, CIOT devices exceeding $40,000 are of a kind objectively, ordinarily 
acquired for ‘personal, domestic or household use or consumption’: Carpet Call v Chan (1987) 55 ASC 55-553. 
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corporations operating “in trade or commerce”. The second question concerns ‘freemium’ practices; that 
is, whether ‘free’ CIOT goods are supplied in ‘trade or commerce’. Business models suggest that free 
devices or apps are provided to consumers as the monetized component is data collation, use and 
analytics – the latter of which may involve a paid service (or premium version) in any case.872 
Alternatively, all elements may be free – in return for consumer data access, and broad (monetizable) 
use. In a social media environment, consumers are repeatedly told that data collation and ads support 
‘free’ services, but Hoofnagle for example, argues (correctly) that personal information is valuable873 and 
tradeable.874 Economically, it is a unique consumer asset in a transactional cost sense, which on website, 
device or app (warranty or other) registration, and is exchanged in a bilateral trading relationship online. 
Behavioural economists argue that consumers are not “rational” as presupposed by traditional economic 
analysis: they bear transaction costs, are subject to significant information asymmetry875 and bounded 
rationality876 in online contracting, and bear burdens such as targeted marketing, fraud and identity theft, 
as well as transferred costs (time, effort or money) to reduce privacy impacts.877 Risks also transfer 
through widespread data misuse and breach, where personal information is disclosed to or traded with 
entities which fail to observe information use and privacy preferences.878  For this reason, it seems likely 
that freemium devices and apps (in exchange for consumer data) are provided in connection with a 
business activity, and will still satisfy the ‘trade or commerce’ requirement, such that relevant ACL 
provisions will apply. An example might be a free fitness device and app provided by a fitness wear 
company; these collect consumer data, are provided as a marketing tool for the business and collect 
customer data, which can be bundled with customer lists to improve marketing and customer profiling -  
and so, should fall within the ACL. Conversely, a free device and app which is completely unrelated to a 
business and confidentially donated879 for non-promotional purposes, without any business data collation 
or use, is less likely to be captured. This is relevant both to regulating paid and “unpaid” CIOT providers, 
                                                          
872 One US decision says that a free (Apple iOS4) software update download is neither. Note however that the case turned on 
very narrow definitions within the relevant legislation as to what constitutes ‘goods’ or ‘services’ and the fact that a free upgrade 
did not fall under the relevant sale or lease laws:  Woffard, ibid.  
873 Hoofnagle, above n 55: 633.  
874 Ibid.  
875 Ibid. 
876 This means that all decision-makers face three constraints: (1) limited and often unreliable information as to possible 
alternatives and their consequences; (2) the limited human ability to evaluate and process information; and (3) the limited 
decision-making time. “…Therefore even individuals who intend to make rational choices are bound to make satisficing 
(rather than maximizing or optimizing) choices in complex situations. These limits (bounds) on rationality also make it nearly 
impossible to draw up contracts that cover every contingency” :Business Dictionary.com, ‘Bounded Rationality’ (undated 
accessed 10 Apr 2015) < http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/bounded-rationality.html> 
877 Hoofnagle above n 55: 625.     
878 Hoofnagle above n 55.     
879 Note ACL s. 5 provides that donations are not ‘supplies’ or ‘acquisitions’ unless for “promotional purposes” except for 
Parts 3-3, 3-4, 4-3 and 4-4 as to product safety, recall (etcetera) where they are supplies or acquisitions. 
[108] 
 
together with the overall supply chain when it comes to products liability, device-related data use, and to 
the terms under which the CIOT industry deals with consumers generally. 
 
4.2 Parts 2-1 & 3-1:  Misleading conduct & false representations 
ACL section 18880 provides that a ‘person’881 shall not in trade or commerce882 engage in conduct which 
is misleading or deceptive or which is likely to mislead or deceive’. To this norm of conduct is added the 
narrower section 29, which is narrower than section 18, but invokes the same elements as to 
representations made “in trade or commerce” which are “misleading”.883 Those representations must be 
“in connection with the supply or possible supply of goods or services or their “promotion by any means 
of the supply or use” and must fall within any of the specific scenarios described in subsections (a) – 
(n),884 which (broadly) relate to product-related quality, ’sponsorship approval performance 
characteristics, accessories, uses or benefits”, testimonials, repair, place of origin, need, guarantees or 
paid warranties. These representations are usually made in product marketing or informational materials 
or websites, and as ‘false or misleading’ is synonymous,885 sections 18 and 29 are often pleaded in 
concert.  Misleading or deceptive or false means that the conduct (including representations) involves a 
real or not remote chance of leading a consumer into error,886 as a question of fact887 - irrespective of 
                                                          
880 The ACL is found in the Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) (CCA) Schedule 2. Note that it is a national law, and 
as state fair trading and related legislation mirror the national provisions, it is not dealt with separately here. 
881 CIOT device-suppliers and app providers are usually corporations which are ‘persons’ under the ACL and are usually 
regarded as ‘carrying on business within Australia’, either through business with an Australian consumer online or through 
physical presence (for example, by representative offices or data centres). Note that as a Commonwealth law, the ACL 
applies to any trading or financial corporation formed within Australia or incorporated within a territory of Australia, or a 
foreign corporation (or a holding company of any of these): Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) sections 4 and 13(1).  
882 ACL section 2 provides that ‘In trade or commerce’ means within Australia or between Australia and any place(s) outside, 
and includes ‘any business or professional activity (whether or not carried on for profit)’. 
883 Courts have confirmed that this phrase has the same meaning as “misleading and deceptive”:  
884 The most CIOT-relevant of these are: as to false representations made in connection with the supply, acquisition  or 
promotion of goods or services, and which prohibits false or misleading representations, inter alia, (a) that goods are of a 
particular standard, quality, value, grade, composition, style or model… (b) or that services are of a particular standard, 
quality, value or grade; or (g) have a sponsorship, approval, performance characteristics, accessories, uses or benefits; or (i) 
as to price; or (l) the need for any goods or services; or (m) concerning existence, exclusion or effect of any condition, 
warranty, guarantee, right or remedy; or (n) concerning a requirement to pay for a contractual right (including statutory 
guarantee or other legal right). 
885 See ACCC v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 634; Comite Interprofessionnel du Vin de Champagne v 
Powell [2015] FCA 1110 (per Beach, J). The main difference is that contravention carries criminal penalties unlike section 
18. 
886 ACCC v TPG Internet Pty Limited [2013] HCA 54; (2013) 250 CLR640; 88 ALJR 176; Parkdale Custom Built Furniture 
Pty Ltd v Puxu Pty Ltd [1982] HCA 44.  
887 Campomar Sociedad Limitada v Nike international Ltd (2000) 202 CLR 45; [2000] HCA 12; Google Inc. v ACCC (2013) 
249 CLR 435; [2013] HCA 1. The court must decide two issues: whether the pleaded representations were conveyed by the 
conduct in question; and if yes, whether the representations were misleading and deceptive, likely to mislead or deceive or 
were false or misleading. Where conduct is directed to the public at large (for example, advertising) rather than to specific 
individuals (for example, purchasers of the device), then the court will assess the conduct by reference to the class or 
classes to whom the conduct was directed.  
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whether this has occurred or not.888 In a CIOT context, this means that terms may mislead whether or 
not a consumer has read them, which is significant given findings as to low read-rates. Examples might 
include app terms and conditions which are inaccurate as to the nature or extent of data gathering, its 
storage or use, or which misrepresent how the ACL applies to those terms and conditions. Others might 
include false representations as to device operation, security levels or activities, or a smart self app which 
(covertly) provides that consumer’s data to his or her health insurance provider.889  As is evident, sections 
18 and 29, and unfair terms laws may overlap.  
The ACCC has not instituted any CIOT-related proceeding under sections 18 or 29.890  Given the 
likelihood that large corporations are involved, many consumers are or will be affected and the potentials 
for industry educative benefits and significant penalties,891 the ACCC might well consider action early in 
the Australian CIOT market to establish an aggressive regulatory footfall.  
 
4.2.1 Smart cases 
Selected international CIOT cases are considered next. Device (in)accuracy and testing, data collection, 
product performance and related misrepresentations are common in CIOT cases. Recent examples 
across smart self, home and car include: 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
888 Taco Co of Australia Inc. v Taco Bell Pty Ltd (1982) 42 ALP 177; [1982] FCA 170 [199]. Section 18 refers to conduct which 
is “likely to mislead or deceive” which has long been viewed as meaning that it is not necessary to prove that the conduct 
misled or deceived anyone: Parkdale; above 886. In Valve, the ACCC has cross-appealed arguing that Justice Edelman erred 
in ruling that certain of Valve’s online chats to individual consumers were not misleading, in part because by correctly asserted 
their ACL rights to Valve, the consumers were not ‘misled’. 
889 An example might be a fitness app which collects data, and assigns consumers to an achievement level based upon their 
fitness ‘level’. Knowledge as to the consumer’s ‘level’ rating may convey inferable information.   
890 Note the VW/ Audi cases exemplify alleged software which functions as a defeat device, without consumer knowledge, 
falsifying green marketing claims and in breach of Australian emissions Standards. Many of these vehicles are level 2 smart 
cars. Cases are emerging as to other marques in 2016-7. 
891 Remedies are extensive, including injunctions, damages and ancillary orders under ACL Chapter V. The ACCC may also 
seek fines of up to $1.1 million for corporations and $220,000 for individuals. Note that the CCA uses the term ‘pecuniary 
penalties’ to avoid the criminal standard of proof.  
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(a) Data inaccuracy & testing deceits (smart self) 
In FTC v Breathometer,892 the FTC893 alleged false claims as to device accuracy and testing894 of a low-
reading blood alcohol concentration detection device, which by app, 895 provided ‘safe’-driving 
recommendations.896 The case also alleged an unreasonable delay in warning consumers,897 and 
disabling the app. The settlement required a recall, $5.1 million buy-back, and an injunction. In Australia, 
ACL sections 18 and 29 (a) and (g), as to false device accuracy would apply, as well as a breach of 
Australian Standard AS3547 under ACL section 136. It may also have a ‘safety-related’ defect under Part 
3-4 requiring recall if it led legally ‘intoxicated’ people to drive, and were anyone killed, injured or property 
damaged, Part 3-5 may allow redress. A subtler case concerns underperforming consumer expectation. 
Two ongoing Fitbit class actions illustrate this: McLellan898 as to heart rate accuracy and Brickman,899 as 
to sleep measurement.  McLellan alleges that the heart rate monitoring systems on the Fitbit Charge HR 
                                                          
892 Federal Trade Commission v. Breathometer, Inc., and Charles Michael Yim, FTC Matter/File Number: 162 3057, Federal 
Court: Northern District of California, Case No. 3:17-cv-314-LB, Stipulated Final Order for Permanent Injunction and Other 
Equitable Relief, Filed 23 Jan 2017 < https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/170123breathometer_dkt._4-1_-
_stipulated_order.pdf> 
893 Section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15 U.S.C. §45(a) prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or unfair practices in or affecting 
commerce. Misrepresentations or the deceptive omission of material facts are included within that definition. Acts or 
practices are unfair if the cause or are likely to cause “substantial injury to consumers” that they cannot reasonably avoid 
and that is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or competition. 
894 The FTC alleged the company falsely claimed it had “rigorous government lab-grade tests” verifying its claims.   
895 The complaint was filed under s. 13(b) of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 53(b) alleging violation of 
section 5(a) of the FTC Act, 15. U.S.C. §45(a). 
896 These included calling a cab if required. 
897 The case alleged Breathometer became aware that its v2 app was yielding low readings by late 2014, upgraded it to 
elevate readings, but by early 2015, testing revealed flaws resulting in potentially thousands of consumers being misled as 
to their reading. Despite this, Breathometer traded for another year and consumers were still buying the device in February 
2016, the company also failed to notify or warn retailers and failure to email registered owners a month later – and did not 
disable the feature until May 2016: Ibid. 
898 McLellan et al., v Fitbit, Inc., Case No. 3:16-cv-00036, Calif Nthern Dist (5 Jan 2016). The case concerns the Fitbit 
Charge HR, a wireless heart rate and activity wristband, and Fitbit Surge fitness watch that consists of a GPS watch, heart 
rate tracker, activity tracker, and smartwatch. The products are sold through retailers and distributors. 
899 The case, involving Californian and Floridian plaintiffs, survived an application to dismiss in 15 July 2016 based upon the 
technology accuracy, as Brookman, J said the consumer issues relate to product representations, not just the disputed 
research. The plaintiffs claim they paid US$30 more for the function. Brickman v Fitbit Inc., Class Action Case No. 3:15-cv-
2077 
<https://www.manatt.com/uploadedFiles/Content/4_News_and_Events/Newsletters/AdvertisingLaw@manatt/BrickmanvFitbit
Inc.pdf>  
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and Surge dangerously under-record rates,900 posing serious user health risks.901 The claims include902 
unfair, deceptive and fraudulent advertising, and intentional concealment of material facts. Recent 
CHOICE research confirmed fitness devices lack accuracy903 - with Fitbit at a positive 95%,904 the expert 
still suggests it will “diminish” workout results.905 Brickman alleges device accelerometer technology 
overstates sleep by 43- 67 minutes, thereby posing serious long-term health concerns.906 Both cases 
also allege unconscionable ‘post’ contractual app terms including mandatory arbitration,907 choice of law, 
a class action ban and claims period limitation, which are unfair and fraudulent trading acts and practices. 
The Australian unfair terms regime, (or less likely) unconscionability may address this, though there is no 
‘unfair trading provision. Both cases continue at pre-trial stage – meanwhile, a shareholder class action 
commenced, alleging Fitbit’s stock fell 5.8% “as a result of the [McLellan] news”.908 
It is perhaps problematic that these cases require researchers to identify flaws which consumers do not 
expect, and that consumer redress will depend upon the misleading nature of product marketing and 
other representations, rather than some concrete standard as to reasonable accuracy or some more 
                                                          
900 The Complaint alleges that Fitbit ‘Purepulse’ uses LED lights to detect changes in capillary volume, then applies “finely 
tuned algorithms” to measure heart rate automatically and continuously” and allow users to “accurately track workout 
intensity”:[22]. 
901 It alleges that the "PurePulse technology," is not accurate, as confirmed by its study, nor does it perfom as well as Fitbit 
marketing claims. Fitbit denies the claim and asserts the study is biased and is not precise evidence. The study found that 
Fitbit's heart rate accuracy is 20 beats per minute inaccurate (on average) during moderate to high-intensity exercise. Dr. 
Edward Jo, claims:  "This inaccuracy that we've seen can definitely pose a danger to not only the clinical population, but 
those population of individuals who may not know that they have any cardiac related conditions… It can definitely put them 
at risk." Fitbit respond that the study was “lacks scientific rigor and is the product of flawed methodology.”: Paul Lamkin, 
‘Fitbit heart rate tech 'puts consumers at risk' according to lawsuit scientist’, WAREABLES (May 2016 accessed 2 Aug 2016) 
<https://www.wareable.com/fitbit/fitbit-hrm-heart-rate-tech-health-risk-2764> 
902 Others alleged include common law fraud, fraud in the inducement, unjust enrichment, revocation of acceptance, breach 
of express warranty, violation of Magnuson-Moss and other statutes as to implied warranty (and others). 
903 Of 14 tested, only five had an acceptable heart rate margin of error. Sydney University tested 14 fitness tracker heart rate 
monitor functioning using a 12-lead electrocardiography (ECG) monitor mapping a professional athlete’s real-time heart rate 
running on a treadmill. One-minute interval readings were taken for five minutes to compare tracker accuracy versus that of 
the ECG. To compare sudden changes in intensity like those in interval training – researchers took readings at ten-second 
intervals in the first minute of warming up, and then the sixth minute when cooling down. The ECG monitor readings were 
compared to the fitness trackers. Dr Edwards asserts that ECG is “the most accurate heart rate monitor, capable of 
identifying an immediate change in heart rate”: Ibrahim, above n 334.   
904 While some achieved high (95%+) accuracy, others were poor performing: Apple Watch Sport (67%), Samsung Gear S2 
(53%) and Sony SmartBand 2 (27%). The high performers included the defendant Fitbit: 99% (Mio) and 95%  (Fitbit, Mio 
Alpha 2 and Garmin Forerunner 235). 
905  Dr Kate Edwards, cited in Ibrahim, above n 334. 
906 Mannatt Phelps and Phillips LLP, ‘Fitbit can’t sleep on false advertising suit over sleep measurement claims’ Lexology 
(29 May 2015 accessed 2 Oct 2016) <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=0193042e-7c61-45bc-85c7-
54deccb42579 > 
907 There is UK authority to the effect that clauses mandating arbitration may be “unfair”, especially if they seek to limit 
consumer access to the courts: Mylcrist Builders Ltd v Mrs G Buck [2008] EWHC 2172. 
908 Kessler Topaz Meltzer Check LLP, ‘Shareholder Class Action Filed Against Fitbit Inc’ <https://www.ktmc.com/new-
cases/fitbit-inc> It alleges that Fitbit “… made materially false and/or misleading statements and/or failed to disclose that: (i) 
Fitbit’s heart rate monitoring technology was inaccurate and did not consistently deliver accurate heart rate readings during 
exercise; (ii) the inaccuracy of Fitbit’s heart rate monitoring technology posed serious health risks to users of Fitbit’s 
products; and (iii) as a result of the foregoing, Fitbit’s public statements were materially false and misleading” from IPO to 
the claim date.  
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discriminating scale. Consumer and product reviews may assist, but this may be an area appropriate 
either for ACCC guidance or industry standards to better clarify or disclose device accuracy, and so better 
align product performance with consumer expectation and industry communications. 
 
(b) Data gathering deceits (smart self and home) 
The We-Vibe case909 discussed in Ch. 5 involves an app collecting sensitive ‘personal’ and device data 
without disclosing this to users: section 18 can still apply where a non- inadvertent910 omission is 
misleading, but section 29 requires an oral, written or implied representation,911 (which may occur without 
intent912) through an overall impression conveyed by (for example) device marketing. Three recent app 
cases impugn device accuracy and representations: the Runtastic heart rate monitor was allegedly 
inaccurate and had not been fully tested to medical device standard so required a clear consumer 
disclaimer upon first use to that effect, as well as opt-in for tracking and other undisclosed data use 
practices;913 Cardio Heart-rate monitor likewise made accuracy (mis)representations and clarification that 
a “potential life expectancy” feature914  was hypothetical only. Both required device accuracy and 
performance warnings, as did the “Baby Heart Monitor” app which conveyed a false “medical-grade” 
impression.915 These cases are likely caught by sections 18 and 29(1)(a) as to false representations 
concerning “standard, quality… grade” or (g) as to “performance characteristics, uses or benefits”. 
 
As to ‘default’ deception, FTC v VIZIO Inc,916 has just paid USD$2.2 million917 to settle charges that it 
installed smart TV software which covertly collected viewing data918  from 11 million TVs without 
                                                          
909 N.P. & Ors v Standard Innovation (US) Corp dba We-Vibe, Case No 1:16-cv-8655, United States District Court of Illinois 
(Filed 2 Sept 2016) <https://www.cnet.com/news/internet-connected-vibrator-we-vibe-lawsuit-privacy-data/> 
910 Inadvertent omissions are not sufficient. 
911 A “representation is an oral or written or implied statement from words or conduct, representing a matter of fact: Given v 
Pryor (1979) 39 FLR 437It is an open question as to whether mere breaches of contract – such as a failure to comply with 
security representations or other terms - constitute a “representation”:   
912 Attorney General of the State of New York, In the Matter of Runtastic GmbH, Assurance No.: 16-174, Assurance of 
Discontinuance under executive Law Section 63, Subdivision 15 (23 Jan 2017) < 
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/runtastic_aod_executed_0.pdf> 
913 Attorney General of the State of New York, In the Matter of Cardiio, Inc., Assurance No.: 16-173, Assurance of 
Discontinuance under Executive Law Section 63, Subdivision 15 (23 Jan 2017) < 
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/cardiio_aod_executed.pdf> 
914 Attorney General of the State of New York, In the Matter of Matis Ltd, Assurance No.: 16-101, Assurance of 
Discontinuance under executive Law Section 63, Subdivision 15 (13 Feb 2017) < 
https://ag.ny.gov/sites/default/files/matis_aod_executed.pdf> 
915 Ibid.  
916 Federal Trade Commission, et al v. VIZIO INC. and VIZIO Inscape Services, LLC, Case 2:17-cv-00758, Filed 6 Feb 2017 
<https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/162-3024/vizio-inc-vizio-inscape-services-llc> 
917 The payment comprises $1.5M to the FTC and $1M to the New Jersey Consumer Affairs (with $300,000 of that amount 
‘suspended’: FTC & Ors v. VIZIO & Ors, ‘Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment’ 
<https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/170206_vizio_stipulated_proposed_order.pdf> 
918 The FTC allege this included consume viewing date, time, channel, live/ recorded status. 
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consumer consent. This occurred via an on-by-default ‘Smart interactivity’ feature,919 which it represented 
provided program suggestions only, but which collected viewer data. VIZIO then attached consumer age, 
sex, income, education level, marital status, household size, home ownership and household value, 
connected to the consumer’s IP address, and sold the data.  While a prima facie privacy breach, section 
18920 also applies to deceit by omission, and depending upon appropriate facts, sections 29(1)(a) and 
(g). Even had privacy consents been obtained through terms (for example, through an opt out) it is still 
possible that an ACL breach might be found if the method or disclosure mode was misleading. An 
analogous claim against Bose alleges that all music and audio files921 on their app-controlled922  wireless 
devices923 and personal registration data,924 is shared “along with other personal identifiers to third-
parties—including a data miner—without its customers’ knowledge or consent”.925 The claim alleges 
music selection is “sensitive”: revelatory of politics, religious views, thoughts, sentiments and 
emotions”.926 Bose denies liability, but has changed to an ‘opt out’ of data collection, de-identified data 
collected and updated its privacy policy.927 
                                                          
919 This feature enabled program “offers and suggestions”. 
920 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) section 4(2) defines ‘engaging in conduct’ to mean ‘doing or refusing to do 
any act’ and sectiopn4(2)(c) states that ‘refusing to do an act’, must be intentional, that is, done other than inadvertently: 
ACCC v Homeopathy Plus! Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1512 
921 These included music, radio broadcasts and Podcasts, and lecture choices. The case argues these “provide an 
incredible amount of insight into his or her personality, behavior, political views, and personal identity. In fact, numerous 
scientific studies show that musical preferences reflect explicit characteristics such as age, personality, and values, and can 
likely even be used to identify people with autism spectrum conditions”:  DM Greenberg, S Baron-Cohen, DJ Stillwell, M 
Kosinski and PJ Rentfrow, ‘Musical Preferences are Linked to Cognitive Styles’ (2015) PLoS ONE 10(7): e0131151. 
<https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0131151> 
922 The Complaint states the Bose Connect app “allows customers to “pair” (connect) their Bose Wireless Products to their 
smartphones using a Bluetooth connection, and access essential product functionality. Specifically, through the Bose 
Connect app, customers can (i) download and install firmware updates to the Bose Wireless Products, (ii) manage the 
connections between the Bose Wireless Products and mobile devices, (iii) adjust the Bose Wireless Products’ noise 
cancellation settings, (iv) customize the Bose Wireless Products’ 
“Auto-Off” settings (for purposes of conserving the product’s battery life), and (v) share music between two Bose Wireless 
Products.” 
923 The case pleads the following: “QuietComfort 35, SoundSport Wireless, Sound Sport Pulse Wireless, QuietControl 30, 
SoundLink Around-Ear Wireless Headphones II, and SoundLink Color II”. 
924 Name, email address, phone number and device serial number. 
925 Kyle Zak et al v. Bose Corp. Case No. 17-cv-2928 (Filed 18 Apr 2017) Northern District of Illinois, Case: 1:17-cv-02928 
(Filed: 18 Apr 2017) <https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/3673948/Zak-v-Bose.pdf>. The causes of action include 
the US Wiretap Act which generally prohibits the intentional “interception” of “wire, oral or electronic communications.” 18 
U.S.C. § 2511(1)(a), and their intentional disclosure: 18 U.S.C. § 2511(1)(c) and Illinois Eavesdropping and Consumer 
Fraud and Deceptive Business practice statues, intrusion upon seclusion, and unjust enrichment. See also Peter S. Vogel, 
‘IoT Privacy Lawsuit- Bose sued for taking headphone data without consent!’, Gardere Blog (25 Apr 2017 accessed 26 Apr 
2017) 
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=19ce5f62-b7ac-4ba6-83b4-82658f1efddd> 
926 Complaint above 925: [24] 
927 Bose Australia, ‘A message to our Bose Connect App customers’ (20, 23 and 25 Apr 2016) 
<https://www.bose.com.au/en_au/landing_pages/bose_corporation_updates.html> 
[114] 
 
These cases may imply a trend involving firstly, CIOT device devices/ software or updates which record 
and transfer consumer data without disclosure, or by default928 or at best, allow settings-based consumer 
opt-out; and secondly, linked third party data handling practices, for which most manufacturers deny 
liability and direct consumers to read additional terms governing the device/ app use. As to the first 
scenario, collating data without disclosure is an ACL issue which is likely to infringe sections 18 and 29(g) 
performance characteristics, and possibly 29 (l) need, though creative approaches may muddy the 
waters, and whether certain forms of disclosure (once in off or online or in manual only forms, for example) 
will suffice. Collating data by default is also possibly misleading, if the default is not clearly disclosed to 
and consented to by consumers, especially where no prompt to check or change settings occurs.  
Settings with automatic opt-ins are more problematic; the NZ Commerce Commission obtained court-
enforceable undertakings to prevent Jetstar misleading consumers as to price “or the nature of kind of 
services” provided in online or in-app airfare purchasing. 929 While there is no precedent as to data 
collection or contexts beyond an online sale, in principle, it is likely that regulators will expand the ambit, 
as the consumer harm of ongoing data collection is significant and long-lasting - albeit less price-related. 
Best practice suggests mandating a separate, informed opt in approach930 for each type of data collected 
and each intended use, to facilitate consumer consent.931 Given the scope of the problem, it would seem 
sensible for the ACCC to recommend it by guideline, with the Privacy Commissioner.  The second ‘trend’ 
is third party sharing, which is not necessarily an ACL deficiency, but requires consistency. If data 
collectors share data, they are best placed to ensure that their business partner/ recipient maintains at 
least equivalent standards with respect to data use and privacy. This chain of responsibility approach 
influences APP 8 (Ch 5).  Examples of such practices evidence emerging large-scale consumer 
                                                          
928 Updates may be especially pernicious if they reset consumer preferences requiring another opt out or settings change. 
929 Jetstar Airways Pty Limited, ‘Undertakings to the Commerce Commission under s46A of the Fair Trading Act 1986 (NZ)’ 
(16 Mar 2016 accessed 5 Dec 2016) <http://www.comcom.govt.nz/fair-trading/enforcement-response-register/detail/928>  
The Commission alleged that the practice was misleading based upon equivalent provisions to ss 18, 29(i) as to price, and 
specific misrepresentations (equivalent to s 33) for conduct liable to mislead as to “kind” of services, and their “nature, 
characteristics, suitability for a purpose or quantity…”[ss 13 (b) and (g) NZ Fair Trading Act 1986].   Examples were 
prevalent across all budget airlines in Australia and included pre-checked boxes selecting travel insurance, seat selection, 
luggage fees and charity donations: Tilly South and Brent Savage, ‘Ticked off with sneaky costs’ CHOICE (2 Dec 2016 
accessed 5 Dec 2016) <https://www.choice.com.au/travel/on-holidays/airlines/articles/preselected-extras-increase-airfare-
costs> 
930 See the GDPR Arts 7 and 9. The ACCC has recently conducted cases against airline “drip-pricing”, a practice where 
upfront prices are added to as consumers purchase their seat, luggage, insurance etc – meaning that the initial price is 
artificially low: ACCC v Jetstar Airways Pty Ltd [2015] FCA 1263   Jetstar was fined $545,000 for two offences and Virgin 
Australia $200,000 – the former are protesting the differential which relates to them employing the practice via multiple fora 
(website and mobile) and Virgin mobile only, plus Virgin received a discount for cooperating at the penalty (not liability) 
stage:; Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Jetstar Airways Pty Limited (No 2) [2017] FCA 205 and 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Virgin Australia Airlines Pty Ltd (No 2) [2017] FCA 204.  A more 
pernicious practice is the habit of pre-checked boxes purchasing insurance (requiring consumer opt-out):  
931 Where data collected is sensitive personal information, express consent is required unless it may be implied: see Ch 5. 
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detriment: the exploitation of information asymmetry and deceptive practices, to automate consumer data 
collection without consent or disclosure.   
 
(c) Product performance deceits (smart car) 
 
The infamous VW emissions-cheating defeat-device ‘conspiracy’ illustrates how 11 million consumers 
suffered detriment from ‘latent’ software which rendered marketing representations false and misleading. 
The $16 billion US settlement;932 precedes ongoing criminal trials,933 international (including shareholder) 
suits,934 and multiplying regulator fines internationally.935  VW argue that there is no “defeat device” in 
Australia,936 and in Europe, have used limitations statutes to reject consumer claims, while regulators 
search their offices.937 International actions proliferate,938 and the ACCC have served proceedings 
                                                          
932 The settlement terms include a buy back, lease termination or retrofit fix (at consumer option) and all consumers will 
receive compensation of between US$5100- 10,000 each. It affects some 482,000 diesel vehicles sold between 2009-2015. 
The total payout includes up to $18 billion to cover legal claims but excludes any civil or criminal penalties levied by Justice 
Dept. It stipulates that 85% of affected 2 litre vehicles must be off road or rectified by June 2019. There is also a $2.7 
environmental remediation fund and another $2 billion for zero emissions vehicle technology. VW has set aside over $18B 
to cover the settlement: In re Volkswagen “Clean Diesel” Marketing, Sales Practices, and Products Liability Litigation, Case 
No. 3:15-md-2672 (N.D. Cal.). See also William Boston, ‘Emissions Cases Against VW Heating Up Around the Globe’ 
Morningstar Dow Jones (23 Aug 2016 accessed 10 Sept 2016) 
<http://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/motoring/volkswagen-back-in-federal-court-over-diesel-emissions-
scandal/news-story/d6b4f88cb2502c896e715cc7a6daf0b9>;  
933 In Michigan, Volkswagen AG formally pled guilty to three felony criminal charges, conspiracy to commit fraud, entry of 
goods by false statement and obstruction of justice. In a settlement with the Dept of Justice (DOJ), it has agreed to pay $4.3 
billion ($2.8B criminal fine and 1.5 B civil fine) in penalties: U.S. v. Volkswagen, 16-CR-20394, Volkswagen Diesel Engine 
Vehicle Matters, Case No. 2:16-cr-20394-SFC-APP (E.D. Mich.) <https://www.justice.gov/usao-edmi/us-v-volkswagen-16-cr-
20394>  The DOJ has also indicted six VW executives and employees, alleging they knew of the fraud and conspired to 
mislead federal regulators and consumers as to diesel emissions between 2006- 2016. In September 2016, former engineer 
James Liang pleaded guilty to charges he conspired to defraud the government and violate the US Clean Air Act, and VW’s 
former lead regulatory compliance officer Oliver Schmidt pleaded likewise in January 2017. Both are cooperating with 
authorities. The US cannot extradite German executives directly: Beth Dalbey, ‘Volkswagen Agrees to $4.3B Settlement in 
Emissions Cheating Scandal: Feds’ (11 Jan 2017 accessed 20 Jan 2017) <http://patch.com/michigan/detroit/vw-group-
close-4-3b-settlement-feds-reports> 
934 Volkswagen AG is defendant to (approx.) 1,400 investor/ shareholder lawsuits claiming about €8.2 billion (AUD$12.01 
billion) in damages, alleging investors were defrauded by the diesel emissions standards cheating scheme. VW shares have 
fallen 11% in 2016: Karin Matussek, ‘VW Sued for Record $9.2 Billion in German Investor Lawsuits’ Bloomberg Markets (22 
Sept 2016 accessed 23 Sept 2016) http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-21/vw-investors-sue-for-8-2-billion-
euros-in-germany-over-diesel> In Sept 2016, VW also settled US$1.2 billion with 650 franchisee dealers who claimed 
businesses losses arising from the scandal. 
935 In December 2016, the South Korean fair trade agency fined VW’s Korean company US$32 million for false emissions 
advertising and will file five criminal complaints against current or former company executives. 
936 Foster, J is hearing the open class action in the NSW Federal Court: Richard Cantor v Audi Australia Pty Ltd & 
NSD1308/2015 – Josephina Tolentino v Volkswagen Group Australia Pty Ltd; NSD1459/ 2015 – Alister Dalton & Anor v 
Volkswagen AG & Anor [matter relates to NSD1307 & 1308/15 above] 
937 Boston, above n 932. 
938 There are currently class action suits and regulatory investigations in “Australia, Brazil, Canada, Germany, Ireland, Italy, 
the Netherlands and Spain”:  Boston, above n 932.  
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against VW939  and Audi.940 That case pleads breaches of sections 18 and 29(1)(a) and (g), and seeks 
declarations,941 pecuniary penalties,942 corrective advertising943 and sealed findings under section 
137F.944 There are also Australian class actions underway,945 pleading breach of consumer guarantees 
and diminished vehicle value. While denying liability, VW offers a “simple software solution” as a “best 
outcome”, but admits: “we … need to regain trust…”946 It is probable that the ACL actions will succeed 
based upon international evidence and findings, which should set a smart car software precedent, as well 
as found evidence upon which consumer actions may also succeed. Consumers do not understand 
vehicle software capabilities -  as comically illustrated by a driver jailed after car called 911, revealing that 
she had illegally left an accident scene.947 However the real legal risk lies not in overt functionality which 
is explainable, but rather in the VW-like case, or software updates which may quietly alter settings, 
change preferences and otherwise deceive and disempower consumers. 
 
4.2.2 Penalties & expanding section 29 
 
Having regard to possible legal uncertainties as to its application, and detriments identified,  section 29 
could be expanded to explicitly prohibit false representations as to ‘goods’ safety, privacy, security or 
related data collection and use practices.948  For example, there seems little consistency in a website 
featuring a celebrity testimonial which contains false privacy or data collection representations being 
                                                          
939 ACCC, ‘ACCC update on VW enforcement investigation’ (1 Oct 2015 accessed 10 Oct 2016) 
<https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-update-on-vw-enforcement-investigation> The ACCC says defeat devices are 
specifically prohibited under the Australian Design Rules, which are mandatory safety standards, enforceable under the 
ACL. 
940 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Audi Aktiengesellschaft & Ors NSD 322/2017 filed 8 March 2017. 
The case alleges that VW manufactured the vehicles using defeat software which “designed to reduce NOx emissions 
produced by the Vehicles during testing to below the limits specified in the Standards.” [para 7] The case is pleaded under 
ACL sections 18(1), 29(1)(a) and (g) and s 33 (suitability for purpose) and s 106 (failure to comply with an Australian Safety 
Standard – then ADR 79). 
941 Section 21 Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth). 
942 ACL section 224. 
943 ACL section 246. 
944 CCA section 137H allows sealed reasons for judgement to be retained on the court file for possible use in later 
proceedings under section 83 as prima facie evidence of those facts, by any person seeking damages or compensation 
orders. 
945 Maurice Blackburn and Bannister law have a class action suit under way in NSW: 
https://www.mauriceblackburn.com.au/current-class-actions/volkswagen-class-action/> There are seven potential actions in 
the UK and 30 launched in the US, according to Bannister Law. 
946 Joshua Dowling, (5 Jul 2016 accessed 2 Sept 2016) < 
http://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/motoring/volkswagen-back-in-federal-court-over-diesel-emissions-
scandal/news-story/d6b4f88cb2502c896e715cc7a6daf0b9> 
947 Shirleen Allicott, ‘Car auto-dials 911 to report accident after driver allegedly commits hit-and-run’ ABC News (4 Dec 2015 
accessed 25 Apr 2016) <http://abc7chicago.com/technology/car-auto-dails-911-to-report-accident-after-driver-allegedly-
commits-hit-and-run/1109554/> 
948 Baker, above n 776; Allens suggest section 18 is too unclear to attract criminal penalties relying upon it as a norm of 
conduct.  The latter recommends expanding section 29 to catch specific misconduct. 
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unequivocally actionable under section 29(e), when those same representations minus the celebrity, may 
fail the requirements within s29 (a) as to ‘quality, value, grade [etc.]…’  or section 29(g) if not “benefits’. 
Obviously, the facts are critical, and existing inclusions often overlap, but false representations in these 
areas are often egregious, affect many consumers, and given low data protection enforcement generally, 
a specific ACL provision is justified to incentivize better corporate conduct and to redress consumer harm.  
Finally, while s. 18 is the most used of all ACL provisions, the inconsistent penalties regime presents an 
illogical regulatory gap. Section 18 penalties are limited to civil sanctions949 whereas section 29 attracts 
criminal penalties:950 these should be harmonised to improve consumer redress under section 18 and 
overcome gaps between sections 18 and 29 in this regard.951  
 
4.3 Part 2-2   Unconscionable conduct & unfair trading   
 
Unconscionable conduct is prohibited under ACL section 21 in relation to goods or services, or where 
inapplicable, by statutory incorporation of equitable unconscionability. This latter form applies requires a 
‘special disability’, which unless implied by device use (for example, a smart home device directed 
towards persons with an intellectual disability), data collected or a consumer is identifiably under a 
disability,  is difficult to establish in a CIOT (often online) context. 952  In contrast, providing its threshold 
criteria is met, section 21 might apply to a CIOT scenario.953  Section 22 sets out a range of non-exclusive 
criteria:954 the most relevant include the parties’ relative bargaining strength;955 whether the CIOT device 
                                                          
949 These include injunctions, damages, compensatory orders, non-party consumer orders and non-punitive orders. 
950 These are $1.1milllion for a body corporate and $22,000 for an individual, plus a range of civil remedies: ACL section 
151. 
951 While historically, this proposal appears to ignore the history and purpose of section 18 (formerly s. 52) there is divided 
legal opinion as to whether those original factors remain compelling when considering ACL reform. ACL Review 
submissions which adopted this point include those of Minter Ellison, the Consumer Action Law Centre, above n 840 c/f 
Baker & McKenzie; Allens, Minters and Allens suggest that section 18 would need clarification as to the type of conduct 
which would rise to the level of seriousness/ culpability to attract criminal penalties, but this departs by definition from its 
principles-based nature. 
952 ACL section 20 prohibits unconscionable conduct “within the meaning of the unwritten law from time to time” and applies 
if section 21 does not. It applies to conduct which does not involve the supply or acquisition of goods or services. Note that 
equitable unconscionability is interpreted by the courts to mean where an innocent party acts under a ‘special disadvantage’, 
the other party has actual or constructive knowledge of that disadvantage and unfairly or unconscientiously exploits that 
disadvantage. In these circumstances, the courts have traditionally placed the onus upon the stronger party to show that the 
transaction was fair, just and reasonable. ‘Special disadvantage’ means a serious disadvantage beyond just an inferior 
bargaining position or commercial vulnerability and extends beyond mere inequality of bargaining power (such as that which 
exists between a consumer and an entity such as Google). See Blomley v Ryan (1956) 99 CLR 362; Commercial Bank of 
Australia v Amadio (1983) 151 CLR 447. 
953 Section 20(2) provides that equitable unconscionability does not apply to situations under which section 21 applies (i.e. 
unconscionable conduct in connection with the supply or acquisition of goods and services). 
954 The ACL provides that the court may consider the contract terms, the manner in which and the extent to which it was 
carried out and is “not limited” to considering the contract formation circumstances.  
955 ACL s 22(1) (a). Note that the High Court has stated that inequality of bargaining power alone cannot constitute equitable 
unconscionability – which may be persuasive as to s. 21 statutory unconscionability: ACCC v Berbatis (2003) 214 CLR 51. 
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or app supplier required the consumer to comply with conditions not reasonably necessary to protect its 
legitimate interests;956 whether the consumer was able to understand terms and policies;957 any undue 
influence or pressure or unfair tactics exerted,958 the extent to which the CIOT entity fails to disclose any 
intended conduct which might affect the consumer’s interests or any foreseeable risks not apparent to 
the consumer;959 and the extent to which the CIOT entity acted in good faith.960 In addition, section 22(1)(j) 
includes the extent to which the CIOT entity was prepared to negotiate the contract, the contract terms 
and conditions, including any unilateral right of variation961 the party’s conduct in complying with its terms 
and any post-contractual conduct of either party; all of which may be relevant in a CIOT context. 
 
There is no authority in Australia applying unconscionability to a CIOT sales or contracting context.962 
There are telemarketing cases involving systemically unfair sales pressure and terms,963 and concerns 
as to children’s rights online,964 but no online contracting scenario yet. However, the recent confirmation 
that businesses may be treated unconscionably in ACCC v Coles965 suggests that it remains an “open-
ended concept”,966 such that the categories of potential victims are open and even, that procedural 
unconscionability – for example, a corporation that exploits consumer behavioural economics factors (Ch 
6) - is a possibility. An argument might be constructed under section 21 whereby multiple contractual 
factors might establish unconscionability: for example, where contractual terms are (procedurally)967 
difficult to locate or access, are lengthy and complex requiring a high reading age, exhibit ‘unfair tactics’ 
in exploiting consumer technical ignorance, or fail to explain CIOT device or app risks not foreseeable to 
                                                          
See also the recent ACCC v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Limited [2014] FCA 1405 in which s. 21 was held to apply to 
Coles in its business dealings and contracts with its commercial (manufacturer) suppliers, resulting in $10 million in 
penalties. 
956 ACL s 22(1) (b). 
957 ACL s 22(1) (c). 
958 ACL s 22(1) (d). 
959 ACL s 22(1) (i). 
960 ACL s 22(1) (l). 
961 ACL s 22(1) (k). 
962 There is authority pertaining to online advertising: ACCC v Zanok Technologies Pty Ltd [2009] FCA 1124; Caspi v 
Microsoft Network LLC 323 N.J. Super 118 (NJ Super Add Div 1999). Note also that factually, the recent Australian 
Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Limited [2015] FCA 330 case involved some 
elements of ongoing online contracting as between small supplier companies and Australia’s second largest supermarket 
chain.  
963 ACCC v Excite Mobile Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 1405 c/f ACCC v EDirect Pty Ltd (in Liq) [2012] FCA 976 
964 ACMA, above n 827; FTC, ‘Mobile apps for kids: Disclosures still not making the grade’ Text of the Commission Staff 
Report (2012) https://www.ftc.gov/reports/mobile-apps-kids-disclosures-still-not-making-grade 
965  Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1405 (22 
December 2014), Federal Court of Australia, 22 December 2014 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2014/1405.html> 
966 ACCC v Seal-a-Fridge Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 525 
967 ACCAN suggests following D. Clapperton and S. Corones, ‘Unfair Terms In ‘Clickwrap’ And Other Electronic Contracts’ 
(2007) 35 Australian Business Law Review 154, that section 21 requires some procedural element in addition to substantive 
(terms-based for example) evidence of unconscionability. The courts do not seem to have taken that line since the 2007 
article was authored. 
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an average consumer968 or where the consumer is exploited as a result of a personal vulnerability of 
which the other party is (through device or otherwise) somehow aware.969 An interesting scenario might 
arise where smart self device manufacturer should be aware that a user has a specific vulnerability 
through (post contractual) device use or by data collected of fused, or related data analytics. Another 
example might be smart home devices tailored for elderly or intellectually-disabled people seeking 
independent living, but who may lack capacity pre, or post contractually. Further, it is not inconceivable 
that sign-up processes entailing long and legalistic online terms and conditions, requiring ill-explained 
consents to excessive or unnecessary data collection970  might also be actionable either alone or in 
concert with unconscionable marketing, contractual terms or conduct, in the right conjunction of 
circumstances.971 But such optimistic thoughts should not ignore that establishing unconscionability is 
difficult, especially via online transactions. Consumer groups claim that it is too legalistic for most 
consumers, and its high threshold has created “regulator uncertainty”.972 Where it requires ‘moral 
obloquy’973 or conduct “against conscience” by reference to social norms,974 even the Full Federal Court 
has complained of the lack of “fixed” elements or rules in the “… agonised search for definition, for distilled 
epitomes or for short hands of broad social norms and general principles, will lead to disappointment… 
and to the likelihood of error”.975  Reflecting this legal uncertainty, the courts have made slim decisions 
confined to the facts, which leaves consumers “exposed to unfair, predatory business practices”: 
                                                          
968 ACCC v Keshow [2005] FCA 558 is analogous as to sales of educational materials to indigenous Australians who it 
seems, did not understand what was being sold to them or how direct debit authorisations would work. 
969 Note that many apps allow children to provide consent. This does not mean that age could not be used to justify an 
action in unconscionability, as it is arguable that a 13-year-old may be unable to understand certain terms and conditions 
which require a higher reading age - and if signed up with an accurate birth date, the supplier is in a position to know their 
age. Note there is also technology to verify age consent now which few sites seem to use. 
970 Note however, pre-ACL authority held that  unconscionability requires some circumstances beyond mere contractual 
terms that would render reliance upon them unreasonable, unfair, wrong or immoral: Hurley v McDonald’s Australia Ltd  
(2000) ATPR 41-741 [31] as discussed in Dan Jerker Svantesson, 'Unconscionability: Consumer Ecommerce’ Commercial 
Law Quarterly: The Journal of the Commercial Law Association of Australia 25:1 (Mar/May 2011 accessed 23 May 2014) 
[11] <http://search.informit.com.au.ezproxy.bond.edu.au/documentSummary;dn=043279687656685;res=IELHSS> ISSN: 
0819-4262> It is possible that this case would be distinguished given the franchise context –  the earlier case of George T 
Collings (Aust) Pty Ltd v H F Stevenson (Aust) Pty Ltd (1991) ATPR 41-104 [52,622 – 3] found that an onerous standard 
form contract term was unconscionable, and so void. 
971 In Video-Ezy International Pty Ltd v Sedema Pty Ltd [2014] NSWSC 143, Harrison AJ found an “accumulation of 
incidents” relating to un reasonable, unfair and bullying franchise behaviour. 
972 CALC, above n 840 (Submission: 10). 
973 Attorney General (NSW) v World Best Holdings Ltd [2005] 63 NSWLR 557 (per Spiegelman, J); Director of Consumer 
Affairs (Vic) v Scully (No 3) [20-13] VSCA 292; DPN Solutions Pty Ltd v Tridant Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 511. For equivocal 
support of moral obloquy, see the High Court’s decision in Kakavas v Crown Melbourne Limited [2013) 250 CLR 392. 
974 Ibid.   
975 Paciocco v Australian and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [20-15] GCAFC 50 at para [304].  
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[Section 20-22 is] dependent on the … facts and circumstances of individual cases. Findings 
that they have been breached … rarely set a general rule or precedent… at best [it is] an 
imperfect tool for a regulator seeking to address systemic or widespread issues.”976 
 
Aside from the evidential pressures, CIOT model complexity - with its multiple supply chain – may insulate 
key actors from liability: for example, where data is shared without contractual privacy requirements or 
re-identified through fusion, brokers may elude responsibility for uses for which the collector may be 
liable. Again, this impacts the law’s effectiveness in disrupting systemic issues.977  A  general prohibition 
against unfair business practices is recommended, which may better address CIOT behaviours, 
especially with respect to vulnerable persons and children,978 and as to certain ‘unfair’ data gathering and 
use practices. While this may entail some duplication, and statutory unconscionability cases may expand 
its impact, there seems little reason from a consumer policy perspective not to adopt this course, 
especially as it will address specific deficiencies via a principles-based approach. Fairness is, in principle, 
an unarguable concept consistent with the Framework, and one otherwise, not wholly addressed. 
Notably, the ACL Review did not recommend this course but proposes to investigate it further.979 
ACL remedies for unconscionability are flexible and extensive.980 It is probable that were any such action 
to be pleaded, it would appear in conjunction with a claim under the unfair terms regime considered 
next.981 
 
 
 
                                                          
976 ASIC, ‘Senate enquiry into the performance of the Australian Securities and Investment Commission – Submission by 
ASIC on reforms to the credit industry and ‘low’doc’ loans’, (Oct 2013 accessed 20 Jan 2016) < 
http://download.asic.gov.au/media/1311541/ASIC-Submission-on-credit-reform--to-Senate-inquiry.pdf> 
977 See for example, Perpetual Trustee Company v Burniston (No 2) [2012] WASC 383. An example is the finance broking 
industry where lenders were (originally) not held liable for the acts of brokers- prior to the National Consumer Credit 
Protection Act 2009 (Cth). 
978 See case examples such as the Apple and Amazon in-app purchases without parental consent:  FTC, ‘Apple Inc.: 
Analysis of Proposed Consent Order to Aid Public Comment; Proposed Consent Agreement’ Federal Register, 79: 15 (23 
Jan 2014) < https://www.ftc.gov/policy/federal-register-notices/apple-inc-analysis-proposed-consent-order-aid-public-
comment> See also ‘Dissenting Statement of Commissioner Joshua D. Wright’,  ‘Concurring Statement of Commissioner 
Maureen K. Ohlhausen’ and  ‘Statement of Chairwoman Edith Ramirez and Commissioner Julie Brill’ ; and Federal Trade 
Commission v Amazon.com Inc., Case No C14-1038-JCC, United States District Court, Seattle, ‘Order granting Amazon’s 
Motion for Partial Summary Judgement and granting the FTC’s motion for Summary Judgment (redacted)’ filed 22 Jul 2016 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160427amazonorder.pdf per Coughenour, J. 
979 ACL Review, above n 832: 6 [2.3]. 
980 Depending upon who institutes the action (a ‘customer’ or the ACCC), remedies include undertakings (s. 218); 
substantiation notices (s. 219); public warning notices (s. 223); pecuniary penalties (s. 224); injunctions (s. 232); damages 
(s. 236 subject to CCA s. 137B); compensation or other orders (s. 237); non-punitive orders (s. 246); adverse publicity 
orders (s. 247); disqualification orders (s. 248) and infringement notices (s. 134A CCA). 
981 In Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2015] FCAFC 50 [363] – [364], Allsop CJ emphasized 
the evaluative nature of the unfairness assessment, and observed that “unjustness and unfairness are of a lower moral or 
ethical standard than unconscionability”. 
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4.4 Part 2-3 Unfair contract terms  
 
…many potentially unfair contract terms are still appearing in standard contracts…- ACCC982 
 
ACL unfair contract term provisions render void any unfair term in most983 ‘standard form’984 ‘consumer 
contracts’985 made, renewed or varied after 1 July 2010,986 and “small business contracts” 987 and terms988 
accepted from 12 November 2016 or renewed thereafter.989  A term is unfair if it:  
  
➢ would cause a significant imbalance990 in the parties’ rights and obligations under the contract;991   
                                                          
982 Quoted in ACCC, ‘Unfair contract terms under scrutiny’ Media Release (28 Mar 2017 accessed 28 Mar 2017) 
<http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/unfair-contract-terms-under-scrutiny> 
983 Insurance contracts for health, home and cars are excluded: See the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) which regulates 
car insurance (inter alia). Other exclusions include shipping contracts, company or other body constitutional documents, and 
those in sectors declared by the Minister (none to date). Note that financial services contracts are regulated by equivalent 
terms in the Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (Cth). 
984  ACL s. 27 imposes a presumption that the contract is standard form, unless the other party proves otherwise – by 
reference to ss (2) which lists  factors the court may take into account in so deciding: (a) whether one party has most of the 
bargaining power; (b) whether the contract was pre-prepared by one party; (c) whether one party was required to “accept or 
reject” those terms; (d) whether there was effective opportunity to negotiate the terms; whether the terms take into account 
the specific characteristics of another party; and (f) any other matter prescribed in the regulations. Clearly this would apply to 
most consumer CIOT contracting, much if not all of which, occurs online. 
985 ‘Consumer contract’ means a contract for the supply of goods or services to an individual who subjectively acquires them 
for personal, domestic or household use or consumption. It has always included an unincorporated sole trader, who for 
example, who might purchase goods or services for an acquisition which is predominantly for personal, domestic or 
household use or consumption, even if partly for business purposes: Australian Government Solicitor, ‘Australian Consumer 
Law’ Fact Sheet No. 12 (March 2011 accessed 28 June 2014) <http://www.ags.gov.au/publications/fact-
sheets/Fact_sheet_No_12.pdf> 
986 These provisions came in force 6 months earlier than other ACL provisions. As to the Commonwealth, contracts entered 
into or varied after 1 Jul 2010 are covered, and those varied or renewed apply only to the extent of the renewal or variation: 
Trade Practices Amendment (Australian Consumer Law) Act (No 2) Schedule 7, section 8(2). 
987 Treasury Legislation Amendment (Small Business and Unfair Contract Terms) Act 2015 (Cth) No 147, 2015. This 
provision is an extension of the UK system. Section 23(4) defines a small business contract as one where: (a)  the contract 
is for a supply of goods or services, or a sale or grant of an interest in land; and (b)  at the time the contract is entered into, 
at least one party us a “small business” meaning it employs less than twenty people (excluding casuals not employed on a 
regular or systemic basis)  - provided the upfront price payable for the contract is $300,000 or less, or where the contract 
exceeds 12 months, one million dollars.  
988 Terms that define ‘the main subject matter of the contract’, or set ‘the upfront price payable’ or are ‘required, or expressly 
permitted, by a law of the Commonwealth, a State or a Territory’ are excluded by ACL s 26(1). “Upfront price” means 
consideration disclosed at or before the contract is entered into and is provided, or to be provided, for the supply, sale or 
grant under the contract. It excludes ‘any other consideration that is contingent on the occurrence or non-occurrence of a 
particular event’: ACL section 26(2). UK authority suggests that to preserve the purpose of the legislation, similar exclusions 
should be interpreted narrowly: Director General of Fair Trading v First National Bank PLC [2001] UKHL 52; [2002] 1 AC 
481; Office of Fair Trading v Abbey National Plc [2010]1 All ER 667 (per Lord Walker J). Note such terms are excluded in 
the UK only to the extent they are clearly expressed; the ACL contains no such restriction. 
989 It seeks to protect “time-poor small businesses entering into contracts for day-to-day transactions”  whilst retaining small 
business self-responsibility for higher-value contracts: Commonwealth Parliament, House of Representatives, Treasury 
Legislation Amendment (Small business and unfair contract terms) Bill 2015, Explanatory memorandum [2.7] 
<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/ems/r5497_ems_b35077f3-dbb6-4c5a-81b0-
7b885634fd81/upload_pdf/503040.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf>; Treasury Legislation Amendment (Small Business and 
Unfair Contract Terms) Act 2015 (Cth) No 147, 2015. 
990 Finding a ‘significant’ imbalance is a question of fact. It has been held to mean one quantitatively substantial in Victoria    
991 Note the UK excludes this in favour of a ‘good faith’ test: regulation 5(1). The European Council Directive 93/13/EEC on 
Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts (5 April 1993) is found in the UK Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations 
1999.  
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➢ is (by rebuttable presumption)992 not reasonably necessary to protect the ‘legitimate interests’ of 
the advantaged party; and  
➢ would cause financial or other detriment to the other party were it relied upon.  
The court must consider the extent of term ‘transparency’993 (is it expressed in reasonably plain language, 
legible and presented clearly, and readily available to any party affected by the term?) and the whole 
contract,994 plus such other factors as it thinks relevant. Terms found to be ‘unfair’ are void and severable, 
995 and the contract continues in binding force if capable of operating without the unfair term.996  
 
CIOT device, website and app software terms and related (usually incorporated) privacy terms are 
commonly provider-biased, non-negotiable,997 standard form consumer contracts within the meaning of 
the ACL, and are commonly lengthy, viewed (if at all) via multiple locations online and sometimes off, and 
often after a consumer has purchased a device or during a related smartphone app purchase or 
download. It is a complicated context, featuring international providers for whom Australia is a minor 
market, a hybrid legal/ technical environment generating complicated device, software and privacy terms 
for consumer comprehension, and yet relatively low value products with (in some cases) relatively high 
risk potentials. CIOT contracting has both substantive and procedural unfairness, much as yet judicially 
unidentified in Australia.  
 
4.4.1 Identifying ‘unfair’ terms 
In 2013, the ACCC selectively reviewed contracts across six industries and found potentially unfair terms 
in eight key areas:  unilateral variation, unfair liability limitation, restrictions upon consumer termination 
rights, suspension/ cessation of services, consumers liability for things beyond their control, prohibitions 
upon consumer reliance upon supplier/ agent’s representations, and purported limitation to consumer 
guarantee rights.998 That review also found “the use of customer’s personal details for a broad range of 
                                                          
992 ACL s. 24(4) imposes a presumption against the party advantaged by the term. 
993 ACL s.24(3) ‘Transparency’ means a term expressed in reasonably plain language, legible and presented clearly, and 
readily available to any party affected by the term. 
994 ACL s. 24(2). Section 23 does not apply to any term which defines the ‘subject matter’ of the contract (that is, under s. 
26(2), consideration payable disclosed when the contract is entered into, but excludes any consideration contingent upon 
the happening or non-happening of any particular event) or sets the upfront price payable under it; or is a term expressly 
required by law. 
995 ACL s. 23(2). 
996 ACL s. 23(2). 
997 Most CIOT notice terms are issued on a take-it-or-leave-it basis which reflects administrative convenience as well as 
(inequality of) bargaining power. The consumer who wants a smart self device cannot usually call Fitbit to amend data 
collection terms. They can however, select another device – many of which may be substitutable market-wise – though most 
if not all, offer the same standard form approach. 
998 ACCC, ‘Unfair contract terms review’ (2013 accessed 2 Feb 2016) 
<https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/Unfair%20Contract%20Terms%20-%20Industry%20Report.pdf> 
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reasons not strictly linked to the supply of services”;999 suggestive that the ACCC regards terms offending 
data minimisation principles as potentially unfair. The review also found that contractual complexity and 
length “hampered transparency and accessibility”.1000 In 2016, the ACCC reviewed 46 business-to-
business contracts used by major firms1001 across seven industries, with similar findings. The most 
commonly-occurring ‘problem’ terms exceed reasonable protection of a provider’s legitimate interests: 
unilateral variation of important or detriment-causing terms; excessively broad indemnities and liability 
limitation; and finally, unreasonable unilateral termination rights.1002 The findings reflect those of other 
regulators.1003   
 
4.4.2 Schedule 1: a selective study1004 
Schedule 1 as to smart self and home devices supports ACCC findings. It uses the fourteen ACL 
‘examples’,1005 and ACCC analysis,1006 to review six devices and finds potentially unfair terms in all 
contracts considered.1007 Two important preliminary points: firstly, the schedule has limitations. 1008 It does 
                                                          
999 Ibid: 16. 
1000 Ibid. 
1001 These included Australia Post, Bakers Delight, Coca-Cola Amatil, Facebook, Fairfax, Google, News Limited, Optus, 
Scentre Group (owner of Westfield shopping centres), Uber, Vicinity Centres, and Vodafone. 
1002ACCC, ‘Unfair Terms In Small Business Contracts’ (10 Nov 2016 accessed 10 Nov 2016): 2 
http://accc.gov.au/system/files/B2B%20UCT%20-%20Final%20-
%20Unfair%20terms%20in%20small%20business%20contracts%20%20A%20review%20of%20selected%20industries_0.P
DF> Industry sectors were selected based upon complaints. 46 contracts were reviewed. Businesses participated 
consensually.  
1003 For example, the UK CMA recently audited the consumer cloud storage industry, finding unfair terms in a wide range of 
contexts, plus pre-contractual information deficits [1.17]. It also found consumer trust and confidence issues: Competition 
and Markets Authority, ‘Consumer law compliance review: cloud storage’ Findings Report (27 May 2016 accessed 2 Jun 
2016) <https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/526447/cloud-storage-findings-
report.pdf> These included unilateral variation, termination/ suspension, automatic renewal, limitation of liability, jurisdiction 
and choice of law, as well as transparency of contract terms. As to other sectors, CHOICE has collected case studies from 
the travel and insurance sectors which it says highlight consumer detriment across the airline, or and campervan hire and 
travel agent industries. 
1004 Important Schedule 1 Note: All comments on and placement of the terms is illustrative only and does not mean 
or imply ACL contravention. Some devices do not have Australian versions or are not yet in the Australian market; 
in either case, UK terms were used if available, but obviously, these will not address specific ACL requirements. 
The Schedule is thus for academic and illustrative purposes only. 
1005 Section 25 ACL. 
1006 See for example, the table in Ozsale Pty Limited, Undertaking to the ACCC (27 June 2016 accessed 2 Sept 2016) 
<http://registers.accc.gov.au/content/item.phtml?itemId=1197453&nodeId=3cfd5bc647e386a7aaa760ff17f06e99&fn=Undert
aking%20-%20s87B%20-%20Ozsale%20Pty%20Limited%20-%20signed%2027%20July%202016.pdf> 
1007 Those selected were based upon market positioning which is suggestive of sales volume and consumer use, subject to 
the important rider that where devices are not in the Australian market yet or no ‘Australian’ terms exist, UK versions are 
reviewed if available These are subject to the EU Unfair Contract Terms Directive and related, derivative UK legislation. 
Several manufacturers did not have those terms accessible online or seemed to exclusively use US versions. These are 
identified in the schedule. Given the unreliability of this, it is suggested that the findings be viewed as illustrative only and not 
as evidence of breach on the part of any one CIOT supplier. 
1008 See above n 1004. Note also that section 25 examples are just that; as such the analysis ignores other terms which 
may potentially be unfair but not fit the categories used. For example, one required consumers to “acknowledge they provide 
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not imply or evidence illegality, as some of the terms used may not be Australian-market specific, so 
placement in the table and ‘comments’ are mere illustrations only. As smart car terms are not readily 
available, the Canadian FIPA’s privacy analysis is adapted, but is not sufficiently detailed to tabulate.1009 
Secondly, CIOT device terms may be long, inter-linked and involve multiple document sets.1010 While 
Part 2-3 does not respond to general unfairness, nor render entire contracts void,1011 it seems intuitive 
that such volume and complexity of form is inherently unfair.1012 While other ACL provisions may respond 
in specific contexts, there is no clear legal disincentive to this prevalent online practice.  
Given proposals to create a general ‘unfairness’ approach were rejected by CAANZ as unnecessary, it 
seems apposite to call upon the ACCC to test sections 21 and 24 in this context in the courts.  
Schedule 1 identifies terms which: 
  
➢ confer unilateral variation rights upon providers, without obligation to provide consumers 
advance notice or use of low-level website notice which consumers may never see; 
➢ confer unilateral variation, assignment,1013 termination or suspension rights upon providers, who 
unilaterally determine (often undefined) consumer breach;1014 
➢ fail to compensate consumers if the provider unilaterally varies or terminates the contract, 
thereby denying or suspending its operation, or if the consumer does not accept new terms 
imposed; 
➢ disclaim device accuracy and fitness for purpose in a manner which may infringe non-excludable 
consumer guarantees;1015 
                                                          
personal information at their own risk”, which again, may be unfair especially where providers control security and are best 
placed to manage data breach detriment. It may also breach privacy legislation or at least, misrepresent its application. 
1009 ‘The Connected Car: Who’s in the driver’s seat? A Privacy Analysis’, Annexure to Lawson, above n 36.   
1010 CHOICE recently claimed one of the Alexa suite of consumer device contracts is 73,189 words long and takes 8.59 
hours to read: CHOICE, ‘Nine hours of 'conditions apply' Media release (15 Mar 2017 accessed 15 Mar 2017) 
https://www.choice.com.au/about-us/media-releases/2017/march/nine-hours-of-conditions-apply> 
1011 ACL section 243, unless they are unable to continue in operation without identified unfair term(s).  
1012 The ACL Review considered and rejected a general unfairness provision, pointing to the requirement to consider 
transparency and the contract as a whole plus other ACL provisions, such as section 18 should offer sufficient redress.   
1013 This may impede ‘device migration’, that is, reconnecting CIOT devices upon moving properties or ‘device transfer’ to 
other parties or simply by leaving them in situ when an owner moves: GSMA, ‘Competition Policy in the Digital Age: A 
Practical Handbook’ (Oct 2015 accessed 2 Aug 2016) <http://www.gsma.com/publicpolicy/wp-
content/uploads/2016/04/Competition-Policy-Handbook.pdf>the disparate devices which may inhabit an IoT home, for 
example, when a consumer moves houses. The US National Association of Realtors and Online Trust Alliance have a 
specific guide to address this issue and to inform realtors as to advising consumers.   
1014 Note consumers are permitted to cancel their contract at any time but regardless of fault, it is stated or implied that the 
“remedy” is ceasing to use a device for which they have paid, and may entail detriments such as loss of data, portability and 
so on.  
1015 eg: ss 54 acceptable quality and s 55 fit for purpose which are non-excludable: s64; 
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➢ may mislead consumers as to the ACL application and remedies, including compensation 
rights;1016 (especially where the regulation 90 text1017 is omitted or not obvious) in warranty, 
limitation of liability and no liability clauses; 
➢ include broad unilateral consumer indemnities, not necessary to protect the provider’s legitimate 
interests; 
➢ exclude liability for (affiliated) third party products and terms, despite recommending them as 
within their CIOT ecosystem;1018 
➢ use of choice of law or compulsory arbitration provisions to restrict a consumer’s rights to 
commence proceedings, impose evidential burdens or limit evidence adduceable. 
 
Numerous other terms which may be unfair but not within the specific categories are not identified. One 
interesting example was a disclaimer as to information security whereby the consumer accepts the 
(subjective) “transparency” assessment also suggests that most terms lack reasonably plain language, 
are not presented as clearly as possible, but positively, are legible and readily available. Perhaps 
reflecting the relative risk profile, smart self examples used simpler terms and were more transparent 
than those for smart homes. It should also be mentioned that terms all expressly incorporate lengthy 
privacy policies (Ch 6), which may also offend section 24. For example: 
 
➢ A term consenting to broad PI collection, retention and usage rights 
Australian Privacy Principles 3 and 6 require data minimisation. ACCC sweep reports suggest 
that failures in this regard could also be misleading and deceptive and unfair to a consumer, who 
may be misled into believing that broad collection and use is necessary when it is not, or that 
extensive collection is reasonably required to provide the service. FIPA found car manufacturers 
offend both data minimisation and informed consent requirements in (for example) requiring vast, 
unnecessary data to use smart car services.1019  However, as the contracts reviewed suggest, 
data minimisation is poorly observed, and ‘use’ is privileged over consumer control. That there 
is no OAIC or ACL judicial authority impugning such collection does not promote minimising data 
take. 
 
➢ A term suggesting a consumer consents to PI disclosure to overseas recipients (without more); 
                                                          
1016 ACL: ss. 259 and 271. 
1017 “our goods come with guarantees that cannot be excluded by the Australian Consumer Law…” 
1018 The ACL refers to “agents” which may not comprehend these third parties, but as this practice is common in CIOT smart 
home contracts, it is flagged. 
1019 FIPA, above n 480: 6. 
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While common, this term is designed to disclaim provider’s liability for personal information sent 
overseas.1020 If a clause fails to explain this clearly then it may be unfair as consumers are 
effectively providing consent to extinguish an extant right. It is also questionable whether a 
bundled consent – such as a one-click contract -  is sufficient to provide consent in this context 
or whether an express opt-in is required.1021 
 
Sched. 1 may suggest CIOT contracts1022 share issues consistent with ACCC findings across other 
industries.  It may be that as the CIOT market matures, cases may emerge voiding unfair terms, but 
absent other ACL breach, remedies may not incentivize compliance, especially where unilateral term 
variation rights are common, effective immediately, and many apply with little consumer notice, by implied 
consent.  
 
4.4.3 Cases 
There are no cases concerning unfair CIOT contract terms in Australia, and few overall since 2010.1023 
Of these, cases include four terms in an ISP contract,1024 consumer liability for hire car damage 
irrespective of fault;1025and a term requiring consumer ‘opt out’ of automatic direct debits were “unfair”.1026 
In Victoria, trivial VCAT matters are routine: from a no refund hire deposit term (not unfair),1027 to 
severance of parts of a hair studio termination;1028 to a “moral victory” when an unfair arbitration clause 
was severed, but no contract breach found entitling a remedy.1029  This should perhaps be viewed against 
                                                          
1020 Relevant provisions are PA section 16C and APP8 which create a regime whereby APP entities are responsible for 
privacy protections unless a consumer consents to disclosure “after having been informed that the supplier will not be liable 
for any overseas’ recipient’s data misuse”. 
1021 Gordon Hughes and Lisa Di Marco, ‘Online privacy policies – it’s not just about the Privacy Act’ Internet Law Bulletin 
(April 2015 accessed 2 May 2015) 38- 40: 40. 
1022 The author subsequently searched out an example of ‘good’ cloud contracting and at least in terms of transparency, 
concludes that Dropbox has adapted a consumer-friendly approach: dropbox ‘Terms of Service’ (20 Feb 2014 effective 24 
March 2014 accessed 19 June 2014) https://www.dropbox.com/terms 
1023 Consumer Affairs Victoria instituted proceedings against AAPT, World Swimming Championships 2007, 2006 Formula 1 
Fosters Australian Grand Prix and Foxtel after its analogous legislation was introduced in 2003. See also Jetstar Airways Pty 
Ltd v Free [2008] VSC 539 <https://www.consumer.vic.gov.au/businesses/fair-trading/contracts/unfair-contract-terms/case-
studies-unfair-contract-terms>   
1024 ACCC v Bytecard Pty Limited (Federal Court, 24 July 2013, VID301/2013) In that case, unfair terms included a unilateral 
price variation without a customer right to terminate the contract; an indemnity applying even where the contract has not been 
breached, or caused by ByteCard’s breach; and unilateral termination.  
1025 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v CLA Trading Pty Ltd (t/as Europcar Australia) [2016] FCA 377 
1026 ACCC v Chrisco Hampers [2015] FCA 1204, per Edelman, J 
http://www.judgments.fedcourt.gov.au/judgments/Judgments/fca/single/2015/2015fca1204 While no pecuniary penalties are 
available for breach, the ACCC can take action under other ACL provisions as well. 
1027 Aboud v Krystal Limousines Pty Ltd (Civil Claims) [2017] VCAT 459 (2 Apr 2017) 
1028 Dharmawardena v Advanced Hair Studio (Civil claims) [2016] VCAT 1036 (6 July 2016) 
1029 Mastos v Advanced Hair Studio (Civil claims) [2016] VCAT 57 (12 January 2016) 
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the extensive ACCC sweeps referred to earlier, which targeted large consumer-sensitive industries, and 
so resolved potential cases cooperatively. 
Norwegian CIOT work is thus of interest: their Consumer Council reviewed four smart fitness devices1030 
and two smart toys1031 and have formally complained that the failure to notify term changes in advance 
is an unfair term.1032 The consequence is that consumers may be locked-in to devices, prevented from 
data portability or termination and also, from changing providers, before the new terms apply.1033 Apple 
responded to their similar complaint by changing its worldwide terms. They also found that contract 
length, failure to give advance notice of (material) changes as to functionality, user interface or rights, 
were deficient.  European cases also reveal some significant victories:1034  In re Google, Inc..1035 held 
that 25 terms in Google’s online 2013 Terms of Use and Privacy Statement, were unenforceable.1036 The 
Berlin District Court ruling addressed three areas which arguably, remain Australian legal uncertainties: 
firstly, it held that online terms and privacy statements create legally enforceable contracts even where 
(for example) related app services are ‘free’.1037 The court found that consent to terms upon registration 
created an exchange for value, whereby Google receives commercially-valuable personal data for its 
                                                          
1030 FORBRUKERRÅDET (Norwegian Consumer Council), Formal Complaint’ (3 Nov 2016 accessed 2 Dec 2016) 
https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2016-11-03-formal-complaint-wristbands-final1.pdf 
1031 FORBRUKERRÅDET, ‘Report: Investigation of privacy and security issues with smart toys’ (2 Nov 2016 accessed 15 
Jan 2017) https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016-11-technical-analysis-of-the-dolls-bouvet.pdf; 
FORBRUKERRÅDET, ‘#Toyfail’ (Dec 2016 accessed 15 Jan 2017) <https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/toyfail-report-desember2016.pdf> 
1032 They point to their previous Apple complaint which led Apple to modify its international terms in this regard: 
FORBRUKERRÅDET (Norwegian Consumer Council), Formal Complaint’ (3 Nov 2016 accessed 2 Dec 2016) 
https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/2016-11-03-formal-complaint-wristbands-final1.pdf; and 
FORBRUKERRÅDET, ‘Complaint regarding user agreements and privacy policies for internet-connected toys – 
the Cayla doll and i-Que robot’ (6 Dec 2016 accessed 15 Jan 2017) https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/complaint-dpa-co.pdf  
1033 Ibid: 6. 
1034 See also the Belgian Report into Facebook (Mar 2015) which concluded that “…Facebook… violates the EU Unfair 
Contract Terms Directive” which covers ‘free’ services.  Those violations relate to (inter alia) major contractual terms, which 
included liability limitations, indemnities, unilateral variation, forum, choice of law and termination: EMSOC & SPION, ‘From 
social media service to advertising network’ Draft Report on Facebook  (31 March 2015 accessed 13 Apr 2015) 
<https://www.law.kuleuven.be/icri/en/news/item/facebooks-revised-policies-and-terms-v1-2.pdf> :25 [fn 63]. The Report also 
concludes Facebook breaches the e-Privacy Directive Art 5(3) as to obtaining free, specific, informed and unambiguous/ 
explicit prior consent for users (despite high-level disclosure) and tracks non-users improperly. Article 5(3) requires prior 
informed, specific, freely given consent for storage of or access to information stored on a user's terminal equipment. 
1035 In re Google, Inc., LG Berlin, No. 15 O 402/12, 11/19/13. There is no English translation of this case available, nor does 
a search reveal that Google’s appeal was successful. This discussion relies on secondary sources. 
1036 Note the German unfair contract terms legislation specifies that terms which conflict with the “main elements of German 
law and unfairly disadvantage consumers” are invalid. Here the German Federal Data Protection Act and the Telemedia Act 
were allegedly infringed (although Googles challenged their application).  There is no equivalent to this provision in the ACL, 
but one would expect terms which increase inequality of bargaining power through which breaching other laws to be prima 
facie unfair. 
1037 Google argued that as their services are ‘free’, there was no valid contract subject to the unfair contracts regime. 
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various purposes.1038 In a CIOT context, even were there no ‘official’ registration, the implicit promise of 
term-prescribed data use upon device connection, might be sufficient alone. The court’s approach would 
satisfy the ACL “in trade or commerce” requirement1039 – as the obtaining and use of such data is clearly 
a part of the CIOT business model, although in most CIOT scenarios, consumer contractual dealings 
bear a commercial character1040 whether selling devices and providing app services in any case. Based 
upon the German authority, the ‘business activities’ of obtaining consumer information for use or with the 
intention of analytics or creating saleable data sets1041 via free service offerings1042 should suffice, even 
where the device seller and app provider are different corporate entities. Secondly, the Google case 
confirms certain unfair term types: unilateral termination, unilateral services change; unilateral variation 
to terms of use without consent and the (mutual) limitation for liability as to statutory product liabilities. 
The final interesting aspect was that as Google’s privacy disclosures were inadequate, check-box 
consents were void.1043  
The case is potentially, very significant were elements of its findings adopted in Australia, and arguably, 
with greater regulator focus in 2017, there may be more cases emerge to test that possibility. 
 
4.4.4 Some recommendations 
Unfair terms are an ACCC priority for 20171044  - perhaps reflecting two gaps evidenced here:  firstly, the 
law is largely untested and so lacks clarity and clear examples of breach; and secondly, companies are 
                                                          
1038 Karin Retzer, ‘German Court Finds 25 Provisions in Google’s Online Terms of Use and Privacy Policy to Be 
Unenforceable’ Morrison & Foerster LLP (20 Dec 2013 accessed 10 Aug 2014) < 
https://www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/german-court-finds-25-provisions-in-goog-45359/> 
1039 The ACL definition includes ‘any business or professional activity whether or not carried on for profit”: ACL s 2. 
1040 Hearn v Rourke [2003] FCAFC 78 per Dowsett, J the focus must be on the conduct in question – which on the facts of In 
re Google, above n 237 included the terms enabling the commercial use of the consumer information. 
1041 A similar though not analogous fact situation is solicitation by mail for subscribers for UK books etc., which conduct was 
held to be “in trade or commerce”: Swan v Downes (1978) 34 FLR 36 c/f E v Australia Red Cross Society (1991) 27 FCR 
310 where the provision of free blood was held to be not” in trade or commerce”. 
1042 An extension of the argument might be to suggest that promoting such services as “free” breaches ACL section 18 
insofar as whilst there is no apparent cost, the consumer is supplying data which has commercial value to the cloud 
provider. This would be an unlikely extension to the law (which tends to focus directly upon the representation with respect 
to whether a consumer must pay or lose money directly in some way) but would more realistically reflect the exchange 
between the parties – and seems open on the reasoning of the German case. 
1043 Spain and Germany are threatening financial sanctions because the privacy terms fail to comply with their privacy laws: 
Loeb Essers, ‘Berlin court rules Google privacy policy violates data protection law’ (20 Nov 2013 accessed 10 Aug 2014) 
<http://www.cio.com/article/2380759/legal/berlin-court-rules-google-privacy-policy-violates-data-protection-law.html>; France 
also took legal action. 
1044 In 2016, the ACCC published a B2B report: ACCC, ‘Unfair Terms On Small Business Contracts’ (10 Nov 2016 accessed 
10 Nov 2016) <http://accc.gov.au/system/files/B2B%20UCT%20-%20Final%20 
%20Unfair%20terms%20in%20small%20business%20contracts%20%20A%20review%20of%20selected%20industries_0.P
DF>  Then in early 2017 announced that it has a number of “in-depth investigations” underway into B2B unfair terms, which 
it will (presumably) presumably act on in 2017: Dr Michael Shaper, ACCC deputy Chair quoted in ACCC, ‘Unfair contract 
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not complying and/ or perceive breaching the law as an acceptable risk. 1045 These enforcement ‘gaps’ 
confirm the ACCC’s emphasis to highlight (and test) the law and to incentivize compliance. But there are 
also exacerbating legal ‘gaps’:  
➢ Unfair ‘contracts’: extend the law to contracts unfair ‘overall’   
While this is partly duplicative,1046 there seems little logic in finding unfairness in a term, or 
allowing that unfairness to void an entire contract if it cannot operate otherwise, as distinct from 
multiple terms combining to create an overall unfair effect. Few companies dread severance 
when terms can so simply be rectified online, so a broader scope may increase compliance. 
CAANZ rather unpersuasively rejecting this proposal,1047 which would address a gap and 
strengthen the regime;   
➢ Monetary penalties:1048 to incentivize compliance and the increase the risk of infringement.  
Given the regime presupposes a standard form non-negotiable contract and ‘unfairness’ requires 
terms that do not reflect the ‘legitimate interests’ of the advantaged party, significantly imbalance 
rights and obligations and cause consumers ‘detriment’, there is a clear argument for penalties 
where such egregious conduct can be established, especially were it repeated conduct;   
➢ Representative actions should be available to regulators.  
This would increase exposure should the law be breached and enhance widespread consumer 
rights and redress, especially if CAANZ increases investigative powers as it proposes;1049 and 
➢ Capture insurers: extend unfair contract terms to cover the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth). 
Insurers are not subject to the unfair terms regime1050 – aside from sound public policy issues,1051 
CIOT data may assume a greater role in insurer decision-making, insurance policies may (for 
                                                          
terms under scrutiny’ Media release  (20 Mat 2017 accessed 28 Mar 2017) http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/unfair-
contract-terms-under-scrutiny. Note its earlier consumer review here: ACCC, above n 998. 
1045 In Valve, the judge was very critical of the US General Counsel’s failure to redraft the terms and conditions in such a 
way as to meet Australian law, especially as terms had been changed to meet NZ requirements.  
1046 Unfairness may underlie actions under sections 18 and 21 – but it may also not. The Law Council pointed to unfairness 
as one of the relevant indicia of unconscionability though acknowledged the latter requires something more. They seem to 
suggest that a contract should not be struck down for unfairness if it is not unconscionable, which seems logically flawed: 
Law Council of Australia, ‘Australian Consumer Law Review’ Submission (23 Jun 2016 accessed 4 Sept 2016) 36- 37 < 
http://consumerlaw.gov.au/files/2016/07/Law_Council_of_Australia.pdf> 
1047 For example, the Law Council put several arguments: these included freedom of contract (which of course has little 
relevance in a standard form contract scenario), plus the contract as a whole and transparency are part of the matters a 
court must consider:  Ibid: 23- 24.   
1048 CALC advocated for this in the ACL review: above n 840: 46. 
1049 CAANZ Proposal 11 suggests that regulators should be allowed to access existing investigative powers to better assess 
if any term is unfair: ACL Review, above n 840: 6. 
1050 CCA section 131A. An alternative would be to mirror the provisions within the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth), as 
sections 14, 35 and 37 are criticised as not equivalent.  Note section 15 prevents judicial review of insurance contracts on 
the grounds of unfairness. CAANZ has recommended that the unfair term provisions be extended to include the Insurance 
Contracts Act 1984 (Cth): above n 840: 6. 
1051 Public policy and clear regulation in this area is urgently required given the value of smart health, home and car data to 
insurers, and the costs to the community if the elderly or poor are unable to take out insurance 
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example) unfairly compel or unfairly incentivize privacy-intrusive data sharing used for potentially 
discriminatory practices1052 (see 3.2.1 above). 
These changes would strengthen the regime, facilitate ‘headline grabbing’ enforcement and incentivize 
proactive behaviour change, as revealed by the obvious fact that despite clear legislation, online unfair 
terms proliferate. 
 
4.5 Consumer Guarantees1053  
CIOT contracts for the supply of goods or services to a consumer in trade or commerce contain consumer 
guarantees1054 which despite many contrary online terms, cannot be excluded, restricted or modified by 
contract.1055 There are nine guarantees as to ‘goods’ and three as to ‘services’1056: the former cover good 
title,1057 undisturbed possession,1058 no undisclosed securities,1059 acceptable quality,1060 fitness for 
disclosed purpose,1061 correspondence with description or sample,1062  availability of repairs and spare 
                                                          
1052 An example in a life insurance context was a Total Permanent Disability policy which did not cover a certain ‘type’ of 
heart attack resulting in the insured receiving only $25,000 of the $1million he was supposedly insured for: Adele Ferguson, 
‘Cominsure exposed’ Sydney Morning Herald (8 Mar 2016 accessed 2 Dec 2016) < 
http://www.smh.com.au/interactive/2016/comminsure-exposed/heart-attack/> 
1053 EU policy is found in Directive 1999/44/EC <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServv.do?uri=CELEX:31999L0044:en:HTML> 
1054 Vulkanovski, above n 110 suggests that the consumer guarantees do not apply to CIOT as it excludes a 
“telecommunications service” under s. 65 (1)(b). ‘Telecommunications Service’ is defined as a “service for carrying 
communications by means of guided or unguided electromagnetic energy or both”: ACL section 65(2). Legal analysis 
confirms that this section does not apply, as nothing of that “kind [is] specified in the regulations”: ACL s. 65(1)(a). 
Consumer groups have called for this exemption to be removed from the ACL: ACCAN, Submission, above n 840. 
1055 ACL section 64 prohibits express terms which exclude, restrict or modify the guarantees or any term which is inconsistent 
with a guarantee – subject to section 64A. This latter provision allows limitation of liability with respect to goods not of a kind 
ordinarily acquired for personal, domestic or household use or consumption. As discussed, this paper assumes that consumer 
IoT goods are, in general, of the sort which would be found to be for ‘personal domestic or household use or consumption’.  
1056 Applicable guarantees are that the supplier will render those services with due care and skill (s. 60), and that the 
services and any product resulting from them, will be reasonably fit for that purpose (s. 61).  This guarantee requires that the 
consumer makes known ‘expressly or by implication” that purpose including a “result that the consumer wishes to achieve”, 
and then there is a guarantee that the services and product will be of “such nature, and quality, state or condition, that they 
might reasonably expected[,] to achieve that result…”  (s. 61(2). Given the prevalence of free app provision, it is arguable 
that subscription (whether paid or free) involves by implication, making known an expectation that the services and products 
will meet the service levels and performance promoted by the app provider. The third guarantee is that services will be 
provided within a ‘reasonable time’ but it does not apply where there is a ‘manner’ for determining time frames agreed to by 
the consumer and supplier. CIOT contracts may cover this field. 
1057 ACL section 51 (unless the supply is expressly for limited title or by hire or lease). In the circumstances of IoT devices and 
software, the terms and conditions will dictate this aspect.  
1058 ACL section 52 (only for the period of hire or lease). 
1059 ACL section 53. 
1060 ACL section 54. 
1061 ACL section 55. 
1062 ACL section 56. 
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parts,1063 and mandatory compliance with express warranties.1064 These apply to CIOT devices and 
software as ‘goods’, such that breach entitles consumers to specified remedies. As such, this section 
considers only those guarantees involving especial CIOT interest: sections 54, 58 and Regulations 90 - 
91. 
Section 54 acceptable quality requires the device/ software to be: 
- fit for all reasonable purposes for which goods of that kind are commonly supplied,1065  
- acceptable in appearance, and 
- free from defects, and 
- safe and durable  
as a reasonable consumer, fully acquainted with the state of the goods (and any hidden defects), would 
regard as ‘acceptable’ on the date of supply,1066 having regard to goods’ nature and price, supplier 
representations (marketing, advertising, packaging information etc.) and any other relevant 
circumstances.  Consumers may thus sue a manufacturer or supplier of a defective CIOT device or 
software supplied which (for example) is damaged, fails to work, or which fails to conform with description, 
advertised features or performance levels. ‘Safe’1067 is undefined but interesting in a CIOT context, given 
security is a complex question and hacking, a known possibility. There is no authority as to whether “safe’ 
means “secure”-  although given known security incidents, a consumer may have a right to expect 
designed-in security in ‘acceptable’ online devices - or whether a hack might constitute a “defect” as 
opposed to a known product vulnerability.1068 Ironically, there is potentially an argument for CIOT 
providers to assert a lower consumer expectation standard generally across IT devices having regard to 
the nature of the industry, its well-publicised security and privacy issues, the common experience of 
software glitches and hacking, and thus, the nature of the products supplied. However, one suspects that 
such an argument is unlikely to succeed except in extreme cases:  designers/ manufacturers arguably 
should understand and secure devices and software against known risks and further, devices intended 
                                                          
1063 ACL section 57. 
1064 ACL section 58. Note Regulation 90 of the Competition and Consumer Regulations 2010 (Cth) specifies a text which must 
appear, as well as mandates information as to who provides the warranty, its duration and how to claim under it. 
1065 The purpose of acquisition is irrelevant: Petersen v Merck Sharpe & Dohme (Aust) Pty Ltd [2010] FCA 180 
1066 Medtel Pty Ltd v Courtney [2003] FCAFC 151. But this does not preclude subsequent relevant information as to the 
goods being considered by the court, in its determination of objective reasonable expectation. 
1067CAANZ proposes to work with stakeholders to provide more specific guidance on the terms ‘safe’ and ‘durable’: above n   
840: 5.  
1068 By analogy, a consumer failed to prove that Vioxx arthritic pain relief medication was not of’ merchantable quality’ (the 
previous formulation for acceptable quality) even though it was known that it might double the risk of cardiac arrest: Merck 
Sharp & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v Peterson [2011] FCAFC 128.  
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for home use may reasonably be expected to meet normative social values as to that space and as to 
vehicles, consumers have long built-up safety expectations in that industry.  
ACL Regulation 90(2)1069 prescribes a specific consumer guarantee text1070 which must be included with 
any goods (or oddly, services)1071 which are supplied with a ‘warranty against defects’.1072 That term is 
broadly applied such that most suppliers with any manufacturer’s warranty must comply, including 
software or devices purchased online. Regulation 91 prescribes a repair notice applicable to devices 
containing user-generated data,1073 - including CIOT devices -  which must state that “repair may result 
in loss of data”.  While a serious issue, it seems odd to absolve the IT industry generally from the 
obligation to design products which are repairable, or to provide ‘backup’ services to consumers such 
that they do not lose valuable data stored on-device. The risk is reduced given CIOT cloud backup is 
commonplace, but from a consumer convenience perspective, the regulation is flagged for obsolescence: 
arguably it may lower rather than lift reasonable consumer expectation. Similarly, section 58 obliges 
broadly-defined1074 manufacturers to “take reasonable action” to provide repair facilities and reasonable 
parts availability for a “reasonable period” after which goods are supplied. Like s. 54, “reasonable” is 
unclear as to either repair facility or parts availability or time, so presumably this becomes a question of 
contemporary standards.1075 The section is mentioned not because it is outdated for all goods: clearly a 
smart(ish) car still needs hands-on servicing, but rather, to highlight its obsolescence in a hybrid device: 
software context. While “parts” is undefined, it includes CIOT device ‘parts’, and may include on-device 
                                                          
1069 Competition and Consumer Regulations 2010 (Cth). From 1 January 2012, any document containing a warranty against 
defects as to the supply of goods or services or a representation that such a warranty applies, is prohibited if the it does not 
comply with regulation 90: ACL s. 102.  Failure to comply with the requirements from 1 January 2012 may result in penalties 
up to $50,000 per offence for corporations and $10,000 per offence for individuals. 
1070 “Our goods come with guarantees that cannot be excluded under the Australian Consumer Law. You are entitled to a 
replacement or refund for a major failure and compensation for any reasonably foreseeable loos or damage. You are also 
entitled to have the goods repaired or replaced if the goods fail to be of acceptable quality and the failure does not amount 
to a major failure.”   
1071 CAANZ Proposal 4 includes clarifying this text to address “services bundled with goods’ and ‘services’, which are ACL 
‘gaps’.  Miller (at page 1763) suggests that this would presumably never be prosecuted (as no services-specific text exists) 
and argues it would be an “unintended absurdity” in the ACL. He cites BMW Australia Pty Ltd v ACCC [2004] FCAFC 167, a 
case where BMW failed to adopt precise Standards terminology as in their (correct) view, their instructional language for 
jacks was more accurate. They lost and were fined: R. V Miller, ‘2016 Miller’s Australian Competition and Consumer Law 
Anotated’ Thomson Reuters Lawbook Co., 2016.  
1072 ‘Warranty against defects’ means a “representation communicated to a consumer in connection with a supply of goods 
or services, at or about the time of supply, to the effect that a person will (unconditionally or on specified conditions): (a) 
repair or replace the goods or part of them; or (b) provide again or rectify the services or part of them; or (c) wholly or partly 
recompense the consumer; if the goods or any part of them are defective, and includes any document” evidencing that 
representation: ACL s. 102(3).   
1073 Regulation 91 cites files on a computer hard drive, mobile phone telephone numbers, songs on a portable media player, 
games stored on a console or files on a USB memory stick. 
1074 ‘Manufacturer’ includes persons who produce, process or assemble goods, hold themselves out as such, permit others 
to use their name/ brand as to the goods, cause or allow themselves to be held out as such or import goods where the 
overseas ‘manufacturer’ lacks a place of business in Australia. 
1075 Miller, above n 1071: 1732. 
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software as a component,1076 but seems likely to exclude related CIOT app software upgrades or patches, 
which are by nature (partly) repair. It is also possible that such repair might be unreasonably delayed, 
leaving consumer IOT devices exposed1077 – but this provision will presumably not apply.  
The consumer guarantees have flaws – indeed, the laws are confusing and despite simple language, are 
difficult to apply.1078 The distinction between ‘major’ and ‘minor’ failures1079 is unclear, the ‘reasonable’ 
time for minor defect repairs is nebulous1080 and consumers precluded from a replacement in that case, 
despite repeated minor failure.1081 Further determining the ‘extent’ of defect in a CIOT device or app will 
often require expert technical review, which is expensive and makes seeking redress potentially 
prohibitive in most smart self and home scenarios. Even in a smart car context, the manufacturer will 
possess complex vehicle and diagnostics data to which, absent court order, consumers have little access, 
and costs of appraisal are high. Further, third party service software lock-out1082 may mean product-
protective dealer-retailers will largely control smart car defect investigations, thereby increasing 
information asymmetry, and reducing legal action and regulator information.  
 
 
 
                                                          
1076 Ibid: 1723. “The ACL draws no distinction between products and the component parts of products, each may therefore 
be regarded separately as ‘goods’ for the purposes of this [s. 54] guarantee”. 
1077 It is suggested that the android phone industry was very slow in its response and that different suppliers at different 
levels across different phones, caused consumers problems: Jason Bourne, ‘One in three cloud services was susceptible to 
Heartbleed, research shows’ Cloudtech (12 May 2014 accessed 7 June 2014) http://www.cloudcomputing-
news.net/news/2014/may/12/one-three-cloud-services-was-susceptible-heartbleed-research-shows/ 
1078 See critical submissions to the ACL Review from a range of entities: Allens, CHOICE, ACCAN, Baker & McKenzie, etc. 
The CAANZ Interim Report summarizes these to suggest that while consistent laws are positive, ‘acceptable quality’ as a 
flexible principle-based text is subject to what constitutes “reasonable durability’, and what a ‘major failure’ is. CAANZ 
suggest that regulator guidance can address these issues and suggests that industry-specific approaches are best dealt 
with through compliance and enforcement activities, as well as soft law options such as best practice guidelines or codes of 
conduct: CAANZ, above n 832: 43- 44. 
1079 ACL s. 260:  A major failure means one where a reasonable consumer would not have acquired the goods had s/he 
been fully aware of the failure or the goods are any of unsafe, substantially unfit for purpose or departed significantly from a 
demonstration model/ sample. CAANZ Proposal 2 will clarify that multiple “minor” failures can become a ‘major failure’: 
CAANZ, above n 832: 4. 
1080 CAANZ Proposal 1 would insert a specified time, so that upon expiry, remedies for refund and replacement become 
available without needing to show a major failure: CAANZ, above n 832: 4. 
1081 CAANZ Proposal 2 will clarify that multiple “minor” failures can become a ‘major failure’: CAANZ, above n 832: 4. 
1082 AAAA, above n 401. The AAAA contend that the Code of Practice has failed to free up after-market vehicle data access 
and that the OEMs are not ‘playing ball’. They persist is seeking legislation: AAAA, ‘Agreement on Access to Service and 
Repair Information for Motor Vehicles 2014, Code of Practice’ (2014 accessed 30 June 2016) 
https://www.aaaa.com.au/files/issues/Signed%20Agreement%20-
%20Access%20to%20Service%20and%20Repair%20Information%20151214.pdf; For a full summary of the AAAA concerns 
and their view as to the Code’s failure, see: AAAA, ‘Heads of Agreement for Access to Service Information and Repair of 
Motor Vehicles and Related Voluntary Codes Of Practice (Feb 2017 accessed 2 Mar 2017) 
<https://www.dropbox.com/s/v79cbsncat7ltm8/170228-AAAA-HOAandCodes-Opt.pdf?dl=0> 
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4.5.1 Cases 
Consumer guarantee application is challenged by the “hybridisation” of physical goods, software ‘goods’ 
and analytics ‘services’.1083 In Valve,1084 the Federal Court ruled that licensed, subscribed games 
software and associated services, internet-streamed internationally1085 and playable on or offline, is the 
supply”1086 of a “good”, and so subject to the ‘acceptable quality’ guarantee and remedies, which the 
Steam agreement and refund policies falsely misrepresented. It seems that had games not been 
accessible “offline”, had the non-executable data (music, etc.) and other services1087 not been 
“incidental”, then the transaction may lose the character of ‘goods’. As such, Valve illustrates that from a 
consumer guarantee perspective, online acquisition1088  or CIOT software provision is not necessarily 
straightforward. Arguably, the whole enquiry perpetuates an ongoing legal uncertainty which would be 
better resolved by statute: for example, an amendment which expressly states that ‘goods’ includes 
software inclusive of any related features such as data analytics or cloud storage. In December 2016, 
Valve was ordered to pay $3 million in penalties.1089 Valve has appealed, and the ACCC cross-appealed 
findings that misleading representations to consumers (who were not personally misled) did not constitute 
conduct breaching section 18.1090 Based upon well-established precedent, the ACCC seem likely to 
succeed.  
Consumer guarantee cases more often concern false representations as to when guarantees and 
remedies apply,1091 and the misrepresented interaction between statutory and manufacturer (voluntary) 
                                                          
1083 CI, above n 44; ACCAN, Submission, above n 840.   
1084 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No. 3) [2016] FCA 196 per Edelman, J 24 Mar 
2017 accessed at <http://www.judgments.fedcourt.gov.au/judgments/Judgments/fca/single/2016/2016fca0196> 
1085 The case was also significant in that it clarified that a corporation incorporated in Washington State and which lacked a 
physical presence in Australia, was still subject to the ACL – despite a choice of law clause which purported to exclude local 
jurisdiction. The court found that Valve “carried on business” in Australia as it had over 2 million subscribers, owned and 
used servers there, generated millions of dollars in revenue and paid Australian companies to run its business in Australia: 
Valve, Ibid: 4. 
1086 The ACL defines a “supply of goods” to include “…supply (including re-supply) by way of sale, exchange, lease, hire or 
hire purchase”. 
1087 For example, Steam Guard, Play or Videos. 
1088 It should also be noted that many CIOT app ‘acquisitions’ are either licensed free or by subscription and as Valve 
suggests, the inclusive definition of “acquire” under the ACL is broad enough to include this concept - ‘acquire’ includes (a) 
in relation to goods – acquire by way of purchase, exchange or taking on lease, on hire or hire purchase; and (b) in relation 
to services – accept: ACL section 2. Under section 11 references to acquisition … include Section 5 provides an exception 
under the safety standards provisions (Parts 3-3, 3-4, 4-3 and 4-4) where a donation of goods or services is a ‘supply’ 
unless for “promotional purposes”. 
1089 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Valve Corporation (No. 3) [2016] FCA 196 per Edelman, J 24 Mar 
2016 <http://www.judgments.fedcourt.gov.au/judgments/Judgments/fca/single/2016/2016fca0196> 
1090 ACCC, ‘ACCC cross-appeals Valve Federal Court judgment’ Media Release (7 Mar 2017 accessed 8 Mar 2017) 
<https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-cross-appeals-valve-federal-court-judgment> 
1091 See for example, the first consumer guarantees case, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Hewlett-
Packard Australia Pty Ltd [2013] FCA 653.  Remedies included pecuniary penalty of $3 million (maximum penalty $6.6 
million); $200,000 for ACCC's costs; Injunction against similar false representations for 3 years; HP letter to resellers; 
Consumer rights notice on its website and online store for three years; Corrective advertising on website homepage for 3 
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warranties,1092 and often heavily-spruiked (questionable) extended warranty products.1093 These are 
common in smart self and home1094 retailing and in the second-hand car industry. One of the more 
relevant ‘cases’, settled by undertaking, was that Apple falsely represented its consumer guarantee 
obligations, and that refunds, replacement or repair was not available for third party products purchased 
via iTunes or the App Store. The undertaking highlighted how Apple refund policies breached the ACL, 
which Apple acknowledged, accepting a suite of consumer education, training, data verification and 
improved reseller returns practices. Apple’s ‘Consumer Law’ Australia webpage is now best practice and 
a model for transparent disclosure.1095  A 2017 Apple case1096 confirms the point: an iOS9 update during 
installation ‘bricked’ iphones and ipads which had undergone an ‘unauthorised’ repair, service or 
replacement,1097 via ‘Error53’. Apple then falsely represented that it was not responsible to rectify the 
error without cost, nor must it honour its voluntary recall. The ACCC alleges these representations as to 
acceptable quality and fitness for purpose and remedies under Part 5-4 breach ACL section 29(1)(m) 
which prohibits false or misleading representations as to any “guarantee, right or remedy” and section 
18. The case – and recent proceedings against LG -  illustrates how large CIOT companies, supplying 
sophisticated products online to vast numbers of consumers, can still (repeatedly) fail to comply with the 
ACL.  
 
                                                          
years and in major newspapers; Consumer Redress of complaints process; independent review and report  thereof; and a 
compliance program for 3 years. More recently, smart TV manufacturer LG was taken to court:  ACCC, ‘ACCC takes action 
against LG for alleged false or misleading representations relating to consumer guarantees’ Media release (15 Dec 2015 
accessed 2 Feb 2016) <https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-takes-action-against-lg-for-alleged-false-or-
misleading-representations-relating-to-consumer-guarantees> 
1092 Smart TV manufacturer LG was taken to court by the ACCC (again):  Ibid.  
1093 CAANZ Proposal 3 addresses enhanced disclosure requiring written agreements, clarification as to the ACL, and a 10 
day cooling off period: CAANZ, above n 840: 4. See for example, Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v 
Bunavit Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 6.  As at 2016, the ACCC had obtained $286,000 in penalty orders against ten Harvey Norman 
franchisees as to false or misleading representations regarding consumer guarantees: ACCC, ‘Harvey Norman franchisee 
ordered to pay penalties of $52,000 for false or misleading representations about consumer rights’  (14 Jan 2016 accessed 
20 Mar 2016) <https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/harvey-norman-franchisee-ordered-to-pay-penalties-of-52000-for-
false-or-misleading-representations-about-consumer-rights> In contrast, this case failed as it relied upon in-store 
conversations which the court regarded to be vague, and salespeople handed out brochures as to the ACL – despite the 
salespeople emphasising manufacturer’s warranties over ACL guarantees : Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v The 
Good Guys Discount Warehouses (Australia) Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 22. In ACCC v Fisher & Paykel Customer Services Pty Ltd 
[2014] FCA 1393 an extended warranty sales letter was a “financial product” regulated under the ASIC Act. Penalties of 
$400,000 were imposed. 
1094 Ibid. 
1095 https://www.apple.com/au/legal/statutory-warranty/ 
1096 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Apple Pty Ltd [2017] FCA 416 (21 Apr 2017). This hearing 
concerned an ACCC application for substituted service upon Apple US, which was granted there being a prima facie case to 
answer. See also ACCC, ‘ACCC takes action against Apple over alleged misleading consumer guarantee representations’ 
(6 Apr 2017 accessed 6 Apr 2017) <https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-takes-action-against-apple-over-alleged-
misleading-consumer-guarantee-representations> 
1097 Unauthorised repair means a repair, service or replacement by anyone other than Apple Australia or its authorized 
Service providers: Ibid [18] 
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4.5.2 Recommendations 
To succinctly summarize this section, the following recommendations are made: 
A model ACL disclosure format by comparative table such as that on Apple’s Consumer Law 
webpage, should be required by regulation to be notified to consumers. The frequency of 
egregious infringement by large companies breaching their disclosure obligations is such that 
legislative action is required. 
Regulation 90 and 91 require amendment to enhance clarity as identified above. 
CAANZ proposals seem sensible minor corrections to clarify the consumer guarantees. 
It is not proposed to explore the consumer guarantees further, save to support ACL Review submissions 
that legal uncertainty and practical enforcement1098 are ‘gaps’. From a CIOT angle, the guarantees will 
likely be tested by the hybrid nature of the product, and in determining where reasonable consumer 
expectation across the electronics versus software industries reasonably falls. 
   
4.5.3 Conclusion 
Consumer guarantees apply to suppliers, such as CIOT device manufacturers1099 or retailers (online or 
off), and statutorily ‘deemed manufacturers’1100 or ‘deemed importers’.1101 CIOT devices are also subject 
to products liability law, which is considered next. 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1098 As to consumer disclosure requirements, see Director of Consumer Affairs Victoria v The Good Guys Discount 
Warehouses (Australia) Pty Ltd [2016] FCA 22 where despite salesperson representations as to extended warranties which 
allegedly breached sections 18, 29(1)(l) and (m), the court found the conversations were “vague and general” and as a 
brochure explaining the consumer guarantees was provided, the conduct was not misleading or deceptive. This is despite 
the fact the consumer guarantees were not drawn to customer’s attention, and discussions as to (time limited) 
manufacturer’s warranty did not clearly distinguish the two. 
1099 ACL section 7 inclusively defines a manufacturer to include those who produce, grow, extract, process or assemble 
goods” and who hold themselves out to the public to be manufacturer or allow other(s) to do so. 
1100 ACL section 7 also defines a manufacturer to include one who causes or permits another to hold them out to the public 
as the manufacturer, either in connection with the supply or possible supply or promotion of the supply or use of goods. 
1101 ACL section 7 defines an importer a deemed manufacturer if they did not manufacture the goods but at the time of 
importation, the manufacturer did not have a place of business in Australia.  
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4.6 Product liability & safety  
“While we look to the future, we must also maintain our focus on safety today.”1102 
The ACL has no express prohibition on selling unsafe products.1103 ‘Acceptable quality’ (s. 23) requires 
that products are ‘safe’ and the first case finding breach of sections 18 and 331104 by the knowing 
marketing of unsafe products,1105 was handed down in 2016. Edelman, J found that a supplier’s failure 
to withdraw and recall “once a reasonable period… in which it could have identified, assessed and 
responded to this safety hazard had elapsed” constitutes “silence” which is misleading and deceptive. It 
is a valuable precedent, and one which illustrates that even “household name” national retailers have 
flawed product safety assessment systems.1106 The principal ACL focus consists of Parts 3-3 to 3-5 
which contain a products liability and safety regime, comprised of principle-based regulation and strict 
liability enforcement of consumer product safety standards,1107 in conjunction with educative materials 
                                                          
1102 Mark R. Rosekind, Ph.D., Administrator, NHTSA, U.S. Department of Transportation, Before the House Energy and 
Commerce, Subcommittee on Commerce, Manufacturing and Trade (14 April 14, 2016 accessed 6 Jul 2016) < 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Congressional+Testimony/testimony-mr-house-04142016> 
1103 The Australian Consumer Survey found that poor quality, faulty and unsafe products are the most common (30%) 
consumer problems in Australia CAANZ, Interim Report, above n 840: 73. 
1104 A person must not, in trade or commerce, engage in conduct that is liable to mislead the public as to the nature, the 
manufacturing process, the characteristics, the suitability for their purpose or the quantity of any goods”.  Note that “liable” to 
mislead is a narrower range of conduct than s 18, requiring proof of actual probability that the public would be misled: ACCC 
v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 634. Remedies include civil damages proceedings, remedial orders, 
injunction or pecuniary penalties. 
1105 ACCC v Woolworths Ltd [2016] FCA 18 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2016/44.html> The Court declared 
that Woolworths as the retailer/importer (deemed manufacturer) engaged in misleading and deceptive conduct by selling 
unsafe products after it had become aware of safety concerns. Note the judge rather amusingly defined Woolworths conduct 
in failing to withdraw a potentially dangerous fryer, as the “Deep Fryer Silence Conduct”. The outcome of the conduct was 
however, far from amusing. 
1106 Woolworths has over 300 Australian stores. Despite this Edelman, J found: “Although Woolworths had product quality 
processes and a compliance system in place, it failed to prevent product safety issues from occurring and continuing to 
occur during 2013 and 2014. In the period from January 2012 to November 2014, Woolworths issued 47 non-food product 
recalls for its house brand goods (i.e. 18 recalls in 2012, 8 recalls in 2013 and 20 recalls in 2014)..”: Ibid: [19] 
1107 Under ACL Part 3-1, the Commonwealth Minister may declare Australian Standards as product safety standards as to 
“consumer goods” [Section 2(1): Goods intended for use or of a kind likely to be used, for “personal, domestic or household 
use or consumption’.]  and/ or related services if necessary to reduce or prevent the risk of injury.  Supply of goods or 
related services which conflict with such standards is prohibited under the ACL and in the event of loss or injury, third parties 
may in certain circumstances, be deemed ‘supplied’. Part 3-3 Div 2 allows the Minister to impose interim (s 109) or 
(revocable) permanent bans (ss. 114 & 117) upon consumer goods or services, where the Minister decides that they are of 
a kind that may or will cause injury or that reasonable foreseeable use will have that result. (s 114) Failure to comply is also 
an offence, and any person injured because of the defect or reasonable foreseeable use of the goods, may recover 
damages or seek compensation: ACL ss 118 re goods and s 119 re product related services; section 197 provides fines are 
up to $1.1 million for a corporation or $220,000 for an individual and the court may order goods be destroyed under section 
133H.  Consistent with these powers, Subdivision A allows the Minister to mandate a consumer goods recall [ACL Division 3 
ss 122 – 126] and the supplier must cease supplying the goods and comply with the notice [ s. 127] Subdivision B section 
128 enables the supplier to   initiate a voluntary recall.  Note Supply’ includes sale, exchange, lease, hire or hire purchase. 
In the recent valve case discussed above, the court also found software supplied under a license was a supply: ACL section 
2. Note there is a defence where the supplier was in turn supplied by an Australian entity and the supplier did not know, 
could not reasonably determine with due diligence, or relied in good faith upon a representation from the original supplier 
that there was no relevant standard: ss. 252 (re goods)) and 253 (re services) and ss 210 (as to civil penalties) and 211 (re 
goods/ services as to criminal penalties). Under ACL section 206. Penalties include $1.1 million for a corporation (s 224) and 
$220,00 for an individual: (s 194). 
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and standards.1108 The product safety framework seeks to identify, prevent and remove unsafe goods 
and product-related services from the market, while the defective goods regime focusses upon 
consumer redress for loss or damage.1109 The laws reflect harm minimisation principles and employ 
post-market controls such as mandatory reporting,1110 supply bans1111 and defect-rectification through 
voluntary or mandatory recall. The ACL has less focus upon pre-market controls such as safety 
standards,1112 design rules and explicit safety obligations, though strictly enforces penalties for 
breaches of industry-specific mandatory safety standards, design rules and voluntary recall notification 
compliance. So, for example, should any CIOT device or software manufacturer fail to comply with any 
Australian Standard, or fail to initiate a voluntary recall upon detecting a safety related defect, then the 
regulator may act. Further, should any CIOT product be defective such that its “safety” is not such as 
“persons generally are entitled to expect”, resulting in death, personal injury or property damage, a 
consumer may institute proceedings for redress. Examples might include a smart home device which 
initiates actions causing a fire, a supposedly- ‘accurate’ smart self device which underreports fatal heart 
issues or a smart car with technology failures which cause a crash. 
In locating product safety ‘gaps’ pertinent to the consumer IOT, the changing market context is important 
to understand. ACMA found that globalisation, overseas manufacture and online shopping “present 
regulators with enforcement and compliance challenges”.1113 Health Canada point to increasing materials 
complexity, speedier innovation to market, new source countries for products, and increased consumer 
information demand, which “require a 21st century approach”.1114 CIOT fits entirely within this space: with 
global manufacture and (significant) e-commerce purchasing and supply.1115 Further the increasing role 
of software in safety-related products such as smart cars injects a new element. Half of all Australian 
                                                          
1108 See for example, the ACCC Product Safety Australia website, Standards Australia Product Safety Framework: 
Handbook 295, ISO standards on safe products and recall and related ISO Guides. 
1109 CAANZ, Interim Report, above n 840: 71. 
1110 ACL section 131. 
1111  ACL ss 129 and 130. The bans process is essentially an administrative one whereby the Commonwealth Minister must 
notify suppliers, provide them with an opportunity to request a conference, accept written submissions and then consider a 
permanent ban. CAANZ cites the small powerful magnets ban, which required the states to impose interim bans for safety 
reasons whilst the Commonwealth process occurred. In Canada in contracts, Health Canada relied upon a general 
prohibition upon unsafe products in the Consumer product safety Act (SC. 2010, c. 21) ss &(a) and 8 (a). See the case 
study in CAANZ, Interim Report, above n 840: 77- 78. 
1112 ACL Part 3-4 Information standards. 
1113 ACMA, ‘Submission to the ACL review” (2016): 8. 
1114 Health Canada, (2016) ‘Consumer Product Safety Act (CCPSA)’ http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/cps-spc/legislation/acts-
lois/ccpsa-lcspc/index-eng.php Note the CCPSA came into force on 20 June 2011. 
1115 The car industry has largely retained its franchised dealer sales model, which enables revenue through sales, but also 
through lucrative parts and service operations. Tesla has introduced online ordering through has opened factory-owned 
outlets for consumers to test drive their vehicles. It seems likely, as cars evolve into smart cars and virtual reality sales 
expand, that sales and servicing facilities may contract somewhat, though of course, parts and consumables such as tyres 
will presumably still require service outlets. It is an odd thought that VR may substitute for a test drive and that cars will 
ultimately drive themselves to be serviced. 
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safety-related software defect motor vehicle recalls for instance, have occurred from 2014 – March 2016 
inclusive, and the author’s study (Sched. 3)1116 reveals that 40 recalls – or 13% – involved thousands of 
consumers and resolution (mostly) by dealer-installed software update. While such recalls are gradually 
increasing,1117 it seems likely that a software-driven smart(er) fleet coupled with inexpensive over-the-air 
updates/ recalls, will positively increase the “fix” rate. But while voluntary recalls require mandatory 
notification, manufacturers may be less likely to formally notify borderline ‘safety’ fixes, or may circumvent 
the process by bundling safety (including security) with non-safety “updates” - mimicking smartphone 
industry practice. Such updates are quietly cheap, but may degrade “pre-market” safety and security by 
design approaches.1118  It also raises a question of increasing manufacturer control – over the product, 
its operation and performance data, consumer product information and over defect transparency and 
fixes – which may potentially diminish regulatory oversight, consumer information and the product liability 
regime itself. Indeed, consumer stakeholders argue that the law does not clearly incentivize design safety 
prioritisation, and that the regime is too reactively reliant upon post-market mechanisms; rather than pre-
market legal incentives. Graphic 4.1 shows Australian reliance upon post-market recall is significant and 
contrasts the significantly-larger UK market to illustrate that a general safety provision appears to 
incentivize pre-supply safety:1119 
 
 
                                                          
1116 Australian Government and ACCC, ‘Product Safety Australia’ (n.d. accessed 6 Mar 2017) 
<http://www.productsafety.gov.au/recalls?source=recalls> 
1117 From 5 (2013) to 12 (2015, 2016). Note that only “safety-related” recalls are counted. From the author’s experience in 
the car industry, manufacturers apply rigorous assessment processes in making that determination. Less serious fixes with 
no “safety” element are often conducted by “field actions” or the like. 
1118 While this seems logical, it should be noted that product testing will become infinitely more efficient and accurate using 
computer simulations based upon real-time vehicle data. However, most of that data is accrued post product release, which 
is precisely the point. Consider for example, the Google minor crash which led to a rerun of software to learn from the car’s 
“mistake”. Overall however, testing and fix resolution time should improve. 
1119 CHOICE suggest that Australia’s recall rate is “abnormally high”, justifying adoption of a UK-style general safety 
provision: CHOICE Submission Table 2, cited in CAANZ, Interim Report, above n 840: 73. It may be that the rate positively 
reflects post-supply recall assessment practices, absent the pre-supply ‘safety provision’ which in the UK incentivizes safety 
pre-supply, so reduces that necessity. What is incontrovertible, is that a safety provision provides a clear incentive to 
manufacturers, suppliers and importers (deemed manufacturers). 
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Graphic: 4.1 Consumer recalls: Australia & UK comparison 
Source: Author-adapted from CHOICE data1120 
 
 
Given the changing market context and the emerging role of hybrid CIOT products, reliance upon post-
market mechanisms such as voluntary manufacturer recall may become a critical weakness in preventing 
consumer information asymmetry, ensuring manufacturer transparency and in incentivising safety by 
design These weaknesses may be addressed through inserting a general safety provision into the ACL, 
to oblige manufacturer/ suppliers to only place “safe” products in the market,1121 and to support existing 
safety-premised provisions as to ‘acceptable quality’ and the defective goods regime.  
 
Further, regulators may need to adapt their role to scrutinise data handling and software updating 
practices, and to reduce increasing informational asymmetry by ensuring continued consumer and 
regulator ‘recall’ notification and regulatory capacity to oversee the market.   
 
These issues and others are fleshed out further through the following smart car hypothetical. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1120 CHOICE Submission Table 2, cited in CAANZ, Interim Report, above n 840: 73. 
1121 This terminology reflects the European Commission General Product Safety Directive (EC GPSD). Capturing the ‘supply 
chain’ reflects the need to incentivize all players to report back product issues and consumer feedback, and to have 
responsibility commensurate with their role in the product distribution process. See Ministerial Council of Consumer Affairs, 
‘Review of the Australian Consumer Product Safety System’ Options Paper (Aug 2005 accessed 2 Nov 2016) 
<http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/completed/product-safety/optionspaper> 
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4.6.1 A smart(ish) car hypothetical: Tesla Model S1122 
 
““What we’ve got will blow people’s minds, it blows my mind…” – Elon Musk1123  
 
This discussion borrows from real facts and rumours surrounding a tragic 2016 Tesla US fatality. Multiple 
long-running investigations1124 have concluded that Tesla has no liability nor was there a ‘safety defect’ 
under US law; as such this discussion is strictly hypothetical only.1125  Systems are as publicly 
described at the time of the accident.1126 Tesla have since released APv8 (+) software, which Elon Musk 
says, would avoid the accident which killed Joshua Brown.1127 
(a) What was (smart system) Autopilot as at May 2016?  
Autopilot is a computer-controlled safety system designed to enable highway driving without drivers 
steering, braking or accelerating.1128 It changes lanes upon driver signal, and has four elements: a forward 
                                                          
1122 Tesla’s Model S is a beautifully elegant, electric passenger motor vehicle. It is a leading smart(ish) car on road, and is 
supplied into Australia. 
1123 Fred Lambert, ‘Elon Musk on Tesla fully autonomous car: ‘What we’ve got will blow people’s minds, it blows my mind… 
it’ll come sooner than people think’ Elektrek Blog (3 Aug 2016 accessed 10 Aug 2016) <https://electrek.co/2016/08/03/elon-
musk-tesla-fully-autonomous-car-blows-mind/> 
1124The accident was investigated by the Florida Highway Patrol, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) and the 
NHTSA Office of Defects Investigation.  
1125 One media report suggests that charges are likely to be laid against the truck driver, but this had not occurred as at 
2016 end. The US Securities and Exchange Commission is also allegedly investigating Tesla for possible securities law 
breach in failing to disclose the fatal crash to investors as an event “material” to the share price, or a development a 
reasonable investor would consider important to the share value. Note that $2 billion in stock was sold on 18 May after the 
crash but Tesla asserts that it only retrieved the vehicle data that same day after it sent a representative to retrieve the data. 
Again, the crash type limited Tesla’s capacity to retrieve vehicle data remotely, and Tesla claim that their investigation did 
not conclude until the end of May- after the financing round had occurred:  Jean Eaglesham, Mike Spector and Susan 
Pulliam, ‘Tesla Owners Sue Over 'Half-Baked' Autopilot Software’ The Wall Street Journal (11 Jul 2016 accessed 6 Aug 
2O16) <https://www.wsj.com/articles/sec-investigating-tesla-for-possible-securities-law-breach-1468268385>  
1126 As at April 2017, the second-generation Autopilot has 8 cameras, all-around ultrasonic sensors, and a forward-looking 
radar. The new car systems are obviously upscaled upon those from just 12 months before: Fred Lambert, ‘Tesla updates 
data sharing policy to include collecting video in order to ‘make self-driving a reality’ electrek (6 May 2017 accessed 10 May 
2017) <https://electrek.co/2017/05/06/tesla-data-sharing-policy-collecting-video-self-driving/> 
1127 See for commentary, Nick Whigham, ‘Tesla Autopilot update to improve ‘probability of safety,’ Musk says’ (12 Sept 2016 
accessed 12 Sept 2016) < http://www.news.com.au/technology/innovation/motoring/tesla-autopilot-update-to-improve-
probability-of-safety-musk-says/news-story/70cfa99decd5209c4b52b0887a3e3e69> A putative class action was filed in April 
2017 as to the updated 2016-2017 models that allegedly contain “inoperative standard safety features, as well as faulty 
enhanced autopilot software for which customers paid a premium.”   The complaint is that Tesla sold vehicles with self-
driving hardware and charged customers for the software, which despite projections to the contrary has not yet been 
released As such vehicles are sub the previous model in terms of functionality: Sheikh, Kelner and Milone & Ors v. Tesla Inc 
dba Tesla motors Inc, Class Action Complaint for Violation of State Consumer Fraud Acts, Fraud by concealment and Unjust 
enrichment, United States District Court Northern District of California, Case No 5:17- cv -02193 (Filed 19 Apr 2017) 
<https://electrek.co/2017/04/19/tesla-owners-class-action-lawsuit-tesla-autopilot-2-0/> 
1128 The Manual reviewed here is no longer the relevant version – see Tesla Motors, ‘Model S Owner’s Manual US v 8’ 
(2016 accessed 2 May 2017) 
<<https://www.tesla.com/sites/default/files/model_s_owners_manual_north_america_en_us.pdf) describes Driver Assist 
components to include front and rear bumper ultrasonic sensors, a forward-looking windshield camera and front grill radar, 
plus electrically-assisted brakes and steering systems. Tesla Motors, ‘Model S Owner’s Manual v 5.9’ (2015 accessed 22 
May 2016): 65 <https://forums.tesla.com/en_AU/forum/forums/new-owners-manual>  
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long-range radar,1129 a forward-facing camera with image-recognition software, 12 ultrasonic around-car 
sensors sending high-frequency pulses to detect objects,1130 and a satellite-connected GPS feeding 
location data, speed limits, etc. to the vehicle computer.1131 In the Manual, it is not a “safety feature”;1132 
it is a “convenience feature…to reduce driver workload”.1133 For consumers, the difference is significant,  
from the name itself, to the “limitations”, “warnings” and vehicle alerts attached to its use and the general 
‘safety’ entailed by those systems individually and overall. 
(b) Causation 
Marketed as the “safest car on the road”1134 with Autopilot “beta technology” to make highway driving “not 
only safer, but stress free…”,1135  Tesla quickly blogged its accident explanation: 
“…a tractor trailer1136 drove across the highway perpendicular to the Model S. Neither Autopilot 
nor the driver noticed the white side of the tractor trailer against a brightly lit sky, so the brake 
was not applied. The high ride height of the trailer combined with its positioning across the road 
and the extremely rare circumstances of the impact1137 caused the Model S to pass under the 
trailer...1138 [author emphasis] 
 
                                                          
1129 It ranges up to 525 feet. 
1130 It ranges up to 16 feet. 
1131 Tesla, USA Today Research, as to the Model S, cited at Alexandra Mosher, ‘Tesla drivers play Jenga, sleep, using 
Autopilot in nerve-wracking videos’ USA TODAY (5 Jul 2016 accessed 6 Jul 2016) 
<http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/07/01/drivers-play-jenga-sleep-using-tesla-autopilot-nerve-wracking-
videos/86613484/>  
1132 These are Lane Assist, Collision Avoidance Assist and Speed Assist. 
1133 Tesla Manual, above n: 1128: 67. Elements include Traffic Aware Cruise Control, Auto steer, Auto lane change, Auto 
park and Auto High Beam Headlights. 
1134 Tesla Motors Inc., Website (AU) (accessed 2 Sept 2016) https://www.tesla.com/en_AU/models?redirect=no It has a five 
star safety rating from the NHTSA and ANCAP, and is ranked 99/ 100 points by US Consumer Reports. 
1135 Tesla Motors Inc, Website (AU) (accessed 2 Sept 2016) <https://www.tesla.com/en_AU/models?redirect=no> 
1136 In the US, this means an articulated truck. 
1137 Tesla claim: “Had the Model S impacted the front or rear of the trailer, even at high speed, its advanced crash safety 
system would likely have prevented serious injury as it has in numerous other similar incidents”: The Tesla team, ‘A Tragic 
Loss’ (30 Jun 2016 accessed 3 Jul 2016) <https://www.teslamotors.com/en_AU/blog/tragic-loss> 
1138 Ibid. 
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The car was traveling on US27 at 74 mph (120 km); nine miles (15 km) over the speed limit.1139 The 
brakes were not activated.1140  Witnesses claim that they heard a dvd playing in the wreckage. Tesla 
describe the accident as a “statistical inevitability” for driver assist technology,1141 though Autopilot should 
brake in response to “…any interruption of the ground plane in the path of the vehicle that cross-checks 
against a consistent radar signature,"1142  In other words, despite multiple component technologies -  
cameras, radar and ultrasonic sensors, GPS and Tesla real-time connectivity -  Autopilot did not ‘see’ a 
16-wheel truck and failed to brake.1143 
 
Graphic: 4.2 Florida traffic crash report 
Source: Florida Traffic Police1144  
                                                          
1139 The NTSB investigation confirmed the speed despite witness’s assertions it was travelling at “high speed”. Frank Baressi 
was the driver of the other vehicle claimed that the car went “…so fast through my trailer I didn’t see him.” Another driver 
claims the car passed her earlier on the same highway when she was doing 85 mph (137 kmh): Teslarati, ‘Witnesses reveal 
new details behind deadly Tesla accident in Florida’ (1 Jul 2016 accessed 4 Jul 2016) < http://www.teslarati.com/witnesses-
details-deadly-tesla-accident/> After the fatal collision, it travelled “hundreds of yards from the point of impact” through 
fences off road until colliding with a power pole: National Transport Safety Board, ‘Preliminary Report, Highway 
HWY16FH018’ (26 Jul 2016 accessed 2 Aug 2016) 
<http://www.ntsb.gov/investigations/AccidentReports/Pages/HWY16FH018-preliminary.aspx>. See also Neal E. Boudette, 
‘Tesla Faults Brakes, but Not Autopilot, in Fatal Crash’ The New York Times (29 Jul 2016 accessed 2 Aug 2016) 
<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/30/business/tesla-faults-teslas-brakes-but-not-autopilot-in-fatal-crash.html?_r=0>; 
Teslarati, ‘Witnesses reveal new details behind deadly Tesla accident in Florida’ (1 Jul 2016 accessed 4 Jul 2016) < 
http://www.teslarati.com/witnesses-details-deadly-tesla-accident/> 
1140 Tesla later retrieved accident data manually on 15 June, as the vehicle did not transmit it, presumably as its roof was 
sheared off in the accident.  
1141 Tesla Motors Inc., ‘Misfortune’ The Tesla Team (6 July 2016 accessed 10 July 2016) < 
https://www.tesla.com/en_AU/blog/misfortune> 
1142 Ibid. Auto Pilot has been available by software update (at additional cost) since January 2016 only. Tesla say that "the 
high, white side of the box truck" failed to interrupt the vehicle ground plane and according to Elon Musk on twitter, 
"combined with a radar signature… very similar to an overhead sign, caused automatic braking not to fire”: 
https://twitter.com/elonmusk/status/748625979271045121 
1143 Contrary to the Blog explanation, one media report suggests that in evidence to the Senate Commerce Committee, 
Tesla have asserted the accident was caused by a brake system failure, which they regard as separate from Auto Pilot: 
Boudette, above n 1139.  
1144 The Florida Highway Patrol report is here: Anjali Singhvi and Karl Russell, ‘Inside the Self-Driving Tesla Fatal Accident’ 
(updated 12 July 2016 accessed 2 Aug 2016) <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/07/01/business/inside-tesla-
accident.html>; Anjali Singhvi and Karl Russell, ‘Inside the Self-Driving Tesla Fatal Accident’(UPDATED July 12, 2016 
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(c) Applying the ACL 
Using the above accident causation,1145 the following ACL questions arise: 
▪ Did the vehicle have a safety defect under section 138? 
▪ Do any of the defences under section 142 apply? 
▪ Was the vehicle of ‘acceptable quality’ and ‘fit for purpose’ under the consumer guarantees?  
▪ Did Tesla’s Manual, in-car systems, marketing and other public representations breach sections 
18 and/ or 29? 
These first two are discussed in turn, although evidentially there is factual overlap between all four. 
(d) Section 138 “A safety defect” 
 
“Just putting a sticker on it saying ‘customer is responsible’ is a nightmare…”1146 
Model S is a hybrid software/ physical good and has a safety defect if its safety is not such as persons 
generally are entitled to expect1147 having regard to their marketing, any instructions or warnings, what 
might reasonably be expected to be done with them and the time of supply.1148 The test is objective and 
the court asks what members of the requisite class1149 to whom the product is marketed or directed, 
would “expect”. This does not mean a car must be entirely free of risk,1150 nor does it excuse a driver 
from taking “reasonable [care]”.1151 It requires a causal link between the alleged defect and injury,1152 
which may be  instructional, performance and/ or design-based.1153  For example, the designed interplay 
between the sensors failed to detect the truck and despite manual informational warnings as to “bright 
                                                          
accessed 2 Aug 2016) <https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/07/01/business/inside-tesla-accident.html>; Jordan 
Golson, ‘Read the Florida Highway patrol’s full investigation into the fatal Tesla crash’ The Verge (1 Feb 2017 accessed 20 
Feb 2017) <http://www.theverge.com/2017/2/1/14458662/tesla-autopilot-crash-accident-florida-fatal-highway-patrol-report>   
1145 Absent any independent human, environmental or third party contribution and ignoring common law actions and 
Australian compulsory motor vehicle accidents schemes: such as the fault-based common law tort of negligence (for the 
manufacture or supply of faulty goods and services); and in contract, the supply of goods in breach of express or (common 
law) implied warranties.  
1146 Olivia Solon, ‘Should Tesla be 'beta testing' autopilot if there is a chance someone might die?’ The Guardian (7 Jul 2016 
accessed 2 Aug 2016) https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/06/tesla-autopilot-fatal-crash-public-beta-testing> 
1147 ACL section 9. 
1148 ACL section 9(2) (a) – (f).  
1149 The class will consist of those to whom the product is marketed /directed, and includes the “astute and the gullible, the 
intelligent and the not so intelligent, the well-educated and the poorly educated”: Campomar, Ibid. 
1150 Merck Sharpe and Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v Petersen [2011] FCAFC 128; (2011) 196 FCR 145 
1151  Ransley v Black & Decker (A’asia) Pty Ltd (1977) TPR 138 per Smithers, J at page 140. 
1152 Carey-Hazell v Getz Bros and Co (Aust) Pty Ltd [2004] FCA 853; [2004] ATPR 42-014. 
1153 The ACL Explanatory Memorandum describes three types of safety defect:  design defects as those relating form, 
structure and composition; manufacturing defects are those which relate to the construction or assembly process, and 
instructional or warning defects are those caused by incorrect or inadequate product warnings or instructions: Cth of 
Australia, ‘Explanatory Memorandum’, Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1992’ (Cth): 8. 
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light”,1154 or mandating driver attention, would persons generally expect that the system would ‘see’ such 
a truck and apply (Auto)brake? It is a complex question. 
Tesla’s Manual and numerous in-car systems describe Autopilot as driver assist only and warn drivers to 
remain in control. A manual may render a product defective in Australia if its instructions were unclear or 
inadequate,1155 and causally related to the crash. Critics would argue that the Manual is too long, the 
non-exhaustive ‘bright light’ warning was inaccurate on the facts and Tesla alert systems were not ‘state 
of the art’ as known to Tesla (at least) - as evidenced by v.8 improvements.1156  
 
 
 
Graphic 4.3 Limitations warning  
Source: Author adapted from (former) Tesla Model S Manual1157 
 
As to their marketing, there is an argument that Tesla over-hyped Autopilot: the name is hyperbolic1158 
and connotes autonomous1159 systems capability from which the Manual, in-car and vehicle “warnings’ 
                                                          
1154 Tesla’s then applicable manual contained some long and unusual “non-exhaustive” “limitations” as to “driver assist”: 
including poor visibility caused by snow, fog, heavy rain; damage or obstructions caused by ice, mud or snow; narrow or 
winding roads; bumper damage or misalignment; ultrasonic wave interference; and extremely cold or hot temperature.  
1155 If the manual were instructionally defective, that is sufficient for both the manual and vehicle to be defective: McDermott 
v Robinson Helicopter Company [2014] QSC 34. As to the required causal connection see Merck Sharp & Dohme v 
Peterson [2011] FCAFC 128 
1156 These include more frequent steering wheel alerts, and turning off the AP system requiring the driver to stop the car and 
restart it. From youtube videos, the previous system has some time between alerts in highway conditions, such that quite 
long videos showed drivers hands-off the wheel. See for example this 2015 test drive: 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DbPqIHwSHos Note the driver is using AP in non-highway conditions which is contrary 
to manufacturer recommendations. As such it illustrates consumer over-confidence. 
1157 It is unclear if this Manual was current as at June 2016. It is thus used illustratively, as it provides Tesla’s warnings at 
some stage as to appropriate AP warnings. Note there are also in-car warnings, which the author has only viewed via 
youtube, so these are not expressly commented upon. A court would consider ALL warnings likely to have been seen by 
drivers collectively, and may find that even if drivers rarely read the Manual and even if the Manual was not instructively 
defective, the in-car warnings and alert-systems should have been sufficient. There is certainly an arguable case as to this. 
Note the driver (who was a Tesla aficionado) represented by his family will not apparently take legal action, though it seems 
likely this decision would be made post the NHTSA final report. Further the insurer may either avoid the claim alleging driver 
100% contribution, or sue Tesla: Dana Hull, ‘Tesla owner in Autopilot crash won't sue, but car insurer might’ Automotive 
News, Bloomberg (2016 accessed 28 Aug 2016) <http://www.autonews.com/article/20160819/OEM06/160819822/tesla-
owner-in-autopilot-crash-wont-sue-but-car-insurer-might> 
1158 Consumer Reports describes the name as “exaggerated” not descriptive and warns that consumers are being sold “a 
pile of promises about unproven technology”: [US] Consumer Reports, ‘Tesla’s Autopilot: Too Much Autonomy Too Soon’ 
(14 Jul 2016 accessed 16 Jul 2016) < http://www.consumerreports.org/tesla/tesla-autopilot-too-much-autonomy-too-soon/> 
The systems which make up Auto pilot likewise use exaggerated terminology given the extent of use warnings attached to 
their operation: Traffic-Aware Cruise Control, Autosteer, Auto Lane Change, Autopark, and Auto High Beam. 
1159 Dictionary.com "autopilot," in Collins English Dictionary - Complete & Unabridged 10th Edition. Source location: 
HarperCollins Publishers. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/autopilot. Available: http://www.dictionary.com/. Accessed: 
August 23, 2016. 
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then retreat. Elon Musk’s public representations: “We tell drivers to keep their hands on the wheel just in 
case, to exercise caution in the beginning” and in good road conditions “…people may [remove their 
hands from the steering-wheel], but we don’t advise that,” 1160 are lukewarm “warnings” at best.1161  Some 
consumers allege hands-and-feet-off1162 vehicle demonstrations and YouTube is peppered with 
consumers driving hands-off, which the media reported1163 and of which Tesla is likely to have been 
aware.  Consumer Reports (US) warned: “…consumers are being sold a pile of promises about unproven 
technology”.1164  
 
 
 
Graphic 4.4 Tesla Australian website 
Source: © Tesla Motors Inc., AU website, 2 December 20161165 
   
 
Competitors are even more critical and “beta software” is an oft-used basis for attack. In IT circles, this 
means pre-release software in test phase, (often) supplied on a no liability basis1166 - a concept foreign 
                                                          
1160 Fred Lambert, ‘Tesla reveals all the details of its ‘Autopilot’ and its software v7.0 [slide presentation and audio 
conference]’ Electrek (14 Oct 2015 accessed 2 Aug 2016) < https://electrek.co/2015/10/14/tesla-reveals-all-the-details-of-its-
autopilot-and-its-software-v7-0-slide-presentation-and-audio-conference/> 
1161 Mr Musk is a hugely successful thought-leader internationally. He attracts great media attention as a result: Sam Levin, 
Julia Carrie Wong and Nicky Woolf, ‘Elon Musk's self-driving evangelism masks risk of Tesla autopilot, experts say’ The 
Guardian (2 Jul 2016 accessed 2 Jul 20916) < https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/02/elon-musk-self-driving-
tesla-autopilot-joshua-brown-risks> Interestingly in August 2016 he announced an intention to wind back his public/ media 
work to focus back on his businesses. 
1162 Ronan Glon ‘Tesla owner blames Autopilot crash on bad marketing’ Leftlanenews (11 Aug 2016 accessed 30 Aug 2016) 
<http://www.leftlanenews.com/tesla-owner-blames-autopilot-crash-on-bad-marketing-92530.html> 
1163 See for example, Davies, Alex, ‘Obviously drivers are already abusing Tesla’s Autopilot’ (Oct 2015 accessed 20 Nov 
2016) < https://www.wired.com/2015/10/obviously-drivers-are-already-abusing-teslas-autopilot/> and the videos listed here: 
Mui, Chunka, ‘Is Tesla Racing Recklessly Towards Driverless Cars?’ Forbes (19 Apr 2016 accessed 26 May 32016) < 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chunkamui/2016/04/19/is-tesla-reckless/#4f9b968c1a26> See also Mosher, above n 1124. It is 
also reported that one of the videos was uploaded (purportedly) by Elon Musk’s wife, Tallulah Riley- see 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=iMiIP6_YFbM : Sam Levin and Nicky Woolf, ‘Tesla driver killed while using autopilot was 
watching Harry Potter, witness says’ The Guardian (2 Jul 2016 accessed 2 Jul 2016) 
<https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/01/tesla-driver-killed-autopilot-self-driving-car-harry-potter> 
1164 Above n 1158.  
1165  Tesla Motors Inc., AU website, 2 December 2016 <https://www.tesla.com/en_AU/models> 
1166  ‘…quality-control technique in which hardware or software is subjected to trial in the environment for which it was 
designed, usually after debugging by the manufacturer and immediately prior to marketing.’  Dictionary.com "beta-test," in 
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to the automotive industry. Even assuming Tesla owners are more IT-savvy than average vehicle 
purchasers, the term is confusing: is it a test phase version so less safe, or as Musk asserts, an 
extensively internally-validated system1167 inaccurately described to reduce consumer complacency?1168 
The German Federal Office for Motor Vehicles (KBA) has stated that had it been the EU assessor, it 
would not approve a “beta-phase version”.1169  A chorus of experts,1170 industry commentators1171 and 
consumer groups1172 concur: one analyst claimed that “traditional car manufacturers would never 
introduce a technology like this without it being fully tested,”1173 and an engineering professor, opined: 
  
“The general impression among competitors is that Tesla was jumping the gun. It was doing what 
computer companies do – putting the product out there when it’s not even close to perfect.”1174  
 
Product perfection is of course not a legal standard. The ACL is modified by defences, which are 
considered next.  
 
 
 
                                                          
Dictionary.com Unabridged. Source location: Random House, Inc. http://www.dictionary.com/browse/beta-test. Available: 
http://www.dictionary.com/. Accessed: August 23, 2016. 
1167 Elon Musk, ‘Master Plan, Part Deux’ Tesla Blog (20 July 2016 accessed 2 Aug 2016) 
<https://www.tesla.com/en_AU/blog/master-plan-part-deux> 
1168 For a view supportive of Tesla, see Zachary Shahan, ‘What Does Tesla Autopilot “Beta” Mean?’ CleanTechnica (11 July 
2016 accessed 2 Aug 2016) https://cleantechnica.com/2016/07/11/tesla-autopilot-beta-mean/ Note the author is a Tesla 
investor and electric car (and environment) enthusiast. 
1169 It is reported by Reuters that the KBA told the German newspaper Welt am Sonntag this. European approvals were 
granted in the Netherlands: Reuters, ‘German Authority Would Not Have Approved Beta-Phase Tesla Autopilot (10 Jul 2016 
accessed 2 Aug 2016) Fortune http://fortune.com/2016/07/10/german-beta-phase-tesla-autopilot/ See also 
http://ecomento.tv/2016/07/11/kba-untersucht-tesla-autopilot/ 
1170 See for example, the comments here: Chunka Mui, ‘Is Tesla Racing Recklessly Towards Driverless Cars?’ Forbes (19 
Apr 2016 accessed 26 May 32016) < http://www.forbes.com/sites/chunkamui/2016/04/19/is-tesla-reckless/#4f9b968c1a26; 
Matthew Dolan, ‘Why experts worry about the Tesla crash’ Detroit Free Press (2 Jul 2016 accessed 6 Jul 2016) < 
http://www.freep.com/story/money/cars/2016/07/01/experts-worry-tesla-crash/86611662/>; Krauss, Eric B., ‘Driverless Cars 
and the Law – The Tesla Accidents’ Husch Blackwell (8 Jul 2016 accessed 10 Jul 2016) < 
http://www.tmtindustryinsider.com/07-08-2016-driverless-cars-and-the-law-the-tesla-accidents/#page=1>; Sam Levin, Julia 
Carrie Wong and Nicky Woolf, ‘Elon Musk's self-driving evangelism masks risk of Tesla autopilot, experts say’ The Guardian 
(2 Jul 2016 accessed 2 Jul 20916) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/jul/02/elon-musk-self-driving-tesla-
autopilot-joshua-brown-risks> 
1171 “One auto industry analyst claimed that “traditional car manufacturers would never introduce a technology like this 
without it being fully tested”: Solon, above n 1146.  
1172 Above n 1158; Mark Rechtin, ‘NHTSA Opens Investigation into Tesla Self-Driving Fatality: Crash underscores 
Consumer Reports' concerns about beta testing self-driving technology on public roads’, (30 June 2016 accessed 16 Jul 
2016) < http://www.consumerreports.org/tesla/nhtsa-opens-investigation-into-tesla-self-driving-fatality/> 
1173 Solon, above n 1146.   
1174 Solon, above n 1146. 
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(e) ACL defences 
Assuming a ‘safety defect’, defences may apply as follows: 
 
Defence 
 
Hypothetical facts and law Outcome? 
The defect did not exist at 
the time of manufacturer 
supply1175 
The AP software was downloaded after vehicle delivery 
via an on-air activation update in January 2016. 
 
Technically it did not exist when the vehicle was 
supplied in 2015. But as hybrid device/ software, it is a 
‘good’ and as such the relevant supply date is when it 
was installed. 
 
X 
Defect caused by 
mandatory standard 
compliance 
 
Not relevant X 
The state of the art 
defence: 1176 
 
The state of scientific or 
technical knowledge at the 
time supplied, was not 
such as to enable the 
safety defect to be 
discovered.1177 
 
This means that 
objectively,1178 it was not 
such as to enable 
“anybody” to discover the 
defect.1179 
 
No adverse inference is 
drawn ONLY because the 
 
 
The test is not subjective. Given the accident scenario 
is a common driving situation, ‘anybody’ testing the 
vehicle under that normal situation could have 
discovered it.  
 
Manual warnings suggest Tesla were aware of issue(s) 
with ‘white light’, but is it reasonable to expect 
consumers to appreciate how that issue might arise or 
to view what occurred as within that warning? 
 
 
Consumers were warned to be alert – but vehicle 
reminder systems did not comport to the (highest) art at 
the time and have since been improved in v. 8.1182 No 
adverse inference applies. 
 
 
Possible 
defence  
                                                          
1175 Note the ACL definition as to manufacturer includes importers as deemed manufacturers, save for determining this 
question – the date of supply by the (real) manufacturer is the relevant date: ACL s. 7. 
1176 ACL section 142(c). Others include a defect (b) only due to compliance with a mandatory standard; (d) if the defect is 
attributable only to the design of other goods (i.e. a component), or their markings or instructions or warnings given by 
another manufacturer, where the safety defect is comprised in other goods. 
1177 The defence succeeded in two cases: as to a drug Vioxx which doubled the risk of heart attack, something unknown at 
the time of supply and the state of the art (scientific and medical knowledge) did not enable its discovery: Peterson, above n 
57.  In Graham Barclay Oysters Pty Ltd v Ryan [2000] FCA 853, an action alleging the supply of contaminated oysters failed 
as technical knowledge at the time did not allow the defect to be discovered without destroying the oysters.  
1178 Merck Sharp & Dohme (Australia) Pty Ltd v Peterson [2011] FCAFC 128; (2011) 196 FCR 145. 
1179 The explanatory memorandum to the Trade Practices Amendment Bill 1992, cited in Merck case, Ibid. 
1182 See the testimony of Dr Mary (Missy) Louise Cummings, above n 394. She explains behavioural traits which may make 
consumers too complacent, such as behavioural adaptation and over-reliance, informational deficits, risk over-
compensation, distraction, skill loss and driver vision research. 
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standard adopted was not 
the “safest possible,1180 or 
ONLY because Tesla later 
supplied safer goods.1181 
 
Driver vision research of which manufacturers should be 
aware suggests that the side-on tray truck crash 
scenario is a “well-known perceptual problem for human 
drivers”, so should have been a foreseeable issue for 
Tesla in its design and safety assessments.1183 
 
 
If the goods were 
comprised in other goods, 
the defect is attributable to 
the design; or markings; or 
instructions and warnings 
given by the manufacturer 
of those other goods. 
 
Tesla’s AP technology used (and possibly adapted, 
though reports are unclear) Mobileye technology, so 
this argument is likely more apposite were an action 
commenced against Mobileye. It illustrates a complex 
design chain, and how this defence might operate. 
 
After Tesla’s published accident explanation, Mobileye 
publicly denied that its system should have ‘fired’ at 
all:1184 
 
Today's collision avoidance technology, or 
Automatic Emergency Braking (AEB) is defined 
as rear-end collision avoidance, and is 
designed specifically for that. This incident 
involved a laterally crossing vehicle, which 
current-generation AEB systems are not 
designed to actuate upon.1185 
 
Mobileye has since claimed it ““expressed safety 
concerns regarding the use of Autopilot hands-free” to 
Elon Musk”.1186  It has since ended their relationship 
because Tesla AP marketing and warnings were 
sending “mixed messages” and their design was 
“pushing the envelope in terms of safety”.1187   
 
The author could not find any warning to consumers 
that AP was limited to rear-end collision avoidance 
only. Note that Tesla instruct that drivers must always 
 
Unlikely 
                                                          
1180 ACL section 9 (4). 
1181 ACL section 9(3). 
1183 Michael Flanagan, Research Associate Professor in human factors Group at U-M Transportation research Institute who 
researches driver vision, cited Ibid.  
1184 Golson, above n 1143. 
1185 Streetinsider, ‘Mobileye (MBLY) Issues Statement on Fatal Tesla (TSLA) Model S Autopilot’ (1 Jul 2016 accessed 15 Jul 
2016) 
http://www.streetinsider.com/Corporate+News/Mobileye+(MBLY)+Issues+Statement+on+Fatal+Tesla+(TSLA)+Model+S+Au
topilot+Crash/11793789.html The statement goes on to indicate the system will include “ Lateral Turn Across Path (LTAP) 
detection capabilities beginning in 2018, and the Euro NCAP safety ratings will include this beginning in 2020”. Note that 
Mercedes Benz warn against their PRESAFE® brake system not reacting to “crossing traffic” using the WARNING symbol in 
their C-Class Model Manual: Daimler AG, C-Class Owner’s Manual at page 87: Author’s own (2016). 
1186 Dana Hull, ‘Tesla Breakup with Mobileye Turns Ugly’ Bloomberg (16 Sept 216 accessed 20 Sept 2016) 
<https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-09-16/tesla-says-mobileye-tried-to-block-its-auto-vision-capability> 
1187  Eric Auchard and Tova Cohen, ‘Mobileye says Tesla was 'pushing the envelope in terms of safety' (14 Sept 2016 
accessed 20 Sept 2016) Reuters http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mobileye-tesla-idUSKCN11K2T8 Note Tesla issued a 
statement that Mobileye could not keep pace with their product changes. 
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remain in control and alert as AP is driver assist 
technology only.  
 
Consumer groups had called for Tesla to change the 
AP name given its aircraft connotations imply self-
driving. 
 
Table 4.1 ACL defences applied to certain facts 
Source: author 
 
 
As the table suggests, the defences require a factually complex analysis and judgement as to the balance 
of evidence. Some of the relevant factors as to ‘state of the art’ were considered by US regulators, but it 
remains possible that an Australian court, considering Part 3-5, might take a different view. 
 
(f) Reality Check: the (real) resolution 
 
Tesla has no liability under US public law. Both regulatory investigations1188 absolved Tesla, finding a 
crash attributable to human error caused by a truck driver, who entered the highway to turn right- perhaps 
expecting a speeding driver to slow a little in deference to size. As Tesla’s data showed, Autopilot was 
on, the braking system did not warn or deploy, and the driver took no avoidance action. The NHTSA 
(ODI)  examined if Tesla systems “may not function as designed, increasing the risk of a crash…”1189 It 
concluded that there were no defects in design or performance, finding that  Tesla’s system complied 
with the rear-end collision avoidance technology industry standard in 2016, and was not designed to 
perform in “all crash modes, including crossing path collisions”.1190 They benchmarked other 
manufacturers, concluding that none had cross-vehicle collision avoidance, without inferring Tesla’s 
leading market position as early-tech-release  innovator.1191 The implicit message is that so long as 
                                                          
1188 United States Department of Transport, NHTSA, ‘ODI Resume Investigation PE 16-007 re Tesla Motors Inc.’ (19 Jan 
2017 accessed 22 Jan 2017) <https://static.nhtsa.gov/odi/inv/2016/INCLA-PE16007-7876.PDF> (Tesla ODI Report). Note 
the ODI examined the following issues as to the design and performance of Tesla’s Autopilot system: “1) AEB design and 
performance in the subject Tesla and peer vehicles; 2) human-machine interface issues related to Autopilot operating mode; 
3) data from crash incidents related to Tesla’s Autopilot and AEB systems; and 4) changes Tesla has implemented in the 
Autopilot and AEB systems”: 2. 
1189 Tesla ODI Report, ibid. 
1190 That conclusion relied upon a 2011 report which validated Tesla’s radar/ camera-based system, and voluntary industry 
agreement to make AEB ‘standard’ by 2022, both of which may be outdated given the rapid pace of current smart car 
developments such as lidar and the like: Tesla ODI Report; above n 1188: [2.2] Objective Tests for Imminent Crash 
Automatic Braking Systems Final Report Volume 1 of 2. (2011). DOT HS811 521. National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration. Washington, DC. 
1191 At [2.2]: “ODI surveyed a dozen automotive manufacturers and several major suppliers to determine if the AEB 
capabilities in crossing path collisions had changed since the CAMP CIB project was completed. None of the companies 
contacted by ODI indicated that AEB systems used in their products through MY 2016 production were designed to brake 
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vehicles comply with overall industry levels - ‘state-of-the-art’ -  then anyone who aims and markets higher 
has some performance latitude, so long as the driver remains in control. Secondly, the ODI concluded 
that as an Advanced Driving System only, it requires full driver attention to monitor and take crash 
avoidance action. This is consistent with Tesla manuals and in-car information, but arguably less 
consistent with certain marketing representations and consumer expectations, which are of import to 
‘safety’ expectations under the ACL.  The ODI also noted that other jurisdictions dislike the name 
‘Autopilot’ but that was beyond scope,1192 which ignores an implied systems-capability impression 
conveyed to consumers.1193  It is perhaps an implicit ACL question to determine which consumers are 
more likely to see and remember: marketing and driving impressions, or systems warnings and Manual 
instructions.  
 
 
 
Graphic 4.5 Tesla vehicle dialog box 
Source: ODI Report page 6 
 
 
Tesla’s driver engagement system1194 was improved by update v 8.0; but the ODI report suggests that it 
conformed to design and industry practice at the time of the accident. The public policy interest in drawing 
no adverse inference appears also in the ACL. But again, this does not account for Tesla’s market or 
marketing position: Tesla arguably represented its product as peer-leading which implies (re)setting the 
                                                          
for crossing path collisions: Tesla ODI Report, above n 1188 :3. Note also that the technology exists at Google and 
Mercedes and other companies: they have just not yet approved it for consumer release. 
1192 Ibid: 3 at footnote 9 
1193 Ibid: 6. These are: 1) the owner’s manual; 2) new software release notes, which refer to the owner’s manual; 3) 
Autosteer user agreement required before first time use or post ignition cycles ending with Autosteer off; 4) a dialog box that 
appears every time Autosteer is activated reminding the driver to “Always keep your hands on the wheel” and “Be prepared 
to take over at any time” (Figure 4); 5) the user interface information, which appears at all times while driving - the blue 
shaded circle around the white steering wheel indicates Autosteer is in operation. 
1194 This is described as an “escalating series of warnings” as follows: (1) visual alert indicating that hands on the steering 
wheel are required; (2) If no response, an audible chime sounds after 15 seconds; then (3)  A pronounced chime after 10 
seconds; than (4)  within five seconds, the vehicle gradually slows in the lane. (5) warnings stop when the driver’s hands are 
detected and Autopilot operation resumes. Note v 8.0 has changed this to ‘strike out’ the system if the driver fails to 
respond. 
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mark.  Finally, the accident data suggested uncommon but foreseeable1195  “extended [driver] distraction” 
of up to seven seconds, which may constitute a safety defect, but the ODI accepted that design process, 
evaluation and testing justified finding otherwise.1196 In conclusion, the ODI noted Tesla crash rates – 
which (remarkably) after Autosteer, dropped almost 40%: 
 
 
 
Graphic 4.6 Tesla improved crash rates MY2014- 2016 
Source: Author using data from ODI Report, page 11. 
 
The ODI concluded that Tesla had informed consumers that driver attention remains required, that 
Advanced Driving Systems are for rear-end collisions and have limitations… in a variety of ways – 
“although not as specific as it could be.”1197  And drivers “should” read and heed warnings. It has closed 
its investigation, though reserved open findings as to whether a safety-related defect exists.  
 
(g) Hypothetical: a conclusion 
Joshua Brown was the first fatality in over 130 million miles driven by Tesla customers,1198 when the US 
national fatality average is one per 94 million miles.1199 Musk has argued an ethical duty to make AP 
available, asserting that Tesla’s autonomous technology saves lives: 
                                                          
1195 In the US, an unreasonable risk arising from reasonably foreseeable owner “abuse” may constitute a safety-related 
defect: United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 518 F.2d 420, 427 (D.C. Cir. 1975) It is likely that a similar finding would be 
made here, as it implies a failure to warn scenario, or at least one where consumer instruction and warnings are inadequate. 
1196 Ibid: 10 [5.3]. 
1197 Ibid: page 11. 
1198 The Tesla team, above n 1137. Note however that Rand Corporation suggest that verification that self-driving cars are 
“as safe” as human drivers, will require 275 million miles to be driven fatality free: Cummings, above n 394.  See also Rand, 
above n 232. 
1199 While this sounds a safety improvement, it is not determinative. Statistics may occur in clusters – for example were there 
suddenly two more fatal Tesla accidents in quick succession, the safety calculation would reduce to one in 43 million miles – 
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Once we get to the point where Autopilot is approximately 10 times safer than the US vehicle 
average, the beta label will be removed.1200 
 
There is no industry standard as to the “ten times” figure; 1201  nor is it binding, permanent or meaningful. 
Implied within the auto industry remit is the duty to take reasonable care, to design and test exhaustively 
for safety and to release products which “do no (foreseeable) harm”. Arguably, releasing a product 
disclaimed by impractical or obscure warnings, with permissive alert systems allowing non-recommended 
behaviors and which (it seems) were so rapidly, readily ‘fixable’, implies a deficiency in judgement, if not 
duty.1202 However, car safety is always a matter of degree and hindsight has many benefits.1203 
As this discussion suggests, the product liability provisions appear simple, but are evidentially difficult to 
establish and practically, rarely tested. In a ‘smart’ device context, this is exacerbated by complex 
technology, complicated causation and the human factor. It is impossible to know if there are few cases, 
or few because manufacturers and their insurers settle strong claims to avoid adverse judgements. 
Jurisprudentially it is not an optimal situation, as the indistinct ‘consumer expectation’ upon which Part 3-
2 relies and the uncertain ‘state of the art’ defence reveal, nor do private settlements clarify the law, 
expose consumer detriment or signal market (safety) issues. It is yet another justification for a general 
safety provision to require that all consumer goods must be reasonably safe -  to reinforce the safety-by-
design culture implicit in section 9(2) and Part 3-5.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
or half the national average. As such, the statistic alone does not evidence greater Tesla safety, nor does it point to accident 
responsibility. 
1200 Elon Musk, ‘Master Plan, Part Deux’ Tesla Blog (20 July, 2016 accessed 2 Aug 2016) < 
https://www.tesla.com/en_AU/blog/master-plan-part-deux> 
1201 Rand Corporation claim that verification of self-driving cars being as “safe as” human drivers, will require 275 million 
miles to be driven fatality: Cummings, above n 1182.  
1202 The NHTSA investigation had access to all Tesla’s test data and product design, testing etc. Their sole question was 
whether a “safety defect”, warranting regulatory intervention, existed. 
1203 Having sat on a recall committee at times, the author is aware though that the thought processes must anticipate 
everything conceivable that may go wrong and adopt reasonable mitigation strategies. Further, drivers have always died 
speeding in vehicles which could have had speed limiters installed, and the industry has never adopted, nor been expected 
to adopt, that type of precautionary design approach for passenger vehicles (c/f trucks). In Australia, the Advertising Code 
does prohibit depiction of excessive speed in the marketing of cars. 
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4.7   Other ACL CIOT ‘gaps’  
 
4.7.1  Strategic acquisition,1204 redundancy & ‘orphans”    
  
Strategic CIOT corporate acquisition is unlikely to constitute an anti-competitive misuse of market 
power,1205 but may adversely impact consumers by targeting data acquisition (Ch 6) and strategic 
redundancy. In mid-2016, consumers had a bad taste of the latter. Google had acquired Nest and then 
Revolv,1206 supporting their USD$300 smart home hub and app for a time, and then ‘bricking it’ in favour 
of their own (competing) platform. Users were quietly informed via Revolv’s website1207 that their smart 
home would soon remotely, become ‘dumb’:  
“They are not merely ceasing to support…they are advising customers that on May 15th a 
container of hummus will actually be infinitely more useful than the Revolv hub…”1208 
The case illustrates how CIOT mergers and acquisitions may leave devices ‘orphaned’,1209 consumers 
‘app-less’ with obsolescent systems and a dumb device, and even reduce overall market competition. 
Happily, after online pressure, Google finally posted a website “refund” offer… incidentally linking 
consumers to Nest.1210  
While the ACCC would express concern as to ongoing consumer guarantee responsibility, any 
misleading representations or whether the s. 58 repair obligations are breached, there may be no clear 
remedy. The law does not oblige consumer IOT devices to stay ‘smart’ for any given time, absent other 
conduct in breach of the ACL. It is a situation which may warrant attention, as such devices proliferate, 
may outlast anticipated durability and suppliers may come and go. 
                                                          
1204 The related issue of inter-company data sharing is considered in Ch. 5 as to privacy. 
1205 Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth) This is a structural form of consumer detriment. The ACCC Chair has 
recently cautioned that Australia’s economy is becoming increasingly concentrated which may adversely affect competition: 
Rod Sims, ‘ACCC Chairman discusses the increasing concentration in Australia’s economy’ (27 Oct 2016 accessed 28 Oct 
2016) < http://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-chairman-discusses-the-increasing-concentration-in-australia’s-
economy> 
1206 Adrian Kingsley-Hughes, ‘Nest to deliberately brick old smart hubs’ ZDNet (4 April 20016 accessed 7 Apr 2016) < 
http://www.zdnet.com/article/nest-to-deliberately-brick-old-smart-hubs/> 
1207 According to Arlo Gilbert, owners were  not directly notified even though Revolv/ Google have customer email 
addresses: Arlo Gilbert, ‘The time that Tony Fadell sold me a container of hummus’ Blog (3 Apr 2016 accessed 2 Sept 
2016) < https://arlogilbert.com/the-time-that-tony-fadell-sold-me-a-container-of-hummus-cb0941c762c1#.3r06trorn; Revolv, 
‘A letter from Revolv’s founders’ (n.d. accessed 7 Apr 2016) < http://revolv.com/> 
1208 Gilbert, ibid. See also Nick Statt, above n 351.   
1209 Google/ Revolv refused to pay consumers compensation, commenting (irrelevantly in Australia at least)) that the “one-
year warranty against defects in materials or workmanship has expired.” It implies their strategy was to maintain Revolv until 
the manufacturer warranties had expired, which they viewed discharged their responsibility. In Australia, the consumer 
guarantees may (usually) outlast the manufacturer’s (contractual) warranty. 
1210 http://revolv.com/ 
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4.7.2 Penalties 
"Some companies think they have a lot to gain from breaching our competition and consumer 
law; they should have much to lose as well…” – ACCC1211 
ACL remedies available to both the regulator1212 and successful plaintiffs1213 are extensive and flexible, 
but there is an obvious regulatory gap1214 -  pecuniary penalties are considerably lower than international 
and competition equivalents for “no strong policy reason”,1215 are lower than relative ASIC penalties,1216 
are attracting adverse judicial comment1217 and are too low to incentivize larger corporations,1218 such as 
those which dominate CIOT markets.1219  Penalties act as a prioritising incentive for compliance and a 
disincentive to illegality, as well as fund future enforcement actions.1220 Further, non-compliance – such 
as misleading practices in data gathering or exploitation of unfair terms - are increasingly prevalent or 
lucrative for CIOT entities, and “…should not be seen as a cost of doing business…”1221 Reflecting this, 
the CAANZ proposes parity with competition law penalties.1222    
                                                          
1211 Speech by Rod Sims, ACCC Chairman, ‘ACCC's Complaint and Enforcement Policy’ Committee for Economic 
Development of Australia, Sydney (19 February 2015). 
1212 ACL Part 5-1 details non-court imposed enforcement powers including undertakings, substantiation notices and public 
warning notices. CCA section 134A empowers the ACCC to issue infringement notices in lieu of civil penalty proceedings. 
1213 ACL Part 5 powers include injunctive relief, pecuniary penalties and compensation orders. 
1214 While submissions generally divided on predictable partisan lines, submissions to the ACL review from consumer 
groups, the Australian Labor Party and small business all agreed. These include ACCAN, CHOICE, Consumer Action Law 
Centre, Consumers Federation Australia, Legal Aid Qld, and many others: CAANZ, above n 840: 177. 
1215 ACCC Chair Sims quoted in Annabel Hepworth, ‘ACCC: ‘rogues don’t care about penalties’ The Australian (16 Apr 2016 
accessed 2 Aug 20116) <http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/accc-rogues-dont-care-about-penalties/news-
story/0bbdf40e76bd23c3ae273f54455b0a60>  
1216 The Corporations Law expresses penalties in penalty units, which are statutorily determined and subject to cpi. As a 
result, these have risen whereas the ACL penalties have not. 
1217 Gordon, J in the Coles case said that the ACL maximum penalty was “arguably inadequate for a corporation the size of 
Coles”: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v  Coles  Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1405 (22 
December 2014) The Full Court of the Federal Court suggested that the ACCC $6M penalty sought in the Nurofen case was 
“modest” and at the “bottom of the appropriate range”: Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Reckitt 
Benckiser (Australia) Pty Ltd [2016] FCAFC 181 (16 December 2016). Note ACCC penalty submissions are ‘advisory’ only 
(unlike some overseas jurisdictions) and courts are free to set higher penalties if justified- but recent court practice is to 
accept ACCC penalties if within a generally ‘permissible range’. 
1218 Sims, above n 1211. He cites the recent Flightcentre price fixing $11M penalty which was criticised in the financial press 
and Gordon, J’s comment in the Coles case that a regime of $1.2 per offence is “arguably inadequate” against a company 
with an annual $22B revenue: Federal Court of Australia, 22 December 2014, Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission v Coles Supermarkets Australia Pty Ltd [2014] FCA 1405 (22 December 2014) 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/FCA/2014/1405.html>    
1219 The maximum competition penalty is ten times the maximum consumer protection penalty. In the EU, GDPR Article 83 
contemplates administrative fines of 20 million EUR or 4% total worldwide annual turnover of preceding FY, whichever 
greater. 
1220 Increasing penalties, using some of the increased revenue from these penalties to increase the Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission’s (ACCC) litigation budget, and give the ACCC formal powers to conduct market studies in the 
public interest. 
This submission details the implications of that policy suite for enhancing the enforcement a 
1221 Sims, above n 842.   
1222 ACL Review, above n 840: 7. Proposal 18 as to maximum financial penalties proposes an increase to the greater of the 
maximum penalty ($10 million) or three times the value of the benefit a company (wrongfully) received or where not 
determinable, 10% of annual turnover for the previous year. Individuals face a $500 thousand fine. See also n 825. 
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4.8 Conclusion 
 
This chapter has looked at the ACL to locate potential gaps or uncertainties which may lead to consumer 
detriment. The proposals to address gaps are summarized below and complement to some extent the 
privacy considerations highlighted in the next chapter. 
 
 
CHAPTER 4: GAP SUMMARY 
 
  
Proposal 1: Act 
early 
Budget and plan resourced compliance-based consumer and provider 
education, regulatory stocktake and early enforcement action(s). 
 
Proposal 2: 
Sweep now  
 
Sweep large CIOT firms to ensure their terms comply with ss. 64 and 67 to 
underline consumer guarantee operation. 
Proposal 3: 
Clarify ‘freemium’ 
Clarify ACL section 5 so that ‘donated’ free(mium) goods which collect recipient 
data accessible to the donee or its affiliates, are treated as a supply of goods 
or services and receipt, an acquisition.  
 
Proposal 4: 
Clarify device 
‘accuracy’ 
 
ACCC guidance or industry standards to better clarify and communicate device 
accuracy performance levels to consumers, especially in smart self (health) 
categories 
Proposal 5: 
address ‘always-
on’ data 
collection  
Provide guidance that ‘always-on’ devices require explicit (not bundled) 
consumer consent and that collectors who transmit data to third parties must 
contractually ensure those parties comply with the terms of the initial consents 
 
Proposal 6: 
address safety 
privacy security 
& data use 
practices 
 
Expand section 29 to prohibit false representations as to ‘goods’ safety, 
privacy, security or related data collection and use practices. 
Proposal 7: 
increase 
penalties 
Harmonise consumer law penalties with competition penalties plus permit 
criminal penalties for breaches of section 18. 
 
Proposal 8: 
prohibit unfair 
practices 
 
Enhance ACL capacity to promote fairness, overcome unconscionability 
difficulties and enable examination of ‘unfair’ CIOT data gathering and use 
practices 
Proposal 9: act 
on unfair terms 
 
Unfair ‘contracts’: extend the law to contracts unfair ‘overall’   
Monetary penalties:  to incentivize compliance and the increase the risk of 
infringement. 
Representative actions should be available to regulators. 
Capture insurers: delete exclusion of the Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth). 
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Proposal 10: 
address 
Regulation 91 & 
section 58  
 
Update Reg 91 to remove disclaimer as to repairer liability for data backup to 
incentivize services backing-up consumer data if required. 
Update section 58 to include software ‘repair’ (patch) obligations 
Proposal 10: 
address digital 
‘goods’ definition 
 
Codify Valve by recognising that software-bundled goods providing multiple 
‘services’ are increasingly common ‘goods’ 
Proposal 11: 
address 
consumer 
guarantee 
disclosure online 
 
Mandate by regulation a model ACL disclosure format by comparative table 
such as that on Apple’s Consumer Law webpage. 
Adopt CAANZ consumer guarantee proposals  
Proposal 12: 
clarify product 
safety and 
liability 
Insert an ACL general safety provision  
Insert goods’ security as a ‘relevant matter’ for device ‘safety’ in section 9 
Clarify ‘state of the art’ defence 
Address data handling and software updating practices to manage increasing 
information asymmetry & to preserve formal regulator notification of recall.  
 
Proposal 13: 
address device 
‘orphans’ 
 
Amend section 58 to require ongoing device and app support for a reasonable 
period, commensurate with device cost and purpose. 
Table: 4.2 Summary chapter 4 
Source: Author 
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Chapter 5 Privacy law & CIOT: an overview    
 
The smog of personal data is the carbon dioxide of privacy. We’ve emitted far too much of it 
over the past decades, refusing to contemplate the consequences… And as computers are 
integrated into the buildings and vehicles and cities we inhabit, as they penetrate our bodies, 
the potential harms from breaches will become worse.1223 
  
Now is the time for setting privacy expectations…1224   
 
 
 
In 2016, the Australian Privacy Commissioner (APC) hailed a “resurgence” in privacy trust as an 
“information age concern”.1225 By mid-2017, he promises Australians IOT privacy guidance and updated 
big data and anonymization guidance.1226  It is an ambitious goal for an entity which, faced with budget 
pressure and threatened disbandment, has struggled in a privacy-adverse environment politically.1227 As 
the Commissioner admits, it has all been “…a little challenging, to say the least”1228 – and now, the 
consumer IOT has arrived. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
In this chapter, references to the Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) include the Australian 
Privacy Commissioner (APC) and vice versa, unless the context suggests otherwise. Timothy Pilgrim is both APC 
and Australian Information Commissioner as at 2017. 
1223 Cory Doctorow, ‘Forget Apple’s fight with the FBI – our privacy catastrophe has only just begun’ The Guardian (4 Mar 
2016 accessed 17 Apr 0216) < https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/mar/04/privacy-apple-fbi-encryption-
surveillance> 
1224 Michelle Dennedy, chief privacy officer for Cisco and founding member of EWF, quoted in Elizabeth Weise, ‘Hey, Siri 
and Alexa: Let's talk privacy practices - USA Today’ (2 Mar 2016 accessed 7 May 2017) 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/news/2016/03/02/voice-privacy-computers-listening-rsa-echo-siri-hey-google-
cortana/81134864/ The  EWF devised draft “voice guidance principles’ applicable to voice assistants such as Google home 
or Amazon’s Alexa (see Ch. 7):  Alta Associates, ’Executive Women’s Forum, ‘Voice Privacy Guiding Principles’ (Version 1, 
Feb 2016 accessed 15 Mar 2016) < http://c.ymcdn.com/sites/www.ewf-usa.com/resource/collection/CAA076AF-9566-4E1E-
9F07-6421154DE0EA/Voice_Privacy_Guiding_Principles_Public_(final).pdf>   
1225 Timothy Pilgrim, ‘Privacy Awareness Week Launch 2016 (16 May 2016 accessed 12 Jun 2016) Speech by Timothy 
Pilgrim to the PAW Business Breakfast, Sydney <https://www.oaic.gov.au/media-and-speeches/speeches/privacy-
awareness-week-launch-2016> He cited figures that 94% of Australians privilege trust over convenience in purchasing 
goods and services: Deloitte, above n 461.   
1226 “My priority is protecting Australian's personal information in the digital age. In the coming year my office will be 
addressing these modern challenges by releasing guidance on big data, de-identification and the Internet of Things to help 
businesses and the wider community take privacy in their hands”: Ibid. 
1227 “In the 2014 Budget the Government announced its intention to disband the OAIC, introduce new arrangements for the 
handling of FOI matters, and re-establish an Office of the Privacy Commissioner. However, as part of the 2016 Budget, the 
Government announced that it would not proceed… and returned funding to the OAIC to enable it to continue with its 
regulating role....” Pilgrim, Ibid.  
1228 Ibid. The Freedom of Information Amendment (New Arrangements) Bill 2014 fell into abeyance in the Senate when a 
federal election was announced. 
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5.1 Australian Privacy Law: a (brief) overview  
While neither privacy nor FOI are absolute rights; a proactive, pro-disclosure and by-design 
approach ensures businesses… meet their responsibilities to communities while building 
trust.1229 
“Privacy isn’t dead; it’s just going through an identity crisis…”1230 
Privacy is an international human right.1231 For advocates, it is an “asset”1232 under serious threat; for its 
critics, an anachronism long “dead”, and for privacy regulators, a slippery issue, legislatively ‘repackaged’. 
Australian privacy is a non-absolute, competing right.1233 There is no statutory or common law1234 right to 
privacy,1235 and despite commitments to international instruments,1236 declarations1237 and guidelines, it 
is questionable whether Australian laws create an internationally- consistent regime in OECD terms.1238 
While data breach disclosure laws finally commence in 2018,1239 online privacy has declined1240 through 
                                                          
1229 Timothy Pilgrim, Commissioner’s Message, OAIC, Corporate Plan 2016- 17 <https://www.oaic.gov.au/about-
us/corporate-information/key-documents/corporate-plan-2016-17>  
1230 Colin Wood ‘Rethinking Privacy: Though Technology has Outpaced Policy, That's No Reason to Give Up’ Government 
Technology  (2 June 2014 accessed 30 Mar 2015) http://www.govtech.com/data/Rethinking-Privacy-Though-Technology-
has-Outpaced-Policy-Thats-No-Reason-to-Give-Up.html 
1231Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, to which Australia is a signatory, states: (1) No one 
shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful 
attacks on his honour and reputation.  (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such interference or 
attacks.  Note the Victorian and ACT Human Rights legislation picks up on clause (1) but not (2), which Clarke suggests, 
makes them virtually inoperative in privacy terms. See also, Article 12 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
1232 Natasha Maclaren-Jones, Foreword, cited in NSW Legislative Council Standing Committee of Law and Justice, ‘Final 
report: remedies for the serious invasion of privacy in New South Wales’ (3 Mar 2016 accessed 10 Mar 2016):9 < 
https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/committees/DBAssets/InquiryReport/ReportAcrobat/6043/Report%20no%2057%20Rem
edies%20for%20the%20serious%20invasion%20of%20.pdf> 
1233 Public policy in Australia clearly recognises competing rights and interests, such as (limited) free speech, (limited) free 
media, the free flow of information and business’ right to efficacy: Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) s 16A. See also the Minister’s 
Second Reading Speech: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 12 April 2000, 15749 
(Attorney-General D Williams), 15749–15750. Privacy may conflict with but also complement free speech – for example, in 
the US, the First Amendment protections as to freedom of speech and association, also protect privacy: Daniel J Solove, 
Marc Rotenberg and Paul M Schwartz, Information Privacy Law (Aspen, 2nd ed, 2006) 33. 
1234 The High Court left the possibility open in Australian Broadcasting Commission v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 
CLR 199, but subsequent cases have not fundamentally clarified the position. As such legal uncertainty persists.  
1235 The ALRC report indicates this contrasts with the UK, Canada, USA and New Zealand: Australian Law Reform 
Commission (ALRC), ‘Serious Invasions of Privacy in the Digital Era’ Final Report (June 2014 accessed 3 Apr 2015) 22 
[1.24- 1.31] <https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/serious-invasions-privacy-digital-era-alrc-report-123> 
1236International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CCPR.aspx> 
Art 17 is referenced in Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) Preamble and s 2(A)(a).  
1237 International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network (ICPEN), above n 18. 
1238 OECD, Recommendation of the Council Concerning Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data (2013 accessed 5 Jun 2016) <https://www.oecd.org/sti/ieconomy/2013-oecd-privacy-guidelines.pdf> 
1239 The (second) current bill is the Privacy Amendment (Notification of Serious Data Breaches) Bill 2015 (Cth), which is still 
before parliament. One exception is health records, which entail sensitive personal information so the Personally Controlled 
Electronic Health Records Act 2012 imposes mandatory data breach requirements upon the System Operator, registered 
repository and portal operators (as defined). These are subject to civil penalties for failing to comply with section 75 as to 
mandatory data breach reporting. The Privacy Act 1998 also simultaneously imposes privacy-related obligations.  In 2014, 
under a voluntary notification system, the Privacy Commissioner commented that “…a number of high profile breaches were 
not reported to us…” – the figures have improved from 61 (2012-13), 67 (2013-14) to 110 (2013-14), though are still very 
under-reported. 
1240 The then Communications Minister stated that the bill ensure retention for two years and “…does not expand the range 
of telecommunications metadata which is currently being accessed by law enforcement agencies in Australia”: Minister for 
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recent mandatory data retention laws.1241 In this fraught legal environment, the consumer IOT will 
challenge the Australian privacy regime and its regulator’s capacity to respond.  
 
The principal privacy statute is the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (PA):1242 which establishes a remedial1243  set 
of technology-neutral (feel-good) principles but as Wigney, J comments: 
 
“…a more labyrinthine, opaque piece of legislation I have yet to discover… legislative porridge…. 
Where almost every word is defined in ways that are counter-intuitive...”1244 
 
The 13 Australian Privacy Principles (APP)1245 are designed to, inter alia,1246 regulate1247 the collection, 
use, storage and disclosure (collectively handling) of ‘personal information’ (PI) and ‘sensitive information’ 
(SI), and to provide consumers with access and correction rights.1248 The PA applies to any act or practice 
with an Australian “link”,1249 including foreign entities which ‘carry on business’  in Australia (see Ch 4) 
1250  and collect or hold PI in Australia.1251 The former is broadly interpreted as Valve suggests, and 
                                                          
Communications Malcolm Turnbull, House of Representatives Hansard, 30 October 2014, p.12560. Note however that the 
APC released a privacy business resource advising that metadata is subject to the APPs – so business awaits Telstra’s 
appeal (discussed below) to ascertain the true position. 
1241 The Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Bill 2015 (Cth) was designed to 
prevent the “…further degradation of the investigative capabilities of Australia's law enforcement and national security 
agencies”: Ibid:12562. When passed, it amended the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) s187AA 
to specify that telecommunications companies are now obliged to store (inter alia) computer and phone metadata including 
subscriber/ account holder details, and communication data as follows – time, date, location and duration, source 
destination, service type used (e.g. email, SMS, social media or voice) and delivery services type (e.g. cable, Wi-Fi, ADSL, 
VoIP). For ‘privacy reasons’ the Act specifically excludes storage of the content of phone calls or emails, or web browsing 
history: Dean Carrigan, John Gallagher and Yvonne Lam ‘Controversial mandatory data retention laws passed’ Clyde & Co 
LLP (30 March 2015 accessed 31 Mar 2015) <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=ef4d20da-0bd0-4045-ae8d-
07b14992d6d5> 
1242 Note that State agencies are regulated by state and territory legislation – excluding Western Australia & South Australia: 
Information Privacy Act 2014 (ACT), Information Act 2002 (NT), Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 
(NSW), Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) , Personal Information Protection Act 2004 (Tas), Privacy and Data Protection 
Act 2014 (Vic). 
1243 As such, it “should be construed so as to give the fullest relief which the fair meaning of its language will allow…”: per 
Warren, J citing Bull v Attorney-General (NSW)(1913) 17 CLR 370 [384]. 
1244 Wigney, J of the Federal Court cited in Peter Leonard, ‘Australian privacy Law: swimming in the porridge of offshore 
disclosure; G+T (6 Nov 2014 accessed 28 May 2015) < http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=61f5ad3e-95cf-4576-
a128-c112278b2790>  
1245 Schedule 1 of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). The former principles were in the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy 
Protection) Act 2012. 
1246 Part III applies to the handling of credit-related personal information for inclusion on individuals’ credit reports.  
1247 The Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) also has obligations under (largely) sector-specific legislation, 
including the Telecommunications Act 1997 and the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 for 
consultative, monitoring and compliance functions, information handling under the eHealth records system: Personally 
Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 etc. See Mathews-Hunt, above n 151. 
1248 It also regulates sensitive health information for health and medical research purposes and individual tax file numbers 
under the Data-matching Program (Assistance and Tax) Act 1990 (Cth). 
1249 PA section 5B(1A). 
1250 The OAIC suggest that judicial guidance may be derived from the ACL cases in this regard.  
1251 PA section 5B(3). 
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requisite ‘collection’ occurs if from an individual physically in Australia,1252 (which usually corresponds to 
device  location). Further, while many CIOT providers may are not in Australia, there is a “link” if it (inter 
alia) markets to or targets services at Australians and it collects PI from Australians. As such the PA will 
apply to most CIOT situations; the question considered next, is how well. 
 
5.2 Gap analysis  
   
CIOT industry practices which do not ‘promote the protection of the privacy of individuals’1253 will infringe 
the APP regime,1254 and regulatory ‘gaps’ will diminish privacy. Inadequate OAIC enforcement de-
incentivizes compliance,1255 and issues detection is unlikely absent a complaint or (rare) regulatory 
audit1256 and ill-informed consumers cannot complain or give up faced with weak outcomes little-justifying 
the effort. This systemic latent detriment diminishes privacy, nor can the system self-correct through 
consumer behaviour.1257 Perhaps reflecting this market failure, the Productivity Commission recently 
recommended a new consumer right to access, correct, transfer, and opt out of consensual data 
collection.1258 It recommends that the ACCC – not the OAIC1259  -  administers the legislation.1260  
Potential PA gaps are as follows: 
                                                          
1252 Hall & Wilcox, ‘Lessons from the Ashley Maddison Investigation-  Part 2’ (28 Sept 2016 accessed 2 Oct 2016) 
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=6c58d9ea-13f2-4b56-968f-
56bf7154949d&utm_source=Lexology+Daily+Newsfeed&utm_medium=HTML+email+-+Body+-
+General+section&utm_campaign=Lexology+subscriber+daily+feed&utm_content=Lexology+Daily+Newsfeed+2016-10-
03&utm_term= > 
1253 This is an object to the PA, section 2A(a). 
1254 The APPs (Sched. 2) are: 1. Open and transparent management of personal information (PI); 2. Anonymity and 
pseudonymity; 3. Collection of unsolicited PI; 4. Dealing with unsolicited PI; 5. Notification of the collection of PI; 6. Use or 
disclosure of PI; 7. Direct marketing; 8. Cross-border disclosure of PI; 9. Adoption, use or disclosure of government-related 
identifiers; 10. Quality of PI; 11. Security of PI; 12. Access to PI; 13. Correction of PI. The long form is accessible here: 
<https://www.oaic.gov.au/individuals/privacy-fact-sheets/general/privacy-fact-sheet-17-australian-privacy-principles> 
1255 OAIC, Privacy Action Regulatory Policy (June 2015 accessed 3 Jan 2016) <https://www.oaic.gov.au/about-us/our-
regulatory-approach/privacy-regulatory-action-policy/> 
1256 For example, in 2015, the APC announced “We are just getting ready to conduct an assessment of the online privacy 
policies of 21 entities against the requirements of Australian Privacy Principle 1. These assessments looked at whether the 
policies were clearly expressed and up-to-date, covered the content and contact requirements and were available in an 
appropriate form”. Pilgrim, above n 231.   
1257 For example, the author fell victim to the Adobe hack (Aug 2015), and had to change an email address held for over a 
decade due to spam. A blood-donor friend was victim to the Red Cross data breach, but was told that his name, age, email 
address was not a ‘serious’ breach. In both cases, consumers are left feeling vulnerable, inconvenienced and annoyed. 
1258 Productivity Commission, above n 190. This is in the proposed Data Sharing and Release Act. 
1259 The draft report also (correctly) suggests that as privacy regulator in a big data context, the OAIC may need additional 
resources: Ibid: 351. 
1260 This supposedly reflects the ACCC competition and consumer policy jurisdiction, but illustrates the converging nature of 
consumer privacy and consumer protection regulation. 
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5.2.1 Defining PI & SPI 
In 2014, international privacy authorities declared CIOT data to be PI: 
 
“Internet of things’ sensor data is high in quantity, quality and sensitivity. This means the 
inferences that can be drawn are much bigger and more sensitive, and identifiability becomes 
more likely than not… Considering that the identifiability and protection of big data already is a 
major challenge, it is clear that big data derived from internet of things devices makes this 
challenge many times larger. Therefore, such data should be regarded and treated as personal 
data.”1261 
 
In Australia, regulatory uncertainty as to fundamental PA concepts is troubling. The nature of what is 
“personally identifiable” is changing, as data fusion and de-anonymisation/ re-identification capacities 
increase exponentially, but Australia law is not evolving apace. Under the PA, PI means “… information 
or an opinion about an identified individual, or an individual who is reasonably identifiable, whether true 
or not or whether recorded in material form or not” ...1262 Sensitive PI (SI) attracts greater protection1263 
and concerns an individual’s: 
 
(a)(i) racial or ethnic origin; or (ii) political opinions; or (iii) membership of a political association; 
or (iv) religious beliefs or affiliations; or (v) philosophical beliefs; or (vi) membership of a 
professional or trade association; or (vii) …trade union; or (viii) sexual orientation or practices; or 
(ix) criminal record; or  
(b)  health… or  
(c) non-health genetic information, about an individual; or  
(d)  biometric information … used for… automated biometric verification or identification; or (e) … 
templates.1264 
 
The 2015 OAIC Guideline confirms that most consumer IOT data is PI: registration/ warranty details, such 
as name,1265 address, birth date, telephone number (etc.)1266 and credit information1267 are all cited 
examples. Device-collected data and software may also access or yield PI: 
                                                          
1261 Mauritius, above n 736.   
1262 The definition concludes with whether the information or opinion is true or not, or whether recorded in material form or 
not. Note section 187LA of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 extends the meaning of PI to cover 
information kept under Part 5-1A of that Act. 
1263 See for example APP 3, 6 and 7. The OAIC acknowledges that SI handling breach may result in discrimination, 
mistreatment, humiliation, embarrassment and undermine personal dignity: OAIC, Guidelines, supra n 1299 :[B140- 141] 
1264 PA section 6. 
1265 Note that surname often reveals ethnic derivation – but often not. As such the Guidelines state that surname alone is not 
SI, nor is every opinion, belief or value. Clearly the facts of each circumstances are relevant. For example, surnames of 
refugees on a boat coming to Australia may become SPI if they indicate ethnic derivation or political affiliations,  
1266 Other examples include medical records, bank account details and commentary or opinion about a person.  
1267 This is provided if device or software licensing, subscription or ongoing payments arise. For example, there is a strong 
suggestion that Tesla may make certain software ‘upgradeable’ via additional or subscription payments. They offer access 
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“…photographs, IP addresses, 1268  Unique Device Identifiers and other unique identifiers, 
personal contact lists, which reveal details about a user’s social connections and the contacts 
themselves, voice print and facial recognition biometrics, because they identify and collect unique 
characteristics of an individual's voice or face, location information, because it can reveal user 
activity patterns and habits and, as a consequence, identity.”1269  
 
Mobile devices commonly hold PI, IP addresses1270 are usually PI1271 and even dynamic IP addresses -  
if as the EU Court of Justice recently found, the collector “has the legal means which enable it to identify 
the data subject with additional data which [it]… has about that person.”1272 All this is consistent with 
international precedents,1273 reports1274 and regulation1275 and portends a necessary expansion of PI 
                                                          
to vehicle service repair manuals, service documents, wiring diagrams, and part information currently by time-period 
subscription, but do not have a dedicated link to Australia. See their UK link here: <https://service.teslamotors.com/> 
1268 See also the EU Working Party 29 (2008) Opinion: EU, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 1/2008 on 
data protection issues related to search engines’ (Adopted 4 Apr 2008 accessed 2 Aug 2016) < 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/policies/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2008/wp148_en.pdf> and the English Court of Appeal in Google 
Inc. v Judith Vidal-Hall and others [2015] EWCA Civ 311, 27 March 2015. The Court of Appeal held there is a serious case 
to answer that third-party cookie-collected online behavioural data is personal data, even though not connected to other 
information directly identifying an individual 
1269 OAIC, ‘Mobile privacy: a better practice guide for mobile app developers’ (Sept 2014 accessed 21 Jan 2016) < 
https://www.oaic.gov.au/agencies-and-organisations/guides/guide-for-mobile-app-developers>  
1270 IP addresses are a digital “fingerprint” left by a device which accesses the internet – so for example, internet-connected 
CIOT devices have an IP address. They are strings of numbers which identify a device to the ISP and website owners – 
usually only one is attached per household or subscriber. Dynamic IP addresses however change which makes them less 
likely to be PI unless combined with other data (such as date and time) which may identify an individual. In that context, 
these are likely to be PI: Mason Hayes and Curran, ‘Are Dynamic IP Addresses Personal Data?’ (29 September 2016 
accessed 20 Oct 2016) http://www.mhc.ie/latest/blog/are-dynamic-ip-addresses-personal-data See also Israel v Bank 
Ha’Po’alim, cited in EU Data Protection Working Party, Opinion 6/2009 on the level of protection of personal data in Israel 
(2009) <http:// ec.europa.eu/justce/data-protection-/article-29/documentation/optinion-
recommendation/files/2009/wp165_en.pdf> Note the now-defunct Obama US FCC proposed rulemaking which defines PI as 
“any information linked or linkable to an individual” with an opt out of IP address use: Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), ‘In the Matter of Protecting the Privacy of Customer of broadband and Other Telecommunications Services’ Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (1 Apr 2016 accessed 2 Aug 2016) (WC Docket No. 16-106) < https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-
releases-proposed-rules-protect-broadband-consumer-privacy> 
1271 OAIC, supra n 1306: 20 [paras B.92].  
1272 Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik Deutschland, Case C-582/14, the CJEU found that “...dynamic IP address registered by 
an online media services provider when a person accesses a website that the provider makes accessible to the public 
constitutes personal data within the meaning of that provision, in relation to that provider, where the latter has the legal 
means which enable it to identify the data subject with additional data which the internet service provider has about that 
person.” The case concerned an internet service provider. Mason, above n 1270.  
1273 See Canada, NZ and US cases respectively: Gordon v Canada (Health) (2008) FC 258; Proceedings Commissioner v 
Commissioner of Police [2000] NZAR 277; American Civil Liberties Union v Clapper et al, 785 F 3d. 787 (2nd Cir. 2015) In 
the latter the Second Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed the view that identification of a specific plaintiff was ‘speculative’ by 
evidence that the NSA searched the files regularly, which included the plaintiff’s.   
1274 See for example, Executive Office of the President, above n 41 (Big Data). 
1275 Directive of the European Parliament and Council, Directive 95/46 EC [1995] OJ L 281 refers to a person who can be 
identified “directly or indirectly” including by reference to identifiers (name, ID number, location data, an online identifier):   
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons 
with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data (General Data Protection Regulation) 
(GDPR) <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=OJ%3AL%3A2016%3A119%3ATOC>; The UK Data 
Protection Act 1988 provides that PI means “…data which relate to a living individual who can be identified—(a) from those 
[164] 
 
categories to adapt to consumer IOT (and other) technologies. However, a recent much-anticipated 
decision on the former PI definition1276 has exposed a ‘gap’ or at best, raises legal uncertainty as to PI 
scope and “identifiability” under the PA. As Anna Johnston put it: 
 “Well. That was a curve ball no-one saw coming.”1277 
In Grubb v. Telstra,1278 the APC determined that mobile phone metadata1279 (including geolocation) was 
PI, identifying an individual through matching device identifiers, IP address and Telstra’s customer 
database,1280 to which Telstra must provide access under NPP6.1(APP 12). After a successful AAT 
appeal,1281 the APC appealed to the Full Federal Court,1282 which arguably, due to the narrow appeal 
grounds,1283 adopted a literal, non-purposive1284 approach, upholding the AAT decision. The case turned 
upon whether the metadata was “about”1285 an individual1286 (which Telstra had acknowledged)1287 or the 
                                                          
data, or (b) from those data and other information which is in the possession of, or is likely to come into the possession of, 
the data controller…’(etc.) 
1276 PI was then defined (relevantly) as “information or an opinion… about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can 
reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion…” The current definition (relevantly) is “… information or an 
opinion about an identified individual, or an individual who is reasonably identifiable.” 
1277 Anna Johnston, ‘Mobiles, metadata and the meaning of ‘personal information’, SalingerPrivacy Blog (19 Jan 2017 
accessed 3 Feb 2017) <https://www.salingerprivacy.com.au/2017/01/19/federalcourtdecision/> 
1278 Ben Grubb v Telstra Corporation Limited [2015] AICmr 35 
1279 ‘Metadata’ is data about data; that is, not what people type on a device or say over the phone, but rather the footprint 
that's left behind. It is variously officially defined. See the dataset required to be retained under the mandatory data retention 
scheme here: https://www.ag.gov.au/NationalSecurity/DataRetention/Documents/Dataset.pdf> See also page 46 here: 
Australian Government, Attorney-General’s Department, ‘Departmental submission Inquiry into the comprehensive revision 
of the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 
Senate Legal and Constitutional Affairs References Committee’ (2016 accessed 5 Mar 2017) 
<http://www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/Senate/Legal_and_Constitutional_Affairs/Comprehensive_revi
sion_of_TIA_Act> 
1280 While not a straightforward exercise, Telstra used the process to assist law enforcement agencies regularly: Eli Fisher, 
‘Developments in Data Driven Law: A Discussion with Peter Leonard’ G+T (23 Sept 2016 accessed 30 Sept 2016) < 
https://www.gtlaw.com.au/?q=developments-data-driven-law-discussion-peter-leonard> 
1281 Decision [2015] AATA 991 (18 Dec 2015) per Dep President S A Forgie. 
1282 Privacy Commissioner v Telstra Corporation Ltd, No VID 38/2-16, Full Federal Court of Australia (Dowsett, Kenny and 
Edelman, JJ)  
1283 The court stated: “There was no ground of appeal which alleged that the AAT erred in its conclusion that none of the 
information was about Mr Grubb. In other words, the Privacy Commissioner did not seek to establish that any of the 
information was about Mr Grubb”: Johnston, above n 1277. 
1284 The court referred to PA objects of protecting individual privacy as “aspirational” and uninfluential in its determination. It 
stated: “this appeal concerned only a narrow question of statutory interpretation which was whether the words ‘about an 
individual’ had any substantive operation’: Ibid: [73] 
1285 This word still appears in the definition, though slightly differently. PI was then defined as “information or an opinion… 
about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, from the information or opinion…” The 
current definition is “… information or an opinion about an identified individual, or an individual who is reasonably 
identifiable.” 
1286 The AAT’s finding conflicts with European and US authority. For example, in Patrick Breyer v Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland, Case C-582/14, the independent advisor to the EU’s highest court found that IP addresses are PI where they 
are handled by a website operator. a dynamic IP address and browsing date and time were under certain circumstances (i.e. 
where the information provides the ability to identify the individual) personal data under the EU legislation. 
1287 In the AAT, Telstra’s legal counsel said: “I’m dealing here with the question of mobile network data in relation to Mr 
Grubb’s mobile telephone service. It’s difficult for me to see how that could not be information about him. It’s information 
about his service”: Johnston, above n 1277. 
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network itself,1288  and concluded the latter, even though Telstra could identify Mr Grubb (with effort) by 
combining multiple databases.1289 Consistent with its narrow analysis, the court conflated object with 
subject, confusing the primary collection purpose, with what data is ‘about’,1290 though acknowledged that 
information may have multiple subject-matters and that context (including linkage) may render data 
‘about’ an individual. The decision is heavily criticised:1291 it has “gutted”  PI,1292 defies international 
precedent1293 and lacks any objective PI-definition methodology.1294 Consumer IOT data raises the same 
questions: it may reliably distinguish or analytically infer user identity, even in shared environments, it 
involves device IP addresses and geolocation data, and commonly involves multiple-subject information 
-  for example, running/ driving data is about the distance/ car but also, the runner/driver.1295 How the 
decision impacts upon the present (distinguishable) PI definition is questionable. PI was then (relevantly) 
“information… about an individual whose identity is apparent, or can reasonably be ascertained, from the 
information…” The current definition (relevantly) refers to “… information … about an identified individual, 
or an individual who is reasonably identifiable.” While the language differs, it is difficult to see why the 
court’s interpretation would1296 if metadata were considered again: 
                                                          
1288 AAT Deputy President Forgie decided that unless an individual is identified in the information intrinsically, then the first 
question is whether that information is “about an individual”; if not, then the second question as to whether identity can 
“reasonably be ascertained” is redundant. The author respectfully suggests that were the case about the current PI 
definition, the question could be split into: is the information about an identified individual, and if not, then is the individual 
‘reasonably identifiable’. On the facts, the AAT found that the data was about the service delivery to Mr Grubb, not Mr Grubb 
himself. Note the definition for PI then was “information about an individual, whose identity is apparent or can reasonably be 
ascertained from the information or opinion about the individual”: 
1289 Telstra argued that it is possible to link geolocation and URL data to an individual but their systems made it difficult, 
requiring complicated historical searches within the retention period of 3 to 30 days. In contrast the APC found that Telstra 
regularly cross-matched metadata in response to law enforcement requests and responded to 85.000 such requests (July 
2013- June 2015). 
1290 Johnston, above n 1277.  
1291 See for example, respected practitioner Peter G. Leonard, ‘A review of Australian Privacy Commissioner v Telstra 
Corporation Limited Full Federal Court of Australia [2017] FCAFC’, G+T (16 Feb 2017) 
https://www.gtlaw.com.au/insights/review-australian-privacy-commissioner-v-telstra-corporation-limited who expresses 
concern as to the lack of policy consideration or guidance provided; Jake Goldenfein, ‘Australia’s privacy laws gutted in 
court ruling on what is ‘personal information’’ The Conversation (19 Jan 2017 accessed 19 Jan 2017) 
http://theconversation.com/australias-privacy-laws-gutted-in-court-ruling-on-what-is-personal-information-71486; c/f 
Johnston, above n 1277.  
1292 Goldenfein, ibid. 
1293 Amicus curiae brief of Australian Privacy Foundation and NSW Council for Civil Liberties in Privacy Commissioner v 
Telstra Corporation Limited (File No. VID 38/2016) (Filed17 Aug 2016 accessed 2 Sept 2016) < 
https://www.privacy.org.au/papers/fca-pcvt-160817.pdf>  
1294 Leonard, above n 1291.  
1295 Note in the AAT, Deputy President Stephanie Forgie gave an example which was narrow in terms of possible multiple 
information use:  “A link could be made between the service records and the record kept at reception or other records 
showing my name and the time at which I had taken the care (sic) in for service. The fact that the information can be traced 
back to me from the service records or the order form does not, however, change the nature of the information. It is 
information about the car … or the repairs but not about me”. Johnston, above n 1277. 
1296 This view is also adopted by Cain Sibley and Ken Powell, ‘What about me? The Full Federal Court says personal 
information must be "about an individual"’ Clayton Utz (2 Feb 2017 accessed 3 Mar 2017) < 
https://www.claytonutz.com/knowledge/2017/february/what-about-me-the-full-federal-court-says-personal-information-must-
be-about-an-individual>  
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In each case, it is necessary to consider whether each item of PI requested, individually or in 
combination with other items, is about an [identifiable] individual…1297 
 
Had the appeal required the court to rule upon the AAT’s ‘evaluative conclusion’, it is possible the it may 
have found multiple subject matters1298  – but the judgment implies a rejection of evolving data matching 
and linking technologies, whereby a mobile phone colour may (in combination) render its owner 
identifiable. It is a case which raises more questions than it answers.1299 This uncertainty creates privacy 
risk, as to the meaning of PI and how data recipients should respond to technology and data holdings, 
as granularity and analytics increase, and holdings expand. Uncertainty may also embolden pro-risk PI 
retention practices - especially where expensive and time-consuming cases against well-funded 
commercial entities like Telstra, fail.1300  
 
Clearly if the PA is to have its intended effect, then any capacity by any entity to reasonably identify an 
individual from information holdings, should be sufficient to activate the Act. Indeed, the new metadata 
retention regime takes this approach,1301 deeming all mandatorily-retained data as PI.1302  However, it 
remains unclear how the CIOT industry perceives the data its devices and apps collect, though in 
questionable contractual practices and data ownership attitudes, there may be a clue.  
 
 
5.2.2 The principles  
The APPs require a privacy by design…1303 - OAIC 
“… overcollecting… (to sift for possible correlations) is the norm…”1304   
                                                          
1297 Privacy Commissioner, above n 1282 [63]. The insertion is mine to illustrate how their evaluation would operate under 
the new PI definition. 
1298 Johnston, above n 1277. 
1299 Cain, above n 1296.   
1300 Ben Grubb first made complaint to the APC as a journalist testing the law in 2014. The APC made its determination in 
mid-2015, and the federal Court, in January 2017. Note that the implications for Telstra have been superseded by statute: 
telecommunications companies’ metadata holdings must be retained under new mandatory data retention provisions in the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979. Section 187LA deems information retained as PI “about an 
individual” if the information relates to the individual or a communication to which the individual is a party. 
1301 It applies to internet, carriage service and content service providers, under the Telecommunications Act (Cth). 
1302 Section 187LA Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 2015 came into force on 13 October 2015. 
1303 OAIC, above n 1269: 2. 
1304 Peter Leonard, ‘Customer data analytics: privacy settings for ‘Big data’ Business International Data Privacy Law 4 (1) 
(2014 accessed 10 Apr 2015) 53 – 68 <http://idpl.oxfordjournals.org/> 
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The APPs are in PA Schedule 1 and augmented by non-binding1305 guidelines,1306 including as to privacy 
impact assessments1307 the Privacy Management Framework,1308 mobile app developers1309 data 
breach1310 and regulatory action.1311 This section considers each APP to locate gaps. 
- APP1 imposes the obligation for an entity to implement PA compliance “practices, 
procedures and systems” and to have a “…clearly expressed and up-to-date” privacy 
policy available [1.3];1312 for example, on a website.1313 As chapter 6 suggests, many entities 
have deficient privacy policies1314 which fail to transparently and accurately explain CIOT 
collection practices1315  or reveal CIOT-collected data use purposes and potential data flows. 
Absent this, then any consent obtained as to data collection and use becomes questionable and 
terms may potentially, be misleading or unfair.  
The OAIC claims that APP1 requires privacy by design (PBD) using a Privacy Management Framework 
which practically, means a risk management-based identification and mitigation of privacy risk:1316  
PBD aims at building privacy and data protection up front, into the design specifications and 
architecture of information and communications systems and technologies, in order to facilitate 
compliance with privacy and data protection principles.”1317 
                                                          
1305 Legally binding guidelines as to medical research, tax file numbers and so on are found here: 
https://www.oaic.gov.au/agencies-and-organisations/legally-binding-guidelines-and-rules/ 
1306 As to the APPs: OAIC, ‘Australian Privacy Principles Guidelines’ (1 April 2015 accessed 5 April 2015) 
http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/privacy/applying-privacy-law/app-
guidelines/APP_guidelines_complete_version_1_April_2015.pdf > Others include: the Privacy Action Regulatory Policy,  the 
Guide to Privacy Regulatory Action,  the Guide to undertaking Privacy Impact Assessments  and the OAIC Privacy 
Management Framework.  It is also emphasized in the ‘better practice guide’ for mobile app developers.  
1307 OAIC, ‘Guide to undertaking privacy impact assessments’ (May 2014 accessed 2 Jan 2016) < 
https://www.oaic.gov.au/agencies-and-organisations/guides/guide-to-undertaking-privacy-impact-assessments> 
1308 OAIC, ‘Privacy management framework: enabling compliance and encouraging good practice’ (N.D. accessed 10 May 
2016) < https://www.oaic.gov.au/agencies-and-organisations/guides/privacy-management-framework> 
1309 OAIC, above n 1269.   
1310 OAIC, ‘Guide to developing a data breach response plan’ (April 2016 accessed 8 Apr 2016) < 
https://www.oaic.gov.au/resources/agencies-and-organisations/guides/guide-to-developing-a-data-breach-response-
plan.pdf>; OAIC, ‘Guide to securing personal information’ (Jan 2015 accessed 8 Apr 2016) < 
https://www.oaic.gov.au/agencies-and-organisations/guides/guide-to-securing-personal-information> 
1311 OAIC, ‘Guide to privacy regulatory action’ (June 2015 accessed 3 Feb 2016) < https://www.oaic.gov.au/resources/about-
us/our-regulatory-approach/guide-to-oaic-s-privacy-regulatory-action/oaic-regulatory-action-guide.pdf> 
1312 APP 1 requires that PI is managed in an open and transparent way (APP 1.1) and that APP entities to take “reasonable 
steps to implement practices, procedures and systems” that will ensure APP compliance, as well as compliance with any 
PA-registered code and which also, enable related inquiry or complaints management (APP 1.2). 
1313 Privacy policies must inform consumers as to the kinds of PI collected/ held, how this occurs; the purposes for which it is 
collected, held, used and disclosed; access and correction processes; complaints process and management; and location of 
any overseas disclosure.  
1314 APP 1.4 details the policy must contain (a) the kinds of PI collected and held; (b) how the entity does this; and (c) for 
what purpose(s); as well as individual rights such as (d) access and correction; (e) how complaints are made and dealt with; 
(f) if disclosure occurs to overseas recipients; and (g) the likely overseas countries. 
1315 For example, by device documentation or set-up, software registration and consents. 
1316 OAIC, ‘Guide to Big Data and the Australian Privacy Principles’ Consultation Draft (May 2016 accessed 2 May 2016): 6- 
7 < https://www.oaic.gov.au/engage-with-us/consultations/guide-to-big-data-and-the-australian-privacy-principles/> 
1317 Ibid: 2. 
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The Framework requires a top-down embedded “culture of privacy”,1318 through robust practices, 
procedures and systems, ongoing efficacy evaluation; and continuous privacy monitoring and 
improvement. PBD is codified, incorporated by reference or by (non-binding) guideline1319 in Australia,1320 
the UK,1321 and the EU,1322 and promoted by the FTC. It has seven foundational principles:  
 
Graphic 5.1 7 Foundational principles for Privacy by Design 
Source: Anna Cavoukian & Deloitte1323 
 
These principles manage privacy lifecycle risk, which offers CIOT providers multiple benefits such as 
reducing privacy litigation or penalties, systematising compliance, reducing liability gaps, boosting 
consumer confidence, improving breach management, and a defensive ‘best practice’ posture in the 
                                                          
1318 OAIC, above n 1308: 1.  
1319 It was unanimously adopted by ‘landmark’ resolution of the 2010 International Conference of Data Protection and 
Privacy Commissioners. Anna Cavoukian as Canadian Privacy Commissioner legitimised the concept within privacy 
regulation: Anna Cavoukian, ‘Operationalizing Privacy by Design: From Rhetoric to Reality’, Office of the Information and 
Privacy Commissioner (2012 accessed 4 Mar 2016) http://www.ipc.on.ca/english/Resources/Discussion-Papers/Discussion-
Papers-Summary/?id=1254. See also Anna Cavoukian, ‘A regulator’s perspective on Privacy by Design’ (n.d. accessed 10 
May 2016) < https://fpf.org/wp-content/uploads/A-Regulators-Perspective-on-Privacy-by-Design.doc> Australian states have 
also adopted the principle. 
1320 Australian states have also adopted the principle. 
1321 Article 23 of the European Data Protection Regulation, which is effective in 2018.  EU Data Protection Regulation, ‘Data 
protection by design and default’ (Accessed 26 June 2016) http://www.eudataprotectionregulation.com/#!data-protection-
design-by-default/c20k7 
1322 Ibid.  
1323 Deloitte, ‘Privacy by Design: setting a new standard for privacy certification’ (2015 accessed 3 Jan 2016): 2  
<https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ca/Documents/risk/ca-en-ers-privacy-by-design-brochure.PDF> Used with 
kind permission of Dr Cavoukian. 
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event of breach.  Compliance with PBD systems also enables trust mark certification,1324 which checks 
system robustness, but is also a marketable way to inspire consumer confidence, increase sales and 
business value, differentiate products, and reduce legal liability upon an actionable breach. 
But there is a regulatory gap here. Despite OAIC rhetoric, the APPs are silent as to PBD or avert to it 
descriptively only, and guidelines have no legal effect. There is no determination stating that APP 1.2 
mandates PBD,1325 nor court ruling to that effect1326 and the OAIC does not audit PBD compliance and 
cannot direct industry to conduct a PIA.1327 The practical outcome is that PBD is ‘optional’, and for CIOT 
manufacturers, entails time and costs to design-in privacy and security systems, which raises cost: benefit 
questions in a highly-competitive, fast-moving marketplace. There is evidence that PBD has not 
transferred from regulator rhetoric to industry practice: as recently as 2014, Telstra was not PBD-
compliant.1328 This gap, adversely impacts privacy enforcement, as the OAIC does not audit or compel 
disclosure of PBD practices, nor can the OAIC direct an ‘organisation’1329 to conduct a privacy impact 
assessment. PBD may thus, be observed more in the breach than in observance – it is cheaper to go to 
market without PBD, and accept the low risk of getting caught – which with CIOT risks to privacy, raises 
an unacceptable gap. 
 
                                                          
1324 For example, with an entity such as TRUSTe. This enables the display of a recognised symbol and may improve 
business practices, promote consumer, investor and supplier confidence, as well as potentially deflect regulator interest. 
See <https://www.truste.com/> 
1325 Section 52 of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) enables the OAIC to make determinations on privacy complaints either of its 
own initiative or where conciliation has failed to resolve a matter. The determinations are subject to appeals to the 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal (s 96 PA) or by the Federal Circuit Court or Federal Court of Australia under section 5 of the 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth). Application to appeal must be made within 28 days (s 29(2) 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth) and ADJR Act section 5), fees are payable and the ADJR process provides 
the Federal Court may refer a matter back to the Information Commissioner should the decision be wrong at law or the IC 
powers were not exercised properly. 
1326 Note the reports may be somewhat self-selective – one would expect companies to resolve cases before appeal where 
they are vulnerable to adverse determination. But since its insertion in 2014, there are no cases dealing with complaints 
relating to APP 1.2 at all. This may be because there is a delay in complaints being made, a delay in breaches being 
identified or a delay in cases coming before the OAIC. It may also be because (perhaps with the force of the new provisions) 
complaints are resolved prior to requiring regulatory action. 
1327 Ibid. 
1328 “Telstra will also establish a clear policy for central software management (including information security arrangements), 
review contracts relating to personal information handling (including by enhancing Telstra’s control over third party 
providers), implement a data loss prevention program, adopt a Privacy by Design strategy, and exit its contract with the third 
party provider.”: Telstra Corporation Limited: Own motion investigation report [2014] AICmrCN 1 (1 March 2014) < 
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/AICmrCN/2014/1.html> 
1329 As distinct from a government agency. 
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Graphic 5.2 IOT ‘Privacy by Design’ Decision Tree 
Source: GSMA1330 
A related PBD concept is privacy (and security) by default. The APPs do not refer to this, which means 
the automatic application of the strictest privacy (and security) settings of a device or app, and informed, 
opt-in consumer actions to modify those settings. In the meantime, device data stays in the highest 
protection mode. It also implies data minimisation consistent with APP 11, as well as promotes the 
designed-in use of privacy-enhancing technologies, as recommended by EPIC,1331 and aligns with Article 
25 of the incoming EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR)1332 which stipulates ‘data protection 
by design and by default’. 1333  Given the complexity of CIOT device and app set-ups, this is a consumer 
protection ‘gap’ in Australia. If this were mandated in Australia, it would overcome evidenced lax CIOT 
security practices such as default passwords or inadequate encryption, which imperil CIOT network 
security and inevitably, enable DDoS attacks (discussed supra) and adversely impact upon consumer 
privacy, trust and confidence.  
                                                          
1330 GSMA, ‘IoT Privacy by Design Decision Tree’ (8 May 2015 accessed 8 Mar 2016) <http://www.gsma.com/iot/iot-
knowledgebase/iot-privacy-design-decision-tree/> 
1331 EPIC, ‘‘Comments of the Electronic Privacy Information Center to the National Telecommunications and Information 
Administration, US Department of Commerce On the Benefits, Challenges and Potential Roles for the Government in 
Fostering the Advancement of the Internet of Things’ (2 June 2016 accessed 26 Jun 2016): 11 
<https://www.ntia.doc.gov/federal-register-notice/2016/comments-potential-roles-government-fostering-advancement-
internet-of-things> 
1332 Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural 
persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 
95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation). 
1333 Ibid: Articles 24 and 25. 
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- APP 1.3 also seeks to ensure open and transparent data management, to “build consumer 
trust and confidence”.1334 But in a CIOT context, that regulatory object is clearly failing. In 
2015, the APC found over half of 21 online privacy policies audited “inadequate”.1335 In 2016, 
a global IOT sweep found that 71% of reviewed Australian CIOT device terms did not 
adequately explain how PI is managed.1336 Internationally, most of 314 smart devices were 
found to “interfere with privacy”1337 in breach of privacy laws (Sched. 2). The sweep identified 
three main concerns: firstly, many fitness device policies did not adequately explain PI 
collection, use and disclosure practices. Few were device-specific, privacy promises did not 
match user experience and most did not disclose third party information recipients. Secondly, 
many failed to explain PI storage and protection practices, and thirdly, data deletion 
information was non-existent or difficult to find.1338 The outcome confirms the OAIC’s 47 
website sweep (2013),1339 and its 2015 ‘follow up’, showing that 55% were still APP1 non-
compliant.1340 Persistently poor compliance outcomes suggest an APP1 regulatory failure - 
and notice and consent failing at both ends. 
 
                                                          
1334 OAIC, above n 1316: 6. 
1335 Paris Cowan, ‘Pilgrim to audit 21 Australian privacy policies’ itnews (20 Feb 2015 accessed 2 Feb 2016) 
https://www.itnews.com.au/news/pilgrim-to-audit-21-australian-privacy-policies-400708 Pilgrim stated: “These assessments 
will look at whether the policies are clearly expressed and up-to-date, cover the content and contact requirements and are 
available in an appropriate form”. 
1336 The devices were fitness and health monitors, smart travel locks and thermostats though explicit data was not released. 
The author contacted the OAIC for details, but it did not respond. OAIC, ‘Privacy shortcomings of Internet of Things 
businesses revealed’ (23 Sept 2016 accessed 28 Sept 2016) < https://www.oaic.gov.au/media-and-speeches/news/privacy-
shortcomings-of-internet-of-things-businesses-revealed> 
1337 PA section 13(1). The AIC can investigate with based upon a complaint (which usually leads to conciliations under 
section 40A, or under its own motion (PA Part V). 
1338 Ibid. 
1339 Of 47 websites checked, almost 50% of policies exhibited 'readability' issues, i.e. “they were considered to be too long 
and difficult to read”, Using the Flesch-Kinkaid Reading Ease test, the average age was 16 with none meeting the OAIC14 
years as their preferred benchmark. Relevance was a problem for 65% of the sites:  OAIC, ‘Privacy Commissioner: Website 
privacy policies are too long and complex’ (14 Aug 2013 accessed 2 Nov 2016) < https://www.oaic.gov.au/media-and-
speeches/media-releases/privacy-commissioner-website-privacy-policies-are-too-long-and-complex> 
1340 Entities included the ANZ Bank, Dept of Human Services, Microsoft and Instagram. The “follow up” resweep still found 
that 25% (5) privacy policies did not outline how to request access or correction of PI; another 25% did not adequately 
describe how they protect PI; 40% (8) did not outline how privacy complaints are dealt with; 20% did not outline overseas 
disclosure or likely countries for that disclosure. OAIC, ‘Privacy policies still have room for improvement’ (4 May 2015 
accessed 2 Nov 2016) < https://www.oaic.gov.au/media-and-speeches/media-releases/privacy-policies-still-have-room-for-
improvement> 
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- APP3 provides that an entity must not solicit1341 and collect1342 PI unless it is “reasonably 
necessary1343 for one or more of the entity’s [lawful]1344 functions or activities” [3.2] and then, only 
by “lawful and fair means” [3.5] and only from the individual [3.6] - unless it is impracticable or 
unreasonable to do so.    “Sensitive information” (SI)1345 requires consent for collection, which 
may be implied.1346  
This raises CIOT issues: firstly, CIOT devices both actively solicit and collect PI which by data 
minimisation, should be limited to that “reasonably necessary” for the functions or activities of the 
entity.1347 The OAIC imposes an objective test: “would a reasonable person, properly informed, agree 
collection is necessary”.1348 The OAIC cites collecting more PI than necessary1349 or collecting for future 
use or for a related body corporate, as examples of unnecessary collection, and clearly, data optimisation 
for sales purposes exceeds the consumer device remit.1350 To be effective, then CIOT data minimisation 
must be enforced – but as the Milo example below suggests, this is often not the case and not always for 
nefarious reasons. Secondly, fair, lawful1351 collection must not be deceptive or unreasonably 
                                                          
1341 ‘Solicited’ PI includes an individual’s PI “…. provided by another entity in response to a request, direction, order or 
arrangement for sharing or transferring information between both entities…” : OAIC Guideline above n 1306: 4 [para 3.7] 
Note that “unsolicited” PI must be destroyed or de-identified soon as practicable if it is lawful and reasonable to do so: APP 
4 
1342 ‘Collect’ means to collect PI for “inclusion in a record…”: s 6(1) PA. ‘Record” includes in a document, electronic or other 
device’, so includes PI stored on a device or in a database such as that which CIOT device systems use to store and 
analyse data. Note also in a smart home context, “collection” includes obtaining (etc.) PI from “surveillance cameras where 
an individual is identifiable or reasonably identifiable” as well as “biometric technology such as voice or facial recognition”: 
OAIC, Guidelines: above n 1306: 7- 8.  
1343 This is an objective test as to whether a reasonable person, properly informed would agree collection is necessary: 
OAIC Guidelines, above n 1306: 6. Note that PI collection may not be reasonably necessary where more information than is 
required for a function is collected or where it is being collected for entry into a database for future use: Guideline, above n 
1306: 194: 7 [para 2.32]. 
1344 ‘Lawful’ means not unlawful, that is not illegal, criminal, prohibited or proscribed by law and includes collection via 
hacking for example but excludes a breach of contract: OAIC Guidelines, above n 1306:14 [para 3.6- 3.61]. 
1345“Sensitive information” means (a) information or an opinion about an individual’s:(i) racial or ethnic origin; or (ii) political 
opinions; or (iii) membership of a political association; or (iv) religious beliefs or affiliations; or (v) philosophical beliefs; or (vi) 
membership of a professional or trade association; or (vii) membership of a trade union; or (viii) sexual orientation or 
practices; or (ix) criminal record; that is also personal information; or (b)health information about an individual; or (c) non-
health genetic information; or (d) biometric information that is to be used for the purpose of automated biometric verification 
or biometric identification; or (e) biometric templates. 
1346 “Consent” means “express consent or implied consent”: PA section 6. 
1347 APP 3.2. OAIC Guidelines point to website description, annual reports, advertising etc., to identify these, or any “directly 
related” functions or activity. 
1348 OAIC, Guidelines: above n 1306: 7. Relevant factors will include the primary purpose of collection, how the PI is used 
and whether the entity could fulfil its functions absent that information? 
1349 Examples include Own Motion Investigation v Australian Government Agency [2007] PrivCmrA 4; D v Banking Institution 
[2006] PrivCmrA 4; M v Health Service Provider [2007] PrivCmrA 15. 
1350 It is unlikely that a CIOT entity would highlight ‘data trading’ clearly, although a privacy statement may enable it (often 
obliquely or euphemistically) within a broad ambit of data transfers. The question here, is whether CIOT data sales lack the 
clear or direct connection to a function/ activity as required.  
1351 APP 3.5. Not lawful includes hacking: Criminal Code Act 1995 Part 10.7, using a listening device of telephone 
interception without a warrant: Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) section 7 and Surveillance 
Devices Act 2004 (Cth) section 14; requesting information for or in connection with a discriminatory act: e.g. Disability 
Discrimination Act 1992 section 30; Sex Discrimination Act 1984 section 27. 
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intrusive;1352 but numerous CIOT security systems, baby monitors,1353 smart TVs,1354 and digital voice 
assistants1355 have already been implicated in this.1356 The OAIC cites  misrepresenting the purpose or 
effect of collection, or any consequence of not providing the information, as possibly “unfair” means –  
and CIOT privacy statements or terms commonly assert that “device functionality” may diminish if 
information is not provided – without clearly specifying the extent (if any) and how.1357 Further any 
assessment of “fair” again raises “consent” issues (Ch 6), but the obligation is conveniently avoided, if 
obtaining consent is generally “unreasonable or impractical” – as may be the case for shared devices or 
those operating in shared environments. Even if individual privacy consents are valid, questions persist 
as to implying consent of unwitting smart home or car occupants, third party visitors or persons who share 
or borrow CIOT devices – or even a person who buys a smart home or car, without changing settings or 
understanding how it all works. Thirdly, APP3 allows collection of PI “reasonably necessary” to pursue a 
collector’s “legitimate functions or activities”, assessed “objectively and practically”.1358 But “legitimate” is 
a loaded term. While most entities justify obtaining PI to provide wanted consumer analytics (e.g. fitness 
trackers use height and weight), or for functionality reasons (e.g. to operate the smart home or car), the 
privacy sweeps have shown excess information collection with no objective justification. Finally, the 
‘lawful and fair means’ criteria is contentious in many CIOT situations, where the purpose or consequence 
of collection is questionably represented1359 and/ or without express or implied ‘consent’ (if required). 
- APP 4 concerns unsolicited PI/ SI collected by an entity, which if collectable under APP3, falls 
under APPs 5-13, but if not, must be destroyed or de-identified as soon as practicable.  
                                                          
1352 Guidelines, above n 1306: 14. See also the Explanatory Memorandum, Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy 
Protection) Bill 2012: 77. 
1353 Arguably collection may deceive consumers where security is not as represented or enables other unlawful collections 
via hacking: Stanislav, above n 617.  
1354 Samuel Gibbs, ‘Samsung's voice-recording smart TVs breach privacy law, campaigners claim’ (28 Feb 2015 accessed 
10 May 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/27/samsung-voice-recording-smart-tv-breach-privacy-
law-campaigners-claim> 
1355 For example, as to future, Samsung plans Viv to integrate with smartphones, tablets, wearables and home appliances, 
based upon its “sophisticated natural language understanding, machine learning capabilities and strategic partnerships that 
will enrich a broader service ecosystem”. The idea is a voice-powered interface for all of its devices -  phones, home hubs, 
fitness trackers to refrigerators.: Carly Page, ‘Samsung buys Viv AI tool to build its own assistant to rival Siri and Cortana’ (6 
Oct 2016 accessed 10 Oct 2016) <http://www.computing.co.uk/ctg/news/2473325/samsung-buys-viv-ai-tool-to-build-its-own-
assistant-to-rival-siri-and-cortana> 
1356 Rory Carroll, ‘Goodbye privacy, hello ‘Alexa’: Amazon Echo, the home robot who hears it all’ The Guardian (21 Nov 
29015 accessed 4 Mar 2016) <https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/nov/21/amazon-echo-alexa-home-robot-
privacy-cloud> Amazon says Alexa streams audio a fraction of a second before ‘woken’ and continues until a request is 
processed” so conversation fragments will be captured. 
1357 Again, the Nestle app collected a range of PI as to its child user, and only at the end (once data was collected) did it 
indicate that data was not required to use the fitness band, and this was neither prominent nor was it clear how to remove 
data entered and take that option. 
1358 OAIC, above n 1316: 9.  
1359 OAIC Guideline above n 1306: 14 [para 3.63]. 
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The CIOT uncertainty here is whether data collected via devices (as distinct from solicited inputs like 
sign-up data) or SI incidentally collected from non-consenting third parties, is ‘solicited’ or collected via 
“no active steps”?1360 This is potentially unclear, but it seems sensible that a device setup to monitor and 
transmit data is an active collection step to solicit whatever data that device detects, and that consent to 
third party SI collection is likely ‘implied’, or alternatively, that its severance for destruction or de-
identification may not be ‘reasonable’ due to impracticality,1361 so APP5- 13 apply.1362 
 
- APP 5 details privacy notice contents,1363 which (where practicable) must be disclosed at or 
before collection, clearly and prominently displayed on device or by (e.g.) link or where by third 
party supply, that party is contractually bound to notify the individual.  
Impracticability may arise, if, for example, devices lack screens, requiring referral to website terms. 
Individuals must also be informed of collection methods; for example, if through “hidden … RFID” or 
software or biometric technology.1364 Ideally, just-in-time on-device or smartphone notification with links 
or opt-in ‘accept’ boxes is preferable notice to long, unheralded privacy statements, but the latter 
proliferates. Despite voluminous guidance,1365 codes1366 and the APP law, genuine ‘notice’ as a precursor 
to genuine ‘consent’ in a CIOT context is limited,1367 as is realistic ongoing (contractual) protection of data 
once transferred or sold (Ch. 6).  
 
                                                          
1360 ‘Solicit” means a request to provide PI or information within which PI is included, but a ‘request’ merely means an “active 
step” taken to collect the information which may not involve ‘direct communications between the entity and the individual’: 
OAIC Guideline above n 1306: 14 [para 4.5- 4.8]. 
1361 The Guidelines cite that destruction or de-identification of unsolicited PI may not be practical if “commingled with 
solicited personal information” – see [4.26 for an example]: OAIC Guidelines, above n 1306: [4.25] 
1362 If not, then the consequence at the extreme, is that all CIOT data (other than that directly inputted or perhaps that 
emanating from the owner) should be de-identified pre-use or destroyed as soon as practicable. 
1363 APP 5 provides that at or before (or asap after) collection of PI, the entity must take reasonable steps to ensure that the 
individual is informed of: its identity and contact details; if PI is not collected from the individual or that individual may not be 
aware of the collection, the fact and circumstances of the collection; if PI was collected mandatorily by law; the purposes of 
collection; consequences if all or any PI is not collected; any disclosees or type thereof; that its privacy policy contains 
access/ correction/ complaints and complaints management information; and finally, details of the location of any overseas 
disclosure intended. 
1364 OAIC Guideline, above n 1306: 6 [para 5.11]. 
1365 For example, see OAIC, above n 1303 or the guidelines explaining the APPs: OAIC, above 1307. 
1366 A ‘gold standard’ example is ICO, ‘Privacy notices, transparency and control’ (7 Oct 2016 accessed 20 Oct 2016) 
<https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/privacy-notices-transparency-and-control/> 
1367 Mark Briedis, Jane Webb & Michael Fraser, ‘Improving the Communication of Privacy Information for Consumers’ 
ACCAN & UTS (Feb 2016 accessed 2 Oct 2016) http://accan.org.au/files/Grants/Improving%20Comm%20Privacy%20Info-
full-accessible.pdf  
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- APP 6: PI held1368 for a “primary purpose” must not be used for a “secondary purpose” without 
consent unless such use or disclosure is “reasonably expected”1369 and the secondary purpose 
is (if SI) “directly related”1370 or where PI only, “related”1371 to that primary purpose.1372  
Reasonable expectation is an objective question of fact, as to what a properly informed reasonable 
person would expect; an interesting CIOT data-use question usually avoided via the consent exception. 
A simple drafting exercise will satisfy APP6 through broad purpose categories – e.g. “data analytics, 
marketing and affiliated third party uses…” It is however difficult to discern how the collection purpose 
can be maintained when data is commonly shared and on- sold, combined and recombined, exposing it 
to re-identification or to new unanticipated correlations and uses.  Future “collection creep”1373 is implicit 
in changeable terms and “function creep” is almost implicit in broad conceptual purposes (e.g. marketing), 
such that absent enforced legal or contractual restraints, data use may go ‘rogue’.1374 Nothing in the PA 
addresses this gap, absent regulatory oversight.  
 
APP 6.2(e) allows use or disclosure for secondary purposes in seven permitted ‘general situations’1375-  
which include preventing a serious threat to life, health or safety,1376 locating missing persons1377 and 
where PI is (objectively)1378 reasonably necessary for any ‘enforcement related activities’1379 of police, 
immigration, ASIC and others, without warrant.1380 CIOT data as to smart self, home and car may 
                                                          
1368 OAIC Guideline, above n 1306: 4 [para 6.7] indicates that ‘hold’ refers to information in the possession and control of the 
entity either physically or by right or power to deal with it. 
1369OAIC Guideline, above n 1306: [6.20] The ‘reasonably expects’ test is an objective question of fact in each case and has 
regard to what a reasonable properly informed person would expect in the circumstances.   
1370 OAIC Guideline, above n 1306: [6.26] This is one “closely associated with the primary purpose, even if it is not 
strictly necessary to achieve that primary purpose”. 
1371 OAIC Guideline, above n 1306: [6.26]: This is one “connected to or associated with the primary purpose”. It must be 
more than tenuously linked: B v Hotel [2008] PrivCmrA 2, E v Insurance Company [2011] PrivCmrA 5. 
1372 APP 6.2 (b) – (e) and 6.3 contain exclusions related to for example, court and enforcement mandated situations.  
1373 Uber was recently accused of this: after being penalised for poor geolocation data protection, it took an incremental 
approach to extending location data collection again, initially amending its privacy statement, then months later rolling out a 
software update with notice and consents, (see https://help.uber.com/h/ba9dd342-158d-421f-a9ea-0e6c7aaad726)  for 
tracking to extend after passengers leave the vehicle: Kate Conger, ‘Uber begins background collection of rider location 
data’ TechCrunch (29 Nov 2016 accessed 29 Nov 2016) https://techcrunch.com/2016/11/28/uber-background-location-data-
collection/ updated its privacy policy in 2015 to allow for background location data collection, 
1374 In 2011, the world’s largest satnav device maker TomTom sold anonymised vehicle speed and location data to the 
Netherlands government which was used (to Tom Tom’s embarrassment) for setting speed traps.   
1375 These are listed in PA section 16A. Of possible CIOT relevance include: Lessening or preventing a serious threat to life, 
health or safety (where consent is unreasonable or impracticable)  
1376 PA section 16A (1) Item 1. 
1377 PA section 16A (1) Item 3. 
1378 The test is whether a reasonable person properly informed would agree the use or disclosure is reasonable in the 
circumstances. 
1379 PA section 6(1): this includes prevention, detection, investigation and prosecution or punishment of criminal offences 
and intelligence gathering activities. 
1380 OAIC, APP Guidelines, above n 1306: 14 [para 6.56- 6.64] Note “enforcement activity” is defined very broadly in section 
6(1) to include intelligence-gathering, prevention, detection, investigation, prosecution or punishment of criminal offences.  
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evidence a serious threat (for example, in-home violence or dangerous driving) and would assist law 
enforcement, but is also potentially prejudicial, inaccurate and privacy-intrusive. While public policy1381  
may justify such disclosures, always-on surveillance-style data derived from ubiquitous consumer IOT 
devices, justifies a careful rethink.1382     
APP 6.3 allows PI use and disclosure by any related body corporate for the same “primary purpose”;1383 
which again, encourages wide statements, data fusion and potentially, uses in unexpected contexts.1384 
Data-rich CIOT companies are also highly attractive targets:1385 for data, but also for technology-
acquisition and/ or anti-competitive reasons.1386  
- APP 71387 prohibits non-consensual direct marketing1388 using SI, but allows PI use in limited 
circumstances. Most privacy statements include advertising communications use, and device or 
                                                          
1381 Policy includes protection of safety, national security and the like. Practically police can already physically search homes 
and cars for a wide range of reasons. See for example, the extensive warrantless search rights in Queensland which include 
to prevent domestic violence, to take a breath test and to preserve evidence: http://www.legalaid.qld.gov.au/Find-legal-
information/Criminal-justice/Police-and-your-rights/Police-searches-without-a-warrant 
1382 The Parliamentary Inquiry found that the police sought warrantless authorisations to access mobile phone and internet 
metadata 310,000 times in five years, before mandatory data retention laws were enacted. Suelette Dreyfus, of the 
University of Melbourne, warns “"If we don't stop this creep into our private worlds that government is using technology for, it 
only becomes a matter of time before these other lines are crossed as well. It's important that we draw that line right here 
and now.": David Wroe and Nino Bucci, ‘Police access phone and internet data 1300 times a week’ (14 Jan 2015 accessed 
2 Feb 2017) The Syd Morning Herald <http://www.smh.com.au/federal-politics/political-news/police-access-phone-and-
internet-data-1200-times-a-week-20150113-12nga3.html> 
1383 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) section 13B provides that collection of “personal information” (PI) (but not ‘sensitive information” 
as defined) between related bodies corporate is not generally an interference with the privacy of an individual. APP 6.6 
provides that PI shared between RBCs has the same “primary purpose” for both as at collection. PA Guideline page 18 
[para 6.77] ‘Related bodies corporate’ has the meaning defined in the Corporations Law. 
1384 The Guidelines provide an ambiguous example here; suggesting that a contractor applying to work for a company may 
have that application shared between RBCs. It is unclear if this is the same context as the parent is overseeing their 
contracting engagement or whether they are assessing suitability for the contractor to work for them too (presumably the 
former as ‘purpose’ must stay the same):  OAIC Guideline, above n 1306: 3 [para 7.9]Internationally, there are numerous 
examples of large entities buying other companies to access their data as a treasure trove; especially, entities which have 
collected PI with very broad use consents – such as social media companies. 
1385 For example, Walmart purchased the Social Calendar app which had 15 million registered users, 110 million personal 
notifications (such as date of birth, anniversary date and the like) and 10 million monthly reminders were suddenly able to be 
combined with Walmart’s already extensive customer databases, as well as any others to which they had access.  This data 
was used in targeted advertising recommending Walmart gift purchases based upon user’s friends’ Facebook page content. 
Similarly, Google purchased DoubleClick in 2008 to feed data into its Adsense advertising network which by 2011, made 
Google some $36.5 billion. The purchase price was US$3.1 billion. Data taken from Google v Vidal-Hall, Hann and 
Bradshaw [2015] EWHC Civ 311 [para 6.1] 
1386  The Economist, ‘The Rise of the Corporate Colossus threatens both competition and the legitimacy of business’. Leader 
section (17 Sept 2016 accessed 20 Nov 2016) <http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21707210-rise-corporate-colossus-
threatens-both-competition-and-legitimacy-business> page 9 cited by Rod Sims, ‘ACCC Chairman discusses the increasing 
concentration in Australia’s economy’ Speech (27 Oct 2016 accessed 28 Oct 2016) < http://www.accc.gov.au/media-
release/accc-chairman-discusses-the-increasing-concentration-in-australia’s-economy> 
1387 This is subject to the application of the Spam Act 2003 (Cth) and Do Not Call Register Act 2006 (Cth). The former covers 
email, instant messaging, SMS (text messages) and MMS (image-based mobile phone messaging) messages of a 
commercial nature. It does not cover faxes, internet pop-ups or voice telemarketing, which is subject to the Do Not Call 
Register. 
1388 OAIC Guideline, above n 1306: 3 [para 7.9] ‘Direct marketing’ means the use or disclosure of PI to communicate directly 
with an individual to promote goods and services, including by email, online or by mail. 
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app sign-ups often (by default) include an opt-in1389 to such advertising. Google Home recently 
voiced a smart audio advertisement (aka ‘helpful’ information), and sparked a social media 
backlash.1390 Direct (profiled) advertising is coming to further monetize the consumer IOT, and 
pre-checked app opt-ins likely will too. In the case of marketing covered under the Spam Act 
2003 (Cth), consent must be express ‘opt-in’ or reasonably inferable.1391 
- APP 8 is relevant to CIOT data flows, cloud storage and analytics. Prior to cross border 
“disclosure” to (for example) a contractor, an entity must take reasonable (usually contractual) 
steps1392 to ensure that the recipient does not breach the APPs (or it may be accountable), unless 
laws or an enforceable code impose “substantially similar” recipient obligations, and with 
enforcement powers accessible to the individual. If an entity stores CIOT data overseas (as most 
apps do), but retains effective handling control1393 then this is ‘use’, not ‘disclosure’ caught by 
APP8. Further, if a foreign law compels disclosure then the APP entity is absolved. Consumers 
are unlikely to understand foreign laws but the PA does not oblige the entity to explain this or to 
modify its disclosure choices to ensure more privacy- protective outcomes. Further, the entire 
chain-of-liability approach is overturned if an ‘express general situation’ arises,1394 or upon 
obtaining express informed consent, provided specific matters are addressed, which CIOT 
providers usually manage online by disclaimer in their standard privacy terms.1395  
- APP 10 Accuracy: requires ‘reasonable steps’ to ensure that PI collected is “accurate, up to 
date and complete”. Inaccuracy has consequences in the consumer IOT (Chs 3 and 4). PI is 
                                                          
1389 APP 7.2 allows DM use where the information is collected from the individual who would reasonably expect the use for 
that purpose and a simple opt-out mechanism (such as a checkbox) is provided. Where there is no such reasonable 
expectation or where information is collected by a third party (such as a data vendor or app provider), where practicable the 
individual must have consented to use, and an opt-out (reminder) statement must be provided in every piece of DM 
1390 Al Roberts, ‘Has advertising arrived on Google Home?’ ClickZ (9 May 2017 accessed 10 may 2017) 
<https://www.clickz.com/has-advertising-arrived-on-google-home/110247/> 
1391 Spam Act 2004 (Cth): Sched 2 clause 2(b) consent can reasonably be inferred from: (i)  the conduct; and (ii)  the 
business and other relationships; of the individual or organisation concerned. Non-automated voice calls are covered by the 
Do Not Call Register Act 2006 (Cth). 
1392 Contracts may include clauses as to auditing compliance, protocols imposed on the service provider, indemnities, 
warranties, reporting and the like. 
1393 Relevant factors as to effective control might include retaining (sole) rights as to access, changing or retrieving PI, who 
accesses it, security measures and whether it remains retrievable or deletable: OAIC Guidelines, above n 1306:  [8.14] Note 
some contracts may retain ‘control’ sufficiently to make storage a ‘use’, such that the APP entity may breach the APPs  as it 
“holds’ the information, as it retains the right and power to deal with it (or can access it physically). Guidelines, above n 
1306: [B.79- 81] 
1394 PA section 16A as discussed above. 
1395 APP 8.2(b) allows an entity to obtain consent for cross border disclosure which must explain that the entity would no 
longer be accountable for the data under the PA, the recipient will not comply nor will redress be available.  This is 
effectively a disclaimer by express notice and consent. Guidelines, above n 1306: [8.39] 
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‘inaccurate’ if it contains a defect or error,1396 and may create an ‘incomplete’1397 and misleading 
consumer picture, which is self-perpetuatingly, ‘out-of-date’:1398 for example a bad driver can 
improve with experience. That data may evolve through many hands, under diminishing 
contractual obligations, while re-identification risk increases over time. And of course, consumers 
may never know who is holding or analysing/ using their data, or for how long.  
- APP 11 Security: PI must be protected against loss, misuse or interference and “…unauthorised 
use, modification or disclosure”. If any PI is no longer needed, then ‘reasonable steps’ must be 
taken to destroy or de-identify it.  
Ch. 3 illustrated serious CIOT security issues, but if ‘reasonable’ security steps are taken,1399 the OAIC 
assert that hacking or data breach is not a privacy breach, but rather a police issue. This ignores 
consumer privacy harm, does not incentivize best practice security, nor imposes compliance- based 
regulatory action. In 2016, there were four determinations involving APP 11,1400 (of 6 since 2010) which 
awarded $3- 10,000 for non-economic loss.1401 While an increase, the OAIC is not ‘go-to’ for breach: 
indeed, in the US, the FTC has prosecuted over 60 (‘unfair’) security cases,1402  US shareholder derivative 
actions are ongoing for security-related breach of fiduciary duty,1403 and substantial UK fines have been 
imposed.1404  
 
                                                          
1396 Inaccurate means the information contains an error or defect: Guidelines, above n 1306: [10.12] – even opinions must 
not be “misleading”; and must not present a “partial or misleading picture”: [10.17] 
1397 OAIC, Guidelines, above n 1306: [10.17] ‘Incomplete’ PI presents a partial or misleading picture, not ‘a true or full 
picture’. 
1398 OAIC, Guidelines, above n 1306: [10.15] ‘Out-of-date’ PI contains non-current facts, opinions or other information. 
1399 The ICO fined TalkTalk £400,000 for its “failure to implement the most basic security systems measures.” The hacker is 
facing criminal charges: ICO, TalkTalk gets record £400,000 fine for failing to prevent October 2015 attack ‘ (5 Oct 2016 
accessed 20 Oct 2016) < https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/news-and-events/news-and-blogs/2016/10/talktalk-gets-record-
400-000-fine-for-failing-to-prevent-october-2015-attack/> Note however, the ICO cannot order consumer compensation. 
1400 Since 1 Nov 2010, the determinations are:  ‘JO’ and Comcare [2016] AICmr 64 (21 September 2016); ‘IY’ and Business 
Services Brokers Pty Ltd t/a TeleChoice [2016] AICmr 44 (30 June 2016); ‘IX’ and Business Services Brokers Pty Ltd t/a 
TeleChoice [2016] AICmr 42 (30 June 2016); ‘IR’ and NRMA Insurance, Insurance Australia Limited [2016] AICmr 37 (27 
June 2016); ‘EQ’ and Great Barrier Reef Marine Park Authority [2015] AICmr 11 (2 February 2015); ‘DO’ and Department of 
Veterans’ Affairs [2014] AICmr 124 (13 November 2014); ‘CP’ and Department of Defence [2014] AICmr 88 (2 September 
2014). 
1401 Ibid.   
1402 The FTC have prosecuted over 60 data breach cases over recent years. See FTC v Wyndham Worldwide Corp. et al., 
Civil No. 13-1887 (Dist. Court New Jersey, 7 Apr 2014) <http://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/1023142/wyndham-worldwide-corporation [Dist Ct].  
1403 Joseph W Swanson & John E Clabby, ‘A Firewall for the Boardroom: Best Practices to Insulate Directors and Officers 
from Derivative Lawsuits and related Regulatory Actions regarding Data Breaches’ Corporate Accountability Report (14 Aug 
2015 accessed 12 Apr 2016) 13 CARE 1810  
1404 Phil Muncaster, ‘UK’s ICO doubled number of data breach fines in 2016’ InfoSecurity (5 Jun 2017 accessed 7 Jun 2017) 
<https://www.infosecurity-magazine.com/news/uks-ico-doubled-number-of-data/> 
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Finally, as to destruction or de-identification, there is no evidence that this practice is complied with,1405 
either internationally1406 or in Australia; nor is there a mechanism for consumers to enforce 
destruction.1407 Data value and cloud computing promote retention ‘just-in-case’, but the OAIC has never 
‘swept’ this issue. Given experts view large data sets as a security “honey-pot”1408 and CIOT data’s 
granular, voluminous nature, the OAIC could readily shape industry privacy practices by own-motion1409 
audits of data retention practices. Given it “expects” entities to conduct information security risk 
assessments under its PIA process,1410 a simple regulator audit could start by examining those 
documents, if they exist at all. 
 
- APP 12 Access and APP 13 Correction Rights1411  These provide an entity must give 
individuals access1412  to PI held1413 about them, on request, subject to specified refusal 
grounds,1414 and set minimal procedural requirements as to reasonable steps to correct PI held 
                                                          
1405 The OAIC’s joint Ashley Maddison investigation has no relevance to the CIOT other than evidencing indicative data 
management practices. It resulted in enforceable undertakings which included: to “…cease its practice of retaining 
indefinitely personal information of users whose accounts are deactivated or inactive; determine an appropriate period 
following account deactivation, or following an extended period of inactivity, upon which to delete personal information, 
based on ordinary usage patterns and its business needs; and inform users of these policies…”: Enforceable Undertaking 
Under s 33E of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), Australian information Commissioner - Avid Life Media Inc. (ALM) (trading as 
Ruby Corp.) (21 Aug 2015) < https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy-law/enforceable-undertakings/avid-life-media-enforceable-
undertaking> 
1406 Australian de-identification failure examples include Australia Post and an almost instant de-identification breach of the 
10% Medicare data set, and the similar breach of the ABS internal workforce data ‘Open government’ (formerly SPI) data 
sets as to the PBS and Medicare were withdrawn from publicly available databases when University of Melbourne 
researchers promptly re-identified the data:  http://www.huffingtonpost.com.au/2016/09/28/privacy-commissioner-to-
investigate-medicare-data-breach/; See the OAIC view here: Timothy Pilgrim, ‘Privacy, Data & De-identification’ Speech by 
Timothy Pilgrim to CeBIT, Sydney (2 May 2016 accessed 30 May 2016) <https://www.oaic.gov.au/media-and-
speeches/speeches/privacy-data-de-identification>  
1407 Productivity Commission, above n 190: 309- 310.  
1408 OAIC, Big Data, above n 1316: 22. 
1409 PA s 40(2) of the Privacy Act, the Commissioner may, on the Commissioner’s own initiative, investigate an act or 
practice that may be an interference with the privacy of an individual or a breach of APP 1 if the Commissioner thinks it 
desirable that the act or practice be investigated. 
1410 OAIC, Big Data, above n 1316: 23. 
1411 APP 9 prohibits the use of “government related identifiers” subject to some exclusions.  APP 12 deals with access rights 
(as in the Grubb case discussed above) and APP13 deals with correction of information which is inaccurate, out-of-date, 
incomplete, irrelevant or misleading for the purpose for which it is held: Guidelines, above n 1306 [13.30-13.41]. 
1412 APP 12 stipulates minimum requirements as to response times [12.66–12.67], how access is given [12.68–12.75], any 
charges [12.76–12.81], and written notice, including refusal reasons [12.82–12.87]. The Guidelines suggest “prompt, 
uncomplicated and inexpensive” access is desirable: OAIC Guidelines, above n 1306: [12.19]. 
1413 ‘Hold’ means in its possession or control of any record containing PI: section 6(1) and extends beyond physical 
possession to any PI the entity has a right or power to deal with: OAIC Guidelines, above n 1306 [12.7]. 
1414 APP 12.3 refusal grounds are: access would pose a serious threat to the life, health or safety of any individual, or to 
public health or public safety (APP 12.3(a)); access would unreasonably impact other’s  privacy (APP 12.3(b)); the request is 
frivolous or vexatious (APP 12.3(c)); the PI relates to existing or anticipated legal proceedings not accessible by discovery in 
those proceedings (APP 12.3(d)); access would reveal the prejudicial intentions of the organisation in relation to 
negotiations with the individual (APP 12.3(e)); access would be unlawful (APP 12.3(f)); denying access is required under an 
Australian law or court/tribunal order (APP 12.3(g)); the provider has reason to suspect that unlawful activity, or serious 
misconduct, relating to its functions or activities has been, is being or may be engaged in such that access would prejudice 
appropriate actions in that regard (APP 12.3(h)); access would prejudice enforcement related activities of an enforcement 
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to ensure that it is accurate, relevant, complete, up-to-date, and not misleading.1415 While data 
control is a laudable objective and one which both the GDPR and Productivity Commission are 
seeking to (re)enshrine,1416 at present, consumers often cannot identify or locate a CIOT entity - 
or any chain of data-handling entities - much less seek access and data correction rights. Nor do 
the APPs entitle consumers to request information deletion (despite APP 11) which is a 
significant gap given the sheer volume of data collected by CIOT devices. If the Grubb case is 
any example,1417 then troublesome access across corporate databases and setting access 
precedents, much less mandatory deletion rights, may be strongly resisted.  
As this discussion suggests, the APPs have significant regulatory uncertainties or gaps when it comes to 
CIOT privacy. Others are considered next. 
 
5.3 Other consumer privacy ‘gaps’ 
 
As the APP analysis above suggests, the law may fail to address new harms, or be uncertain, under-
inclusive or even obsolete in many CIOT contexts.1418 Some other CIOT-relevant PA ‘gaps’ include issues 
as to application, data anonymity, geolocation and law reform. 
 
5.3.1 Application  
Subject to minor exceptions,1419 the PA does not apply to small businesses1420 with an annual turnover 
of $3 million or less.1421 This is a gap in the privacy regime given that many smaller players may be 
                                                          
body (APP 12.3(i)) ; or  “reveal evaluative information generated within the organisation in connection with a commercially 
sensitive decision-making process” (APP 12.3(j)).  
1415 APP 9 prohibits the use of “government related identifiers” subject to some exclusions.  APP 12 deals with access rights 
(as in the Grubb case discussed above) and APP13 deals with correction of information which is inaccurate, out-of-date, 
incomplete, irrelevant or misleading for the purpose for which it is held: Guidelines, above n 1306 [13.30-13.41]. 
1416 Productivity Commission, above n 1316: 183.  
1417 Telstra argued that releasing Mr Grubb’s metadata would unreasonably impact upon the privacy of other individuals: 
Privacy Commissioner v Telstra, above n 1282: [31]. 
1418 Bennet Moses (2007) classifies regulatory failures in a technological change context in these four categories as cited in 
Manwaring, above n 836: 6. 
1419 These include private sector health providers (including private schools, childcare centres, GPs etc.), businesses that 
sell and purchase PI, credit reporting bodies, employees’ associations and contracted service providers for Commonwealth 
contracts. 
1420 Or not for profits. Note ‘small businesses’ does not include those with a related body corporate with a turnover 
exceeding the $3M threshold: http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-fact-sheets/other/information-sheet-
private-sector-12-2001-coverage-of-and-exemptions-from-the-private-sector-provisions 
1421 PA section 6EA provides that they may ‘opt-in’. If this link is accurate, there appears to be no entity which has decided to 
‘opt in’ to date: <http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-fact-sheets/other/information-sheet-private-sector-
12-2001-coverage-of-and-exemptions-from-the-private-sector-provisions> 
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involved in consumer IOT data collection and is inconsistent with most international frameworks.1422  
Exceptions apply if a related body corporate is subject to the Act or the entity (inter alia)1423 trades in a 
consumer’s personal information1424 without consent.1425  This may catch some small data brokers and 
(the rare) CIOT data collector/ discloser who fails to insert consents in their terms. It should however be 
noted that the CIOT data market is latent and diverse, so absent consumers detecting an adverse 
downstream outcome (targeted advertising or notified data breach, for example) - from a linkable 
disclosure – the PA has little impact.  
5.3.2 Data Anonymity, De-identification – no one will know!  
 
“…businesses and consumer groups could benefit from “something more concrete against which 
to measure claims of de-identification and anonymity…”1426 
Anonymised1427 or de-identified1428 data use is largely unregulated in Australia. Information is de-
identified when “no longer” defined “PI”,1429 through removal of personal identifiers1430 and removal/ 
alteration of individually or collectively rare or unique attributes.1431 OAIC Guidance1432 permits de-
identified data release,1433 but warns re-identification risk warrants active assessment and management, 
                                                          
1422 PC, ‘Big Data Report’ above n 41: 498-9. See for example, the New Zealand Privacy Act 1993; UK Data Protection Act 
1998; GDPR; OECD Privacy Guidelines (revised 2013); APEC Privacy Framework 2005. 
1423 It also includes a health service provider as defined. 
1424 This means to disclose or collect an individual’s PI by receiving or providing a “benefit, service or advantage…” to 
another. It is open as to the point at which CIOT device or software companies will be deemed ‘data brokers’ if their relative 
income earnt from product sales versus data sales, is disproportional. However, given the proliferation of privacy policies 
with consents as to data sales, those companies will likely comply with the PA. 
1425 Or if mandated by law. 
1426 FTC, citing EPIC in Letter to Commenter (EPIC) RE In the Matter of Compete, Inc., Matter/File Number: 102 3155 
(2013) <https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/cases/2013/02/130222competeepicletter.pdf> 
1427 ‘Anonymisation’ means processing personal data to irreversibly prevent identification. Methods include randomisation, 
generalisation, pseudonymisation, noise addition, permutation, differential privacy, aggregation, k-anonymity, l-diversity and 
t-closeness. : EU, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation techniques’ Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (adopted 10 Apr 
2014 accessed 15 Apr 2015) [3] < http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp216_en.pdf> 
1428 ‘De-identification’ means that the information is no longer about an identified individual or one who is reasonably 
identifiable: Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). section 6(1). It usually includes two aspects: firstly, removing personal identifiers (name, 
address, dob etc.) and secondly, removal/ alteration of other information which may allow identification (e.g. rare 
characteristics or a combination thereof): OAIC, ‘De-identification of Data and Information’ Privacy Business Resource 4 
(April 2014 accessed 20 Apr 2015) <http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-business-
resources/privacy_business_resource_4.pdf> 
1429 PA section 6 defines “deidentification” as where PI is no longer about an identifiable individual or one reasonably 
identifiable. 
1430 The Guidelines cite for example, name, address, dob, (etc). 
1431 OAIC, above n 1306: [B59 – 62]: 13  
1432 OAIC, ‘Privacy Business resource 4: De-identification of Data and Information’ (April 2014 accessed 9 Oct 2016) 
<https://www.oaic.gov.au/agencies-and-organisations/business-resources/privacy-business-resource-4-de-identification-of-
data-and-information> 
1433 The OAIC allow ‘information asset’ release of de-identified data, provided that indirect identification risks are assessed 
and managed via a ‘motivated intruder’ test, an assessment is done ‘in the round’ and factors such as the cost, practicality, 
difficulty and likelihood of re-identification occurring are considered. ‘De-identification’ may occur through many methods 
which must be assessed in context: the OAIC list examples such as removing quasi-identifiers (eg. profession, income), 
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having regard to “cost, difficulty, practicality and likelihood”.1434 The difficult question is the reasonable 
threshold beyond which re-identification risk becomes low or remote.1435 To illustrate, Fitbit’s privacy 
terms allow them to sell or use  aggregated, de-identified data, protected by “legal and technical 
measures”.1436 But in 2013, CIA analysts could identify a person’s identity, height, weight and gender – 
using anonymised Fitbit data, or just “gait data alone.1437 Researchers explain that consumer IOT 
datasets are “sparse”, so only a few data points are often identifying: an MIT study re-identified 95% of 
the 1.5 million anonymised people, using only four annual smartphone location points.1438 The problem 
is that big data, technological advance and consumer IOT granularity, allow individual or combined 
database points which “…will almost certainly” enable re-identification.1439 In other words, as the Art 29 
WP Opinions,1440 data commissioner’s guidance,1441 and the ICO Code of Practice1442 acknowledge, 
current or future re-identification is a likely risk which increases with time. 1443  
 
                                                          
combining identifying information into categories (e.g. ages into 25- 35); using ‘tolerable errors’; swapping information 
between data subjects to retain the same overall outcomes; using synthetic data and data suppression: OAIC, above n 181: 
3- 4. ‘Motivated intruder’ test means whether a reasonably competent non-specialist but motivated person would be able to 
identify the data via resources such as the internet, public documents and reasonable enquiries. ‘In the round’ means an 
assessment of whether any entity or member of the public could identify an individual from the data, including in combination 
with other available information/ data.  
1434 OAIC, above n 1432.  
1435 Section 6 of the Privacy Act defines “deidentification” as where PI is no longer about an identifiable individual or one 
reasonably identifiable. 
1436 Ibid. 
1437 Peppet, above n 283: 129 citing Ira Hunt, Chief Technology Officer, ‘The CIA’s grand challenges with data’ (20 Mar 
2013) <http://gigaom.com/2013/03/20/even-the-cia-is-striggling-to-deal-with-the-volume-of-real-time-social-data/2 archived 
at http://perma.cc.Q8DG-S2PL> 
1438 Larry Hardesty, ‘How Hard is it to ‘De-Anonymise’ Cellphone Data?’ MIT News (27 Mar 2013 accessed 3 Mar 2016) 
<http://news.mit.edu/2013/how-hard-it-de-anonymize-cellphone-data>. The four points involved locating a single phone user 
within a few hundred yards of a transmitter some time during an hour within a 12-month period. The cellphone location was 
inferred from the cell tower it was connected to, and the time of the connection fell within a one-hour interval. Each 
cellphone had a unique, randomly generated identifying number, so that its movement could be traced over time. But there 
was no information connecting that number to the phone’s owner. These are described as “fairly low spatial and temporal 
resolution” data sets. 
1439 Re-identification is not defined in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) but means turning de-identified data back into PI through 
reasonably reliable inference or data matching or similar techniques, either by reference to the dataset alone or through 
aggregation with other data. This may mean that Privacy Act consents have to be obtained post data collection (at the time 
of re-identification) which is so administratively difficult that businesses may either ‘lock up’ their data or ignore the Act: 
Reyhaneh Saadati and Alec Christie, ‘Big Data, Big issues? Is Australian Privacy Law keeping Up?’ DLA Piper (26 July 2013 
accessed 25 Mar 2015) <https://www.dlapiper.com/en/australia/insights/publications/2013/07/big-data-big-issues-is-
australian-privacy-law-ke__/>  
1440 EU, Article 29, above n 1427; Opinion 03/2013 on Purpose Limitation (2013) 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data=protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-recommednation/files/2013/wp203_en_pdf 
1441 (Ireland) DPC, ‘Anonymisation and pseudonymisation’ (2016 accessed 2 Oct 2016) 
<https://dataprotection.ie/viewdoc.asp?DocID=1594&ad=1> 
1442 ICO, ‘Anonymisation Code of Practice’ (accessed 8 Aug 2016) <https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1061/anonymisation-code.pdf> 
1443 See the numerous examples cited in Bruce Schneier, ‘Why 'Anonymous' Data Sometimes Isn't’ WIRED (13 Dec 2007 
accessed 15 Apr 2015) < 
http://archive.wired.com/politics/security/commentary/securitymatters/2007/12/securitymatters_1213> 
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Anonymisation failures abound.1444 As the Irish DPC suggests, no technique is 100% effective to 
irreversibly anonymise data,1445 which repeated public1446 and private1447 sector failures evidence. 
Practices such as data collection optimisation, “data fusion,”1448 “matching”,1449 “linking”1450 and the 
“mosaic effect”,1451  make de-identification a “limited proposition”1452 and “…an illusion,”1453 entailing 
“residual” privacy risk.1454 There is no reason to expect that consumer IOT companies will de-identify data 
with any greater success. Indeed, faced with multiple failures, the Australian government has chosen 
hard law over technology. It is legislating to criminalise any attempt to re-identify de-identified government 
                                                          
1444 For example, AOL released 19 million web searches of 700,000 anonymised consumers, only to find many of them re-
identified publicly: Numeric IDs were attached to each of the 658,000 subscribers whose searches contained identifying 
personal information; e.g. name, location and social security data: Anick Jesdanun, ‘AOL: Breach of Privacy Was a Mistake’ 
The Washington Post (7 Aug 2006 accessed 15 Apr 2015) < http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/08/07/AR2006080700790_2.html>   A researcher identified a US state governor from supposedly 
de-identified public health data.  The Massachusetts Group Insurance Commission (GIC) released anonymised data as to 
state employee hospital visits for researcher use – which the Governor assured everyone were private as identifiers had 
been removed. Latanya Sweeney decided to test that proposition; she knew the governor’s city, purchased the voting roll 
and combined the voter information – name, address, postcode and dob - with the GIC records. Her study revealed 6 people 
with his dob, 3 were male and only he had the right postcode. She thus located the Governor’s data, which she sent to his 
office: Nate Anderson, ‘“Anonymized” data really isn’t—and here’s why not’ Ars Technica (8 Sept 2009 accessed 15 Apr 
2015) http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2009/09/your-secrets-live-online-in-databases-of-ruin/> In 2009, Netflix was sued 
by class action for allegedly voluntarily disclosing the personal information of 480,000 subscribers when it provided contest 
participants with data sets containing over 100 million subscriber movie ratings and preferences, to improve its 
recommendation system data. The damage alleged included that movie watching history would “…identify or permit 
inference of her sexual orientation…” which would adversely affect her livelihood and family life in their community: Valdez-
Marquez, Sinopli, Navarro et al v Netflix, Inc. U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California, San Jose Division, 
Civil Action No. c09 05903) <http://privacylaw.proskauer.com/uploads/file/doe-v-netflix.pdf> (17 Dec 2009) The case settled. 
1445 (Irish) DPC, above n 1441.  
1446  In 2016 anonymised Australian Government health data was promptly re-identified, and within one week, anonymised 
employee census data of 100,000 employees was withdrawn, for fear of re-identification:  C. Culnane, Benjamin Rubenstein 
and Vanessa Teague, ‘Understanding the maths us crucial for protecting privacy’ Pursuit, Dept of Engineering and 
Technology (29 Sept 2016 accessed 5 Oct 2016) <https://pursuit.unimelb.edu.au/articles/understanding-the-maths-is-
crucial-for-protecting-privacy>  The latter dataset was downloaded at least 58 times before the error was realised: Noel 
Towell,  ‘96,000 public servants in new data breach’ The Canberra Times (5 October 2016 accessed 10 Oct 2016) < 
http://www.canberratimes.com.au/national/public-service/96000-public-servants-in-new-data-breach-20161004-grul2p.html> 
1447 One study found that 25% of websites shared personal login details with third parties, including sexual orientation and 
drug use habits: Valentino-DeVries, above n 752. OkCupid for example sent user names to one company, gender, age and 
postcode data to seven companies, drug use to six companies and sexual orientation to two companies – but claims that as 
sent, it is all ‘anonymized’, but this may not prevent re-identification especially in combination. 
1448 Executive Office of the President, above n 41 (Big Data). For example, data brokers are known to reattach individual 
personal data obtained from retailers to anonymised browsing history, to provide a whole new analysed data set for retailer’s 
marketing use: Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, above n 752.  
1449 Data matching means comparing multiple systems of records to aggregate data about an already identified subject. 
1450 Data linking means linking identified and anonymous databases to de-anonymise or re-identify anonymous data by 
identifying data fingerprints, which may often then be linked to other data sets. 
1451 Ibid: this means the integration of big data whereby personally identifiable information can be derived or inferred from 
supposedly de-identified datasets. 
1452 PCAST Report, ‘Big Data and Privacy’ Harvard Law Petrie-Flom Center, Online Symposium on the Law, Ethics and 
Science of Re-identification Demonstrations (2013) 8. 
1453 Data from just four ‘anonymous’ credit card purchases can identify 90% of people: Jamie Condliffe, ‘Anonymised Credit 
Card Data Really Isn't Very Anonymous’ Gizmodo (31 Jan 2015 accessed 15 Apr 2015) 
<http://www.gizmodo.com.au/2015/01/anonymized-credit-card-data-really-isnt-very-anonymous/>  
1454 The EU opinion concluded that unless engineered properly and constantly revised to reflect latest technology 
developments, anonymization presents “residual risks” to consumers: EU, above n 182. 
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data, or to publish or communicate any re-identified dataset1455- but consumer PI will not attract the same 
protection. In the meantime, the OAIC is rewriting its guidance, warning that privacy impact assessments 
must always be undertaken when assessing de-identification in a big data world. 1456  
5.3.3 Geolocation  
Smart device and app geolocation is ubiquitous, useful1457 and uniquely privacy intrusive.1458 Location 
data is created when electronic devices are trackable via GPS or Wi Fi, and is revelatory of vast tracts of 
SI/PI, including home and workplace, “social graph”,1459 behavioural patterns, “business connections, 
political affiliations or medical conditions”1460  or other correlations of inferable purpose.1461  Of all 
anonymised data, it is readily re-identified and where public, tracking creates “…new risks ranging from 
data theft to burglary, to even physical aggression and stalking.”1462  The recent Telstra case suggests 
that geolocation metadata is not PI, insofar as it may not be “about” an (identified) individual. In contrast, 
Uber were prosecuted for privacy-intrusive geolocation practices1463 and the Irish DPC regards location-
revealing home-router data1464 and smart car geolocation data, as PI.1465 If location metadata is not PI in 
Australia, then legislative resolution is required; cases are too few and slow, and the federal government 
                                                          
1455 Senator George Brandis, ‘Amendment to the Privacy Act to Further Protect De-Identified Data’ Media release (28 Sept 
2016 accessed 29 Sept 2016) < https://www.attorneygeneral.gov.au/Mediareleases/Pages/2016/ThirdQuarter/Amendment-
to-the-Privacy-Act-to-further-protect-de-identified-data.aspx> 
1456 The OAIC advises in its latest draft guide, that privacy impact assessments should always be used when assessing de-
identification and using big data. That assessment should consider the range of information, algorithms and how data will be 
used or disclosed: OAIC, above n 1316: 5. The final has not been released as at submission date. 
1457 Geolocation permits geographically-relevant services such as the maps, navigation, weather, restaurants and so on. 
Other examples also include augmented reality, geotagging internet content, tracking people (friends, children etc.), and 
(sometimes useful) location based advertising. 
1458 The Art 29 WG suggest it can be secret (through app updates) or ‘semi-secret’ – people may forget the setting, not be 
properly informed location services are ‘on, or when settings change from ‘private’ to ‘public’. 
1459 Philippe Golle and Kurt Partridge, ‘On the anonymity of Home/ Work Location pairs’ Stanford University (n.d. accessed 3 
Aug 2016) <http://crypto.stanford.edu/~pgolle/papers/commute.pdf>;  Philippe Golle and Kurt Partridge  ‘Your Morning 
Commute Is Unique: On The Anonymity Of Home/Work Location Pairs’ (13 May 2009 accessed 3 Aug 2016) 
<https://33bits.org/2009/05/13/your-morning-commute-is-unique-on-the-anonymity-of-homework-location-pairs/> 
1460 Golle, ibid. 
1461 Data Protection Commissioner (Ireland), above n 346.   
1462 Ibid. 
1463 New York Attorney-General, ‘A.G. Schneiderman Announces Settlement with Uber to Enhance Rider Privacy’ Media 
release (Jan 2016 accessed 2 Nov 2016) <http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-settlement-
uber-enhance-rider-privacy> These included to  encrypt passenger geo-location information, adopt multi-factor 
authentication pre-employee PI access, etc. Uber also had to pay $20,000 with respect to an un-notified data breach. After 
the AG opened an investigation into Uber’s collection, maintenance and disclosure of rider personal information amid 
reports that Uber executives had access to riders’ locations and that Uber displayed this information in an aerial view, known 
internally as “God View.” Note their Jan 2015 New York Attorney General’s Office settlement which mandated Uber encrypt 
its user data: <http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-announces-settlement-uber-enhance-rider-privacy>  
1464 Irish DPC, above n 346. 
1465 Irish DPC, above n 346. For smart cars, the Irish DPC distinguishes between data as to a private or company vehicle 
(the location of which is linked to a living person) versus an autonomous taxi carrying unidentifiable persons, but it seems 
unlikely that any smart car would ever not collect occupant-identifying PI whether via camera, booking or payments systems. 
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has already, in its data retention regime, accepted that such information is best privacy-protected as 
“personal”.   
 
5.3.4 Law reform…. again 
 
One Australian desktop IOT privacy study1466 found legal ‘gaps’ as to ubiquitous, international collection 
and security,1467 and concluded that the PA “cannot keep up with, or properly protect security, 1468  privacy 
rights management and personal information control”.1469 Another analysed CIOT privacy harms utilising 
Solove’s taxonomy;1470 and upon author revision, every identified harm as to information collection;1471  
processing,1472 dissemination;1473 and private affairs invasion1474, is “relevant” in a CIOT context. While 
Thierer asserts that data breach alone is not a “harm”,1475 EU and (some) US authority disagrees, and 
Australia’s new mandatory data breach scheme hinges upon finding “serious [individual] harm” in breach.  
 
Successive Australian enquiries have recommended a statutory privacy tort to redress privacy harms,1476 
to prohibit intrusions into a person’s “seclusion or private affairs (including by unlawful surveillance)”; and 
the misuse or disclosure of PI. A tort, distinct from the OAIC approach in privately and impartially1477 
conciliating most consumer privacy complaints,1478 would strengthen consumer options to enforce privacy 
                                                          
1466 This was assessed through four themes derived from a literature review:  unauthorised surveillance, uncontrolled data 
generation and use, inadequate authentication and information security risk. Xavier Caron, Pachelle Bosua, Sean B. 
Maynard and Atif Ahmad, ‘The Internet of things (IoT) and its impact on individual privacy: An Australian perspective’ 
Computer Law and Security Review 32 (2016) 4- 14 
1467 Ibid. The only other Australian desktop review found (without real legal analysis) that privacy law would be sufficient. 
This accorded with NTC findings as C-ITS and autonomous vehicles; again, based upon submissions rather than rigorous 
legal analysis. 
1468 Ibid. 
1469 Ibid: 13.  
1470 Daniel Solove, ‘A Taxonomy of Privacy’ University of Pennsylvania Law Review 154: 3 (Jan 2006 accessed 21 Apr 
2016): 477- 564 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/40041279). this exercise was first undertaken by Vulkanovski, above n 110, but 
in a different manner. 
1471 Subcategories are:  surveillance, interrogation 
1472 Subcategories are:  aggregation, identification, insecurity, secondary use, exclusion 
1473 Subcategories are:  breach of confidentiality, disclosure, exposure, increased accessibility, blackmail or extortion, 
appropriation, distortion.  
1474 intrusion and decisional interference.   
1475 Section 40A requires the OAIC make a reasonable attempt to conciliate a complaint. It states that “Most complaints are 
resolved in this way”: OAIC, above n 1255: 6 [28]. 
1476 Both the UK and NZ recognise a tort of misuse of private information and a tort of intrusion upon seclusion. See for UK: 
Vidal-Hall v Google [2014] EWHC 13 (QB); and NZ: Hosking v Runting (2004) 7 HRNZ 301; (2005) 1 NZLR 1; C v Holland 
[2012] NZHC 2155.  The USA has recognised a common law right of privacy for almost a century: Ruth McColl, "Privacy, 
Business and the Digital Era" [2014] NSWJSchol 15 <http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/journals/NSWJSchol/2014/15.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=APP1.3> 
1477 Chapter 1 [1.15] The APC does not advocate and the process is “free, informal and accessible” without requirement for 
legal representation but each bears their own costs.  OAIC, above n 1311.  
1478 OAIC, above n 1255 and OAIC, above n 1311.  
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rights publicly in a CIOT context. As the possibility was left open by the High Court1479 and its nature, 
operation and necessity has been repeatedly recommended by authoritative Australian enquiries 2008-
2015,1480 this reform is not explored further here. 
 
Given the multiple gaps identified as to the APPs and that open data regime proposals are premised 
(largely) upon access,1481 it seems clear that Australian consumer privacy protections and industry 
compliance would be strengthened by proactive public consumer litigation, in addition to the private PA 
complaints-managed regime.  
 
5.4  (Un) smart privacy cases 
“… universal notions of privacy and security don’t necessarily translate to the Internet of 
Things…”1482 
  
There are no Australian CIOT-related privacy cases. But international cases are factually illustrative and 
invite questions as to the PA’s capacity to respond. Recent examples concern smartTVs,1483 Amazon’s 
‘Alexa’, Google Nest Cam,1484 and computer1485  and Xbox1486 ‘spy’ software. In 2013, LG’s smart TV 
was ‘caught’ collecting consumer data without any opt out1487 and in 2016, EPIC filed a FTC complaint 
alleging1488 that Samsung smart TV voice-recognition involves deceptive and unfair practices, by 
                                                          
1479 Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats Pty Ltd (2001) 208 CLR 199. Two lower court decisions 
recognised a tort of invasion of privacy as well, though both settled before an appellate decision could be given. See Grosse 
v Purvis [2003] QDC 151 (16 June 2003); Doe v Australian Broadcasting Corporation [2007] VCC 281. 
1480 ALRC, above n 1235; Australian Law Reform Commission, ‘For your Information: Privacy Law and Practice’ Report No. 
108 (May 2008 accessed 5 Jan 2016) <https://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/108_vol1.pdf >; NSW Law Reform 
Commission, ‘Invasion of Privacy’ Report No. 120 (3 Mar 2016 accessed 5 Jun 2016) < ; ALRC, above n 1235; Victorian 
Law Reform Commission, ‘Surveillance in Public Places’ Report 18  (12 Aug 2010 accessed 3 Apr 2016) 
<http://www.lawreform.vic.gov.au/projects/surveillance-public-places/surveillance-public-places-final-report> Privacy torts 
exist in both the US and the UK. 
1481 Productivity Commission, above n 190 Ch. 9. 
1482 Ben Warlick, attorney with Morris, Manning and Martin in Atlanta, cited in AP, ‘Hello Barbie and Security Not the Perfect 
Couple, Claims Lawsuit’ Investor’s Business Daily (n.d. 2015 accessed 15 Jan 2017) < 
http://www.investors.com/news/technology/hello-barbie-security-not-the-perfect-couple-claims-lawsuit/> 
1483 EPIC, above n 356.   
1484 EPIC, ‘Request for Workshop and Investigation of ‘Always On’ Consumer Devices’, Letter to US Department of Justice 
and the FTC (10 Jul 2015 accessed 4 Feb 2016) <https://epic.org/2015/07/epic-urges-investigation-of-al.html> 
1485 Google’s Chromium browser: EPIC assert that Chromium browser software turns on computer microphones, to listen for 
the “OK Google” prompt which results in “constant voice recording” in private homes: Ibid: 2. 
1486 Microsoft’s ‘Kinect’ in Xbox consoles, monitors voices until it hears a command, even when it is ‘off’: T C Sottek, ‘The 
Xbox One will always be listening to you, in your own home’ The Verge (21 may 2013 accessed 4 Feb 2016) 
<http://www.theverge.com/2013/5/21/4352596/the-xbox-one-is-always-listening>  cited in EPIC, Ibid: footnote 16. 
1487 The TV reported to LG every channel change, scanning all shared files on the home network and its opt-out mechanism 
did not work: Justin Brookman, ‘Eroding Trust: How New Smart TV Lacks privacy by design and Transparency’ (27 Nov 
2013 accessed 26 Apr 2016) <https://iapp.org/news/a/eroding-trust-how-new-smart-tv-lacks-privacy-by-design-and-
transparency/> 
1488 Samsung, above n 356. 
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recording users and by internet-transmission for third party processing, together with device data and IP 
address.1489 Samsung’s Privacy Policy disclosed this, but (EPIC say unfairly) disclaimed responsibility 
for third party privacy and security standards,1490 arguing that consumers could not reasonably anticipate 
their TV transmitting private conversations to another company. The FTC has since warned ‘always-on’ 
app developers not to spy on viewing habits,1491 and pursued the Vizio case,1492 which highlighted default 
tracking. Vizio did not notify consumers or obtain consent; but covertly linked registration PI with viewing 
history which it on-sold to third parties, including cross-device advertisers.  Clearly, this deceptive 
‘omission’ violates the ACL (Ch. 4), and breaches APPs 3, 5 and 6 (and others) as to non-disclosure of 
non-related purposes, nor would (express) consent be inferable, given data is likely PI if not SI.  Samsung 
has also been accused,1493 but notified their tracking in a bundled consent with a one click “opt in”, so 
even if a once-off, buried mid sign-up process, this would comply with APP requirements.1494 Of course 
the consent fallacy is that the person who clicks ‘accept’ for all device viewers, may lack legal authority 
or capacity. In its specificity, the FTC settlement illustrates Australia’s ‘so-so’ privacy regime: it requires 
affirmative express consent and “prominent disclosure”, separate from other terms, as to collected/ 
shared data type, the identity or specific categories of third party recipients and “all [sharing] purposes”. 
“Prominent” disclosure must be noticeable, unavoidable and understandable by ordinary consumers1495  
without inconsistency or contradiction.1496 While the PA mandates disclosure, there is regulatory 
                                                          
1489 EPIC, above n 356. The complaint alleges breach of section 5, as well as the Electronic communications Privacy Act 
(which prohibits interception of oral communications”, and COPPA as to children. 
1490 The policy stated “You should exercise caution and review the privacy statements applicable to the third-party websites 
and services you use”. 
1491 Email from Claire Gartland, EPIC Consumer Protection Counsel to author, 11 Aug 2016. 
1492 Federal Trade Commission, Attorney General of the State of New Jersey, and NJ Division of Consumer Affairs v. VIZIO 
INC. and VIZIO Inscape Services, LLC, Case 2:17-cv-00758, Filed 6 Feb 2017 <https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/162-3024/vizio-inc-vizio-inscape-services-llc> 
INCL ‘Complaint for Permanent Injunction and Other Equitable and Monetary Relief ‘ 
<https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/170206_vizio_2017.02.06_complaint.pdf>  and ‘Stipulated Order for 
Permanent Injunction and Monetary Judgment’ 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/170206_vizio_stipulated_proposed_order.pdf and ‘Concurring Statement 
of Acting Chairman Maureen K. Ohlhausen In the Matter of Vizio, Inc.’ 
<https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1070773/vizio_concurring_statement_of_chairman_ohlhaus
en_2-6-17.pdf> 
1493 EPIC, above n 356.  
1494 EPIC alleged that: “When the voice recognition feature is enabled, everything a user says in front of the Samsung 
SmartTV is recorded and transmitted over the internet to a third party regardless of whether it is related to the provision of 
the service”: EPIC, Ibid. California has enacted laws to address smart TV voice recognition privacy and disclosures: 
Assembly Bill No. 1116, 2015-16, <https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160AB1116> 
c/f Samsung deny the accusation: Samsung, above n 356.   
1495 If targeted to children, elderly, terminally ill etc. then they include reasonable members of those groups. Disclosure must 
by both syntax and diction understandable to ordinary consumers and appear in each language in which the ‘triggering 
representation’ appears.  
1496 FTC v Vizio, above n 1492: Order II as to Notice and Affirmative Express Consent. Prominent disclosure requires: Visual 
disclosure:  by size, location, contrast, length of time it appears and other characteristics, to stand out contextually so it is 
“easily noticed read and understood”; Audible disclosure: delivered at volume, speed and cadence sufficient to hear and 
understand; and where delivered by any interactive electronic medium communication: (e.g. firmware update), it must be 
“unavoidable”. 
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uncertainty as neither the PA or Guidelines specify substantive compliance, such that the standards 
required become a question for judicial interpretation rather than industry knowledge and regulatory 
control. 
In 2016, a class action1497 alleging that We-Vibe 4+ smart vibrators “secretly collect and transmit highly 
sensitive personally identifiable [user] information”, settled.1498 Remotely app-controllable, the device 
enabled “connected lover” sessions, and without notice or consent, recorded use date and time, and 
settings1499 which it transmitted with the user’s email address to cross-border servers. The settlement 
(without admission) involved a USD$3.7 million, with up to $10,000 to each customer.1500 While mildly-
amusing and privacy-offensive in turn, the case illustrates that lawful data disclosure,1501 breach or 
extortion has a darker side, when device ‘use’ is illegal in several US states1502 and countries.1503 No less 
dark are “creepy, eavesdropping” smart toys. ‘CloudPet’ is a smart stuffed-animal marketed as “a 
message you can hug”, but has allegedly exposed over 800,000 customer credentials and 2 million 
children’s voice recordings – which were stored in an insecure internet-accessible database.1504 Security 
experts describe the breach as “sinister” and “unforgiveable”.1505 Mattel’s ‘Hello Barbie’,1506 sparked an 
                                                          
1497 Prompted by a DefCon security exposé. A software flaw also enabled a hacker to control the device remotely: Ry Crist, 
‘Screwed by sex toy spying? You may get $10k’ CNET (15 Mar 2017 accessed 20 Mar 2017) 
<https://www.cnet.com/au/news/app-enabled-sex-toy-users-get-10000-each-after-privacy-breach/> 
1498 N.P. & Ors v Standard innovation (US) Corp bda We-Vibe, Case No 1:16-cv-8655, United States District Court of Illinois 
(Filed 2 Sept 2016) <https://www.cnet.com/news/internet-connected-vibrator-we-vibe-lawsuit-privacy-data/> 
1499 These included device temperature, vibration level and mode.   
1500 Customers who used only the vibrator (not the app) receive up to $199. 
1501 The app Terms of Use included usual clauses allowing the manufacturer to divulge device use data upon court order. 
1502 In 1568 Montgomery Highway v. City of Hoover (2009), the Alabama Supreme Court upheld as constitutional a statute 
prohibiting the sale of “any device designed ... primarily for the stimulation of human genital organs” - which targeted dildos 
and vibrators. The court concluded the rationale was “public morality” and as there is no recognised constitutional right to 
sexual freedom, the law should be upheld. 
1503 For example, penalties include public lashings (Saudi Arabia) and 32 months jail (Indonesia). 
1504 Alex Hern, ‘CloudPets stuffed toys leak details of half a million users’ The Guardian (1 Mar 2017 accessed 14 Mar 2017) 
https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2017/feb/28/cloudpets-data-breach-leaks-details-of-500000-children-and-adults 
Details included email addresses and passwords, profile pictures, and voice recordings; while the company denied the 
latter, experts report that the recordings were accessible via the url, which is in turn accessible via the app. Password 
requirements were also described as “lax” so “trivial” to hack. The records are being traded online according to ‘Have I Been 
Pwned’ data breach website. CloudPets did not notify users of the hack. 
1505 John Madelin, CEO of RelianceACSN quoted Ibid. 
1506 Samuel Gibbs, ‘Hackers can hijack Wi-Fi Hello Barbie to spy on your children’ The Guardian (26 Nov 2015 accessed 10 
May 2016) < https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/nov/26/hackers-can-hijack-wi-fi-hello-barbie-to-spy-on-your-
children>; Samuel Gibbs, above n 618; NBC, ‘New Wi-Fi Enabled Barbie Can be Hacked, researchers Say’ NBC 5 Reports 
(17 Dec 2015 accessed 10 May 2016) http://www.nbcchicago.com/investigations/WEB-10p-pkg-Surveillance-
Toy_Leitner_Chicago-353434911.html> See Toy Talk, ‘Hello Barbie Companion Application Terms of Use’ (14 Oct 2015 
accessed 10 May 2016) https://toytalk.com/hellobarbie/terms/; Toy Talk, ‘Privacy Policy’ and ‘Children’s Privacy Policy’ (Last 
revised 11 Jan 2016 accessed 10 May 2016) < https://www.toytalk.com/legal/privacy/>; Toy Talk, ‘Hello Barbie Privacy 
Policy’ (Last Revised 5 Jan 2016 accessed 10 May 2016) < https://www.toytalk.com/hellobarbie/privacy/>; Manta, Irina D & 
David S. Olson, ‘Hello Barbie: First They Will Monitor You, Then They Will Discriminate Against You. Perfectly.’ 67 Alabama 
Law Review 135 (2015) <https://law.depaul.edu/about/centers-and-institutes/center-for-intellectual-property-law-and-
information-technology/programs/ip-scholars-conference/Documents/ipsc_2015/abstracts-papers-
presentation/OlsonD_abstract.pdf> 
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EU state investigation and a class action seeking injunctions and damages for an “inherently dangerous 
product” involving “…unlawful and negligent collection, use and distribution of minor’s personal 
information”.1507  In 2016 both the FTC and EU1508 initiated actions against ‘My Friend Cayla’ and ‘i-Que 
robot’ smart toys, which like Hello Barbie, use speech recognition software via a smartphone-pairable 
app, doll microphone and speakers, to “talk” to children.1509 The toys record interactions, and are 
allegedly, readily hackable.1510 The FTC complaint alleges privacy consent and consumer protection 
legislation breaches,1511 while EU complaints allege the toys violate Directives;1512 and breach ‘unfair 
terms’, data minimisation principles,1513 and enable (partly-unidentified) third party data sharing subject 
to their ‘unfair’ terms.1514 The terms may also enable profiling and targeted advertising to children1515 and 
                                                          
1507 Archer-Hayes & C.H. and Johnson & AP. & Ors v. ToyTalk Inc, Mattel Inc., Samet Privacy LLC dba Kidsafe Seal 
Program & Ors, Class Action Complaint, Case No. BC 603467 Superior Court of California (Filed 7 Dec 2015) 
http://www.coppanow.com/wp-content/uploads/HelloBarbieComplaint.pdf  The case pleads Violation of the Unfair 
Competition Law, Negligence, Unjust Enrichment (they made money on the doll where they shouldn’t have) and Invasion of 
Privacy and COPPA. The latter Act provides it is unlawful an online service directed to children to collect personal 
information from a child without (1) providing notice of what information is collected, how it is used, and its disclosure 
practices; and (2) obtaining verifiable parental consent. Moreover, the operator must provide parents with (1) a description of 
the information collected; (2) the opportunity to refuse to permit further use, maintenance, or future collection of personal 
information from the child; and (3) reasonable means to obtain any personal information collected from the child. The 
operator is further required "to establish and maintain reasonable procedures to protect the confidentiality, security, and 
integrity of personal information collected from children [which includes identifying and contact information, geolocation and 
voice in audio file etc.]: 15 USC 6501 (8) 
1508 They filed with EU Commission, the International Consumer Protection and Enforcement Network, and national DPAs in 
Norway, Greece, Belgium, France, the Netherlands and Ireland 
1509 The software locates answers to questions either from a list of pre-programmed answers, or from limited internet 
sources (e.g. Wikipedia, Google and Weather Underground).  
1510 Any smartphone can connect to Cayla via Bluetooth, even without physical access, due to an “inadequate quality’ 
Bluetooth chip and no mechanical barriers. See the complaint-supporting research from Norway: FORBRUKERRÅDET, 
‘Report: Investigation of privacy and security issues with smart toys’ (2 Nov 2016 accessed 15 Jan 2017) 
https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/2016-11-technical-analysis-of-the-dolls-bouvet.pdf; 
FORBRUKERRÅDET, ‘#Toyfail’ (Dec 2016 accessed 15 Jan 2017) <https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-
content/uploads/2016/12/toyfail-report-desember2016.pdf> 
1511 In the Matter of Genesis Toys and Nuance Communications, ‘Complaint and Request for Investigation, injunction, and 
other relief’, Submitted by The Electronic Privacy Information Center, The Campaign for a Commercial Free Childhood, The 
Center for Digital Democracy and the Consumers Union (6 Dec 2016 accessed 12 Dec 2016) 
<https://epic.org/privacy/kids/EPIC-IPR-FTC-Genesis-Complaint.pdf> The privacy/ consent-related breach was of the 
COPPA legislation as to their failure to obtain parental consent for information collection for children under 13. Note the 
GDPR consent age is 15, although member states can reduce it to 13 or 14. 
1512 Data Protection Directive and Unfair Contract Terms Directive. See for example, the complaint to the Norwegian Data 
protection Authority and The Consumer ombudsman, FORBRUKERRÅDET, ‘Complaint regarding user agreements and 
privacy policies for internet-connected toys –the Cayla doll and i-Que robot’ (6 Dec 2016 accessed 15 Jan 2017) 
<https://fil.forbrukerradet.no/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/complaint-dpa-co.pdf> 
1513 The terms required smartphone contact access, without justification. 
1514 Unfair terms included a failure to notify consumers before terms changes, data collection exceeding the collection 
purpose and breaching data minimisation, plus amending privacy policy without notice, the right to use and transfer voice 
data to third parties, and non-transparent data deletion policies: Ibid: 4. 
1515 They allegedly link anonymised and personal information, with publicly available user data for this purpose. Note that the 
US ‘Instructions’ claim that there “will be no data mining”: 
<https://media.wix.com/ugd/a340e5_ee888af1dba447a2a1a344d7d872b700.pdf> 
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that certain toy ‘answers’ constitute marketing. The dolls are banned in Germany as surveillance 
devices,1516 but are still sold in Australia.1517  
 
Australian regulators may be waiting upon outcomes; but relying upon Norwegian investigation findings, 
there are potential breaches of APP1 (low privacy policy accessibility); APP3 (collection beyond that 
required- the apps access parent contacts); APP6 (non-consensual SI use);1518 APP7 (cross-border data 
flows); APP 11 (excess data retention).1519 APP12 as to lax data security; APP 13 (data cannot readily 
be deleted).1520 That such privacy-adverse terms proliferate reflects the low likelihood of OAIC action; 
indeed, the ACCC has its eye on smart toys1521 and seems far more likely to take them on.  
 
 
5.5 OAIC privacy enforcement performance  
 
My priority is protecting Australian's personal information in the digital age... [and] to help 
businesses and the wider community take privacy in their hands.’ – Timothy Pilgrim1522 
 
“We are uniquely placed to bring government, business and technical expertise together to 
address the privacy dimensions of these technologies to protect both individual privacy, and 
organisational reputation.1523 
 
 
The FTC’s “current privacy enforcement priorities” include the internet of things, and data security.1524 
FTC CIOT cases are discussed in Ch. 4,1525 and it continues to successfully assert its jurisdiction.1526 The 
EU has an even greater privacy and security case inventory, backed by significant penalties and the 
                                                          
1516 Germany's Federal Network Agency (Bundesnetzagentur) says the toy is banned as "unauthorised wireless transmitting 
equipment" as it transmits signals and records sound without detection 
1517 See https://www.myfriendcayla.com/shop-australia. 
1518 Ibid: 24. 
1519 “…it is not always possible to completely remove all of your information from our databases… because of backups, or 
other reasons…”: Ibid: 25 
1520 Ibid: 25 
1521 Discussion between Delia Rickard and author. 
1522 Pilgrim, above n 1225.   
1523  Timothy Pilgrim cited in OAIC, above n 1229.  
1524 FTC, ‘Prepared Statement on Oversight of the Federal Trade Commission’ United States Senate (27 Sept 2016 
accessed 2 Oct 2016): 8 
<https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/986433/commission_testimony_oversight_senate_0927201
6.pdf> 
1525 Ibid: 10. To put this activity in context, the FTC filed over 160 consumer protection complaints, obtained over 300 
permanent injunctions/ orders requiring payment of over $1.6 billion in consumer redress or disgorgement of funds. 
Referrals to the Dept of Justice led to 40 judgments and penalties around $43 million: FTC, Ibid: 3. 
1526 Its application of principles similar in effect to APP 11 is currently under appeal in LabMD Inc. v FTC, above n 650. 
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incoming GDPR;1527  indeed, the UK’s ICO has imposed over £7.8 million in civil penalties.1528 In contrast, 
the OAIC is criticised as a “toothless tiger”,1529 and despite enhanced enforcement powers and positive 
rhetoric,1530 there is little case-based evidence of improved strategy, policy or approach.1531  The OAIC’s 
privacy performance is modest, to say the least: in 2015-6 it made seven determinations,1532 oversaw 
123 data breach notifications (none prosecuted), accepted two enforceable undertakings,1533 conducted 
17 self-initiated investigations (s 40(2)), and 21 privacy assessments,1534 and  one court case as the sum 
                                                          
1527  Laraine Laudati,  ‘Summaries of EU Court Decisions Relating to Data Protection 2000- 2015’ Data protection Office & 
European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) (28 Jan 2016 accessed 5 Mar 2016) <https://ec.europa.eu/anti-
fraud/sites/antifraud/files/caselaw_2001_2015_en.pdf> The  GDPR applies EU-wide from May 2018. It increases 
compliance requirements, and imposes significant financial penalties of (whichever greater) up to €20m or 4% of annual 
worldwide turnover for company groups. These apply to infringements of principles as to processing, including consent 
conditions, data subject rights, international data transfers, national law obligations allowable under the GDPR, and data 
protection authority orders including data flow suspension. Commentators suggest that the fines are so significant that firms 
will take them very seriously leading to behavioural changes. Infringements for entities such as Google, Microsoft, Apple and 
Facebook could result in fines worth billions. 
1528 ICO, ‘Actions we’ve taken’ (accessed 20 Nov 2016) https://ico.org.uk/action-weve-taken/ This includes 80 undertakings, 
52 monetary penalties, 33 enforcement notices, and 25 prosecutions – in 2016 alone. It has also undertaken 157 Audits, 
advisory visits and overview reports: see <https://ico.org.uk/action-weve-
taken/enforcement/?facet_type=Prosecutions&facet_sector=&facet_date=&date_from=&date_to=> 
1529 “The ALRC often heard concerns that the Privacy Act is a ‘toothless tiger’, lacking adequate enforcement mechanisms 
and sufficient sanctions to ensure compliance…”: ALRC, ‘Executive Summary’ ALRC Report 108 (2008 accessed 20 Apr 
2015) <http://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/Executive%20Summary/extensive-public-engagement# >; Matt Goodwin, 
‘Toothless Tiger…Now With Teeth’ Pigott Stinson (3 Sept 2013 accessed 20 Apr 2015) 
<http://pigott.com.au/publications/toothless-tigernow-with-teeth/> See for example, the outcome of the first case of privacy 
breach when the new powers applied: OAIC, ‘Optus Enforceable undertaking’ (n.d. 2015) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/privacy/applying-privacy-law/enforceable-undertakings/enforceable-
undertaking-optus.pdf> See also  critique of the OAIC’s own motions investigations: Jennifer Siganto,  Jodie Lomoff and 
Mark Burdon, ‘The privacy commissioner and own-motion investigations into serious data breaches: a case of going through 
the motions?’ University of New South Wales Law Journal (2015) 38 3: 1145-1185 
http://espace.library.uq.edu.au/view/UQ:367575 and the author’s conclusions as to OAIC enforcement as to behavioural 
advertising: Mathews-Hunt, above n 185.   
1530 Pilgrim, above n 1225. 
1531 The first large scale breach case post the amendments involved Singtel Optus Pty Ltd which voluntarily notified three 
privacy breaches caused by their own systems’ security flaws, each affecting over 100,000 customers: Michael Pattinson, 
‘First enforceable undertaking under new privacy laws’ Allens Linklaters (31 Mar 2015 accessed 20 Apr 2015) 
<http://www.allens.com.au/pubs/priv/fopriv31mar15.htm>  The APC did not pursue civil penalties and accepted a section 
33E enforceable undertaking, partly due to its cooperation and the (expensive) systems, audit and related corporate reviews 
included as a part of the settlement: see the text here: <http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/enforceable-
undertakings/singtel-optus-enforceable-undertaking>. Consistent with growing US practice, it is surprising though that the 
APC did not act under APP 11 as to a failure to take reasonable steps to protect information – in one case, 122,000 
customers had personal information published in the White Pages and online – without their consent. This is a serious 
breach with significant consumer harm to justify civil penalties. In contrast, the ACCC prosecuted Optus for advertising 
misrepresentations which resulted in $3.61M in penalties. The Full Federal Court found that Optus was not a ‘first offender’ 
and had lax compliance systems: Gilbert & Tobin, ‘Singtel Optus Pty ltd v ACCC’ (27 Apr 2012 accessed 20 Apt 2015) 
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=46cac7c5-c732-4001-b553-98f620b75935>  
1532 OAIC, ‘Annual Report’ 2015-6 https://www.oaic.gov.au/about-us/corporate-information/annual-reports/oaic-annual-
report-201516/part-2-performance Of these all were individual complaints which had failed at conciliation. None involved 
‘consumer’ issues but rather were “low-tech” individual scenarios. As such they little advance the privacy cause and are 
more small claims in effect. 
1533 One included the infamous Ashley Madison data breach case which was investigated in conjunction with the Canadian 
Privacy Commissioner:  Enforceable Undertaking Under s 33E of the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth), to the Australian Information 
Commissioner - Avid Life Media Inc. (ALM) (trading as Ruby Corp.), 21 Aug 2015. 
1534 These were across education, government, identity verification, retail, telecommunications. 
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of its enforcement activity for 2015-6.1535 Put simply, the OAIC is small,1536 poorly funded,1537 has too 
much to do and unsurprisingly, has limited regulatory impact. 
But the OAIC has G-PEN sweep evidence of existing Australian CIOT privacy problems, and has 
regulatory powers to influence CIOT pre- widespread consumer adoption: it could publicly educate and 
warn Australians of CIOT privacy concerns, issue best practice guidance or encourage stakeholders to 
register a privacy code,1538 it could investigate a CIOT privacy policy as a test case  or seek to prosecute 
data breach due to inadequate security compliance1539 or undertake a self-initiated  Part V enquiry.1540 
Further it could address its weak evidence-base for CIOT privacy policy-making as to the economic and 
technical dimensions of privacy, as well as approaches to preventative measures. The comprehends 
improving its capacity to understand and interpret complaints data, breach statistics, and how sanctions, 
fines etc. influence CIOT industry behaviour - all potentially rich insights for policy makers1541 – and none 
of which publicly exist. 1542  Indeed, the OAIC is less engaged in research and less transparent in its 
disclosure practices than many of its peers, which may impede its capacity to monitor PA compliance 
and to detect consumer detriment.1543 While these approaches might be ‘unusually’ pre-emptive in 
Australia, there is sufficient international concern1544 to justify signalling that future success and consumer 
trust resides in up-front privacy-compliance.1545  
                                                          
1535 It managed 19,000 privacy questions, 2,128 privacy complaints – of which only 120 were online, and 97% overall 
resolved, conducted 21 privacy practice assessments, and 123 data breach notifications in 2015-6: OAIC, ‘Performance’ 
(accessed 5 May 2017) <https://www.oaic.gov.au/performance/#!year-2015-16-section-what-we-do-promote-uphold-and-
shape-australian-information-privacy-rights> 
1536 As at 2015-6, the OAIC has 75 staff, of whom 58 are full time.  
1537 In 2015-6 the legal budget was $253,777.15 external ($132,719.05 internal), and paid only $253, 777.15  for external 
legal services – and briefed external counsel only four times: OAIC, ‘Legal Services Expenditure Report 2015-6’ 
<https://www.oaic.gov.au/about-us/corporate-information/legal-services/legal-services-expenditure-report-2015-16> Unless 
there are significant internal legal resources, it is little wonder they so rarely pursue proceedings or even an amicus status. 
1538 PA Part IIIB. 
1539 Unless APP 11 is breached, the APC will not act on hacking if there is no “disclosure” as required under APP 6. That is 
no consolation to affected consumers, or incentive for the hacked organisation to institute better security – to “take such 
steps as are reasonable in the circumstances” [APP 11] to protect its data from unwanted intrusion. ‘Hacking’ or 
unauthorised data access is of course an issue for the police and criminal law enforcement - but again, this does not redress 
the individual privacy harm or enable the privacy regulator to take compliance- based action. 
1540 PA section 33C. See the reports here: http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/applying-privacy-law/commissioner-initiated-
investigation-reports/ 
1541 OECD, above n 505 :34. 
1542 The OECD criticises international regulators for poor data formats unsuited for international comparisons, which 
impedes analysis.   
1543 The OECD finds gaps across privacy regulators as to the economic and technical dimensions of privacy, and 
preventative measures. International privacy enforcement authorities gather and release public data, but Australia is not 
prominent. Improving its capacity to understand and interpret complaints data, statistics as to breach, and how sanctions, 
fines etc. influence CIOT industry behaviour would offer potentially rich insights for policy makers, justify budget increases 
and improve consumer information. 
1544 Above n 18.   
1545 Timothy Pilgrim  ‘Defining the sensor society’ Presentation by the Privacy Commissioner, to the 'Defining the Sensor 
Society Conference' at University of Queensland, Brisbane (8 May 2014 accessed 30 May 2016 ) 
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5.6 Conclusion: chapter five  
My priority is protecting Australian's personal information in the digital age... [and] to help 
businesses and the wider community take privacy in their hands.’ – Timothy Pilgrim1546 
 
As evidenced, the APPs are too weak to meet CIOT challenges and based upon current OAIC strategy 
and government under-resourcing, are unlikely to exert a positive influence over the promotion of privacy 
into the future. Privacy law ccompliance offers potential long term benefits in any industry context,1547 but 
given the significant consumer threats posed by the IOT, principles-based, self-fashioned laws with 
largely ‘soft’ enforcement will rarely initiate the momentum for substantial corporate investment in any 
area of legal compliance. In other words, unless it walks the talk, and talks a lot louder, then the OAIC 
will not be on the radar of many CIOT developers, to the detriment of Australian consumer privacy. 
Further, while compliance is a laudable long-term regulatory aim, ‘soft’ enforcement alone rarely initiates 
the momentum required for aggressive corporate investment in any area of legal compliance. Absent 
some significant court cases,1548 financial penalties or evidenced consumer trust backlash, this chapter 
suggests that limited consent-based privacy administered by the OAIC is unlikely to be effective against 
the significant consumer IOT privacy challenges.1549 
To resolve these potential ‘gaps’, certain recommendations and draft principles appear in Part IV. The 
next chapter considers the consumer contracting and notice and choice consent model in landscape; 
using various studies, cases and behavioural economics approaches, to expose the greatest legal gap 
of all - that CIOT consents, data collection and privacy are premised upon a consumer protection 
contracting fallacy. 
                                                          
https://www.oaic.gov.au/media-and-speeches/speeches/defining-the-sensor-society; More recently, the CIOT was 
referenced in a submission to the Canadian Commissioner:  
1546 Pilgrim, above n 1225.  
1547 Interestingly the 2015 IAPP survey found that increasing consumer trust is a “much higher priority” in Europe (48%) than 
in the US (30%) in terms of the top two reasons for having a privacy programme. In contrast, data protection was US (46%) 
and EU (38%): IAPP-EY, ‘Annual Privacy Governance Report 2015’ (2015 accessed 6 Apr 2016): 97 < 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/10/00029-97820.pdf> 
1548 The APC’s enforcement regime has improved if it were so inclined: it can conduct audits, make a determination (PA Part 
VI), accept court-enforceable written undertakings PA ss 33E and 33F) and apply for civil penalty orders (PA Part VIB: 
penalties range from $340,000 for individuals and up to $1.7 million for companies.) The Optus Case exemplifies the 
enforcement policy where an infringing entity ‘cooperates’: the OAIC accepted an enforceable undertaking in lieu of the 
educative and publicity benefits of a court case and potential civil penalty. It signals that upon (voluntary) breach notification, 
organisations which cooperate and agree substantial compliance undertakings and auditing, will not necessarily face 
enforcement action. The approach may be resource-related but it ignores even egregious breach, which sends a weak 
message.  
1549 Mathews-Hunt, above n 151,185 and 841. The author’s views are derived from personal experience as a corporate 
lawyer in terms of what motivates investment in compliance within large companies. Note also that consumer trust may be 
addressed advertising/ branding as well – so a resources choice might be made between investment in marketing versus 
compliance activities. The better approach is to do both. 
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Potential problem or “gap” 
 
 
Consumer detriments (identified & potential) 
Legislated reliance upon 
“informed” or “implied” 
consent to justify the 
collection, storage and use 
of PI or SPI  
- information asymmetry 
- behavioural economics suggests … 
- impractical in a CIOT device context  
- market failure evidence (e.g. sweep 2016; evidence of unfair 
contract terms) 
 
Lack of mandated privacy-
by-design and security-by-
design and both by default 
- information asymmetry 
- expose consumers to substandard privacy and security protections 
and anti-privacy and/ or security default settings 
- requires tech expertise beyond ‘plug n play’ so disadvantages many 
consumers especially those who are young, elderly, disabled or 
intellectually disabled or disadvantaged  
- evidence of unsafe or defective product sales (e.g. 2016 sweep 
evidences informational defects) 
- evidence is numerous data breach incidents 
- market failure  
Limited mandated 
mandatory data breach 
reporting to consumers 
(2018)1550 
- information asymmetry 
- product and informational complexity prevents consumers making 
informed decisions as to their CIOT device security and privacy 
settings 
- clear evidence that most data breaches are unreported 
- market failure outcomes 
Lack of mandated 
requirements as to data 
protection and retention 
requirements 
- information asymmetry 
- obliges consumers to assess CIOT data flows and security which 
many lack the information, time or knowledge to do 
- clear evidence of data breach internationally and in Australia 
- evidence of unsafe or defective product sales 
- market failure outcomes 
Lack of ongoing privacy 
controls over upstream data 
handlers 
- information asymmetry 
- anonymization failures 
- privacy policies often fail to clearly specify where data goes, who 
uses it, for what (specific) purpose and for how long 
- consumers cannot control or monitor privacy compliance of data 
- collecting entities may not set in place ongoing controls 
- (undisclosed) commission payments upstream for data 
- market failure outcomes  
Lack of audits or research 
to check industry 
compliance 
 
- market failure: system fails to self-monitor 
- regulatory failure: OAIC fails to monitor comprehensively or to 
commission research (c/f Office of the Canadian Privacy 
Commissioner CPC) 
- evidence of unsafe or defective product sales 
- evidence of unfair terms in privacy statements and product terms 
and conditions 
- goods new to market so consumers purchase rates infrequent  
                                                          
1550 On 13 February 2017, the Privacy Amendment (Notifiable Data Breaches) Act 2017 (Cth) was enacted, to insert 
mandatory data breach notification requirements into the PA.  
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Weak or nil codes of 
practice which govern 
privacy-related concerns1551 
 
- market failure 
- e.g. Automotive manufacturer’s global privacy undertakings are 
described by CPC research as “substandard” and non-compliant 
Lack of prosecutions to 
incentivize industry 
standards or set regulatory 
warnings to govern future 
industry practices and/ or 
guide possible codes of 
practice 
-? regulatory failure as to information asymmetry 
-? regulatory failure as to generating industry signals 
- Nil CIOT privacy-related prosecutions or court cases in Australia 
- Nil data as to CIOT privacy complaints available 
- evidence of data collection practices in breach of APPs  
- international complaints evidence 
Systemic weakness in weak 
prosecution and 
enforcement practices 
- political failure 
- regulatory failure 
- market failure 
- APC Guidelines not legally binding 
- inadequate consumer redress 
No general privacy tort to 
enable individual privacy 
right of action 
 
- regulatory failure where legal ‘gaps’ are not addressed1552 
- inadequate consumer redress 
 
Table 5.1 Summary chapter 5 
Source: author 
  
                                                          
1551 The Australian IOT Alliance is working on a guideline as to privacy and data, due for release in 2017. 
1552 Four substantive public enquiries in 8 years have recommended that a privacy tort be enacted: Australian Law Reform 
Commission, above n 1480; NSW Law Reform Commission, ‘Invasion of Privacy’ Report No. 120 (   accessed 5 Jan 2016) < 
; ALRC, above n 1235; Victorian law Reform Commission, above n 1473; and NSW Legislative Council Standing Committee 
of Law and Justice, ‘Final report: remedies for the serious invasion of privacy in New South Wales’ (3 Mar 2016 accessed 10 
Mar 2016) 
<https://www.parliament.nsw.gov.au/committees/DBAssets/InquiryReport/ReportAcrobat/6043/Report%20no%2057%20Re
medies%20for%20the%20serious%20invasion%20of%20.pdf> 
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Chapter 6 Contracting & imperfectly rational consumers @ CIOT  
 
Gaining consumer consent by mystifying them with long-winded legal statements and 20-page 
policy disclaimers is not a sustainable strategy…1553  
 
“A “notice and choice” or consent-based approach to privacy protections simply does not work 
in the Internet of Things.”1554  
 
Digital contracting shapes the consumer IOT ecosystem1555 -  from device purchase, to app download, 
to data-collection, cloud and data analytics – in a ubiquitous but legally problematic process. 
Characterised by voluminous, non-negotiable, small print, standard form contracts, online contracting 
struggles with legal technicalities such as capacity, voluntariness and informed consent. At its best, it 
confers competition, convenience and efficiency; at its worst, it is a behaviourally-manipulative 
environment,1556  where absent consumer agreement, choice narrows unworkably.1557 Premised upon 
classical contract theory,1558 such contracts require offer and acceptance, intention to create legal 
relations, consideration and capacity, subject to vitiating factors such as misrepresentation, 
unconscionability, mistake and undue influence.1559 Devices (rarely) come with hard-copy terms, so 
consumers must seek out websites and app stores with links to terms and conditions, and expressly-
incorporated, privacy, data and cookie (tracking) policies and pop-up boxes (terms). Consumer 
                                                          
1553 KPMG, ‘Creepy or cool? Staying on the right side of the consumer privacy line’ (Nov 2016 accessed 9 Nov 2016): 26 
<https://assets.kpmg.com/content/dam/kpmg/nl/pdf/2016/advisory/creepy-or-cool.pdf> 
1554 EPIC, ‘’Comments of the EPIC to the NTIA On the Benefits, Challenges and Potential Roles for the Government in 
Fostering the Advancement of the Internet of Things’ (2 June 2016 accessed 26 Jun 2016): 12 
<https://www.ntia.doc.gov/federal-register-notice/2016/comments-potential-roles-government-fostering-advancement-
internet-of-things> 
1555 E-commerce is the sale of goods and/or services “ordered via the Internet or any other computer-mediated network… 
regardless of whether the payment and/or the ultimate delivery of the goods and/or services is conducted online or offline” 
(OECD). The ABS include: “all retail trade activity where the commitment to purchase is made online may be considered to 
be online retail trade activity…”: Australian Bureau of Statistics, ‘8501.0.55.007 - Information Paper: Measurement of Online 
Retail Trade in Macroeconomic Statistics, 2013’ (19/08/2013 accessed 17 July 2014) 
<http://www.abs.gov.au/AUSSTATS/abs@.nsf/Latestproducts/8501.0.55.007 
Main%20Features12013?opendocument&tabname=Summary&prodno=8501.0.55.007&issue=2013&num=&view=> 
1556 While it may seem odd to assert that a private online consumer purchase or other transaction might be pressured, web 
marketers employ various tactics such as dark patterns, drip pricing and the like, which may manipulate consumers in a 
contracting context. The ACCC has finally persuaded Virgin and Jetstar Airlines to cease an opt-in by default for insurance, 
for online flight bookings. This is after they succeeded (largely) in an action based upon drip-pricing. 
1557 Facebook is perhaps the best example of this. Many workplaces, schools, groups, sporting clubs etc. maintain a page 
which consumers may have to join to receive news from their ‘social network’. 
1558 Jeannie Marie Paterson, "The Australian Unfair Contract Terms Law: The Rise of Substantive Unfairness as a Ground 
for Review of Standard Form Consumer Contracts" [2009] UMelbLRS 20: 20 
<http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/journals/UMelbLRS/2009/20.html#fn37> 
1559 These have both statutory and common law bases. 
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acceptance occurs through mandatory notice,1560 ‘take it or leave it’,1561 opt-in or opt-out,1562 tick a box1563 
or most often, ‘deemed/ implied consent’ inferred from continued site, device or software use.1564  As 
Sched. 1 suggests, many CIOT contracts exhibit troubling features: including length and complexity, 
standard form non-negotiability; acceptance by use or affirmative consent, and low transparency. 
Consumers must ‘take or leave’ disadvantageous terms which impose “privacy-trading behaviours”;1565 
and reallocate risk, in an artificial environment. Several US decisions criticise that artificiality: in Berkson, 
Weinstein, J described the “wraps” 1566 as a “questionable [contracting] form”, and in Meyer, the court 
refused to uphold Uber’s (clickwrap) arbitration terms as a “legal fiction”: 1567 
 
… [online users] “supposedly agreeing to lengthy ‘terms and conditions’ that they had no realistic 
power to negotiate or contest and often were not even aware of”.1568 
Obar argues that flawed ‘notice and choice’ regulatory regimes perpetuate a “self-governance fallacy”.1569 
Consumer informational asymmetry, unfair terms and power imbalance underscore serious consumer 
                                                          
1560 This is the stipulated regime under the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) for personal information which is not ‘sensitive’ as defined. 
1561 See for example the Samsung Privacy Policy here, which advises that updates ‘may’ be notified to consumers; 
otherwise the burden to stay informed rests with the consumer to return to the policy page and check for changes:  
http://www.samsung.com/au/info/privacy.html. Note also that additional ‘new’ terms or even, policies may be announced as 
immediately effective, regardless of consumer awareness and consent is deemed from continued use - see for example, in 
response to the SmartTV furore here: Samsung, ‘Samsung Global Privacy Policy - SmartTV Supplement’  
<https://www.samsung.com/uk/info/privacy-SmartTV.html> 
1562 Consider for example, the Jetstar terms used an opt-out for insurance: Australian Competition and Consumer 
Commission v Jetstar Airways Pty Limited (No 2) [2017] FCA 205   
1563 Directive 95/46/EC specifies that ‘Consent may be given by any appropriate method enabling a freely given specific and 
informed indication of the user's wishes, including by ticking a box when visiting an Internet website’. 
<http://eurlex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:32002L0058:EN:HTML>  In Australia, the OAIC discourages  
“opt outs” as intention may be ambiguous where an individual fails to opt out: OAIC, Guidelines, above n 1306: [B.40] A pre-
checked box is not effective consent under the Spam Act according to the regulator, ACMA: Justin Cudmore and James 
True, ‘Before you hit send: Complying with the Spam Act – the unsubscribe and identification requirements’ Marque Lawyers 
(9 November 2014 accessed 25 Mar 2015) <http://www.marquelawyers.com.au/assets/marque-update_before-you-hit-send-
complying-with-the-spam-act-has-the-recipient-consented 
161014.pdf?utm_source=Mondaq&utm_medium=syndication&utm_campaign=inter-article-link> 
1564 Nest, ‘Terms of Service’ (UK) (updated 10 Mar 2016 accessed 2 Apr 206) <https://nest.com/uk/legal/terms-of-service/>   
Clause 1(a) provides: “(a) Overview and Relation to Other Agreements. These Terms govern your use of the Services…  All 
additional guidelines, terms or rules and the Website Privacy Policy … and the Privacy Statement … are incorporated by 
reference into these Terms and you are agreeing to accept and abide by them by using the Services.” 
1565 Bailey, above n 51.  
1566 On websites, these are ‘browsewrap’ and ‘clickwrap’:  the former creates contracts purportedly formed through inferred 
consent via continued website or device use, and the latter, creates contracts through a positive assent - such as clicking “I 
agree”. In the US and EU, browsewrap contracts are generally not enforceable against a consumer: Fyeta v Facebook Inc 
841 F Supp 2d 829, 836 (SDNY 2012); whereas ‘clickwrap contracts usually are. Rackoff, J also mentioned ‘scrollwrap’ 
(where consumers must scroll through Terms and click assent beneath) which is a variant of clickwrap, but ended up 
proposing ‘sign in wrap’, to cover cases where consumers sign into a website or mobile application 
1567 Rackoff, J cited in Paul, Weiss, Rifkund, Wharton & Garrison LLP, ‘Southern District of New York Decision Suggests 
Increasing Scrutiny of Electronic Agreements’ Client Memorandum (8 Aug 2016 accessed 2 Sept 2016) 
<https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3662711/8aug16uber.pdf> 
1568 Meyer v Kalanick, No 15 Civ 9796, 2016 WL 4073012 (SDNY July 29, 2016) 
1569 Jonathan Obar, ‘Big Data and the Phantom Public: Walter Lippman and the fallacy of data privacy self-management’ Big 
Data and Society (July-Dec 2015 accessed 5 Jul 2016) 1-15 < 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/10/00076-98127.pdf> 
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detriment, legitimise commercialised data collection and use, through a virtual appropriation of consumer 
identity.  
 
This chapter identifies a regulatory failure. Unfair terms regimes have been in force in Australia since 
2010 and in Europe longer – yet many CIOT-product providers are not responding to the law – until 
caught.1570  While the GDPR may effect broader change, international companies are incentivized to 
tailor their contracts to the lowest bar in each jurisdiction. If past is precedent, consumers cannot trust 
CIOT industry members to voluntarily regulate their own contracting behaviour even under the shadow 
of the law, and neither should regulators. 
 
 
6.1 CIOT contracting ABCs… 
 
“Manufacturers…sensibly disclaim warranties, limit liabilities, and curb disputes in their 
standard terms. But courts will flout such measures… unless valid contracts were formed.”1571 
 
Anyone who has ever installed software after “consenting” to the terms… understands that the 
disgruntled user has exactly two choices when it comes to mass market license agreements: 
take it or leave it.1572 
 
Online contracts are legally enforceable in Australia1573 and internationally.1574 Even if a consumer does 
not read the contract but clicks ‘agree’,1575  – they are usually bound – provided the terms are physically 
obvious, reasonable steps are taken to attract attention to them pre-contract formulation, and there is no 
‘alert’ as to incapacity or vitiating factors.1576 It is however important to distinguish between contractual 
                                                          
1570 Recent examples include the airlines, which despite consumer angst (evidenced by petitions and the like), failed to 
redress online drip-pricing and other contracting practices of concern, until the NZ Commerce Dept. and the ACCC took 
formal action. 
1571 Barbara Melby & A. Benjamin Klaber, ‘Contract Corner: Standard Terms in the IoT Age’ Morgan Lewis & Brockius LLP 
(13 Apr 2017 accessed 14 Apr 2017) <http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=69f405ae-ead6-442c-a961-
bb266bac135b> 
1572 Jane Chong, ‘We Need Strict Laws If We Want More Secure Software’ (31 Oct 2013 accessed 2 Feb 2016) < 
https://newrepublic.com/article/115402/sad-state-software-liability-law-bad-code-part-4> 
1573 The Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) led to uniform state legislation including the Electronic Transactions Act 
2001 (ACT), Electronic Transactions Act 2000 (NSW), Electronic Transactions (Victoria) Act 2000 (Vic), Transactions 
(Queensland) Act 2001 (Qld), Electronic Transactions Act 2000 (SA), Electronic Transactions Act 2003 (WA), Electronic 
Transactions Act 2000 (Tas), and Electronic Transactions (Northern Territory) Act 2000 (NT). 
1574 Forder above n 148: 34- 35. Note the UN Commission on Electronic Trade Law (UNICTRAL) Model Law on Electronic 
Commerce. On 1July 2016 the EU eIDAS regulation commenced in all EU member states. Aimed to promote user 
confidence, trust and convenience in digital transactions, the regulation introduces an EU Trust Mark system for qualified 
trust services and is designed to promote cross border e-commerce, including e-signatures: Digital Single Market, ‘Trust 
Services and EID’ <https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/trust-services-and-eid> 
1575 See Forder, above n 148: chapter 4. 
1576 These include ACL unfair terms, unconscionability, misleading or deceptive conduct or false representations, which may 
vitiate agreement. 
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and privacy ‘consents’ online – which conceptually blend nuances of technical1577 and true1578 consent. 
The former is satisfied by accepting the policy (use or the ‘click’) whereas the latter, presupposes 
“informed, free intention”1579 to accept something read and understood. While the PA does not refine this, 
OAIC Guidance does: PA consent requirements are limited,1580 may be ‘express’1581 or ‘implied’ by 
reasonable inference,1582 and require four elements: 1583  adequate advance information,1584 then consent 
must be voluntary,1585  current and specific,1586 by a person with capacity,1587 who communicates their 
consent.1588 Some academics call this consent duality a “vexed question, with no clear academic or legal 
consensus”.1589 Practically, privacy consents are based upon disclosure; that is, provided suppliers 
disclose information uses and consumers assent or impliedly do so, then the courts will (absent vitiating 
factors) not interfere. Any alternative view opens millions of online contracts to review based upon 
participant’s understandings - which is obviously impracticable. It is not however, impossible that a court 
may find the contract or the express incorporation term flawed such that the privacy policy loses its 
contractual gloss,1590 or that a policy communicated after an individual has purchased a device or 
                                                          
1577 ‘Technical’ consent means that the consumers adopt the mechanism required by the supplier to agree to the actions 
contained within the privacy policy. While that is identifiable in a “clickwrap’ situation, it is less clear if ‘continued use of a site 
or product is ‘consent’. See the discussion in Briedis et al, above n 1367: 42- 43. 
1578 Briedis, above n 1367: 42 
1579 Briedis, above n 1367: 42. 
1580 ‘Consent’ is only relevant in APP3 (collection of SI), use and disclosure (APP 6) direct marketing and cross-border 
disclosure (APP 8). It provides an exception to a general prohibition against PI being handled in a prohibited manner (e.g. 
APPs 3.3(a); 6.1(a)), or confers authority to handle PI in a specific manner, in APPs 7.3, 7.4 and 8.2(b): OAIC Guidelines, 
above n 1306 [B.34] 
1581 Non-legally binding OAIC Guidelines indicate that consent is to be ‘given explicitly, either orally or in writing’. Examples 
in an online context might include clicking ‘agree’: OAIC, ‘Australian Privacy Principles Guidelines’ (1 April 2015 accessed 5 
April 2015) [9 para B. 36] <http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/privacy/applying-privacy-law/app-
guidelines/APP_guidelines_complete_version_1_April_2015.pdf> 
1582 Section 6(1) contains this definition. Re implied consent, see Ibid [para B.37]. 
1583 OAIC, above n 1306.  
1584 The Guidelines state that this means clearly and properly informed in plain English and without jargon; and also includes 
an understanding as to the implications of withholding consent - such as that access to a website may be denied: OAIC, 
above n 1306: 11 para B.47.  
1585 The OAIC Guidelines say ‘Voluntariness’ is met if the individual has a ‘genuine opportunity’ to provide or withhold 
consent and excludes duress, coercion or pressure such as to overpower the individual’s will: OAIC, above n 1306: 10, para 
B 43. Relevant factors include any alternatives open to the individual if they choose not to consent, the seriousness of any 
consequences if an individual refuses to consent, and any adverse consequences for family members or associates of the 
individual if the individual refuses to consent. 
1586 The OAIC Guidelines provide that this should be sought upon collection or at the time of use/ disclosure, does not last 
indefinitely, should be no broader than required for uses and may be withdrawn at any time: OAIC, above n 1306: 11 para 
B.48 – 51. 
1587 The OAIC Guidelines provide that capacity means that the individual is capable of understanding the consent decision 
and may be presumed to have capacity unless there is anything to alert the recipient otherwise. Note however that the 
Guidelines make no mention of capacity online; yet it is clearly a circumstance where persons without the requisite capacity 
could attempt to provide consent and the recipient is unlikely to be alerted otherwise: OAIC, above 1306: 11 [para B. 52 – 
55]. 
1588 Above n 1306:  at  <https://www.oaic.gov.au/agencies-and-organisations/app-guidelines/chapter-b-key-
concepts#_Toc380575605 
1589 Ibid: 49. 
1590 In Rana v Australian Human Rights Commission [2014] FCA 1902, email communications between the parties were held 
not to form a part of the contract as there was no intent to enter contractual relations; with the result that the ACL unfair 
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software online is not contractual.1591 Further, an otherwise valid contract incorporation term may be 
ineffective if incorporated documents are unavailable or illegible, or where Terms are ‘unfair’ and severed 
under the ACL (Ch. 4).1592 A recent US case rigorously reviewed Uber’s online contract process against 
requirements for  reasonably conspicuous notice and unambiguous consent,1593 and found against 
enforceability, citing six factors, mostly as to notice and accessibility.1594 Further the judge observed:  
   
“electronic agreements fall along a spectrum … and it is difficult to draw bright-line rules because 
each user interface differs from others in distinctive ways”.1595  
 
It may be difficult, but bright line rules are clearly required to reset online contracting methodologies and 
approaches. While the spectrum of online agreements ranges from good to bad, the bad CIOT contract 
may be uniquely so, in terms of consumer privacy, security, liability and enablement of S/PI data 
collection, use and commercialisation. It is important to understand why consumers accept such 
contracts, and why there is prima facie ‘unfairness’ to consumers – such that online contracting as a 
concept, requires regulatory realignment.  
 
 
6.2 Reading, reading, reading … the contract 
 
Privacy Statements are not disclaimers…1596  
 
Just putting a sticker on it saying ‘customer is responsible’ is a nightmare…”1597  
 
                                                          
contract terms did not apply. See also Rowe v Emmanuel College [2013] FCCA 231 where a consumer had not ‘accepted’ a 
‘separated parent policy’ and so was not able to argue that it contained unfair terms. 
1591 Ebay International AG v Creative Festival Entertainment Pty Ltd (2006) 170 FCR 450 
1592 Gordon Hughes, above n 1121: 38- 40; Hughes, Gordon and Lisa Di Marco, ‘Online privacy policies – it’s not just about 
the Privacy Act’ Internet Law Bulletin (April 2015 accessed  2 May 2015)  38- 40; Gordon Hughes and Andrew Sutherland, 
‘Enforcement problems with online contacts: an Uber case study’ Davies Collison Cave (5 Oct 2016 accessed 10 Oct 2016) 
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=9eacde91-e023-4334-a1e3-
381492e3a212&utm_source=Lexology+Daily+Newsfeed&utm_medium=HTML+email+-+Body+-
+General+section&utm_campaign=Lexology+subscriber+daily+feed&utm_content=Lexology+Daily+Newsfeed+2016-10-
10&utm_term=> 
1593 The test is derived from Specht v Netscape Communications Corp., 306 F 3d 17 (ed. Cir 2002) 
1594 These were:  absence of a check box meant there was no required ‘manifestation’; the user did not have to review any 
terms before registering; references to the terms and consent were smaller and less conspicuous; “Terms of Use” might 
imply what services were being provided as opposed to contractual terms relevant to the user; the hyperlink did not go 
directly to the TOS, and even if the user did access the TOS, the arbitration clause was located three pages into the 
agreement: Paul, Weiss, Rifkund, Wharton & Garrison LLP, ‘Southern District of New York Decision Suggests Increasing 
Scrutiny of Electronic Agreements’ Client Memorandum (8 Aug 2016 accessed 2 Sept 2016) 
<https://www.paulweiss.com/media/3662711/8aug16uber.pdf> 
1595 See also the ongoing battle in McLellan et al., v Fitbit, Inc. (2016) where the plaintiffs allege (inter alia) that Fitbit sell 
their device and then “unconscionably” exclude court action “through an unconscionable post purchase agreement, which 
class members were required to accept in order to render their purchase “operational.” See also In re Ashley Madison 
Customer data security breach, Case No 4”15-md-02669 filed 9 Dec 2015. 
1596 Lawson, above n 36. 
1597 Solon, above n 1146 citing Ferdinand Dudenhöffer, auto industry analyst. 
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Consumers do not read online Terms,1598  and do not understand them when they do. IDG report that 
93% do not read website terms and conditions,1599 while the OAIC found 56% of Australians do not read 
website privacy policies.1600 That 88% of gamers granted Gamestation granted an “eternal option” on 
their “immortal soul” (rather than opting out for a £5 reward)1601  comically illustrates an unfunny point1602 
for consumer and privacy regulatory models built upon consumer education/ protection, and 
disclosure/consent1603 respectively. Even less funny is that regulators and legislators consistently defend 
these models,1604 when research and evidence-based approaches inform them otherwise. 
Studies suggest that Terms do not support rational consumer decision-making,1605 and many are legally 
“unfair” and unconscionable.1606 Factors such as length, accessibility/ visibility, complexity, legalese or 
technicality, positive framing and comprehension impugn consumer online contracting, but consumer law 
is only gradually responding. The ACL requires an openly evaluative1607 judicial approach: 
The legislative concept of “unfairness” in s 24, with elaboration through the three elements of 
unfairness, might be described as a guided form of open-ended legislation.1608 
                                                          
1598 CAANZ, above n 95.  
1599 Dan Swinhoe, ‘Infoshot: Happy Reading with Terms and Conditions’, IDG Connect (3 Jul 2014 accessed 28 Jul 2014) 
<http://www.idgconnect.com/ abstract/8491/infoshot-happy-reading-with-terms-conditions>. 
1600 Consumer Affairs Victoria found a quarter of consumers fail to read contracts, and 21% give only “cursory 
consideration”: OAIC, above n 458: 39[2]. 
1601 Consumers received a £5 GB coupon for noticing the link. The clause continued: "we reserve the right to serve such 
notice in 6 (six) foot high letters of fire, however we can accept no liability for any loss or damage caused by such an act. If 
you a) do not believe you have an immortal soul, b) have already given it to another party, or c) do not wish to grant Us such 
a license, please click the link below to nullify this sub-clause and proceed with your transaction."  
1602 Mathews-Hunt, above n 152. In one day, 7,500 consumers granted Gamestation an eternal option to claim their 
“immortal soul” without liability for loss or damage thereby caused and upon notice served “in 6 (six) foot high letters of fire.” 
Only 12% of consumers selected "click here to nullify your soul transfer"; the rest (presumably) did not read the terms and 
conditions. 
1603 As identified in chapter 5, consent is not an APP nor is it required under the Privacy Act: it is only relevant to APP3 
(collection of sensitive information), APP 6 (use or disclosure of PI other than for the primary purpose) and APP7 (direct 
marketing disclosures) and APP 8 (overseas disclosure without retaining APP compliance).  
1604 Obar, above n 1569: 7. Former FTC Chair Ramirez was a staunch CIOT consumer advocate, but still asserted that 
notice and choice is an appropriate model: Ramirez, above n 446. c/f Stacy A Elvy, ‘Contracting In The Age Of 
the Internet of Things: Article 2 Of the UCC and Beyond’ [2016] Hofstra Law Review 44: 839. 
1605 A. M. McDonald and L.F. Cranor, ‘The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies’, I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the 
Information Society (2008) <http://lorrie.cranor.org/pubs/readingPolicyCost-authorDraft.pdf> 
1606 Consumer Affairs Victoria, ‘Unfair Contract terms in Victoria: Research into their extent, Nature, Cost and Implications’ 
Research Paper No. 12 (October 2007 accessed 5 Aug 2014) [15]  http://www.consumer.vic.gov.au/resources-and-
education/research> See the longer discussion in Mathews Hunt, above 152. 
1607 Paciocco v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Limited [2015] FCAFC 50 [363] – [364], Allsop CJ (Besanko and 
Middleton JJ agreeing) 
1608 Australian Competition and Consumer Commission v Chrisco Hampers Australia Limited [2015] FCA 1204 (10 
November 2015) < http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-
bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/FCA/2015/1204.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=Chrisco> per Edelman, J at [40]. 
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The ACL does not define fairness, nor transparency within fairness; rather, the court must consider its 
‘extent’,1609, defined (relevantly) as “reasonably plain language” and possibly, “presented clearly”.1610 The 
Explanatory Memorandum states: 
…if a term is not transparent it does not mean that it is unfair and if a term is transparent it does 
not mean that it is not unfair…1611 
Privacy law is equally unresponsive. APP1.3 refers only to “clear” expression, and although the (non-
binding) Guidelines1612 go further, there is no binding authority using either prism. This discussion 
therefore justifies its conclusions based upon studies, Sched. 1 analysis, and examples, in considering 
common CIOT features which may cause consumer detriment:  
Length:  CIOT contract length is increasing.1613  Samsung’s SmartHome1614 and 
Fitbit1615 contracts each exceed 7000 words and take 29.5 minutes to read.1616 Linked terms 
increase disclosure but exacerbate length: Garmin1617 has terms exceeding 10,000 words1618 
across five(+) documents and under one clause, third party links tally to around 32,000 words1619 
                                                          
1609 That consideration is only in relation to the impugned term, and only as to ss 24(1)(a) -(c) matters: Ibid: [43].  
1610 ACL s. 24(2)(a). ‘Transparency’ is defined in s 24(3) to mean expressed in reasonably plain language, legible, presented 
clearly, and accessible. 
1611 Commonwealth of Australia, House of Representatives, Explanatory Memorandum, Trade Practices Amendment 
(Australian Consumer Law) Bill (No 2) 2010 (Cth) [5.39] http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/bill/tpaclb22010505/> Note the 
Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ 1993, L 095/29 (EU Directive) Art 5. 
requires contract terms to be drafted in “plain, intelligible language” without further definition, though a contra proferentem 
interpretation rule applies. In Kásler and Káslerné Rábai/OTP Jelzálogbank Zrt, CJEU 30 April 2014, case C-26/13, 
ECLI:EU:C:2014:282 points 73–74, the CJEU clarified that where a term is non-transparent, a national court needs to 
consider this when it assesses ‘unfairness’; that is whether non- transparency is contrary to good faith and creates a 
significant imbalance between the parties’ rights and obligations to the detriment of the consumer. See Marco Loos and 
Joasia Luzak, ‘Wanted: a Bigger Stick. On Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts with Online Service Providers’ Journal of 
Consumer Policy, (March 2016) 39(1): 63–90 <http://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10603-015-9303-7#Sec7> 
1612 OAIC Guidelines stipulate that privacy policies should be honest, accurate, specific, easy to understand, prominently 
positioned, accessible (etc.)  
1613 In 2008, the average privacy policy was 2,518 words: McDonald, above 1605, whereas a recent Australian study of 16 
policies, found an average of 3232 words: Briedis, above n 1367. Note however the contract lengths in Sched. 1 which are 
similar to Apple iTunes at 19,972 words long – longer than Macbeth (18,000 words): Swinhoe, above n 1599. 
1614 7,391 words 
1615 7,397, words 
1616 The method uses the standard reading rate for academic literature of 250 words per minute: McDonald, above n 1605.  
1617 The author purchased an attractive Garmin Vivomove smart self device for personal use, and hence this is the example 
chosen. It does not suggest (as Sched. 1 confirms) that Garmin is better or worse than other suppliers. Their website is clear 
in many respects; their terms are likewise – but (in my opinion) negative features which illustrate the criteria still exist. 
1618 Garmin Australia for example, has website terms (3050 words) an app privacy statement (3,911 words), Garmin 
Connect/ device privacy statement (4747 words), a Connect mobile phone permissions explanation document (614 words), 
and a security policy (393 words) - with multiple links throughout each. 
1619 These links are to Google, Microsoft (Azure apps insights), and Splunk which tally to 555 words, 2564 (short form) to 
23126 long form and 2280 respectively. Note other providers were linked also, until Google purchased them. See the 
Australian terms <http://www.garmin.com/en-AU/legal/privacy-statement> which link to the smart phone app ‘Connect’ terms 
here <https://connect.garmin.com/en-US/privacy> 
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- which Garmin recommends  “you carefully review”.1620 Consumer groups1621 descry such length 
as “absurd”; CHOICE recently publicly proved that by reading Amazon’s terms out loud – for 
almost nine hours.1622  
 One recommended solution - layered contract simplification1623- is inherently exploitable.1624 
Short form policies inevitably omit or misrepresent detail and may mislead or deter consumers 
from reading further. Microsoft clearly omits much of its 23,126-word policy in its 2,564-word 
condensed version; and Nestle’s smart self device short-form1625 assurance that ‘no children’s 
data is retained’ is overtaken by devilish detail in its long-form policy, where children’s data 
provided by parents may be retained.1626  It is a ‘half’-inconsistency hinging upon data “from” 
versus “about”; a distinction which few who read on, would detect. 
 
                                                          
1620 See ‘Links, Third Party Apps, and Third Parties’ Privacy Practices’ here: <http://www.garmin.com/en-AU/legal/privacy-
statement> 
1621 For example, the Norwegian Consumer Council spent 32 hours reading an average app users terms and conditions, 
based upon the average of 33 apps per smartphone: FORBRUKERRÅDET, ‘#Appfail’ (Nov 2016 accessed 2 Dec 2016) < 
https://www.forbrukerradet.no/undersokelse/2015/appfail-threats-to-consumers-in-mobile-apps/> 
1622 CHOICE, ‘Nine hours of 'conditions apply' Media Release (15 Mar 2017 accessed 15 Mar 2017) 
<https://www.choice.com.au/about-us/media-releases/2017/march/nine-hours-of-conditions-apply> 
1623 OAIC recommend this approach: OAIC, APP Guidelines, above n 1306: 5 [1.12]. Sensis recently agreed to summarize 
‘key terms’ on each product page”: ACCC, ‘Undertaking to the ACCC given for the purposes of section 87B by Sensis Pty 
Ltd, (11 May 2017 accessed 11 May 2017); Centre for Information Policy Leadership, ‘Ten steps to develop a multilayered 
privacy notice’, Centre for Information Policy Leadership website <www.informationpolicycentre.com>. 
1624 The OAIC recommends condensed privacy policies in its guide, OAIC, ‘Guide to developing an APP privacy policy’ (May 
2014) < https://www.oaic.gov.au/agencies-and-organisations/guides/guide-to-developing-an-app-privacy-policy:; See Helen 
Nissenbaum, ‘A contextual approach to privacy online’ (2011 accessed 2 Jan 2016) 140 Daedulus, Journal of the American 
Academy of Arts and Sciences, 32- 48; and D. Solove, ‘Privacy Self-Management and the Consents Dilemma’ (2013 
accessed 2 Jan 2016) 126 Harv. Law Rev. 1880. Nissenbaum refers to a loss of meaning. 
1625 The FAQs state: “How will you protect the personal information of me and my child? Our Privacy Policy sets out how 
Nestlé collects, stores and uses your personal information and how you can access and update your personal information or 
make a complaint. You can access the full Privacy Policy here.” As to app-collected data, the short-form states:“…Nestlé 
does not knowingly collect personal information from children under 15, even with parental consent”: Nestlé Australia, 
‘Condensed Privacy Policy’ (updated Sept 2015 accessed 10 Jun 2016) <http://www.nestle.com.au/info/privacypolicy 
1626 After 860 words, the full policy states: “Children under 15 – Nestlé does not knowingly collect personal information from 
children below the age of fifteen. If we discover that we have accidentally collected information from a child, we will remove 
that child’s information from our records as soon as feasibly possible. However, we may collect personal information about 
children below the age of 15 from the parent or custodian directly.” [author emphasis]: Nestlé Australia, Privacy Policy’ 
(updated Sept 2015 accessed 10 Jun 2016) <http://www.nestle.com.au/info/full-privacy-policy>   
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 Graphic 6.1 Milo Champions™ webpage1627   
Source: ©Nestlé Australia Pty Limited 
 
Length is thus inherently consumer-unfriendly, imposes cognitive overload and reduces provider 
accountability. Recent UK authority suggests it may render a contract unfair,1628 while US 
authority refused to enforce a significant term buried three pages into fine print.1629 There is no 
Australian case in which length has justified finding an ‘unfair’ term, though appearance/ location 
have been referenced.1630   
 
Accessibility/ visibility relates to accessing the contract, and to locating contractual terms and 
perhaps, important terms within the overall. As product packaging and device screens (if any) 
shrink, consumers must find multiple documents online, often requiring multiple clicks, cross-
referencing, broken links, dense text and uncertain product application. On mobile phones, terms 
may be physically unreadable. Garmin’s site for example has multiple webpages comprising and 
linked to its terms, and poorly differentiates which apply to certain products and/ or in 
Australia.1631 For the vulnerable or time poor, these are genuine barriers.1632 
Complexity is common and adversely impacts both consumption and comprehension. Length, 
layout, layering or multiple terms across multiple links creates confusion. Australian consumers 
complain that online terms cannot be understood (43%), are “boring” and 58% would rather read 
                                                          
1627 Nestlé, Milo Champions™ (accessed 12 Mar 2017) <https://shop.milo.com.au/> © MILO Nestlé 
1628 Spreadex v Cochrane [2012] EWHC 1290 
1629 Meyer v Kalanick, No 15 Civ 9796, 2016 WL 4073012 (SDNY July 29, 2016) 
1630 ACCC v Chrisco Hampers Australia Ltd [2015] FCA 1204, per Edelman, J. 
1631 For example, while the app linked directly to Australian terms, the privacy policy went to a broken link. The website 
contained numerous policies and it was genuinely confusing to identify which applied to my product and which did not. 
There were distributor terms which applied as well as the manufacturer’s which was slightly confusing. Overall, the site was 
clearer than most and the terms were long but reasonably transparent (once located). 
1632 The impacts on vulnerable people are important consumer law considerations, especially as to detriment.  
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their utility bill.1633  But simple language linked to definitions has its pitfalls too: Samsung’s data 
sharing practices seem clear until simple terms like “affiliates” and “third parties” hyperlink to 
such expansive definitions, that they can share and aggregate consumer data with (almost) 
anyone they like.  As such, complexity requires a multi-dimensional evaluation: all the factors 
discussed in this section may create contractual complexity which considered as a whole,1634 
may lack ‘transparency’.1635  
Legalese and technicality: legally robust clauses drafted for legal ends to withstand legal 
contest, are ill-placed in consumer communications.1636 Plain English is possible, 1637  but as 
Sched. 1 implies, not practised. For example, consumers may not understand a legalistic ‘choice 
of law’ provision or its practical implications should they wish to sue, or that indemnities, waivers 
and exclusion clauses may impose risk. Consumers may not understand legal context either: the 
prefacing phrase: “To the extent permitted by law” is common, but rarely overcomes the 
prevailing impression that a following disclaimer overrides consumer guarantee rights.1638 
Similarly, technicality1639 creates information asymmetries where complicated concepts or terms 
of art are used to enable unexpected data use or conceal consumer risk.1640  
Positive framing (bias): euphemistic language exploits positive over unattractive attributes, and 
is found in each contract considered. These wordings may omit material aspects or imply half-
truth impressions whether by language, technicality or legalese, or fail to fairly, instil balance or 
clarity. For example, Samsung introduce broad variation rights including to unilaterally limit 
features, restrict user access or to ‘brick’ devices, with this line: 
 
“We’re always trying to improve the Services, so they may change over time…”1641 
                                                          
1633 OAIC, above n 458: 40. The figures as to privacy policies were too long (52%), too complicated (20%) and too boring 
(9%). 
1634 ACL section 24(2)(b). 
1635 ACL section 24(2)(a).  
1636 As the ACCAN study found, the contracts they reviewed “tended to be overly comprehensive regarding descriptive 
elements that are unlikely to be of interest to a consumer, and too obscure on these points that are likely to be of interest…”: 
ACCAN, above n 1367: 25. 
1637 A lawyer rewrote Instagrams 5000 plus word Terms into one page, using plain English which young people found much 
easier to understand: Amy Wang, ‘Teens finally understand rights after lawyer translates Instagram terms into plain English’ 
The Sydney Morning Herald (9 Jan 2017 accessed 7 Feb 2017) <http://www.smh.com.au/technology/web-culture/teens-
finally-understand-rights-after-lawyer-translates-instagram-terms-into-plain-english-20170108-gtny6d.html> 
1638 Another common (US) example is: ‘SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF 
INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, SO THE ABOVE LIMITATION OR EXCLUSION MAY NOT APPLY TO 
YOU…’ The obvious point is that this confuses consumers. See Sched. 1 for examples. 
1639 Obar, above n 1569; Nissenbaum, above n 1624; Solove, above n 1624.  
1640 An analogous situation might be Medical Information Sheets, which must explain contraindications even where the risk 
is small.  
1641 Samsung, ‘Smart Things Terms of Use’ (n.d. accessed 9 Apr 2016) 
<http://www.securingtomorrow.com/blog/knowledge/3-key-security-challenges-internet-things/> 
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 Fitbit’s long but clear Terms include: 
 
Use of the Fitbit Service should not replace your good judgment and common sense. 
Please read and comply with all safety notices that accompany your Fitbit product...1642 
 
While sensible in language and tone, the associated (non-mandatory) hyperlink leads to 
(important) instructional warnings as to product-related dermatitis and pacemaker 
interference.1643 It is perhaps a fine line between positive and misleading, but most CIOT Terms 
read more as marketing spiels peppered with legalese (or vice versa), than as balanced 
consumer communications. 
 
Comprehension: a 2015 study found that 46% of Australians were not sufficiently prose literate 
to confidently read a newspaper or to understand medicine packet instructions.1644 In other 
words, written consent is a poor means to communicate information to half the population, 
especially for vulnerable groups such as children.1645 A 2016 UK study confirmed this: finding 
that “impenetrable and largely ignored” terms require “postgraduate reading level”,1646 which 
means that consumers are contracting personal information away, unknowingly.1647 
Undoubtedly, many  terms require comprehension levels which exceed those of the average 
consumer, such that upon expert evidence, a court might consider them ‘unfair’.   
Clearly, these issues point to potentially systemic informational asymmetry. It seems obvious to assert 
that legally-binding “regulation or guidelines should be established for how terms, conditions and privacy 
statements are written and presented.”1648 
                                                          
1642 Fitbit, ‘Terms of Service’ (last updated 2015) <https://www.fitbit.com/au/legal/terms-of-service> 
1643 Fitbit, ‘Wear and Tear’ <https://www.fitbit.com/au/productcare> 
1644 Lisa McWhirter and Lisa Eckstein, ‘Australian Consent Study’ (2015 accessed 20 Mar 2016) http://www.utas.edu.au/law-
and-genetics/research-and-projects/australian-consent-project The study included persons aged 15 and over. 
1645 Ibid. These groups include intellectually or cognitively -impaired people, those with a mental illness, as well as children, 
non-English speakers and Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders. 
1646 UK Office of the Children’s Commissioner, ‘Growing up digital: a report of the growing up digital taskforce’, (Jan 2017 
accessed 2 Mar 2017) <http://apo.org.au/node/72332> 
1647 Ibid. The study reviewed Instagram’s 5000 word,17-page policy which was accepted by 56% of 13- 15-year-old children 
in the UK. The Report calls for a US-style children’s legislation to control data use of children, citing that the uncertainty of 
Brexit means that the continuation of GDPR protection as to children’s information is “not guaranteed”: Ibid: 12. 
1648 FORBRUKERRÅDET, ‘250,000 words of app terms and conditions’ (14 May 2016 accessed 22 Aug 2016) < 
https://www.forbrukerradet.no/side/250000-words-of-app-terms-and-conditions/>  
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Consumer “informational overload” generates confusion and “sub-optimal” decision-making:1649 one 
survey found that one in five consumers have ticked a consent box to unknowingly extend a contract, or 
accidentally accepted non-cancellation clauses.1650  In the CIOT, these online risks multiply with serious 
consequence: consumers may sign-away information privacy,1651 or sign-up for constant surveillance,1652 
unknowingly. Taking these evidence- based asymmetries into account, and given greater provider 
bargaining power, use of non-negotiable and legally protective over consumer-friendly contracts, there 
seems little consumer incentive to read much less understand, CIOT terms. In other words, perhaps a 
rational – and irrational - consumer would not read them at all.  
 
And that, is a big consumer protection gap. 
 
 
6.3 Rational consumers & certain choices  
 “Notice and choice, in a highly complex and connected environment is next to impossible…”1653 
“There are essentially no defenders anymore of the pure notice-and-choice model... It’s no longer 
adequate.”1654 
“Consent should be granular.”1655 
Failing to read contracts entails consumer detriment: it leaves consumers ill-informed and disempowers 
them in the marketplace. Asking why is critical to consumer policy making, with an answer which 
undermines extant consumer protection approaches. There are two streams of thought as to this 
disempowering behaviour:  one drawn from neo-classical economics, upon which classical ‘notice and 
choice’ theory is premised, and the other from behavioural economics, which draws upon psychology 
and economics. At its simplest, neo-classical economics deductively assumes that humans are rational 
decision-makers,1656 that is, informed consumers will make choices reflecting their best interests and 
                                                          
1649 Patrick Xavier, ‘Behavioural Economics and Customer Complaints in Communications Markets’ ACMA Research (2011 
accessed 5 Jul 2016) :5 < http://www.acma.gov.au/Industry/Telco/Reconnecting-the-customer/Public-
inquiry/communications-behavioural-economics-research-reconnecting-the-customer-acma> 
1650 Ibid. 
1651 Bailey, above n 51.   
1652 Peppet, above n 283:139- 143. 
1653 Jedidiah Bracy, ‘On Building Consumer-Friendly Privacy Notices for the IoT’ Privacy Tech (6 Nov 2015 accessed 29 Apr 
2016) https://iapp.org/news/a/on-building-consumer-friendly-privacy-notices-for-the-iot/ 
1654 Daniel Weitzner, a senior policy official at the NTIA, cited in Steve Lohr, ‘Redrawing the route to online privacy’ Taipei 
Times, NY Times News Service (3 Mar 2010 accessed 10 Jan 2016) 
<http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2010/03/03/2003467037> 
1655 Article 29 WP, above n 638. The Art 29 WP identified bundled consent as one area where forced consent should be 
prohibited and consumers must be given a free choice to accept or reject data processing and still use the service. 
1656 Richard A. Posner, ‘Rational Choice, Behavioural Economics, and the Law’ Stanford Law Review 50: 5 (May, 1998) 
1551-1575 http://www.jstor.org/stable/1229305 Posner refers to the classic definition as “choosing the best means to the 
[208] 
 
minimising personal detriment. In considering why consumers fail to read contracts, a recent EU study 
concluded it “rational” cost: benefit- driven behaviour:  reading costs are high (due to length, etc.) and the 
benefits are low given contracts are non-negotiable and the desired transaction cannot occur without 
‘acceptance’: 
It would be unrealistic but arguably also unnecessary to expect all consumers to read and 
comprehend all T&Cs…In most cases, these T&Cs will not have an impact on the performances 
by the parties…1657 
Behavioural economics (BE) challenges neo-classical economics by inductively considering irrational 
behavioural traits, to understand why consumers do not necessarily act in their own best interests, and 
the complex processes underpinning consumer decision-making.1658 BE is increasingly informing 
consumer policy making internationally: 1659 
It does not necessarily counsel heavy-handed paternalistic consumer protection regulation…A 
sensible approach … seek[s] to install relatively less intrusive measures that inform and 
‘nudge’1660 more informed, empowered consumers towards better decisions (e.g. through the 
use of greater transparency and information disclosure and default options that recognise 
behavioural tendencies), without unduly raising service provider compliance costs… 
Acquisti et al conclude that informed consumer decisions as to online data collection are “severely 
hindered” because consumers have imperfect or asymmetric information as to when, why and what 
consequences it entails.1661 They identify three themes: consumer uncertainty as to privacy trade-offs 
and preferences,1662 powerful context-dependence1663 and privacy preference malleability, by those with 
                                                          
chooser’s ends” [page 1551]. He points out that it long ago abandons the idea of consumers as “hyperrational” and argues 
BE is “antitheoretical”. 
1657 EC,’ Study on consumers’ attitudes towards Terms and Conditions (T&Cs) Final’ (2016 accessed 2 Dec 2016) 
report<http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumer_evidence/behavioural_research/docs/terms_and_conditions_final_report_e
n.pdf> 
1658 Patrick Xavier, above n 1649: 5 – 6. 
1659 It may be defined broadly, as “the application of inductive scientific method to the study of economic activity”: Pete Lunn, 
‘Regulatory Policy and Behavioural Economics’ OECD (2014 accessed 16 Feb 2016): 20 
<http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/9789264207851-en> 
1660 A ‘nudge’ means a policy of libertarian paternalism which “sets the architecture” based upon a benefit arising through 
free choice; so where a regulator has responsibility in an environment where consumers are making suboptimal decision, 
the nudge has two aspects: firstly, free choice is retained by not preventing the suboptimal choices; and secondly, BE is 
used to alter the decision-context such that better decisions become more likely. Note a nudge requires a positive regulatory 
impact analysis such that ex-ante outcomes are an improvement: Ibid. 
1661 Acquisti, above n 579.   
1662 Uncertainty arises through information asymmetry especially where privacy harms can be hidden or intangible as well as 
human uncertainly generally as to preferences: Ibid 510. 
1663 This means that the extent of privacy concern – from apathy to extreme concern – may depend upon the situation: Ibid: 
511. 
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greater information.1664 Consumers also suffer “consent fatigue”1665 and potential biases or 
misperceptions, including:1666 
Choice overload: comparing too many products and features creates consumer confusion, 
random choice-making or failure to choose at all. ‘Bundled consent’ may be an example of this: 
consumers may object to one of multiple uses but feel pressure to consent to all – or do nothing 
about the one. 
Default inertia: may operate as to ‘opt out’ decisions, which take more effort than ‘opting in’.1667 
Default settings as to device operation and contract inclusions, are thus important to consumer 
protection outcomes. Research suggests that best practice privacy and security by default 
settings with an opt-out would improve consumer choice and CIOT security/ privacy. But 
predictive advertising experience suggests that vested or self-interests may pressure 
manufacturers against consumer-protective defaults.:1668 as such, incentivising defaults may 
require mandatory regulation. 
Endowment:  consumers value something owned more than pre-purchase, and may be 
reluctant to give it up – this favours incumbent brands as consumers may exhibit misplaced 
loyalty or reluctance to acknowledge poor past choices. Recent research bears out brand-
adherence in smart homes.1669 
Framing bias:  consumer choice and decision-making is influenced by information presentation 
mode, with effect size depending if options are perceived as a loss or gain.1670 For example, the 
Fitbit term extract cited above encourages sensible trust, downplaying its warnings-based intent. 
                                                          
1664 Alessandro Acquisti, Laura Brandimarte and George Lowenstein, ‘Privacy and human behaviour in the age of 
information’ Science (30 Jan 20125) 347: 6221: 509 -514.  
1665 This means where users are so used to ticking privacy policies to continue browsing or purchasing online that the 
gesture has “lost all significance”: Felicity Turton, IFCLA Conference 2016, ‘Shifting the burden of consent under the GDPR’ 
(18 Feb 2016 accessed 24 Apr 2016) <http://www.scl.org/site.aspx?i=ed46562> 
1666 Xavier, above n 1649:  4- 5. 
1667See for example, ACMA, ‘Community research on informed consent’ (2011 accessed 4 Jul 2016) < 
http://www.acma.gov.au/theACMA/informed-consent-research>.  A recent example is that Jetstar had its insurance default 
set to ‘yes’ and the ACCC has recently persuaded it to change that due to consumer complaints.  
1668 Mathews-Hunt, above n 185.  
1669 Parks Associates, ‘Parks Associates: Safety and Home/Away Use Cases Dominate Smart Home Interoperability Matrix’ 
(29 Nov 2016 accessed 22 Jan 2017) <http://www.marketwired.com/press-release/parks-associates-safety-home-away-use-
cases-dominate-smart-home-interoperability-matrix-2179177.htm> 
1670 Briedis, above n 1367: 44. 
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One privacy study found that people desiring privacy protections (a ‘gain’) prefer to opt-“in” (72%) 
rather than “out” (46%),1671 but also that framing decreases as perceived risk increases.1672  
Heuristics: complex decision-making may be short-circuited by consumer short cuts, such as 
following other’s actions/ advice. This explains why regulators are actively pursuing fake online 
review cases to prevent consequential market failure – and why reviews are increasingly valued 
as self-corrective consumer mechanisms.1673 
Hyperbolic discounting occurs because consumers and providers use short-sighted decision-
making: they over-value immediate (over future) costs and benefits. In a CIOT world, this may 
mean engaging in privacy-sacrificial behaviours without factoring in likely, less certain future 
privacy detriments.1674  
Unrealistic optimism or overoptimism means that consumers have an over-inflated view of 
themselves and are unskilled at assessing the likelihood of experiencing a negative event.1675 
An example is a consumer’s belief s/he is less likely to experience data loss harm than others; 
therefore, perceived risk (if any) is assessed as relatively low or lower than it is. Susceptibility to 
this bias increases with increased numbers of CIOT devices owned.1676 For example, a smart 
car Snapshot device collects driving data for insurance premium calculations, but recently, to 
also increase ‘bad’ driver premiums. It is predicted that as users retain a sense of control, they 
may underestimate their risk of a premium increase.1677 
Risk/loss aversion preference is greater than gains preference, which may inhibit consumers 
from switching products or suppliers for fear that new unknown one(s) may be worse, which may 
reduce market competition  
BE factors may influence consumer decisions as to purchase, ‘accepting’ CIOT contracts and post-
contract decisions as to complaints. As Bar-Gill argues, consumer contracts form through the interaction 
                                                          
1671 T Baek, Y Bae, I Jeong, E Kim and J Rhee, ‘Changing the default setting for privacy protection: What and whose 
personal information can be better protected?’ (2014 accessed 2 Dec 2016) 51 Social Science Journal 524-33 cited in 
Briedis et al, above n 1367: 44. 
1672 Ibid. 
1673 ACCC, ‘Fake online reviews’ webpage <https://www.accc.gov.au/business/advertising-promoting-your-
business/managing-online-reviews> 
1674 See Bailey’s discussion of this where she suggests that IOT consumers are more likely to be hyperbolic discounters 
because the immediate benefit (buying the device) is certain whereas the privacy trade-off (via the contract) is uncertain into 
the future: Above n 51: 1040. 
1675 Bailey, above n 51:1035. 
1676 Ibid: 1043. The bias impacts both the idea that a person is less likely than an average person, but also, that the actual 
probability of something occurring is less likely than it is. 
1677 Ibid: 1045. 
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of market forces and consumer psychology, and the latter entails a “myriad of biases and misperceptions” 
which influence market outcomes.1678  Competition does not help and may even exacerbate, certain 
resulting market failures.1679 Indeed, they may shape supplier behaviours anti-competitively; for example 
if Google Home can ‘lock in’ consumers via non (or limited) product interoperability  (generating high 
switching costs), and endowment works in their favour, then Google are not incentivized to provide good 
customer service, unless consumers convey its importance. Absent that, business is de-incentivized to 
invest in service, consumers may (optimistically) assume Google to be no worse than others, such that 
a competitor which does invest may reduce or not improve its market share and may even lower its profit 
margin. In the long term, it may make market sense to let customer service decline while already service-
poor firms have little incentive to improve.1680  
Sellers operating in a competitive market, have no choice but to align contract design with the 
psychology of consumers. Put bluntly, competition forces sellers to exploit the biases and 
misperceptions of their customers…. Better legal policy can help consumers and enhance market 
efficiency.1681 
This is market failure which a regulator might correct through policy; for example, by increasing consumer 
market information, by publishing service metrics and/ or by prosecuting suppliers whose poor service 
breaches the law. 
 
As identified above, due to implicit technicality, complexity and novelty (amongst other things) the CIOT 
market evidences “information asymmetry”, whereby providers have greater information and consumers 
have inadequate information upon which to make positive, efficient decisions. But even where adequate 
information exists, behavioural tendencies may generate sub-optimal decisions – a pro-competition 
framework requires better quality information disclosure in structured, understandable formats: 
Behavioural economics underlies the importance of making use of ‘smarter information – thinking 
carefully about its framing, the context in which information is read, and the ability of consumers 
to understand it.1682 
A recent EU study adopted recommendations to improve the “substantive quality” of consumer contracts 
through firstly, “increasing transparency” (to shorten and simplify) - assuming that consumers are 
                                                          
1678 Bar-Gill, above n 51: 8.  
1679 Ibid. 
1680 Xavier, above n 1649: 5.  
1681 Bar-Gill, above n 51: Introduction (page 2). 
1682 Xavier, above n 1649: 5.   
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motivated to understand certain terms, so as to forestall any economic consequences1683 - to create 
“effortless awareness”.1684 This focussed on consumer awareness of contract quality (rather than 
content), using a quality cue such as a trust mark or trusted-body endorsement system indicating a 
contract is “fair”.1685 These may be communicated visually as well as through text, and convey either a 
summary of key actionable metrics or a more generalised (often settings-implicit) ‘trust’ rating: 
 
Graphics 6.2(left) and 6.3(right) Traffic light and Privacy dashboard approaches 
Sources: Open Notice1686 and Privacync IAPP1687 
 
 
The study concluded that contract simplification offers “beneficial effects” such as higher readership, 
better understanding and a more positive consumer attitude, while a quality cue increases trust levels 
and purchase intent.1688  UC Berkeley suggest that from a privacy information perspective, a dashboard 
is effective for any service which collects, aggregates or processes user PI, especially if that information 
changes over time and/ or is collected or aggregated in ways that might be “unexpected, invisible or 
easily forgotten”, or where users have access, correction and deletion options. 1689 It seems the ‘pictures’ 
                                                          
1683 Under Article 5 of the Unfair Contract Terms Directive the EU Court of Justice has emphasized that contracts must be in 
plain, simple language such that the “average consumer can foresee, on the basis of clear, intelligible criteria, the economic 
consequences which derive from those terms for the consumer”: CJEU, Case No C-26/13, ECLI:EU:C:2014: 282 (Kasler) at 
point 73, cited Ibid: footnote 1. 
1684 While the trustmark provides an instant cue, the study recognised the importance of the related regulatory strategy of 
education: that is, to better inform consumers as to their legal rights generally; such that they know their entitlements so the 
terms are irrelevant in that context: Ibid: 29- 30.  
1685 Ibid: 7. 
1686 Open Notice, Mark Lizar and John Wunderlich, ‘Kantara Consent Receipt Presentation’ (n.d. accessed Apr 2017) 
https://kantarainitiative.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Kantara-Consent-Receipt-Presentation.pdf 
1687 Privacy dashboard as to US Fitbit – as such its findings relate to the US FIPPS: Bracy, above n 1653.   
1688 Ibid: 68. Note that some of the effects upon simplification were described as “small”. Notably consumers did not feel they 
missed any relevant information (although they may have). The obvious point here is that lawyers may feel that certain 
information cannot be missed which preserves length. 
1689 UC Berkeley School of Information, ‘Privacy dashboard’ (n.d. accessed 20 Nov 2016) 
<https://privacypatterns.org/patterns/Privacy-dashboard> 
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can simplify while  words ‘complicate’: ironically, while consumer regulators and unfair contract terms 
laws favour shorter, simpler terms, other regulation may impose requirements generating length and 
complexity,1690 as may prudent legal advice. In the event of a dispute, a less comprehensive contract 
may disadvantage the provider, especially in a global context, but perhaps ‘comprehensive’ should be 
distinguished from ‘complex’.1691  Indeed, if providers want to retain flexibility and freedom to contract 
without increasingly consumer-protective content prescription (which seems probable over time), then 
they need to respond proactively to improving contract content and consent practices overall.   This 
highlights the need to incentivize better practices to recreate a consumer-friendly online-contracting 
‘language’, through both mandatory contract ‘transparency’ regulation, and identifiable, independent 
consumer cues, such as dashboards, traffic light systems and trust marks.1692 
Behavioural economics insights represent practical, targeted, time and cost efficient solutions. In an 
information asymmetry scenario, market performance may be improved using BE insights to: 
➢ Identify the behavioural changes and outcomes sought; 
➢ Align information with business incentives to garner support; 
➢ Align information with the wider “pro-competitive regulatory system” and existing regulation, such 
as the ACL and PA; 
➢ Frame information to be simple and of value to consumers and business, to incentivize mutual 
behavioural changes; and  
➢ Regulatory information should incentivize “best/ good practice” behaviours, including invoking 
reputational impact concerns.1693 
Recent evidence1694 also supports that view that ‘notice and choice’-based policy fails to empower 
consumers and is flawed in a privacy terms context. Data-collection practices of industry, app 
providers1695 and others – as contractually expressed - are usually justified in policymaking as a trade-
                                                          
1690 Ibid: 27- 28. 
1691 For example, Microsoft finally implemented a comprehensive privacy dashboard in 2015 to create “straightforward terms 
and policies that people can easily understand” and has refined multiple services policies into one, plus a renewed privacy 
policy: Horacio Gutierrez, ‘Improving the Microsoft Services Agreement and Privacy Statement for consumers’ Microsoft (4 
Jun 2015 accessed 5 Jan 2016) <https://blogs.microsoft.com/blog/2015/06/04/improving-the-microsoft-services-agreement-
and-privacy-statement-for-consumers/> 
1692 Any third-party mark, logo, picture, or symbol provided to dispel consumer concern as to security and privacy, and to 
increase firm-specific trust levels: K Damon Aiken and David M Boush, ‘Trustmarks, Objective-source Ratings, and Implied 
Investments in Advertising: Investigation Online Trust and the Context-specific Nature of internet Signals’ Journal of the 
Academy of Marketing Science, 34:3 (2008) 308- 323 <http://jam.sagepub.com/ggi/content/abstract/34/3/308> 
1693 Xavier, above n 1649 :6. 
1694 Turow, above n 466.  
1695 For a clear explication of how privacy consents are managed on smartphones, see Florian Schaub, Rebecca Baleako, 
Adam L. Durity & Lorrie Faith Cranor, ‘A design space for effective Privacy Notices’ 2015 Symposium on Usable privacy and 
security, USENIX Association, Submission to FTC PrivacyCon (2016 accessed 5 Apr 2016): 11 
<https://www.ftc.gov/policy/public-comments/initiative-623> 
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off regime whereby consumers fully understand the opportunities and costs of allowing or volunteering 
PI collection and use, and choose to do so. The privacy paradox1696 - that consumers give information 
despite personal objection - is factored into their decision-making calculus, so the argument runs, and 
justifies the present approach. But as evidenced above, most consumers do not read the contracts 
legitimising data collection and use, so information asymmetry is real. This prima facie undercuts 
conceptions of consent. Further, many consumers “overestimate the extent to which the government 
protects them from discriminatory pricing” and 65% think a website privacy policy means that their PI will 
not be shared.1697 The study identifies many other surprising examples of consumer misconceptions1698 
and concludes that privacy-sacrificing decisions are commonly based upon incorrect information. In 
Australia, the ACL Survey 2016 suggests likewise: it found that most consumers (incorrectly) believe that 
businesses which treat consumers ‘unfairly’ will be detected (51%) and penalised (42%).1699 Further, 
while consumers are aware of the APC (47%),1700 69% are more concerned about online privacy but 65% 
do not read privacy policies,1701 and only 7% would report PI misuse. One suspects that few Australians 
understand from its title, that the ‘privacy’ Act is not premised upon privacy ‘protection’ per se, but rather, 
upon disclosure and (often implied) consumer consent.  
Turow et al found that Americans are not playing loose with their PI: they do not view ‘data for discounts’ 
(or download or analytics, etc.) as a “square deal”, nor do informational asymmetries as to use practices 
explain their willingness to provide PI to entities like CIOT providers.1702 Instead, Turow’s study finds that 
consumers are “resigned” to giving up PI without choice. Consumers regard the undesirable outcome 
(surveillance and disclosure) is inevitable and feel “powerless to stop it”: 
                                                          
1696 Turow, above n 466: 5. Surveys often reveal this: for example, consumers may want real-time shopping promotions 
(60%) but only 14% wants to share their browsing history and 20% will share their location – both of which are required to 
provide the former.   
1697 Ibid: 4. 
1698 Aswini Rao, Florian Schaub, Norman Sadeh, Alessandro Acquisti & Ruogo Kang, ‘Expecting the Unexpected: 
Understanding mismatched Privacy Expectations Online’ Submission to ACM Conference on Human Factors in Computing 
(2016 accessed 5 Apr 2016) <https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_comments/2015/10/00081-99936.pdf> 
1699 Australian Government, ‘Australian Consumer Survey 2011’ Sweeney Research (2011 accessed 22 Oct 2015) 
http://consumerlaw.gov.au/files/2015/09/Australian_Consumer_Survey_Report.pdf> Conversely, businesses report a $3.5B 
decline in compliance costs, from $21.56B to $18.03B.  
1700 The OAIC 2013 study showed 82% were aware of the PA with 17% not aware and 1%, unsure. The study did not test 
consumer understanding as to content (beyond the Act’s name) and provided a definition of PI to consumers to assist them 
to answer questions OAIC, above n 458 [Research Report & Survey Appendix]; The 2017 Survey found that less than half 
(47%) are aware of the Privacy Commissioner (APC), but only 7% would report misuse of information to the APC. Worse, 
nearly half (47%) were unable to name any agency for such a report to, with the most likely choice being the police (12%): 
OAIC, above n 458: iii.  
1701 Ibid (2017).   
1702 Turow, above n 466.   
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Our study reveals that more than half do not want to lose control over their information but also 
believe this loss of control has already happened.1703 
OAIC 2017 data shows few Australians will trade PI for rewards and benefits (33%) or for a chance to 
win a prize (20%).1704 This conforms to many studies evidencing that consumers value privacy and do 
not like PI use and exploitation. 1705 Further, that value is contextual: people regard their (smart) homes, 
bodies and cars as private spaces, which is an important consumer trust factor to which CIOT contracts 
often feign indifference. 
That indifference leads to another fundamental consumer IOT issue without norms, which requires urgent 
regulatory attention.  
 
6.4 But I own my own data… don’t I?  
 
In short, there is no uniform approach…1706  
 
Who owns the data in IOT? The answer is, it’s complicated…”1707 
 
 “A tipping point could be reached where people will realize ‘that data belongs to me,'”1708 – Tim 
Berners-Lee 
 
Smart home, car and self surveys suggest that consumers believe they should own their own data.1709 
That view is shared by the Productivity Commission,1710 EU activist groups1711 and the Obama FCC,1712 
but a question ultimately determined by “presumptively market-alienable” rights1713 determined by CIOT 
                                                          
1703 Turow, above n 466. 
1704 OAIC, above n1700: ii. 
1705 OAIC, above n 1700.   
1706 Mercer, above n 88.  
1707  Gareth Corfield, ‘Internet of Things Security? Start with Who Owns the Data” The Register (28 Sept 2016 accessed 4 
Dec 2016) < http://www.theregister.co.uk/2016/09/28/cambridge_wireless_iot_event_defence_sig/> 
1708 Klint Finley,‘Tim Berners Lee, ‘Inventor of the web, plots a radical overhaul of his creation’ WIRED (4 Apr 2017 accessed 
4 Apr 2017) <https://www.wired.com/2017/04/tim-berners-lee-inventor-web-plots-radical-overhaul-
creation/?mbid=nl_4417_p2&CNDID=>  
1709 Turton, above n 1665. 
1710 PC, above n 179. The Paper states: “A key element is to increase the control of individuals over their data”. 
1711 See for example, www.mycarmydata.eu  
1712 “The bottom line is that it’s your data. How it’s used and shared should be your choice.” Former Obama FCC Chair 
Wheeler on the announcement of the Trump-defunct new Rules as to ISP data use: Federal Communications Commission 
(FCC), ‘In the Matter of Protecting the Privacy of Customer of Broadband and Other Telecommunications Services’ Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking (1 Apr 2016 accessed 2 Aug 2016) (WC Docket No. 16-106)  https://www.fcc.gov/document/fcc-
releases-proposed-rules-protect-broadband-consumer-privacy>  
1713 Margaret Jane Radin, ‘Incomplete Commodification in the Computerized World’, in Niva Elkin-Koren & Neil Weinstock 
Netanel eds.  The Commodification of Information (2002): 17. ‘It makes a big difference whether privacy is thought of as a 
human right, attaching to persons by virtue of their personhood, or as a property right, something that can be owned and 
controlled by persons. 
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contracts. At law, there is no property right in a piece of data,1714 nor is there a “uniform approach” 1715 to 
data ownership or databases across jurisdictions.1716  Depending upon the terms and conditions of CIOT 
collection agreements, consumers may have all rights, shared rights or (effectively) none at all – save for 
the ‘right’ to cease data flow by turning an (expensive) device off. Consumer data collected within the 
CIOT ecosystem may be governed by the terms, or by third party terms, and even by linked social media 
terms. Through these, data ownership (aka use rights) very quickly dissipate beyond consumer control. 
Hoofnagle et al even assert that some firms use data industry “gag notices” imposing confidentiality as 
to data transfers upon third party recipients.1717  
 
CIOT industry approaches differ: few promise not to use data and most reserve extensive rights to do so. 
Samsung, for example, marketed that consumers will own their smart home data:1718  
 
“You own your User Submissions and Device Data, and SmartThings does not claim any 
ownership over your User Submissions or Device Data…” 
 
But Samsung are granted a license: 
 
“…you hereby do and shall grant SmartThings a worldwide, non-exclusive, perpetual, 
irrevocable, royalty-free, fully paid, sub-licensable and transferable license to use, modify, 
reproduce, distribute, share, prepare derivative works of, display, perform, and otherwise fully 
exploit the User Submissions and Device Data in connection with the Services, and SmartThings' 
(and its successors' and assigns') business…”1719 
                                                          
1714 Adam Rendle, ‘Who owns the data in the Internet of Things?’ Taylor Wessing (Feb 2014 accessed 19 Nov 2015) 
<http://united-kingdom.taylorwessing.com/download/article_data_lot.html> 
1715 Mercer, above n 88.  
1716 Database rights may be relevant. In Australia, the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) states a compilation (s. 10) or database 
must demonstrably be an original literary work, (s. 32) and the High Court has found that absent the relevant authorship and 
originality, and regardless of significant expense or labour, copyright is not the appropriate means to protect such works. In 
summary, in the EU, there must be a database as defined; that is, ‘a collection of independent data which are arranged in a 
systematic or methodical way and which are individually accessible”.  This would usually include the “capture, transfer and 
analysis of data” so it seems likely that IoT data captured by a device, transferred and analysed by an app falls within that 
definition. Further the maker must have a substantial investment in that process of collection and arrangement, which seems 
assumed in an IoT product development context. Finally, the maker of the database must have a substantial business or 
economic connection with an EEA state, which means incorporation plus a principal place of business or business 
administration in that state or have its registered office within a state together with its operations linked with that state 
economy in an ongoing basis: Rendle, above n 1714.  See Desktop Marketing Systems Pty Ltd v Telstra Corporation 
Limited [2002] FCAFC 112 where the Full Federal Court found “originality” in Telstra’s White Pages, which was a 
compilation of Telstra customer information provided to it free-of-charge by customers. Telstra Corporation Limited & Anor v 
Phone Directories Company Pty Ltd & Ors [2010] FCA 44; Nine Network Pty Limited v IceTV Pty Limited [2009] HCA 14. 
The case concerned a subscription-based electronic TV guide which the court held did not reproduce a “substantial portion” 
of channel 9’s TV programme schedule, and so did not infringe the Copyright Act, despite significant labour or expense 
involved. In the UK, the Copyright and Rights in Databases Regulations 1997 implemented the 1996 EC Council Directive 
on the legal protection of databases from 1 January 1998.   
1717 Hoofnagle, above n 55.  
1718 Hong, above n 322.   
1719 The clause concludes: “including without limitation for promoting and redistributing part or all of the Services in any 
media formats and through any media channels (including, without limitation, third party websites and services)…”: 
Samsung, ‘Samsung Smart Home Terms of Service (UK)’ (3 Sept 2015 accessed 2 Aug 2016) 
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And should a third party dispute their PI being used, the consumer must provide an enforceable warranty: 
 
”You represent and warrant that you own or otherwise control all rights to such User Submissions 
and Device Data and that disclosure and use of such User Submissions and Device Data by 
SmartThings… will not infringe or violate the rights of any third party.1720 
 
While it has extensive user rights, Samsung does not promise to preserve data either: 
 
“…SmartThings has no obligation to maintain or persist your User Submissions or Device Data 
for any specified period of time, to guarantee access to User Submissions or Device Data, 
…1721 
 
From a BE perspective, providers “transfer business costs” to consumers every time PI is transferred to 
another party, as well as transfer business risk via terms and poor attendant security.1722  VTech 
children’s toys were hacked, resulting in unauthorised access to the PI of 11.2 million people,1723 so they 
inserted a (now-removed) term outsourcing risk back to consumers: 
 
“You acknowledge and agree that any information you send or receive … may not be secure and 
may be intercepted or later acquired by unauthorised parties. … [and that] your use of the site 
and any software or firmware downloaded therefrom is at your own risk.”1724 
 
This clause is likely void as unfair in the UK1725 and infringes the consumer guarantee provisions under 
the ACL, as well as section 18 for misleading consumers as to their rights. It may also be ‘unfair’ in 
Australia by imposing greater risk burden on consumers which causes them detriment, and given APP11 
imposes security obligations, is not ‘reasonably necessary’ to protect VTech’s legitimate business 
interests.1726 The problem is of course, that consumers who read and accept the terms are misled and 
may not pursue redress, those who complain to the provider will be referred to the terms and mostly 
‘switched off’, and regulators will never know unless a persistent (or legally informed) consumer 
complains - or an industry sweep occurs. As these clauses suggest, industry practices vary, and many 
incidents of data ownership are reserved if not appropriated contractually by providers.  
 
                                                          
<https://www.smartthings.com/uk/terms> The same terms appears on the Australian website here: 
https://account.samsung.com/membership/etc/specialTC.do?fileName=smarthome.html  
1720 Ibid.   
1721 Ibid. 
1722 Hoofnagle, above n 55. 
1723 Patto, above n 618.  
1724 The Australian privacy policy is a scroll wrap document and as to security, includes: “…no data is entirely secure and 
safe from a breach or failure of data backup and security.  Accordingly, whilst we take reasonable steps in relation to 
security of its services, we exclude all warranties and disclaim to the full extent permitted by law all liability in relation to data 
backup and security.” VTech Electronics (Australia) Pty Ltd, ‘Privacy Policy (Australia)’ (n.d. accessed 20 Feb 2017) 
<https://www.vtech.com.au/privacy_policy/> 
1725 Data Protection Directive 95/46 EC and Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK). 
1726 ACL ss 24 (1)(a)-(c) inclusive. 
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Indeed, some assert outright ownership:  
 
…you acknowledge and agree that all information you communicate to Nestlé through the 
Internet… becomes and will remain our exclusive property with unrestricted rights to use it…1727 
  
Smart cars present an industry-wide controversial example:  it seems likely that consumers will not “own” 
their driving or vehicle information detected/ recorded by their smart car as manufacturers assert that 
their software and algorithms are proprietary technology, licensed for use with the consumer-owned 
device (their car).1728 Tesla for example, disclose that electronic modules collect vehicle driving and 
systems data – including trip, acceleration, braking, systems deployment, speed, location, direction and 
the uniquely-identifying VIN1729 –  all wirelessly transmitted to Tesla. They use data for service and 
“various purposes” and aside from “its [unidentified] partners” do not disclose it to third parties without 
owner agreement or consent or that of any “leasing company”, which raises the interesting prospect that 
in-car app permissions onscreen may be used to achieve such consents. Disclosure exceptions are court 
order, official police request, Tesla lawsuit defence, anonymised research purposes or to its data 
management providers or any [undefined] “Tesla affiliated company’. As to ownership, the Manual is 
silent,1730 save for this: 
 
Tesla does not disclose the data recorded to an owner unless it pertains to a non-warranty 
repair service and in this case, will disclose only the data that is related to the repair. 
 
The argument was first controversially-put by John Deere, to significant criticism that they were using 
copyright to undermine tractor ownership and to prevent non-dealer repair.1731 Consumers can ‘opt-out’ 
of providing data, but Tesla’s privacy statement contains a strong caution: 
 
….if you opt out from the collection of Telematics Log Data or any other data from your Tesla 
vehicle… [excluding Data Sharing]1732… we will not be able to notify you of issues applicable to 
                                                          
1727 Nestlé Australia Disclaimer dated 27 Nov 2001 accessed <http://www.nestle.com.au/info/disclaimer> Note that their 
smart self device app communicates to Nestlé via the internet, though query whether this broad international website 
disclaimer is intended to apply where there are more explicit terms. The position seems unclear. 
1728 Weins, above n 410. In Australia, this argument has played out in apparent attempts by the manufacturers to inhibit the 
after-market car repair industry (so the latter assert): AAAA, above n 401. In the US, data sharing is agreed, but in Australia 
after-market participants complain the manufacturers have failed to comply with a non-binding Code and are hoping a new 
enquiry into the industry will result in a binding code or regulation to compel cooperation. 
1729 Tesla, above n 1128 ‘Model S Owner’s Manual v 5.9’ at page 180 under ‘Vehicle Telematics/ data Recorders’. 
1730 Personal data (defined as saved music favourites, imported contacts, ‘Homelink’ programming, addresses etc) can be 
deleted to reinstate defaults: Ibid: 103 but there is no indication whether such data has already been transmitted to Tesla 
and so could be retained by them. 
1731 Weins, above n 410; Steve Brachman, ‘John Deere, GM push back against consumer modifications of vehicle software’ 
IPWatchdog (1 Jul 2015 accessed 3 Jul 2016) <hrrp://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/07/01/john-deere-gm-push-back-against-
vonsumer-modifications-on-vehicle-software>. John Deere’s position is best explained here: Agpro, ‘Deere memo clarifies 
equipment/software ownership’ (19 May 2015 accessed 3 Jul 2016) <http://www.agprofessional.com/news/deere-memo-
clarifies-equipmentsoftware-ownership> 
1732 This system uses the car’s external cameras to collect short video clips to improve Tesla’s systems for recognition of 
traffic lights, lane lines, street signs, and traffic light positions. Consumers can opt out and Tesla assures users it is not 
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your vehicle in real time, and this may result in your vehicle suffering from reduced functionality, 
serious damage, or inoperability, and it may also disable many features of your vehicle including 
periodic software and firmware updates, remote services, and interactivity with mobile 
applications and in-car features such as location search, Internet radio, voice commands, and 
web browser functionality.1733 
 
BE would call this a ‘push’ and possibly an example of hyperbolic discounting, that is, consumers prefer 
to avoid the short-term cost of losing “certain services” over the longer-term benefit of withholding 
information. Consumers may also exhibit over- optimism as to the negative impacts of vehicle data 
collection. Based upon recent European analyses,1734 it is possible that service denial for coercive (non-
legitimate) purposes may be an unfair term in Australia (depending upon the facts); however, the example 
cited appears legitimate insofar as real time notifications and software updates are important safety 
features. It may however be that privacy-by-design systems should be designed to make opting out 
granular; such that safety features are not bundled with others. The GDPR addresses ‘freely given’ 
consent explicitly which the Australian PA does not,1735 and considers “consent fatigue” and coercion – 
such as contract performance being conditional upon data use consents not necessary to perform the 
contract.1736  For example, a general ‘warning’ may not adequately inform consumers: 
 
You can choose not to provide us with certain types of information, but if you do so we may not 
be able to provide you with certain services or it may affect your ability to use or receive some 
services.1737 
 
In other words, excessive data gathering bundled into other legitimate collection rationales – a practice 
common in the CIOT industry -  may be illegal, unethical and/ or render consents invalid, at least under 
the GDPR. 
 
Consumers are justifiably wary and it seems likely car manufacturers will experience pushback. A multi-
country EU study of ten thousand consumers found that 90% felt that car-generated data should be 
owned by the vehicle owner (or driver) and 91% wanted the option to turn off all communication 
                                                          
relatable back to their vehicle: Tesla, ‘Customer Privacy Policy’ (accessed 10 May 2017) 
<https://www.tesla.com/en_AU/about/legal> 
1733 Tesla, ‘Customer Privacy Policy’ (accessed 10 May 2017) <https://www.tesla.com/en_AU/about/legal> 
1734 Article 29 WP, above n 638.   
1735 Article 7 Conditions for Consent; Article 8 as to child’s consent. 
1736 GDPR Article 7(4).  A precis of this clause Conditions for Consent, is: (1) the controller must demonstrate consent; (2) 
any request must be clearly distinguishable from other matters, intelligible and transparent and any part infringing the article 
(2) is not binding; (3) consent may be (easily) withdrawn at any time as a right but this does not affect data gathered prior to 
that occurring.  
1737 This clause raises risk without explaining what will happen; as such it may be misleading. It is likely to persuade 
consumers to avoid the risk. 
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altogether,1738 though presumably without wholesale loss of functionality. Consumers want the right to 
know what data is shared when they drive, and while the disclosures discussed above are as transparent 
as any, they may still lack the granularity necessary. After all, only manufacturers collect vehicle data, so 
are best placed to disclose where that valuable treasure trove flows and who uses it for what. Further, 
consumer willingness to ‘share’ data is limited: 
 
 
 
Graphic 6.4 Consumer preparedness to share car data   
Source: author using data from McCarthy1739 
 
 
US evidence suggests that advertisers are pressuring manufacturers for data access,1740 and while the 
non-binding Auto Manufacturers’ Privacy Principles cite respect for context, they include broad use 
notices and consents, and targeted advertising.1741 The NTC reports that “…some in industry” want 
greater certainty about vehicle data access “for commercial purposes”, 1742 while Clayton Utz 
recommends “regulatory prescription”,1743 and the consumer federation, FIA, lobbies for greater 
transparency including industry-specific data legislation,1744 
                                                          
1738 Federation Internationale de’L’Automobile, ‘What Europeans think about Connected Cars’ (Jan 2016 accessed 21 Apr 
2016) <http://www.fiaregion1.com/download/20160129_fia_survey_brochure_2016_web_fin_fin.PDF> 
1739 Niall McCarthy, ‘Connected Cars by the Numbers’ Statista Report (28 Jan 2015 accessed 20 Jun 2016) 
<https://www.statista.com/chart/3168/connected-cars-by-the-numbers/> 
1740 United States Senate Committee on Commerce, Science and Transportation, ‘Hands Off: The Future of Self-Driving 
Cars’ <http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2016/3/hands-off-the-future-of-self-driving-cars> 
1741 The phrase is “…Using Covered Information to provide Owners or Registered Users with information about goods and 
services that may be of interest to them”. “Covered Information” means 1) Identifiable Information that vehicles collect, 
generate, record, or store in an electronic form that is retrieved from the vehicles by or on behalf of a Participating Member 
in connection with Vehicle Technologies and Services; or 2) Personal Subscription Information provided by individuals 
subscribing or registering for Vehicle Technologies and Services – but excludes that altered or combined with the 
information so that the information can no longer reasonably be linked to the vehicle from which the information was 
retrieved: Auto Alliance, above n 399.  
1742 NTC, ‘Regulatory Reforms for Automated Road Vehicles’ Policy Paper (Nov 2016 accessed 11 Nov 2016) 
<https://www.ntc.gov.au/Media/Reports/(32685218-7895-0E7C-ECF6-551177684E27).pdf> 
1743 Clayton Utz, ‘Driving into the Future: Regulating Driverless Vehicles in Australia’ (17 Aug 2016 accessed 20 Aug 2016) 
<http://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=08533855-ae66-405c-b5ff-0482b99e60be> 
1744 FIA, above n 1738, via its MyCarMyData campaign here: www.mycarmydata.eu 
[221] 
 
 
 
Graphic 6.5 Consumers (95%) want smart car user data protected by legislation 
Source: Author using data from Federation Internationale de L’Automobile 1745 
 
 
So too, consumer and after-market repairer access to vehicle data (including diagnostics) is inhibited by 
manufacturer proprietary software, allegedly for safety as well as financial reasons. Although a voluntary 
data sharing code was agreed,1746  under shadow of government intervention,1747 it has (allegedly) 
functioned poorly,1748 with the result that the AAAA seek a mandatory code acknowledging a consumer 
right to assign electronic log books and telematics data access to a chosen repairer. They argue that 
consumers are suffering detriment from technological lock-in and their inability to access “critical 
diagnostic information”,1749 such as car software updates.  The car companies argued that allowing 
access will compromise their systems and intellectual property,1750 but the US Copyright Office ruled that 
like dvd digital rights management, people own their smart car as a physical object, but only have limited 
rights to its controlling software which is ©manufacturer.1751  This prevents software changes, whether to 
                                                          
1745 FIA, above n 1738.   
1746 AAAA, above n 1082. Stuart Charity, AAA Chair says: “Since 2009, AAAA also has advocated for a mandatory industry 
code that ensures manufacturers make service and repair information available to independent workshops for a fair price. A 
mandatory code will create a level playing field with both dealerships and independent workshops able to operate using the 
latest technical data. Consumers will then benefit greatly because they will have genuine choice of repairer opportunities.” 
1747 Discussion with Ms Lesley Yates, AAMA. 
1748 “Since the voluntary agreement was signed December 2015, only a handful of car companies have increased the 
availability of repair and service data to independent workshops via their websites. And only one out of the 68 car brands 
selling in Australia has fully complied with the voluntary agreement by sharing all the critical information required for today’s 
vehicles, such as technical service bulletins and software updates and pin-codes for the many computers built into them.”: 
Stuart Charity quoted in AAAA, ‘AAAA score political parties' policies: vehicle data sharing’ (28 June 2016 accessed 30 June 
2016) <https://www.aaaa.com.au/news.asp?id=244> 
1749 This includes fault codes, turn off check engine light, identify the correct oil, access a PIN code or to install a new 
component. 
1750 Steve Brachman, above n 1731; Autoblog, ‘GM claims that it owns your car's software’ (20 May 2015 accessed 12 Nov 
2016) <http://www.autoblog.com/2015/05/20/general-motors-says-owns-your-car-software/>;  Evan Ackerman, ‘It's Now 
(Temporarily) Legal to Hack Your Own Car’ (1 Nov 2016 accessed 12 Nov 2016) <http://spectrum.ieee.org/cars-that-
think/transportation/systems/its-now-temporarily-legal-to-hack-your-own-car> The U.S. Copyright Office agreed that people 
should be able to modify the software that runs cars that they own, and as of December 2016 that ruling came into effect for 
the next two years.  
1751 Under the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act, manufacturers can potentially sue those who seek to interfere with 
copyrighted programming 
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fix problems, counteract obsolescence, or to improve security, and (detrimentally) ties consumers into 
parts purchases from the manufacturer only. In the US, the DMCA has granted an exemption for purposes 
of  “…lawful diagnosis and repair, or aftermarket personalization, modification, or other improvement ...by 
the lawful owner of the vehicle” – excluding the vehicle entertainment system, telematics or changes 
which otherwise break laws (for example, emissions legislation). 1752  
 
The case illustrates both how CIOT manufacturers may use data and systems ownership anti-
competitively1753 and that for repairers with lesser bargaining power, a voluntary industry code may not 
work.1754 In Australia, the copyright position is less clear. Further, a 2014 enquiry found that a lack of 
after-market repair access “…may lead to repair market failure and/ or consumer detriment”.1755 The 
question remains unresolved.1756 
 
6.5 Consumer liability: a new era? 
 
CIOT device data may assist to accurately allocate consumer liability, individualise insurance premiums 
and enhance liability efficiency, depending upon diverse factors such as device reliability, data accuracy 
and absent inaccurate adverse inferences or consumer profiling. Volvo assert: 
   
“If there is a crash and the car is in self-driving mode, even if the driver is reading a newspaper, 
then we – Volvo – are responsible…. However, because each self-driving car will be bristling 
                                                          
1752 Ackerman, Ibid. The wording is: “Allow[s] circumvention of TPMs [technological protection measures] protecting 
computer programs that control the functioning of a motorized land vehicle, including personal automobiles, commercial 
motor vehicles, and agricultural machinery, for purposes of lawful diagnosis and repair, or aftermarket personalization, 
modification, or other improvement ...by the lawful owner of the vehicle…” subject to the exceptions noted. 
1753  “Australian independent workshops want nothing more and nothing less than the same data that these same car 
companies share through mandatory schemes in Europe, Canada and the USA.”: above n 1748. The AAA also assert that 
“Current Australian consumer law is not sufficiently protecting vehicle owners’ rights. In many comparable international 
jurisdictions, the issue of vehicle data ownership is recognised and is protected through special provisions to ensure 
competition is maintained in this important market…”:  
1754 Charity says: “The vehicle makers deny there is a problem. They tell government ‘All the data is out there’. The truth is 
that only information the vehicle makers are prepared to share is made available.” “Their offerings do not include critical 
diagnostic information that allows independent workshops to interpret fault codes, turn off the check engine light, to identify 
the correct blend of oil, to access a PIN code to reinstall a new component, and to download the latest software update for 
the car’s computer system. Car companies also told government independent repairers want the data for free. This also is 
not true. Workshops are prepared to pay a fair commercial price, but they need all the data that dealers get.”: AAAA, ‘Make 
it Mandatory: Automotive Repair Code of Practice’ Press release (29 June 2016 accessed 2 Jul 2016) 
<https://www.aaaa.com.au/policy-advocacy/make-it-mandatory-automotive-repair-code-of-practice/> 
1755 CAANZ, ‘Sharing of Repair Information in the Automotive Industry’ Final Report (27 Nov 2012 Accessed 30 Jun 2016) 
<http://www.aaaa.com.au/data/Final-report-on-sharing-of-repair-information-in-the-automotive-industry.pdf> 
1756 “The car industry has also been put on notice that it must take all necessary steps to make the required information 
available to the independent aftermarket over the next 12 months. If they don’t, the Government will be forced to regulate.”:  
AAAA, above n 401. Note that outgoing Senator Ricky Muir proposed an Automotive Repair Code of Practice, but was not 
re-elected. 
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with cameras, radar and laser sensors all feeding data continuously to an on-board “black box” 
recorder, any mistakes by other car users will be used… against other motorists…”1757  
 
As this suggests, CIOT data may be sought for or against consumers in criminal or civil proceedings, by 
way of manufacturer defence, or via discovery or subpoena. This issue is contractual insofar as the terms 
govern data ownership, custody and control as well as the provider’s right to respond to court orders, 
which means that CIOT data is potential ‘evidence’. Courts are also starting to hear applications for smart 
device data access or admissibility in both civil1758 and criminal proceedings.  Potentially probative 
evidence as to life, injury, location, accident causation, home occupancy, building security status, drug 
and energy consumption, utility data1759 and so on, is discernible from CIOT data and factually useful. In 
2016, Arkansas prosecutors sought smart meter data to evidence an accused’s water usage consistent 
with probable cause theory in a murder trial.1760 Police also seized an Amazon Echo voice assistant and 
sought its server data by warrant.1761 Amazon provided the accused’s device account details, enabling 
the Police to access on-device recordings, but resisted providing retained server recordings,1762 though 
its terms entitled it to do so. There are obvious publicity concerns, as well as parallels with the US Apple 
iPhone cases: which range from prosecutor requests to access device contents such as contacts, through 
to requests to devise encryption-defeating software.1763 There are also obvious parallels to surveillance: 
WikiLeaks’ recent ‘Vault 7’ dump shows that the CIA hacking methods include smart homes and cars:  
 
                                                          
1757 Erik Coelingh, Senior Technical Leader at Volvo Cars cited pre-London and Guttenberg (Sweden) smart cars trials: 
Steve Connor, ‘‘First self-driving cars will be unmarked so that other drivers don’t try to bully them’ The Guardian (30 Oct 
2016 accessed 30 Oct 2016) < https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2016/oct/30/volvo-self-driving-car-
autonomous?utm_source=esp&utm_medium=Email&utm_campaign=GU+Today+AUS+v1+-
+AUS+morning+mail+callout&utm_term=197124&subid=19742650&CMP=ema_632> 
1758 The authors cite an example of the Kilmore East Bushfire class action where the cause of a powerline failing was 
significant: Matthews v AusNet Electricity Services Pty Ltd [2014] VSC 663 at [75]). In future, IoT data may monitor and 
record fatigue events and record actions in response, which if accurate, are potentially significant in liability. 
1759 Ibid. 
1760 Commonwealth v Risley, Criminal Docket: CP-36-CR-0002937-2015 (Lancaster Cty., Pa., printed Nov. 16, 2015) The 
night of the murder, 140 gallons of water were used between 1 - 3 a.m. The victim was found dead in a hot tub. Prosecutors 
allege the water was used to wash away evidence of a bloody struggle, as the victim was allegedly strangled then drowned 
in the hot tub. The accused, James Bates is charged with first-degree murder, and tampering with physical evidence. If 
convicted of murder, he faces 10 - 40 years’ jail or life imprisonment. 
1761 Eric Ortiz, ‘Prosecutors Get Warrant for Amazon Echo Data in Arkansas Murder Case’ NBC News (28 Dec 2016 
accessed 14 Jan 2017) <http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/internet/prosecutors-get-warrant-amazon-echo-data-arkansas-
murder-case-n700776> 
1762 The prosecutors indicated that they may not pursue the server access, as they could access the device itself and this 
evidence formed part only of their case. It seems likely they were fishing for evidence- relying upon the window within which 
an ‘on’ device records background voices. Adam Roberts, ‘Bentonville warrant for Amazon Echo records in murder case 
gets privacy advocates' attention’, 4029 News (28 Dec 2016 accessed 14 Jan 2017) 
<http://www.4029tv.com/article/bentonville-warrant-for-amazon-echo-records-in-murder-case-gets-privacy-advocates-
attention/8539414>;  Yuna Lee, ‘Amazon challenges search warrant in Benton County murder case’ (22 Feb 2017 accessed 
24 Feb 2-17) <http://www.4029tv.com/article/amazon-responds-to-local-search-warrant-in-murder-case/8964554> 
1763 In Re Order requiring Apple, Inc. to assist in the execution of a search warrant issued by the court, Memorandum and 
Order, U.S. District Court, Eastern District of New York (Brooklyn), 1:15-mc-1902 (JO), February 29, 2016 per Orenstein, J. 
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All those new online devices are a treasure trove of data if you’re a “person of interest” to the spy 
community. Once upon a time, spies had to place a bug in your chandelier … With …the “smart 
home,” you’d be sending tagged, geolocated data that a spy agency can intercept in real time 
when you use the lighting app on your phone...1764 
 
In Australia, the collection of surveillance-related data is governed by legislation,1765 but mandatorily-
retained metadata is not accessible for use in civil proceedings.1766  As to obtaining CIOT data for 
discovery or by subpoena, the question is essentially, who is in ‘possession, custody, or control’ of data, 
how it is retained and whether it may be identified and extracted without excessive cost, burden or 
contractual issues. That determination may once again, depend upon construction of the relevant 
contracts – but it seems likely, that the manufacturer will have any of custody, possession or control, so 
whether the data is accessible by the consumer directly or via subpoena from the manufacturer, its 
software provider or its cloud storage provider, the data is potentially available. As Basten JA stated: 
  
‘The ultimate justification for compulsory production and disclosure of information which might 
otherwise remain confidential, is the legitimate furtherance of judicial proceedings’.1767  
 
Where data includes PI, the court may order disclosure but the recipient party cannot, without court leave, 
use it for any purpose until it is admitted into evidence.1768 Courts will also assess privacy and 
confidentiality by weighing it against open justice; and making orders preventing publication or information 
disclosure if deemed necessary.1769  
 
While Australian judges may be cautious,1770 the CIOT may open people’s homes, cars and bodies to 
even greater court scrutiny than ever before. That CIOT data is not always accurate and is potentially 
                                                          
1764 Spencer Ackerman, ‘CIA Chief: We’ll Spy on you through Your Dishwasher’ WIRED (15 Mar 2012 accessed 5 Jun 2016) 
<https://www.wired.com/2012/03/petraeus-tv-remote/> 
1765 This is beyond scope, but see the Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth) as to federal law enforcement agencies covertly 
using data, optical, listening and tracking surveillance devices. Note the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation 
(ASIO), the Australian Security Intelligence Service (ASIS) or the Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) are governed by the 
Australian Security Intelligence Organisation Act 1979 (Cth) and the Intelligence Services Act 2001 (Cth).) See also the 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act (Cth) as to warrants required to intercept communications passing over a 
telecommunications system and also, the new mandatory data retention scheme which allows metadata access to 22 
agencies, without a warrant. 
1766 Australian Government, ‘Review of whether there should be exceptions to the prohibition on civil litigant access to 
retained telecommunications data’ (Apr 2017 accessed 2 May 2017) 
<https://www.ag.gov.au/Consultations/Documents/Access-to-telecommunications-data/Review-civil-litigant-access-to-
retained-telecommunications-data.pdf> 
1767 Lowery v Insurance Australia Ltd [2015] NSWCA 303, cited in Michael Legg & Claire Golding, ‘How the Internet of 
Things will affect the future of litigation’ Law Society Journal (November 2016 accessed 2 Dec 2016) 
<http://www.law.unsw.edu.au/news/2016/11/how-internet-things-will-affect-future-litigation> 
1768 Hearne v Street (2008) 235 CLR 125 at 154-162; [2008] HCA 36). 
1769 Legg, above n 1767.  See, for example, Court Suppression and Non-Publication Orders Act 2010 (NSW). 
1770 Technology is starting to impact court processes however; for example, in McConnell Dowell Constructors (Aust) Pty Ltd 
v Santam Ltd & Ors (No 1) [2016] VSC 723, predictive coding was accepted as an approach to discovery. It involves 
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malleable and hackable, suggests that prosecutors, civil litigants and courts should exercise caution 
before relying upon it.  While potentially enabling contemporaneous, relevant information and disputes 
resolution using “objectively recorded data, rather than recollections or expert opinions”, it may also, open 
costly and time-consuming applications for discovery, disputes as to data-subject identity, validity, 
relevance and accuracy, as well as invasive privacy breach. But while consumers face cost and risk in 
this scenario, CIOT suppliers are unlikely to be adversely implicated, as most contracts (and the PA) 
contain a clause entitling them to respond to lawful court orders without liability to consumers. As such, 
the risk (or benefit) falls upon the consumer. 
 
6.6 Recommendations 
 
This chapter employs studies, behavioural economics concepts and case examples to examine why 
online CIOT contracting entails inherent ‘unfairness’ disempowering consumers, both by exacerbating 
extant online contracting problems and cumulatively, creating new ones. Contracts are unfair in form and 
content, employ ‘unfair’ BE factors collapsing choice and present ‘take-it-or-leave-it’ options, with little 
market pressure or incentive to improve. As Solove summarizes it, “severe cognitive problems” 
undermine online self-management conceptually, and structural problems such as unknown downstream 
data collectors/recipients and fused, reconstituted data over time, renders it “virtually impossible” for 
consumers to understand or exercise online contract self-management,1771 or the reasonably expect the 
sorts of uses to which data is ultimately put. For these reasons, consumer detriments require regulatory 
action to incentivize industry behavioural change and increase consumer awareness. The approaches 
discussed here include clear ACL regulation as to meaningful ‘transparency’,1772 privacy and data use 
limitations as defaults with (if any) voluntary opt-outs; choice of law reflecting a consumer’s location and 
essentially, contractual ‘fairness-by-default’.  As previously recommended, this might be comprehended 
within an ACL ‘unfair’ commercial practices regime, provided sufficiently clear criteria are specified for 
court consideration. Further, best practice model contracts or clauses (such as those developed by the 
                                                          
software which is ‘trained’ to review discoverable documents, by an agreed protocol which learns from a human 
categorization of a sample document set as well as corrections overturning its decisions, until the parties agree it is 
sufficiently accurate. As judicial comfort levels increase, one might imagine greater alacrity to accepting CIOT-generated 
data may follow. 
1771 Solove, above n 1624.   
1772 This is not ‘transparency’ as contemplated under the ACL; rather it extends across multiple areas as to comprehension 
and comprehensibility: contract clarity, length, layout, simplicity, language use and reading skills requirements, technical 
features such as the provision of consumer-protective defaults with or without opt out facilities, and exploitation of BE 
factors, etc. 
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UK’s ICO)1773 can absolve users of liability and trust mark-style cues as to ACL, privacy and security 
compliance could be developed consultatively and overseen by regulators or CIOT-industry groups – 
both may reset online norms and enhance consumer confidence online. Neither of these proposals is 
mutually-excusive and both enhance the other. Consumer data ownership also requires regulatory 
attention; to instil acceptable standards and impose consumer-friendly controls – for example, defaults 
preventing data use beyond that required for safety functionality (aka data minimisation) and granular 
opt-outs to clarify collection content, purpose and all possible uses.  
 
6.7 Conclusion 
 
Part III evidences that the CIOT raises significant actual and potential consumer detriment, through its 
structure, inextricable links with other emerging technologies and by its very scope, scale and stakes. As 
Ch. 3 suggests, it is complex and insecure, neither of which favour consumer protection. As Chs. 4 and 
5 suggest, it will challenge existing weaknesses in consumer protection legislation, and expose new ones.  
As Ch. 6 suggests, it will exacerbate online contracting woes, which in turn will compound consumer 
detriments as to rampant data optimisation, sharing and (mis)use. And as chapter 1 suggests, it is that 
quantitatively and qualitatively different, that a comprehensive regulatory and industry response is 
required to promote consumer protection consistent with the ACPF. It is thus appropriate to move beyond 
Step 2 of the Ch. 2 Framework, to resolve a policy position next. 
  
                                                          
1773 These cover transfers of personal data and where used in entirety (even if in conjunction with other clauses which do not 
change their import) constitute sufficient safeguards as to as offering adequate safeguards as to Article 26(2) compliance: 
ICO, ‘Model Contracts Clauses: International transfers of personal data (v. 1.0)’ 
<https://ico.org.uk/media/1571/model_contract_clauses_international_transfers_of_personal_data.pdf> 
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Part IV PROPOSAL FOR ACTION  
Chapter 7 Regulating CIOT: policy recommendation 
…Technology typically advances faster than policy, leaving a gap … the IoT is advancing quicker 
than previous technological developments, this traditional gap is … a chasm…1774  
 
 “There is a lack of urgency, and the rhetoric is very different to other key markets… there is no 
sense of crisis…”1775 
 
It is worthwhile briefly revisiting the argument holistically: the CIOT is developing rapidly, though 
consumer adoption, demand and penetration in Australia is, as yet, low. This will accelerate from late 
2017, as consumer adoption of smart home devices increases through increasing baked-in ‘smarts’, 
smart self devices continue in popularity and formalised smart car testing presages the first consumer-
driven ‘smart-er’ cars on Australian roads. Thousands of smart devices thus become millions, Australian-
generated data collation and big data grows exponentially, algorithms and predictive analytics uses 
continue to explode - all to collate more minute-by-minute, high quality, granular, personal consumer 
information. Absent appropriate controls, that information may provide unprecedented insights into 
consumer’s lives, thoughts, actions, habits and even intentions. While such insights offer great public 
benefit in some contexts, they also pose significant risks to consumer privacy, data security and 
autonomy.  Technically, the CIOT ecosystem (devices->apps->cloud, etc.) is not sufficiently mature or 
secure to reliably protect personal data, which exposes consumers to data breach, identity fraud and 
theft. Data anonymisation is likewise a contestable concept, with many asserting that big data fusion, 
fuelled by voluntary social media and other disclosures, combined with involuntary online tracking and 
always-on CIOT information, creates an unprecedentedly granular consumer self-portrait and means at 
best, that anonymisation is temporary (time, technology and data dependent) or at worst, a fraud. 
Consequently, consumers face rampant collection, data abuse and privacy breach, as well as potentials 
for data-based discrimination, profiling and targeted marketing through applied algorithms and data 
analytics. At present, CIOT culture as revealed through contractual terms, is one of big data and little 
transparency, where principles of data minimisation and timely end-use destruction are neither evidenced 
or practised. Current regulatory reliance upon ‘notice and choice’ has failed; lengthy, impenetrably 
legalistic and (usually) unfair contracts function more as disclaimers than disclosure, and confound rather 
than facilitate, informed or implied consumer consent. Little wonder consumers ignore them. Indeed, even 
                                                          
1774 President’s NSTAC Report, above n 65. 
1775 Greg Austin, Australian Centre for Cyber Security, quoted in ComputerWorld ANZ, ‘CyberThreat looms large: is Australia 
doing enough as to cybersecurity?’ (July 2016 accessed 11 Jul 2016) 
<http://docs.media.bitpipe.com/io_13x/io_132733/item_1376580/ANZ_ISM_0716_ezine_FINAL.pdf> 
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where consent is sought in a reasonably open manner, consumers are opaquely warned of unexplained, 
designed-in ‘lost functionality’ if they decline data-sharing, and so the desire to use or download a product 
frames positive acceptance from the start. As this reveals, consumers suffer detriment across the CIOT 
environment, and despite (largely) principles-based, technology-neutral privacy and consumer legislation 
and traditional contract-law approaches, lack adequate protection from practices which regardless of ill-
enforced or inapposite legal obligation, persist every day, right across the globe. 
 
This Part IV proposes certain approaches to redress these issues, drawn from existing regulation, 
research and best practice. These are not ‘solutions’ per se, but nor are they ‘in search of a problem’. 
Observably, few companies will select the more expensive, time-consuming or pro-consumer option 
where regulatory tolerance and legal gaps or uncertainties permit others which are cheaper and more 
commercially lucrative - which is what CIOT consumer regulation is presently allowing. This section 
commences by recapping the ACPF objective and problem identification, discusses various regulatory 
approaches and justifies the author’s multi-faceted approach, which justifies the recommendations and 
principles in chapter 8.   
 
7.1 STEPS 1 & 2: Revisiting Ch. 2 CIOT “problems” 
The ACPF policy objective envisages improving consumer protection and empowerment to enable 
confident participation in fairly-trading markets, through six operational objectives. 1776These are refined 
into four concepts accepted by this thesis:  
➢ that consumer wellbeing1777  (as opposed to economic exploitation) is a laudable social, political 
and economic policy objective, and is enhanced by empowered1778 and educated control and 
choice, as well as regulatory protection (hard or soft law and/ or other protective mechanisms);  
➢ that effective competition is good for markets and produces desirable consumer outcomes; 1779  
➢ that consumers have the right to be confident within the marketplace; and  
➢ finally, that fairness is a desirable marketplace objective.   
 
                                                          
1776 Recital C, Intergovernmental Agreement, above n 501. 
1777 The EC assert that “consumer protection is at the heart of well-functioning markets”:  
1778 Above n 501.  
1779 The 2008 Australian Productivity Commission Review found that educated and informed consumers are a best defence 
against predatorial firms, as well as create effective demand for competitive and innovative markets: above n 498.   
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Six identified consumer IOT ‘problems’ were examined in Part III, exhibiting a range of possible sources 
first identified in Ch. 2:   
 
Problem 
 
 
Possible source(s) 
 
Agency & 
chapter 
Complexity: Consumers 
confused by product and 
industry complexity  
 
 
Business conduct (design issues) 
Informational failure (complexity and cognitive 
overload) 
Consumer behaviour (heuristics, overconfidence, 
framing)  
Regulatory failure (low consumer education or 
proactive enforcement) 
 
ACCC 
(limited) 
Ch. 1 
Security: Consumers 
confused by complex 
product security – is it 
secure or how to make it 
secure? 
 
Business conduct (design issues) 
Business conduct (framing) 
Informational failure (complexity and volume) 
Consumer behaviour (heuristics, overconfidence, 
framing, defaults) 
Regulatory failure (low consumer education; legal 
gaps; low enforcement) 
ACCC 
(limited) 
Ch. 3 
Performance & safety: 
Suppliers or products do 
not fulfil their promises or 
meet consumer 
expectation 
 
Business conduct (fraudulent sale deceptive sales; 
unfair contract terms, unconscionability; competitive 
issues) 
Consumer behaviour (overconfidence, framing) 
Regulatory failure (low enforcement, international 
supply chains) 
Consumer behaviour (heuristics, overconfidence, 
framing)  
 
ACCC 
Ch. 4 
Privacy: Consumers 
confused by complex 
product data flows and 
privacy – who has it, is 
data private or how to 
make it so? 
 
Business conduct (informational issues) 
Informational failure (complexity and volume) 
Consumer behaviour (heuristics, overconfidence, 
framing)  
 
OAIC 
Ch. 5 
Consent: Consumers do 
not understand product 
‘legals’ (terms and 
conditions, instructions, 
privacy and software 
terms) 
 
Business conduct (misleading/unfair terms; 
exploitation of ‘consent’) 
Business conduct  
Informational failure (complexity and overload) 
Regulatory failure (complexity, length & access may 
make terms unfair or beyond consumer competence 
to understand; inadequate enforcement) 
OAIC 
ACCC 
Ch. 6 
Data analytics & 
discrimination: 
Consumers unaware that 
data is stored and may be 
Business conduct (informational and disclosure 
issues) 
Business conduct (security and anonymisation 
failures) 
ACCC, 
OAIC, & 
Anti-
discrimination 
Commissioner  
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used by others or how it is 
used 
 
Regulatory failure (low consumer education or 
proactive enforcement) 
Consumer behaviour (heuristics, overconfidence, 
framing)  
(all limited) 
Ch.3 (briefly) 
Table 7.1 Problem definition & source 
Source: author 
 
 
Chapters 1, and 3 to 6 demonstrated various forms of actual and potential consumer detriment, whether 
personal or structural, apparent or hidden, financial and non-financial, as well as identified regulatory 
‘gaps’ in Australian consumer, privacy and contract law. For the purposes of this thesis, and based upon 
Chs. 3- 6, it is assumed that these detriments are sufficiently serious to justify policy action under Step 3 
of the ACPF.1780  
 
The next steps are therefore evaluated below.   
 
7.2 STEP 4: Set policy objectives and identify the range of policy actions  
 
Based upon the ACPF objective, there are multiple possible interventions, ranging from consumer 
empowerment (demand-side) to improving information quality, type and availability, to modifying poor 
business practices (supply-side) to incentivizing industry self-regulation to mandate better practice or 
protect against those which entail consumer detriment. Policy options thus include no action, soft law, 
hard law and ‘alliance’.  
 
A regulatory impact statement approach1781 to deal with the identified problems suggests four 
options:1782 
                                                          
1780 This is of course, an evaluative and partly subjective exercise, and possibly one requiring extensive economic analysis 
to justify itself. Further, a cautious approach might require evidence of real detriment within the Australian market (or at least 
consumer submissions to that effect), before committing to substantive policy action (other than encouraging industry-driven 
self-regulation). This paper however, takes a more pre-emptive approach having regard to the nature of the technology in 
question, its rapid evolution, intertwined nature and its significant potential and long-lasting consumer impacts. By analogy, 
the amendments expanding the unfair terms jurisdiction to include small business, did not overly rely upon either of these 
approaches. 
1781 The model for this approach was the consideration of section 23 ACL here: 
<http://parlinfo.aph.gov.au/parlInfo/download/legislation/ems/r5497_ems_b35077f3-dbb6-4c5a-81b0-
7b885634fd81/upload_pdf/503040.pdf;fileType=application%2Fpdf> 
1782 The inspiration for this appraisal came from this report Table 0.1, but uses the author’s content: EC, above n 52.  
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Option 1: No action: “the status quo”. Consistent with permissive innovation1783 as the “optimal 
policy default”,1784 no action is taken until a compelling case of serious harm can be 
evidenced, so that CIOT innovation may proceed unimpeded and its problems dealt with 
“later” - aftermarket failure or other problems have demonstrably emerged. 1785 In the 
meantime, court cases may resolve instances of detriment. 
Option 2:  Soft Law: Light-touch with non-regulatory responses. This presumes some industry 
actions which may or may not be binding, or cover all CIOT-industry participants. Those 
actions may include self-regulatory, voluntary codes and where incentivized, could 
include standardised contractual terms1786- using simple language, which are fair and 
balanced, flexible and adaptable and ISO compliant -  to standardise privacy, data 
ownership and other practices. Meanwhile, regulators continue to monitor, subject to 
industry negotiation if problems arise 
Option 3:  Hard Law: Legislation that is CIOT-specific and/ or amendments to existing legislation 
to capture CIOT concerns. This has high-level efficacy, provided compliance incentives 
are adequate; for example, that enforcement is funded and pursued. It may entail some 
negative externalities1787 requiring legal refinement to manage its efficiency and impacts, 
and to ensure it does not impede CIOT innovation and implementation.  
Option 4:  Alliance: Combined legal approaches including a mix of industry-initiated codes and 
a range of policy-led initiatives, as well as some hard law in the form of generic principles-
based legislation or specific rule-based gap-filling as required. Legislative amendment 
may extend or improve consumer privacy, security and consumer law rights to better 
address CIOT detriments, together with incentivising complementary industry actions, 
including Codes of Practice, improved disclosure, improved data management 
                                                          
1783 Thierer, above n 161. (Permissionless Innovation) The essential premise is that innovation requires that the market be 
allowed to shape and develop technology until any material damage occurs.  
1784 Ibid (Testimony).   
1785 Adam Thierer, ‘The Internet of Things and Wearable Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns without 
Derailing Innovation’ Mercatus Center (19 Nov 2014 accessed 3 Mar 2016) <http://mercatus.org/publication/internet-things-
and-wearable-technology-addressing-privacy-and-security-concerns-without>  21 Rich. J.L. & Tech. 6 (2015), 
http://jolt.richmond.edu/v2li2/article6.pdf> 
1786 See for example the SLALOM terms devised by the EC in relation to cloud contracting. The Service Level Agreement 
and open model seeks to devise standardised ‘ready to use’ terms and SLAs to “a baseline of fair, transparent and 
understandable templates and guidelines aimed at increasing the uptake of cloud services and making it easier for 
customers to migrate efficiently to the cloud”: Mason, Hayes and Curran, ‘Can SLALOM Transform Cloud Computing 
Contracts and SLAs?’ Tech law blog (15 Sept 2016 accessed 16 Sept 2016) <http://www.mhc.ie/latest/blog/tech-can-
slamon-transform-cloud-computing-contracts-and-slas>  
1787 A ‘negative externality’ is a cost that is suffered by a third party (for example a consumer) as a result of an economic 
transaction: www.economicsonline.co.uk/Market_failures/Externalities.html 
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transparency, etc., as well as generating improved and ongoing consumer education 
and information from both regulator and regulated. This approach engages bottom-up 
localised power with top-down regulatory power to locate the most targeted and efficient 
outcomes. Market players retain freedom to the extent they are prepared to take 
mandatory code-based responsibility, shaped by government policy and consumer 
protection objectives. Further, negative externalities are often more readily industry-
identified, so an alliance between regulators, industry and consumers may be highly 
effective and responsive. 
 
Present structures suggest that principle-based regulation supplemented by industry Codes and 
standards is the preferred consumer-protection approach in Australia, but there are also ‘bright line’ and 
complex or detailed ‘rule-based’ approaches1788 in both the ACL and PA. As the ALRC found in 2008, 
best practice suggests that principle-based regulation alone does not address circumstances where more 
specific rules may respond better to different industry or policy considerations. Further, principles-based 
frameworks can also adopt differing degrees of rule-based prescription and detail within high-level 
principles, while industry involvement may improve efficacy and help to create a regulatory model which 
addresses the problem at least cost to “business and the community”.1789  
Step 5 undertakes that evaluation. 
 
7.3 STEP 5: Evaluate Options & set a policy action  
Option one reflected the federal government approach at the commencement of 2016, and remains as 
to smart self and home devices. Smart car on-road trials have undergone the extensive NTC review 
process, resulting in Guidelines as a “first step” designed to provide industry “clarity”. 1790 Perhaps 
                                                          
1788 J Black, Principles Based Regulation: Risks, Challenges and Opportunities (2007) London School of Economics and 
Political Science, 10;  Black illustrates each:  ‘An organisation must not collect personal information  relating to an 
individual’s sexuality’ (‘Bright line’); ‘An organisation must not collect personal information unless it is necessary for one of its 
functions or activities’ (‘principle’); ‘An organisation [defined] must not collect [defined] PI [defined] unless all of the following 
conditions are met: [list of conditions]…’ (‘Complex/detailed rule’). 
1789 Victorian Government, Victorian Government Guide to Regulation (2011 updated Jul 2014 accessed 20 Apr 2016) Dept 
of Treasury and Finance < http://www.dtf.vic.gov.au/Publications/Victoria-Economy-publications/Victorian-guide-to-
regulation> 
1790 NTC, ‘Guidelines for Trials of Automated Vehicles in Australia’ (April 2017 accessed 20 Apr 2017): Foreword 
<https://www.ntc.gov.au/current-projects/automated-vehicle-trial-guidelines/> Note that the Guidelines are an overview; for 
example, they require a safety management plan to be submitted with trial applications (to state regulators) and cite broad 
headings, without specifics. “Security” for example requires safety criteria as to “security” which includes vehicle hacking and 
personal information access, without specifying more. In response, manufacturers will presumably refer to the usual vehicle 
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reflecting high difficulty, risk and few simple solutions, the enquiry has deferred addressing the smart car 
consumer-problem(s) identified here.1791 However Part III clearly reveals that current regulation does not 
adequately protect consumers against CIOT detriments, while there are significant incentives for 
providers to exploit that situation, such as optimising big data collation, use and sale. 
Option two is favoured by industry based upon current Reports.1792  While yet to attract public debate,1793 
industry-led self-regulatory risk management and compliance guidelines are usually preferred over hard 
law regulatory responses, absent evidence of market failures or inhibited industry development requiring 
legislative solution.1794 The Australian IOT Alliance for example, is currently providing non-binding top-
level Guidelines, which are not (yet) consumer-focussed.1795 This approach is a valuable complementary 
step but alone, given the likely diversity of CIOT industry players, is unlikely (at least initially) to prevent 
ongoing consumer detriment, especially where compliance is voluntary. This is not expected to 
adequately or systematically address the identified problems nor overcome consumer detriments, without 
greater industry compliance incentives.  
Option three is usually opposed by industry groups for its inflexibility and the possibility of stifling CIOT 
innovation. More generally, concerns to remove rather than strengthen industry barriers are also 
important, as well as promoting international competitiveness on a level-playing field. Arguably, hard law 
alone will not systematically address CIOT problems for Australian consumers and could impose 
additional compliance costs which impede industry competitiveness.  Given the nascent state of the 
technology and any Australian CIOT industry, legislation without substantial industry buy-in may be 
counterproductive to future industry development and prosperity. This approach alone may fail to strike 
an appropriate balance between industry development, innovation, and consumer interests and risk. It is 
thus probable that Option four provides a more flexible and holistic approach to addressing CIOT issues 
at this stage, while preserving and promoting consumer rights and protections in an Australian context 
and encouraging Australian businesses and consumers to take reasonable steps to protect their own 
interests in an CIOT context. 
                                                          
systems as mitigation – and it seems unlikely state authorities will criticise those: Ibid: 10. Note that hacking could pose a 
risk to other road users however, so should be seriously addressed especially if vehicles are unmanned. 
1791 Ibid.  
1792 Australian IOT Alliance and Communications Alliance, for example. 
1793 The Australian IOT Alliance (IOTAA) website appears here: www.aiota.com.au While it is a well-organised and 
resourced group, it is predominantly big-player, industry- led. The author’s involvement however suggests the group is very 
open to all viewpoints and will broaden with time and traction. It is presently developing Guidelines which are an advisory 
form of non-binding recommendation – as such they are very general and have attracted little media interest to date. 
1794 See the observations and recommendations in Communications Alliance, above n 119.  
1795 Peter Gutierrez, ‘IoTAA releases IoT security guidelines’ IotHub (28 Feb 2017 accessed 4 Mar 2017) 
<https://www.iothub.com.au/news/iotaa-releases-iot-security-guidelines-452893> 
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Option four is the preferred option. Based upon evidence-based research, consumer surveys, 
international cases and ACPF analysis, demonstrable consumer detriment from CIOT is either occurring 
or likely to occur, at least until CIOT industry maturation. It is therefore recommended that existing legal 
protections as to privacy, security and consumer protection are strengthened to, for example, address 
critical privacy and security detriments by design and default. This approach alone is expected to 
substantially promote best practice risk management processes, significantly reducing avoidable security 
flaws, and reducing the incentive for misleading or unfair terms, and excessive data collection or use. 
Chapters 3-6 recommend certain ACL and PA amendments to codify certain high risk elements within 
CIOT manufacture, sales and consumer use, together with complementary soft regulatory approaches. 
These should better achieve an appropriate balance between protecting those consumers who wish to 
protect their data and self-autonomy in the CIOT world, but who may lack sufficient information, resources 
or bargaining power, while reinstating contractual transparency and certainty, and encouraging 
businesses to better justify consumer trust. These recommendations are detailed in chapter eight. 
Smart cars provide an interesting current example.1796 The Auto Alliance non-binding principles weakly 
address consumer smart car privacy and security issues1797 [option two]. International governments are 
anxious to facilitate on-road testing: the UK has a non-mandatory Code [option two],1798 the US has a 
federal bill,1799 some US states1800 and South Australia1801 enacted legislation [Option three],1802 while 
                                                          
1796 Internationally in March 2016, the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (UNECE) revised the Vienna 
Convention on Road Traffic (1968), to allow automated driving systems on roads, providing that they meet UN vehicle 
regulations or a driver can control or disable the system: Lennart S. Lutz, ‘Automated Vehicles in the EU: A Look at 
Regulations and Amendments’ GenRe Publications (Mar 2016 accessed 5 Apr 2016) 
<http://www.genre.com/knowledge/publications/cmint16-1-en.html> 
1797 Auto Alliance, above n 399. 
1798 Minister for Roads and Road Safety, ‘Victoria Leading the Way on Autonomous Vehicle Trials’ Press release (15 Dec 
2016 accessed 18 Jan 2017) <http://www.premier.vic.gov.au/victoria-leading-the-way-on-autonomous-vehicle-trials/> 
1799 The federal Autonomous Vehicle Privacy Protection Act of 2015 (HR3876) has stalled: H.R. 3876 — 114th Congress: 
Autonomous Vehicle Privacy Protection Act of 2015. (2015) https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/hr3876 Note it 
principally concerned governmental readiness. 
1800 As to the states in mid 2016: (approx.) 5 have enacted legislation, 13 bills have failed and 13 states have bills under 
consideration: Gabriel Weiner and Bryant Walker Smith, ‘Automated Driving: Legislative and Regulatory Action’ (n.d. 
accessed 10 Nov 2016) <cyberlaw.stanford.edu/wiki/index.php/Automated_Driving:Legislative_and_Regulatory_Action>  
Pittsburgh currently has a large Uber test fleet on road without any regulation at all, which has seen journalists supervising 
in the ‘engineer’s’ seat.  
1801 Motor Vehicles (Trials of Automotive Technologies) Amendment Act 2015 (SA). This exempts autonomous vehicle tests 
from certain laws, enabling public road testing. To some extent the unilateral SA action reflects pressure from industry and 
the state’s threatened automotive base: local suppliers had already conducted testing with Volvo, Tesla and Bosch which 
rather forced a proactive response. 
1802 Belle-Isle, above n 716.   
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the NHTSA has two criticised1803 non-binding preliminary statements1804 [option two] and late in 2016, 
issued its federal policy1805 which unusually, is both in force and open for public comment: 
 
…the speed with which HAVs are advancing, combined with the complexity and novelty of those 
innovations, threatens to outpace … conventional regulatory processes and capabilities…”1806 
 
The NTC exhibited similar hesitancy:1807 adopting open-ended guidelines [option two], but stalling on 
other issues, opting to avoid and defer:1808  
 
… Additional issues should continue to be monitored by governments as the technology 
develops. These include potentially increased safety risks related to vehicle modification, 
maintenance and repair, resolving complex liability scenarios, privacy protection and access to 
data to determine fault and civil liability.1809  
 
                                                          
1803 Former NHTSA head Joan Claybrook extensively criticised these as a secretive “kumbaya” between a regulatory agency 
and an “industry seeking to avoid regulation”.  She contends the Principles abrogate regulatory responsibility, victim-blame 
drivers for accidents and ignore that regulatory actions (over collaboration) and imposed standards are precisely why 
“NHTSA estimates that over 600,000 deaths have been prevented by such safety rules since the 1960s.”: Belle Isle, above 
n 709.  
1804 NHTSA, ‘Preliminary Statement of Policy concerning Automated vehicles’ (2013) 
<http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/U.S.+Department+of+Transportation+Releases+Policy+on+Automat
ed+Vehicle+Development>; NHTSA, ‘Policy Statement Concerning Automated vehicles’ (2016 update accessed 2 Jul 2016) 
http://www.nhtsa.gov/About+NHTSA/Press+Releases/dot-initiatives-accelerating-vehicle-safety-innovations-01142016; 
NHTSA, ‘Policy update to NHTSA, ‘Preliminary Statement of Policy concerning Automated Vehicles’ (2016 accessed 2 Aug 
2016) < http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/Autonomous-Vehicles-Policy-Update-2016.pdf> 
1805 NHTSA, above n 327 & Fact Sheet: <https://www.transportation.gov/sites/dot.gov/files/docs/DOT_AV_Policy.pdf> 
1806 NHTSA, above n 327.   
1807 NTC, above n 397: 98- 100 (Discussion Paper). The NTC found over 716 legislative barriers, especially as to the human 
‘driver’ liability and determining ‘control’. The Vienna Convention on Road Traffic expresses the guiding principle that human 
drivers exercising human judgement are responsible to drive a motor vehicle. Australia is not a signatory but the Australian 
Road Rules provide that “a driver must not drive… unless the driver has proper control of the vehicle”:  Regulation 297 (1) 
Australian Road Rules (Accessed 2 Jul 2016) <http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/sa/consol_reg/arr210/s297.html> Reg 
297(2) prohibits driving unless the driver has “a clear view of the road, and traffic, ahead, behind and to each side of the 
driver.” 
1808 While asserting “Australia should aim for a high level of privacy protection for drivers and occupants” they fail to appraise 
current systems or consider research, shelving the issue for ‘later’: NTC, above n 397: 107 (Discussion Paper) and above n 
1742: 17 (Policy Paper). While pressing ‘on-road’ issues may have justified not resolving a clear policy position as to 
privacy, data collection/ use and third party access and liability scenarios, it remains concerning the NTC did not look more 
resolutely at these issues. It did suggest that no ‘different’ privacy issues arise, but they failed to evidence their conclusion 
and seemed to hide behind future ‘unknowns’ rather than identifying the many ‘knowns’ – such as current practices for 
example. Note that the C-ITS Platform Final Report (Brussels, 2016) WG4 found that C-ITS data is ‘personal data’ (as VIN 
access indirectly leads to driver identity) but query if the PA would include it: EC, ‘C-ITS Platform Final Report’ (Jan 2016 
accessed 20 Dec 2016) https://ec.europa.eu/transport/sites/transport/files/themes/its/doc/c-its-platform-final-report-january-
2016.pdf While raised, the NTC reports do not revisit this issue: NTC, above n 397: 109,  deferring to an Austroads privacy 
impact assessment anticipated mid-2016. They also contradict themselves in finding a ‘legislative gap’ requiring regulation 
insofar as certain ‘enforcement agencies’ are not bound by the Privacy Act - but “later”.  For the record, the ACCC and OAIC 
did not make a submission, nor is there any evidence that a legal analysis was conducted to assess privacy and 
surveillance law efficacy in a smart car context. In discussion with the author, Natasha Bolsin, Policy Adviser on 22 
November 2016 mentioned that a lack of submissions on these topics is perhaps reflected in the report. This issue is not to 
be construed a as criticism of the enquiry, which was well-conducted- but it is difficult not to suspect that avoiding the issue 
was the easiest option given testing protocols were the priority. 
1809 NTC, above n 1742.  
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Deferral and soft law approaches may reflect industry power or credibility,1810 but may also abrogate 
regulatory responsibility. As former NHTSA Head Claybrook puts it,1811 hard law and enforcement are 
precisely why “…over 600,000 [US crash] deaths have been prevented… since the 1960s.”1812 Her view 
seems supported by an unprecedented spate of global recalls,1813 record US industry fines1814 and 
multiple safety scandals of recent years.1815  As such, sound regulation in a smart context where the 
stakes are high, may well require a mix of approaches. 
 
To summarize, Option one does not address the detriments and regulatory gaps identified; as such it is 
not sufficient to address the CIOT as is. Option two has significant potential to address some issues but 
depends upon industry preparedness to embrace its own flaws (or those of its worst elements) and to 
take positive steps to address those flaws. The option does not address those industry participants who 
choose not to adopt or to comply with Codes, nor that industry has, to date, not proposed such solutions 
for CIOT problems. Industry preference as to smart cars suggests that voluntary codes are preferred, 
though may entail a lower bar than relevant hard law and entail weak enforceability. Option three offers 
the most rigorous methodology to impose legal clarity and to enforce industry compliance, provided hard 
laws are rigorously monitored and enforced. Option four offers the broadest and most holistic approach, 
but also the most flexible. It meets the objective to establish clear legal guidance whilst avoiding 
unnecessary prescription, and preserves flexibility to accommodate rapidly evolving and dynamic 
technology, as well as new business models.1816  The most serious problems and gaps can be redressed 
through hard law, general principles-based compliance can be assisted through industry codes which 
emphasize and explicate the law practically to create an industry culture of compliance, and future or 
emerging consumer detriments can be swiftly addressed through industry actions influenced by 
                                                          
1810 Note in Australia the car industry and government have long had a close and trusting relationship which the author 
believes has been effective for all parties, including consumers. Recent international industry behaviours are less 
reassuring: Brent Snavely, ‘Auto industry thrives despite scandals’ USA TODAY (25 Jul 20916 accessed 5 Aug 2016) 
<http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2016/07/25/auto-industry-thrives-despite-scandals/87517968/> 
1811 (US) DOT, above n 716.   
1812 Belle-Isle, above n 716.   
1813 For example, the Takata air bag recall is the largest in US history and affecting 32 million vehicles across 33 brands. 
The defect has caused more than 100 injuries and at least ten fatalities, yet industry vehicle sales are at record levels: 
Snavely, above n 1809. In early 2017, there is some suggestion that Takata may file for bankruptcy. 
1814 For example, in 2014 Toyota Motor Sales paid $1.2 billion fine to avoid criminal prosecution and admitted in the 
settlement to misleading consumers through “deceptive statements”. GM has also paid $900 million fine to settle federal 
criminal charges as to faulty Chevrolet ignition switches, which killed at least 124 people. GM admitted to knowing of the 
problem for over a decade in congressional hearings: Doron Levin, ‘Here are some of the worst car scandals in history’ 
Fortune (26 Sept 2015 accessed 2 Jan 2016) < http://fortune.com/2015/09/26/auto-industry-scandals/>  
1815 ACCC, above n 939. For global actions, see Boston, above n 932. 
1816 These objectives emerged from the FTC, ‘Mobile Privacy Disclosures: Building Trust Through Transparency: A Federal 
Trade Commission Staff Report’ (Feb 2013 accessed 17 Mar 2016): 13- 14 
<https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/mobile-privacy-disclosures-building-trust-through-transparency-
federal-trade-commission-staff-report/130201mobileprivacyreport.pdf> 
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government policy, incentivized (where necessary) by threatened regulation.  As such, the latter model 
best responds to the broad problems identified and those which may emerge, and guards consumer 
interests proactively, so is (arguably) at least cost to the community overall. The author depicts this below, 
showing that as regulatory power increases, compliance should do likewise.1817 The ACCC’s regulatory 
tools graphic reflects alliance-style policy: the strongest (and most expensive) methods cover the smallest 
footprint and are reserved for those with the weakest compliance attitudes and observance. 
 
 
 
 
Graphics 7.1 Alliance approach & 7.2 ACCC Compliance and Enforcement 
Source: Author & ACCC respectively1818 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
1817 This view should be distinguished from that of “responsive regulation” advocates in this recent Australian article: M. 
Richardson, R. Bosua. K.  Clark, J. Webb, A. Ahmad,  & S. Maynard, ‘Towards responsive regulation of the Internet of 
Things: Australian perspectives’, Internet Policy Review (2017) 6:1) <DOI: 10.14763/2017.1.455> That model views 
regulation (ideally) as a minimal but effective (if necessary, escalating) market intervention and proposes a ‘participatory 
solution’ over one that is ‘repressive’ (i.e., top-down and coercive) or ‘autonomous’ (i.e. based upon laissez faire legal 
approaches such as the common law doctrines). Their IOT regulation solution proposes privacy by design as the base of a 
pyramid, with consumer and data protection standards in the middle and privacy-based doctrines on top. That the OAIC 
sees privacy by design as within APP1 (albeit more implied than explicit) suggests that the authors may be understating its 
relevance already. Compliance-driven (ISO 9001) companies employ many elements of it in their business practices now. 
1818 ACCC, ‘Compliance and Enforcement policy’ (Jan 2017 accessed 2 Feb 2017) <https://www.accc.gov.au/about-
us/australian-competition-consumer-commission/compliance-enforcement-policy> 
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7.4 Conclusion 
 
Having regard to dual CIOT imperatives of industry innovation and consumer protection, as well as the 
seriousness of consumer detriments identified, the regulatory gaps found and the need for flexibility to 
adapt to future product and industry developments, this paper concludes that an alliance regulatory 
approach is the most flexible, responsive, adaptable and open to stakeholder inputs – all of which 
promote industry acceptability and compliance, as well as responsiveness to evolving consumer issues 
and flexibility to meet challenges ahead. That approach forms the basis for the recommendations in 
chapter eight. 
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Chapter 8:  Recommendations and draft principles 
 “…the culture, standards and policy structures that have been applied to big data analytics 
may need to move out of the back room and into the showroom if community confidence and 
wide opportunity for innovation are to be maximised…”1819   
 
“Trust is the foundation of the IOT and that needs to be underpinned by security and privacy. 
And it’s a conversation we all need to start having now …”1820 
 
“With consumer concerns comes the very real prospect of regulatory intervention…”1821 
 
This final chapter locates an ambitious mix of self-regulatory and regulatory approaches to address the 
problems identified in the ACPF analysis. It then sets out eight draft principles, which capture simple, 
best practice approaches to a “human-centred”1822 consumer-respectful internet of things, at least as to 
smart cars, home and self. Indeed, should all else founder upon government, industry, pro-innovation, 
anti-regulation, money, power, uncertainty - or other resistance - these principles express the baseline 
fundamentals, to start afresh. 
 
8.1 Intended application 
Don’t start with the technology, start with the audience…1823  
 
Innovation is not always about technology. It can be about changing people’s behaviour. It’s not 
always about making things smaller or faster…1824  
The recommendations proposed employ a range of targeted complementary mechanisms using industry, 
regulator and consumer inputs. Their purpose is to establish a clear, comprehensive, cooperative 
framework to set industry laws, standards and practices as norms early in CIOT development – before 
rusted-on (mis)behaviours are entrenched -  to create an ethical compact justifying industry confidence 
and consumer trust. They are also aimed to ensure some degree of conceptual parity between Australian 
and EU CIOT approaches, reflecting Australian Standards harmonisation1825 and the clear international 
                                                          
1819 Productivity Commission Chair cited by Timothy Pilgrim, above n 1406. 
1820 Samani above n 553.  
1821 IAB (US), ‘Privacy and Tracking in a Post CookieWorld’ White Paper (Jan 2014 accessed 9 Apr 2015) [7] 
<http://www.iabaustralia.com.au/uploads/ 
uploads/2014-11/1415289600_3ee3de01b67c04945704bce1e7964095.pdf>  
1822 EC, above n 93.  
1823 Ken Shillinglaw, controller BBC2 and BBC4 cited in Accenture, above n 24: 45. 
1824 Dean Takahashi, ‘The Internet of Things: A Toaster That Can Tell You the Weather And A Lung Cancer Sniffer’ VB (26 
Oct 2016 accessed 28 Oct 2016) http://venturebeat.com/2016/10/26/the-internet-of-things-a-toaster-that-can-tell-you-the-
weather-and-a-lung-cancer-sniffer/ quoting ARM chief technology officer Mike Muller {ARM set up wearables for good]. 
1825 Leading harmonisation bodies are the International Standardization Organization (ISO), the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC). Approximately 80% of Australian 
Standards are aligned with international standards and Standards Australia (SA) and government have agreed via MOU that 
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role of the EU in shaping the IOT, especially as to privacy and data processing.1826 That approach must 
inevitably evolve over time with increasing industry sophistication, capability and consumer knowledge, 
so requires a mix of coercive and flexible responses. To that end, ongoing industry, consumer, regulator 
and other stakeholder involvement is imperative.  
While the position as to the broader IOT is distinguished,1827 these consumer IOT proposals address 
extant online ‘on-air’ issues, as well as CIOT-specific or CIOT-exacerbated issues.  As such, they may 
also have application beyond smart cars, self and homes, depending upon context. 
8.2 Recommendations 
Specific recommendations are detailed in the conclusions to Chs. 4-6. Those of most import appear here; 
note that some are complementary while others have elements of duplication or even, inconsistency. 
Reliant upon the impossibility of all (if not any) being implemented, these proposals are inclusive. 
 
Legislation 
8.2.1 Australian Consumer Law (ACL) 
Amend the ACL to address the proposals identified in Ch 4 Table 4.2, including: 
(a) insert a general prohibition upon unfair business practices (which could include as 
‘relevant matters’ for consideration, data use and contractual transparency, further 
defined by Guideline); 
  
                                                          
this percentage be maximised, with any exceptions “well justified”. Note the MOU (1988) includes that no Australian 
standard will developed where an acceptable international standard exists, nor will an SA contravene World Trade 
Organization requirements or be used as non-tariff free trade barriers: Standards Australia, ‘Submission to Standing 
Committee on Economics, Finance and Public Administration, Inquiry into the state of Australia’s manufacturing industry 
now and beyond the resources boom (2006). 
1826 Warwick Ashford, ‘EU data protection rules affect everyone, say legal experts’ ComputerWeekly (11 Jan 2016 accessed 
18 Jul 2016) <http://www.computerweekly.com/news/4500270456/EU-data-protection-rules-affect-everyone-say-legal-
experts> 
1827 Large industrial IOT industry is capable of setting specifications, mandating standards compliance and insurance, and 
imposing other protective mechanisms with CIOT- suppliers contractually. It is questionable whether the industrial CIOT is 
less likely to generate direct consumer harms, with its focus upon industry because of course, the industrial CIOT (partly) 
presupposes production of goods which consumers may use. By analogy, the view is often expressed that had this carefully 
considered process occurred earlier in the development of the internet, many of its extant and potentially insurmountable 
security and privacy issues – which now imperil national security, and enable the world’s greatest criminal and illegal 
surveillance activity - might have been at least, ameliorated.  From a consumer perspective, that focus might have earlier 
fallen upon other internet ‘issues’ such as online behavioural advertising and online tracking, which remain substantially 
unregulated in Australia, and which the author has argued elsewhere, are despite some positive but belated EU regulation 
and US industry efforts, somewhat out of control internationally.  
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(b) insert a general ‘safety’ provision (including as ‘relevant matters’ for consideration, 
‘privacy’ and ‘security’);1828 
 
(c) expand section 29 to prohibit false representations as to goods’ safety, privacy, security 
or related data collection and use practices;1829  
 
(d) amend section 58 to insert an ongoing obligation upon hybrid device/ software 
manufacturers to establish, maintain and demonstrate reasonable security-by-design 
and automatic software security update practices throughout the reasonable product 
lifecycle;1830 
 
(e) expand unfair terms laws, to contracts unfair ‘overall’, include monetary penalties and 
representative regulator actions; and delete insurer exemption;  
 
(f) mandate by ACL regulation a model consumer guarantees disclosure format by 
comparative table1831 and an Australian-law compliant version of the OTA IOT consumer 
checklist (Annex. D) as to safety, privacy and security of IOT devices;1832 and 
 
(g) increase penalties and allow criminal penalties for breaches of section 18. 
 
  
8.2.2 Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (PA) 
Amend the PA to address the issues identified in Ch. 5. Table 5.1 including: 
(a) Amend the ‘PI” definition to include identifying information or opinion, when linkable to 
other information or opinion in the possession, custody or control of an entity;1833 
                                                          
1828 An alternative related approach might be to include ‘security’ in ACL section 9 as to the definition of a ‘safety defect’.  
1829 e.g. ‘Use’ includes anonymisation, de-identification, storage, retention, accuracy, correction and transfer to third parties 
and related bodies’ corporate. 
1830 This is an update to the old-style repair and repair facilities intent of section 58. 
1831 See (e.g.) Apple’s ‘Consumer Law webpage’: Apple, <https://www.apple.com/au/legal/statutory-warranty/> 
1832 This is similar to the Reg 90 requirement, so not an unknown approach in consumer law. Nearly 100 entities, from 
businesses, consumer and privacy advocates, academic institutions, international testing organizations, and U.S. law 
enforcement and governmental agencies contributed to the checklist: OTA, ‘Consumer IoT Checklist’ (4 Oct 2016) 
http://otalliance.actonsoftware.com/acton/attachment/6361/f-0096/1/-/-/-/-/IoT%20Checklist.pdf  
1833 Grubb appears to have been interpreted to mean that if data linkage is practically “unlikely” (we wouldn’t do that!) then 
there is no collection of PI: DAB v. Byron Shire Council [2017] NSW CATAD 104.This is inconsistent with international 
approaches, so clearly requires an explicit legislative statement. 
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(b) insert in APP 1.2 an express obligation to comply with  
- privacy by design and  
- privacy by default,1834 and  
- defence-in-depth privacy,  
as defined in a (revised) OAIC Guideline;1835 
 
(c) insert ‘chain of liability’ by deeming the device/ app PI collector responsible to consumers 
for unauthorised third party PI uses, unless they have implemented industry-standard 
anonymisation and/ or contractual protections;  
 
(d) insert that privacy policies must include an explicit statement as to who owns S/PI 
collected by the device/ app and precisely to whom data will flow (beyond general 
categories); 
 
(e) insert a definition that S/PI collected by devices/ apps in smart home and smart self 
contexts belongs to the consumer, prohibit collection unnecessary beyond device 
operation, and inconsistent with data minimisation1836  as well as any non-anonymised 
use without express consumer opt-in to each (fully disclosed) such use, presented in 
non-bundled form. Note this is to address the possibility that smart home data may not 
be PI as defined, where devices have multiple users;1837 
 
While not CIOT-specific, a new tort would assist to redress consumer redress in a privacy-
intrusive environment. As proposed by the ALRC, a statutory cause of action in tort for serious 
invasion of privacy,1838 to cover intrusion into a person’s “seclusion or private affairs (including 
                                                          
1834 EU, above n 49. The UK Information Commissioner points out that devices with minimal interfaces may have privacy by 
design features available, but unless they are activated by default, they are not ‘privacy-friendly’: ICO, ‘Response to Ofcom 
Consultation: ‘Promoting investment and innovation in the Internet of Things'’ (1 Oct 2014 accessed 2 Feb 2016) 
<https://ico.org.uk/about-the-ico/consultations/ofcom-consultation-promoting-investment-and-innovation-in-the-internet-of-
things/> 
1835 The recommendation in footnote 3 concurs with this view: Richardson, above n 1817.  
1836 GDPR Art 7 Conditions for Consent provides (4) When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall 
be taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional upon 
consent to the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of the contract. 
1837 ICO, above n 1834: The UK Information Commissioner makes the point that “it is debateable” whether smart home 
devices are collecting PI where multiple users are not distingushed by the device; this may be so unless the collector has 
other data which it can use to link or infer identity. This may depend upon household ‘type’; for example, where there is one 
adult and a baby, it seems safe to infer that the ‘use’ is identifiable as the adult’s usage. Note it would also be unworkable 
where each home must be evaluated as to whether users are capable of being distinguished – hence the proposal that all 
such data is deemed PI and therefore must be anonymized before use. 
1838 ALRC, above n 1235.  
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by unlawful surveillance)”; and the “disclosure or misuse of private information” as to a person, 
whether true or not, is recommended.  
 
8.2.3 Australian Standards 
 Develop internationally-harmonised privacy/ security standards:1839.  While beyond scope, 
the Art 29 WP has recommended portable, interoperable, clear, self-explanatory data formats; 
which include raw and aggregated data formats; minimise strong identifiers to facilitate 
anonymisation; and certified standards as to baseline privacy and security requirements. Once 
developed these should become mandatory Australian Standards, such that any breach is 
enforceable under the ACL. 
 
Regulatory Guidelines 
8.2.3 ACCC 
 
(a) Create CIOT ACL guidance as proposed above, and: 
 
- Clarify required smart self device “accuracy” and consumer disclosure requirements; 
- Clarify that to comply with the ACL, collectors who transmit data with consumer 
permission to third parties must contractually (or by other enforceable mechanism) 
ensure those parties comply with the terms of the initial consents; 
 
(b) Create online contract ‘transparency’ guidelines (for OAIC adoption)1840 including 
layout, process, disclosure, notices, consent format(s), length, links use, language, 
reading-age and other BE factors. In this regard, the ACCC could also work with industry 
                                                          
1839 The Australian IOT Alliance has proposed a UK standard, Hypercat, which facilitates smart city (and other) 
interoperability and vertical integration: Hypercat Alliance Ltd, ‘Hypercat is a Global Alliance and standard (PAS 212) 
driving secure and interoperable Internet of Things (IoT) for Industry and cities,’ <http://www.hypercat.io/> For Hypercat 
Australia, see http://www.hypercat.io/australia.html  
1840 See for example, the UK good practice “blended approach”: ICO, ‘Privacy notices, transparency and control’ (7 Oct 2016 
accessed 20 Oct 2016) <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/privacy-notices-transparency-and-
control/> 
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to devise model contract clauses,1841 dashboards etc. which satisfy or exemplify such 
Guidelines.1842 
 
8.2.4 OAIC 
 
(a) Revise APP Guidelines to reflect CIOT concerns in Chapter 5;1843  
 
(b) Guidance as to ‘PI’ definition:  to clarify hybrid device scenarios,1844 how Grubb may 
impact those scenarios (for example, where data is linkable,1845 or where several people 
use a device like a car, but identity inferences are illuminated by other information held, 
such as driving/ entertainment settings1846 reveals individual driver identity);1847 
 
(c) Mandate ‘privacy by design’ which is ‘expected’ in the non-binding Privacy 
Management Framework guidance under APP1.2, but not ‘enforced’ by the APPs. The 
OAIC defines privacy by design as “‘a holistic approach where privacy is integrated and 
embedded in an entity’s culture, practices and processes, systems and initiatives from 
the design stage onwards”.1848 This should be clearly defined in APP 1.2, to include 
“privacy, security, choice and ‘useability’ by design” and default1849 with expected, 
evidenced use of the following: 
- privacy impact assessments pre-device release and as changes require during 
product life-cycle;1850 
                                                          
1841 ICO, above n 1773.  
1842 The ICO, for example, has issued binding guidelines as to data sharing,  together with model contract clauses  which if 
adopted, avoid the requirement to conduct privacy impact assessments: ICO, ‘Data sharing code of practice’ (accessed 8 
Aug 2016) <https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1068/data_sharing_code_of_practice.pdf> Prepared under 
s. 52 of the Data Protection Act (UK), this is a statutory code but does not create additional legal obligations or 
authoritatively state the law, but may be used in evidence and must be considered in any legal proceedings.  
1843 Note that the OAIC already provides around twenty guides to enhance PA compliance; these would benefit from 
revision. The ICO has created a very user-friendly and attractive style of publication which is worth emulating.  
1844 See as to apps, Art 29 WP, above n 556.  
1845 DAB v. Byron Shire Council [2017] NSW CATAD 104. 
1846 For example, social media connections to driver profile can reveal identity, seat settings may reveal a shorter person, 
driving ‘style’ data may be analysable through linkage to reveal differing drivers (for example, time of day linked to 
acceleration patterns etc). 
1847 For example, apartment smart home data may be aggregated, such that the recipient cannot distinguish which 
apartment contributed which data, rather than collecting individual apartment data separately.  
1848 OAIC, above n 1316. 
1849 Vulkanovski, above n 110: 67. 
1850 OAIC, above n 1307. See for overseas approaches, ICO, ‘Privacy impact assessments’  (7 Oct 2016 accessed 20 Oct 
2016) <https://ico.org.uk/for-organisations/guide-to-data-protection/privacy-notices-transparency-and-control/>; PIAF, ‘A 
Privacy Impact Assessment framework for data protection and privacy rights’ (21 Sept 2011 accessed 6 Mar 2016) 
<http://www.piafproject.eu/ref/PIAF_D1_21_Sept2011Revlogo.pdf> 
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- privacy management framework;1851 
- privacy enhancing technologies:1852 (e.g. consent receipts and age-checking);1853 
- data minimisation and destruction1854 and security;1855 including defence-in-
depth;1856 
- mandatory data breach disclosure; 
 
and recommended use of communication and privacy-enhancing tools such as: 
- privacy certification schemes;1857 
- privacy dashboards; 
- trust mark, icons or symbols, such as traffic light systems; and 
- cues such as clear graphics, colour, and sound. 
 
The OAIC could work with industry to devise model contract clauses,1858 dashboards 
etc. which satisfy ACCC/ OAIC transparency guidelines,1859 and feed into a safety cue 
trustmark system. 
 
(d) Mandate privacy by default, to include device and app set-up requiring default 
passwords be changed and automatic (non-bundled) privacy updates. Where the latter 
is not practicable, consumers should be personally informed (by email or device prompt) 
and reminded to install to patches and updates.1860 Include defence-in-depth 
approaches such as encryption; 
 
                                                          
1851 OAIC, above n 1308.  
1852 ENISA, ‘Privacy Enhancing Technologies: Evolution and State of the Art’ (9 Mar 2017 accessed 20 Mar 2017) 
<https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/pets-evolution-and-state-of-the-art> 
1853 See British Standards PAS 1296 Age Checking code of practice which provides guidance as to confirming consumer’s 
age-related eligibility and verified parental consent before children’s data processing. Kantara’s consent receipt specification 
enables consumers to communicate and manage the personal data they have shared: Open Notice, above n 1686.  
1854 As required by APP 3 and (partly) 11. The Guide is here: OAIC, above n 1316.  
1855 OAIC, above n 572: 2; OAIC, above n 1310.  
1856 ‘Defence-in-depth’ means that security measures are considered across multiple levels: a device may be secure but if it 
relies upon consumers’ router security (which may be poor) then designers should develop additional device steps to 
encrypt or otherwise secure device-related data: FTC, above n 449: 30. 
1857 The US-based Online Trust Alliance promotes an CIOT Trust Framework with respect to smart homes and products and 
consumer wearables, which identifies 23 mandatory requirements and 12 recommended requirements, imposing security, 
user access, disclosures and transparency and data sharing requirements upon participants: Online Trust Alliance, ‘IoT 
Trust Framework’ (8 Feb 2016 accessed 3 Mar 2016) 
<https://otalliance.org/system/files/files/initiative/documents/iot_trust_framework_2-8_no_fn.pdf> 
1858 ICO, above n 1773.  
1859 ICO, above n 1842. 
1860 iPhone users would be familiar with reminders which persist until updates are either selected automatically or at a 
chosen time. 
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(e) Address the ‘bundling’ of device functionality with data collection and use ‘consent’: 
reflecting GDPR positioning,1861 collection should reflect data minimisation and device 
functionality should not be conditional upon consumer data use beyond that reasonably 
required;1862 
 
(f) Cooperate with industry and other regulators to devise an Australian anonymisation and 
de-identification standard, to prescribe best practice and provide a safe harbour from 
liability for compliant providers as to re-identification risk. That Standard should detail 
prescribed checks and balances, review and audit processes and quality control 
requirements to be built into best practice de-identification processes. 
 
Additional CIOT specific regulatory guidance as to difficult, sensitive or rapidly evolving areas – 
such as the proposed new anonymisation guidance1863 - is a soft law method of conveying 
regulatory-expectation, while preserving flexibility. 
 
 
Self-Regulation 
8.2.5 Australian IOT Alliance or other industry body 
 
(a) Best practice self- regulation:1864 for example, devise a new consumer IOT Code which 
meets best practice standards to create a plain English consumer-communications culture 
and content; provide comprehensive CIOT coverage across the industry; create a certified 
trust mark and console system,1865 an approved independent complaints process; improve 
                                                          
1861 Art 7 Conditions for Consent provides (4) When assessing whether consent is freely given, utmost account shall be 
taken of whether, inter alia, the performance of a contract, including the provision of a service, is conditional upon consent to 
the processing of personal data that is not necessary for the performance of the contract. 
1862 EU, Art 29, above n 49: 21. The Opinion states that many IOT stakeholders only need aggregated data and so should 
destroy raw data as soon as that has been obtained: [7.1].   
1863 The OAIC would be well-advised to adopt the style and approach of the ICO document, which Peter Leonard describes 
as “best practice”: ICO, above n 1442. The old version is here: OAIC, ‘De-identification of Data and Information’ Privacy 
Business Resource 4 (April 2014 accessed 20 Apr 2015) http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/privacy/privacy-
resources/privacy-business-resources/privacy_business_resource_4.pdf  
1864 An example of a Code with some overlapping issues is the ADMA Charter and Code of Practice. This is transparent, 
well written and includes issues such as data use, collection, transparency and safety (data security). This industry arguably 
presents a lower risk profile than the consumer IOT, which may justify its strong self-regulatory success. 
1865 Another industry has addressed this: the ADMA uses a Data Pass program which is essentially data management 
compliance training and designed to differentiate their members in the marketplace. It covers the data lifecycle from 
collection, use, analysis and disclosure uses in advertising. See ‘http://www.adma.com.au/connect/articles/how-can-you-
show-that-you-are-a-trusted-marketer-the-answer-is-adma-data-pass/ 
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legal compliance through impact assessments, audited systems and reporting practices; 
improved disclosure and transparency through public complaints resolution; and appeals, 
sanctions and consumer remedies for Code breach.  
 
(b) Voluntary industry codes1866 may also pre-empt legislative intervention, and promote good 
practice and consumer trust. The Australian IOTA supports an interoperability standard1867 
and is developing guidelines. Well-regarded stipulations abound, which suggests that many 
CIOT issues reflect poor compliance, rather than poor information. For example, OTA and 
OWASP provide authoritative CIOT privacy and security1868  resources (Annex. E) and 
ENISA has smart home1869 and privacy-enhancing technologies1870 recommendations. As to 
online contracting, TRUSTe and a plethora of online tools exist to improve practices.1871 
 
(c) Think laterally: Tech companies pursue product defence strategies through Bug Bounty1872 
and security-gap programs incentivize white-hat hackers to locate product issues.1873 These 
programs and competitions of similar ilk are a consumer-protective positive relevant to trust 
mark certification. 
 
 
                                                          
1866 The ACCC Guidelines define these as setting out “specific standards of conduct for an industry in relation to the way it 
deals with its members as well as its customers”: ACCC, ‘Guidelines for developing effective voluntary industry codes of 
conduct’ (31 Aug 2011 accessed 2 Feb 2016): 1 < https://www.accc.gov.au/publications/guidelines-for-developing-effective-
voluntary-industry-codes-of-conduct> 
1867 Late in 2016, it supported Hypercat, a UK interoperability standard which it hopes will become the Australian Standard. It 
aims to improve interoperability and “data discovery”, as well as enables a device catalogue to be published as a web 
repository of devices and related metadata: AIOTA,  
1868 See for example, NIST, GSMA or UK Security Foundation approaches. 
1869 ENISA, ‘Online privacy tools for the general public’ (17 Dec 2015 accessed 14 Jun 2016) 
https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/privacy-tools-for-the-general-public; ENISA, ‘Privacy Enhancing Technologies: 
Evolution and State of the Art’ (9 Mar 2017 accessed 20 Mar  2017) https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/pets-
evolution-and-state-of-the-art; ENISA, ‘Privacy and data protection by design – from policy to engineering’, (2014 accessed 
14 Jun 2016) https://www.enisa.europa.eu/activities/identity-and-trust/library/deliverables/privacy-and-data-protection-by-
design; ENISA, ‘PETs controls matrix - A systematic approach for assessing online and mobile privacy tools’ (20 Dec 2016 
accessed 10 Feb 2016) <https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/pets-controls-matrix/pets-controls-matrix-a-systematic-
approach-for-assessing-online-and-mobile-privacy-tools> 
1870 ENISA, above n 34; ENISA, above n 357.  
1871 See Appendix B, OAIC, Big Data draft, above n 1316. 
1872 A bug bounty program may be defined as a deal offered by websites, software developers or companies with software-
dependent products whereby recognition and compensation if given to people for reporting bugs, especially those as to 
vulnerabilities and exploits. See the long major corporate list here: Bugcrowd, (2017) ‘Bounty Programs’ (n.d. accessed 2 
Mar 2017) <https://bugcrowd.com/list-of-bug-bounty-programs> 
1873 Tesla (up to $10,000), Fiat Chrysler ($1500) and even the US Dept. of Defense offer such programs: Andy Greenberg, 
‘Chrysler launches Detroit’s First Bug Bounty for Hackers’ WIRED (13 Sept 2016 accessed 20 Oct 2016) 
https://www.wired.com/2016/07/chrysler-launches-detroits-first-bug-bounty-hackers/ GM offers a reporting amnesty only. 
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Regulator actions  
 
8.2.6 ASIC, ACCC & OAIC 
  
(a) Increase (targeted) regulatory audits: the ACCC could readily audit online practices 
across the CIOT industry as to misleading, deceptive or unfair contractual terms, and 
the APC could likewise audit privacy policies.1874 Either could take enforcement action 
where necessary in the interests of consumer protection, industry education and 
deterrence enforcement. This would incentivize a compliance-based attitude within the 
CIOT ecosystem; 
 
(b) Use the Courts: the ACCC and ASIC could also institute proceedings to pursue an 
Australian precedent as to the application of the unfair terms to consumers using 
‘freemium’ services, as well as auditing (with the OAIC) downstream data recipients (ad 
networks/ data brokers) as to data minimisation, destruction and security.  
 
(c) Use influence: to encourage industry Codes of Practice1875 to identify best practice in 
specific industry applications: for example, in CIOT security1876 or privacy,1877 or 
sectorally: for example, across smart cars, 1878 home1879  (including voice assistant 
technology1880) and self devices and apps.  
 
(d) Think laterally:  FTC-sponsored competitions seek solutions to difficult consumer IOT 
problems: for example, after the massive 2016 DDoS attack, they announced a 
                                                          
1874 The Commissioner has power to conduct 'Commissioner initiated investigations' (formerly ‘own-motion investigations’) 
which might cover this approach though are principally designed to investigate a suspected interference with privacy, and 
can more formally conduct an ‘audit’ (now called an ‘assessment’) of governmental agencies with very limited powers as to 
private sector entities. See OAIC, <https://www.oaic.gov.au/about-us/corporate-information/annual-reports/oaic-annual-
report-201314/chapter-seven-privacy-compliance#s8> 
1875 ACCC, ‘Product Safety: A Guide to Testing’ (Oct 2013 accessed 2 Aug 2016) https://www.accc.gov.au/publications/a-
guide-to-testing-product-safety; ACCC, ‘Guidelines – Use of section 155 powers’ (Sept 2016 accessed 5 Set 2016) 
http://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/1119_ACCC%20Guidelines-use%20of%20section%20155%20powers_FA.PDF>; 
ACCC, Guidelines, above n 1866. 
1876 GSMA, above n 113.  
1877 Privacy code registration is rarely used by the private sector, nor is it compelled by the APC under s 26E (2). It offers a 
potentially useful sectoral approach. For the two codes registered, see: <https://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy-law/privacy-
registers/privacy-codes/>  
1878 Note the industry guidelines are here: Auto Alliance, ‘Framework for Automotive Cybersecurity Best Practices’ (19 Jan 
2016 accessed 2 Mar 2016) <http://www.autoalliance.org/index.cfm?objectid=1E518FB0-BEC3-11E5-
9500000C296BA163>But see also: GSMA, above n 583.  
1879 GSMA, above n 113.  
1880 Alta, above n 1224.  
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competition for a tool to automate software updates.1881 There are a range of current 
CIOT problems identified in this paper – including device obsolescence1882 and 
consumer liability for refusing updates1883 - which could benefit from this kind of targeted 
solutions-based incentivisation. 
 
Consumer Education 
 
8.2.7 A safer default environment 
 
(a) If privacy and security by design and default is legally required, devices should arrive to 
consumers set to the safest mode practicable, relieving any (immediate) need to understand 
many operational questions.1884 Answers to these questions should be disclosed upon 
device purchase and set-up. Wherever possible, device prompts (e.g.) mandating complex 
replacements for default passwords, are more effective than expecting consumers to initiate 
settings change; 
 
(b) Safety cues such as trustmarks and dashboards should be applied to devices, apps and 
online, and be promoted nationally, to develop high consumer recognition and incentivize 
industry participation.  
 
8.2.8 Consumer actions 
 
Empowered consumers still share some CIOT-responsibilities including: 
                                                          
1881 FTC, ‘IoT Home Inspector Challenge’ (4 Jan 2017 accessed 15 Feb 2017) <https://federalregister.gov/d/2016-31731> 
The prize for the competition is up to $25,000, with $3,000 available for honourable mention winner(s). 
1882 Patrick Thibodeau, ‘Friday's IoT-based DDoS attack has security experts worried’ ComputerWorld (25 Oct 2016 
accessed 15 Feb 2017) <http://www.computerworld.com/article/3134746/security/fridays-iot-based-ddos-attack-has-
security-experts-worried.html> 
1883 Eric A. Taub, ‘Your Car’s New Software Is Ready. Update Now?’ The New York Times (8 Sept 2016 accessed 16 Oct 
2016) <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/09/automobiles/your-cars-new-software-is-ready-update-now.html> Note 
consumers may potentially face liability for a failure to update their vehicle, if manufacturers do not make updates automatic. 
1884 For example, questions such as how the device works, what settings options exist, how when and why data is collected; 
whether all data sought is necessary to provide desired functionality; where the data will go and to whom; and what risks a 
device or app may entail under different settings. 
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(a) The obligation to use resources - such as manufacturer-checklists1885- as well as to read all 
reasonable, ‘transparent’ instructions, warnings, terms, cues and privacy policies. This 
presupposes significant change in the style, content and provision of such information; 
(b) Non-users whose data is collected should be informed as to the presence of CIOT devices 
and the data type collected. While less significant for smart self devices, smart homes could 
display standardised stickers to fulfil notice purposes. Smart cars are more problematic: for 
example Tesla has just started random on-road vision data capture from its vehicle cameras: 
while subject to express driver consent, it is unclear how this may impact upon other road 
users’ rights.1886 This should be clarified. 
 
Continuous Policy Review & Flexibility:  
8.2.9 Of all the differing views as to the CIOT, perhaps the most dominant is that it is a rapidly evolving 
and requires policy flexibility to avoid stifling innovation.1887 This presupposes a permanent 
monitoring body continuously reviewing the CIOT in practice; such a body as the Australian IOT 
Alliance with members from industry, retailers, consumers, regulators and government. Its brief 
should include: 
(a) to monitor and report upon the CIOT, including (without limitation) international problems, 
cases and research; secondly, to develop CIOT consumer education and awareness 
programs; thirdly to create an industry ‘consumer first, risk minimisation culture’ – ADMA 
for example adopt the hero principle “Consumer first through empowerment and 
protection” -  and finally, to recommend research to address CIOT problems;1888 
(b) to identify Australian problem areas (e.g. market failures);   
(c) to recommend regulatory or other appropriate government actions in a timely manner; 
and 
(d) to provide CIOT-related submissions to government and other enquiries.  
                                                          
1885 OTA, ‘Consumer IoT Checklist’ (4 Oct 2016) http://otalliance.actonsoftware.com/acton/attachment/6361/f-0096/1/-/-/-/-
/IoT%20Checklist.pdf See Annex D. 
1886 Google Glass and other wearable glasses have recording capacity as well. Thierer asserts that social norms may control 
inappropriate uses – he argues that people do not use mobile phone cameras in locker rooms for example. While that may 
be so, people sensitive to norms don’t - those who are doing so for privacy-intrusive reasons still do – as peeping-Tom court 
cases reveal. 
1887 There seems little debate on this point; the question is whether it is used to stifle sensible regulatory approaches in the 
meantime.   
1888 These four recommendations have their genesis in NSTAC’s recommendation 6, above n 66.  
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This recommendation is consistent with the final Framework requirement:  Step 6: Implement 
and evaluate after time.1889 
It is suggested that these multi-faceted approaches represent the most efficient and responsive approach 
to guiding consumer IOT development and deployment, and minimising its socially-disruptive effects in 
Australia. Of course, Australian actions must work in concert with international actions, and in this respect, 
this research suggests that the European approaches are more advanced and consonant with the ACPF 
objective and its implicit social and ethical values, than US regulatory positioning at present.1890 But this 
is a discussion Australians are waiting to have. 
This regulatory wish-list rests upon the following draft foundational principles – which the author 
recommends form a baseline for CIOT implementation, regulation and consumer expectation in Australia.  
 
  
                                                          
1889 OECD, above n 505. The Consumer Policy Toolkit is discussed in Ch. 2. 
1890 As previously noted, Australia has followed EU consumer law approaches as to strict products liability, unfair terms and 
standards harmonization; as such it seems clear that this judgment has already been made. Privacy appears to be an outlier 
at this stage which may reflect current (and past) government disinterest. The GDPR necessitates a reconsideration of 
privacy in 2018, as it will practically impact upon Australian exporters.  
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8.3 Draft CIOT principles  
 
RECOGNISING that the consumer Internet of Things (CIOT) promises unprecedented benefits to 
humanity through enabling human-centred services and pervasive data collection to fuel 
insightful analytics and enable improved public policy and universal metrics. RECOGNISING also 
that the CIOT represents an unprecedented risk to consumer privacy, information security and 
personal autonomy, RECOGNISING ALSO the normative values implicit within the Australian 
Consumer Policy Regulatory Framework, these draft principles are proposed for the 
consideration of Australian regulators, consumer groups, the CIOT industry and other interested 
parties.  
The principles apply to CIOT goods and services provided to consumers and / or to persons 
whose personal information has been CIOT-collected.  
 
 
Principle one: General & application 
Public interest and industry success depends upon a principled, morally-grounded and trusted consumer 
internet of things. Self-determination is an inalienable right of all human beings.1891 CIOT products are 
inherently human-intrusive, so should be subject to these principles with respect to product design, 
manufacture, deployment, data collection and use, throughout the reasonable, sustainable device and 
data life-cycle.  
CIOT industry or sectoral groups should develop CIOT-specific codes of practice1892  to establish an 
effective, industry-appropriate compliance culture and prescribed methods to meet all applicable 
consumer laws and these Principles. For greatest efficacy, such Codes should be mandatory, registrable, 
legally and standards-compliant and meet best practice code requirements. 
These Principles apply only to CIOT devices capable of collecting consumer personal information, and 
where applicable, include machine-to-machine communications which are not consumer-mediated. 
                                                          
References in this section are not abbreviated as they form part of the principles. 
1891 International Conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, ‘Mauritius Declaration on the Internet of 
Things’ (14 Oct 2014 accessed 12 Apr 2015): 1 <http://www.privacyconference2014.org/media/16596/Mauritius-
Declaration.pdf> 
1892 See as to voluntary ACCC-registrable codes: ACCC, ‘Guidelines for developing effective voluntary industry codes of 
conduct’ (31 Aug 2011 accessed 2 Aug 2016) https://www.accc.gov.au/publications/guidelines-for-developing-effective-
voluntary-industry-codes-of-conduct  As to APP-registrable Codes see PA section 26C. Any breach of a registered code 
constitutes an ‘interference with privacy’ under the PA: OAIC, ‘Guidelines for developing codes’ (Sept 2013 accessed 2 Aug 
2016) https://www.oaic.gov.au/agencies-and-organisations/advisory-guidelines/guidelines-for-developing-codes Note that  
code developers must undertake public consultation before making an application to register a code (ss 26F(2) which 
increases accountability.  
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Principle two: Examine ethics  
The CIOT is disruptive to ethics, so consumer products should only be released where they satisfy a 
proportionality test, such as an ethical impact assessment, comparing relative product benefits or uses 
to the cost or disruptions they may or will cause to consumers. 
Such assessment must also include consumer empowerment and protection through factors such as 
transparency, fairness, honesty, consumer choice and security, and having regard to a reasonably 
practicable chain-of-responsibility approach to the product, security updates and related consumer data 
life-cycle. 
Guidance: Wright (2011)1893 
 
 
Principle three:  Protect privacy 
The consumer IOT is disruptive to privacy, so products should only be released where they survive a 
proportionality test, such as a privacy impact assessment, and comply with privacy by design, privacy-
by-default and privacy defence-in-depth principles. 
Product privacy and default provision of product privacy-enhancing updates is a manufacturer obligation 
for the reasonable product lifecycle. Personal information anonymisation, minimisation, time-limited 
purpose use and timely destruction are privacy best practice.  
Guidance: OAIC, ‘Guide to undertaking privacy impact assessments’1894 
ICO, 'Conducting privacy impact assessments code of practice”1895  
Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, ‘Privacy by Design’1896  
 GSMA, ‘IoT Privacy by Design Decision Tree’1897 
 
                                                          
1893 See for example, David Wright, ‘A Framework for the ethical impact assessment of information technology’ Ethics and 
Information Technology 13: 3 (2011) 199–226 accessed 3 Mar 2016 <http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2035938> 
1894 OAIC, ‘Guide to undertaking privacy impact assessments’ (May 2014 accessed 2 Jan 2016) 
<https://www.oaic.gov.au/agencies-and-organisations/guides/guide-to-undertaking-privacy-impact-assessments> 
1895 ICO, 'Conducting privacy impact assessments code of practice” (Feb 2014 accessed 5 Mar 2016) 
<https://ico.org.uk/media/for-organisations/documents/1595/pia-code-of-practice.pdf> 
1896 Information & Privacy Commissioner of Ontario, ‘Privacy by Design’ (2013 accessed 5 Jan 2016) 
https://www.ipc.on.ca/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/pbd-primer.pdf 
1897 GSMA, ‘IoT Privacy by Design Decision Tree’ (8 May 2015 accessed 8 Mar 2016) <http://www.gsma.com/iot/iot-
knowledgebase/iot-privacy-design-decision-tree/> 
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Principle four:  Secure insecurity 
The CIOT is disruptive to device, data and network security, so products should only be released where 
they survive a proportionality test, such as a security impact assessment, and where personal information 
is likely to be collected, comply with security-by-design security-by-default and security defence-in-depth 
principles. 
Product security including end-to-end encryption and default unbundled security updates provision 
remains an ongoing manufacturer obligation for the reasonable product lifecycle. Data minimisation, time-
limited purpose use and timely destruction are security best practice.  
Data collection solely for product or network security purposes by default is permissible provided no other 
use is made and personally-identifiable information is removed if shared with third parties for threat 
intelligence or prevention purposes. 
Guidance:  GSMA, ‘IoT Security Guidelines Overview Document’1898  
OWASP, ‘Security by Design Principles’1899   
  Australian IOT Alliance, ‘IOT Security Guideline1900 
  OAIC, ‘Guide to information security’1901  
 
 
Principle five: Transparency to trust  
Consumer trust is vital to CIOT development and success. 
Trust is enhanced by provider integrity, accountability and transparency, and privileging consumer control 
and empowerment: 
Integrity is enhanced by provider fairness, honesty and commitment to consumer empowerment 
and protection.  
                                                          
1898 GSMA Security Guidelines: http://www.gsma.com/connectedliving/future-iot-networks/iot-security-guidelines/; GSMA, 
‘Automotive IoT Security: Countering the Most Common Forms of Attack’ (22 March 2016 accessed 2 Apr 2016) < 
http://www.gsma.com/connectedliving/automotive-iot-security-countering-the-most-common-forms-of-attack/> 
1899 OWASP, ‘Security by Design Principles’ (3 Aug 2016) 
<https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Security_by_Design_Principles> See also OWASP, ‘Consumer IoT Security Guidance’ 
(14 May 2016 accessed 2 Jun 2016) <http://www.owasp.org/index.php?title=IoT_Security_Guidance&oldid=216879> 
1900 Australian IOT Alliance, ‘IoT Security Guideline V1.0’ (Feb 2017 accessed 2 Mar 2017): 17- 18 
<https://static1.squarespace.com/static/573853ed1d07c093e27aefd2/t/58ab9bf8ebbd1a2b74e2aa2d/1487641596432/IoTAA
+Security+Guideline+V1.0.pdf> 
1901 OAIC, ‘Guide to information security’ (April 2013 accessed 10 Apr 2015) [2] < http://www.oaic.gov.au/privacy/privacy-
resources/privacy-guides/guide-to-securing-personal-information> 
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Accountability is enhanced by providers adhering to these Principles and prompt disclosure and 
remedial actions as to product defect and data breach. 
Transparency is enhanced through clear consumer-friendly language, fair terms, accurate and 
honest disclosure of data collection purpose and data flows, and the provision of simple control-
enhancing mechanisms as to device operation, settings and preferences. It is not enhanced 
through coercive settings or mechanisms, or reducing functionality unnecessarily where 
consumers do not accept data sharing or certain uses. 
Consumer control and empowerment is enhanced by best practice information communication 
on-device, in-app or (where a limited interface) online, and control-enhancing technologies such 
as granular opt-in systems, dashboards, cues and trust marks. 
Consumer trust is promoted by provider adherence to best practices in product design, privacy and 
security, consent and data management, together with ongoing, documented, product assessment, 
improvement and update practices over the reasonable product lifecycle.  
Guidance: ICO, ‘Privacy notices, transparency and control – a code of practice on communicating 
privacy information to individuals’1902 
Online Trust Alliance IoT Trust Framework (Annex. E) 
   
Principle six: Create choice  
CIOT personal information belongs to the consumer from whom it was collected. 
CIOT providers may use consumer data for the primary purpose of providing the CIOT goods and 
services, and for secondary purposes ‘reasonably expected’ or consented-to by a consumer. Best 
practice suggests that any non-primary purpose uses and sharing of consumer data should require 
express, granular, affirmative “opt-in” consents by consumers. Default settings should exclude all uses 
save for those of a primary nature. 
Providers must provide simple, accessible and clear methods for consumers to easily, at their option, 
obtain access to or to correct data and to opt in or out of data sharing, without disincentive. Best practice 
data management requires providers to ensure that consumer data is readily accessible, correctable, 
trackable and destructible upon reasonable consumer request. 
                                                          
1902 ICO, ‘Privacy notices, transparency and control – a code of practice on communicating privacy information to individuals’ 
(24 Mar 2016 accessed 20 Apr 2016) https://ico.org.uk/media/about-the-ico/privacy-notices-transparency-and-control-0-
0.pdf 
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Example:  EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2016/679  
 
Principle seven:    Always anonymise 
Anonymisation of consumer data is best practice. Anonymisation practices require an ongoing 
assessment of best practice and re-identification risk. Where re-identification exceeds a ‘low or remote’ 
risk, providers must not provide such data to third parties.  
Providers sharing consumer data with third parties must not do so unless consumer consent is first 
obtained. Best practice requires that providers use contractual and technical means to ensure that such 
data is thereafter used and retained consistently with the terms of that consent.  
Guidance: EU, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation 
Techniques’1903  
ICO, ‘Anonymisation Code of Practice’1904  
OAIC, ‘De-identification of data and information’1905 
   
Principle eight:    Future harmonisation & development 
Providers and regulators must monitor best practice international developments impacting upon the 
consumer IOT, including regulation, technical developments, product defects, security or data breach 
and responses to market failure or other problem. Where necessary or useful, best international practice 
should be incorporated into Australian products and regulation (as applicable) in a timely manner.  
These Principles should evolve over time due to the highly dynamic nature of CIOT technology and the 
monitored experience and assessment of consumers, regulators and industry. 
 
Glossary 
consumer IOT refers to internet of things devices and applications which are intended for 
consumer use, where ‘consumer’ is as defined in the ACL  
                                                          
1903 EU, Article 29 Data Protection Working Party, ‘Opinion 05/2014 on Anonymisation Techniques’ (10 Apr 2014 accessed 2 
Jan 2016) < http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/files/2014/wp216_en.pdf>   
1904 ICO, ‘Anonymisation Code of Practice’ (accessed 8 Aug 2016 <https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1061/anonymisation-code.pdf>  
1905 OAIC, ‘De-identification of Data and Information’ Privacy Business Resource 4 (April 2014 accessed 20 Apr 2015) 
<http://www.oaic.gov.au/images/documents/privacy/privacy-resources/privacy-business-
resources/privacy_business_resource_4.pdf> 
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defence-in-depth means that even where one control is reasonable, more controls approaching 
risks in “different fashions” are preferable. Controls used in depth render severe vulnerabilities 
difficult to exploit and so lessen the likelihood of occurrence1906  
personal information and sensitive information are as defined in the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) 
and included in references to consumer ‘data’ in these principles 
product(s) include(s) CIOT devices and related software apps 
proportionality refers to an approach whereby there must be a legitimate aim for a measure, 
the measure must be suitable, necessary and reasonable to achieve the aim, considering other 
competing interests or approaches. Relevant factors include the harm to be guarded against, the 
cost of measures, the state of the art as at product release date, the nature, scope, context, 
purpose and cost of a product; and the nature and severity of consumer risk. 
  
                                                          
1906 OWASP, ‘Security by Design Principles’ (3 Aug 2016 accessed 20 Sept 2016) 
<https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Security_by_Design_Principles> 
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Conclusion  
 
“It isn’t really about things. It’s about Us. The Internet of Us.  
The human and digital experiences no longer sit side by side; they are bound ever tighter by 
this new way of life…”1907 - Microsoft 
 
Seismic technological events happen - and portend vast disturbances and recreate human experience. 
The consumer internet of things – in its highly disruptive technological moment - is one such event. This 
digital ‘skin’ portends almost organic innovation, unprecedented capabilities and analytics, extraordinary 
efficiencies and will in many ways, greatly enhance consumer life and human well-being. Smart cars 
alone, will undoubtedly save lives, while smart self and home will enable unprecedented enhancements 
to human health, fitness, environment and lifestyle management. The CIOT promises an efficient, 
metrics-driven and consumer-responsive world. The critical question is whether that world will also entail 
a principled, morally-grounded and trusted consumer IOT; whether it will ultimately empower or  transform 
us all into “hostages of technology”.1908 For in locating and activating consumer’s most intimate ‘darkest’ 
data, the smart world will also locate, activate and weaponize the worst attributes of ubiquitous digital 
surveillance and the big data analytics ecosystem, perpetuate the greatest flaws of consumer power 
imbalance, rampant information asymmetry, online ‘notice-and-choice’ contracting, privacy-trading,  
exponentially-greater data gathering and algorithm-driven profiling. The CIOT will thus both challenge 
and expose the very bounds of consumer and privacy protection in this country.  
 
This thesis has drawn a uniquely Australian snapshot of the CIOT, by mapping out its scope, scale and 
stakes from limited Australian information enhanced by sharper international statistics, and reflecting 
critically upon international studies and consumer experience, which should inform Australia’s earliest 
policy-making and regulatory steps. The analysis explores six serious problems which the consumer IOT 
creates or exacerbates, examines actual and potential detriments which consumers may suffer, identifies 
specific consumer and privacy law gaps in responding to CIOT-based issues, proposes flexible but 
effective alliance-based regulatory responses to those problems and finally, devises a set of simple base-
line principles, informed by best practice international research and expert recommendations. It is 
hopefully, some help towards a national conversation, already overdue by international standards. While 
industry is working hard to excite government interest, it is difficult not to note inaction, or the fact that 
there are significant social, legal and ethical issues attached to this technology which warrant a reflective, 
                                                          
1907 GSMA, above n 113.  
1908 EC, above n 93: 29.  
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values-based community debate, to preface policy development and a required regulatory response.  As 
Julie Brill warned over three years ago: 
“Academics technologists, lawyers…  consumer advocates and policymakers all have a role to 
play in developing these [consumer] protections. The time to start is now.” 1909   
 
Given CIOT is here now, its inevitably disruptive impacts, its evidenced serious detriments, and the many 
consumer protection gaps identified in this thesis, it is time that Australian consumer protection regulators 
take the consumer IOT head-on. This thesis proposes recommendations and principles to that end, as 
at best, a proactive high ground and at worst, a working starting point. It is to be hoped that regulators 
will respond to strengthen consumer empowerment and protection now, before Australians venture forth 
into a dauntingly vast, but excitingly-transformational, brave new world... the consumer internet of things. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
                                                          
1909 Brill, above n 446. 
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EPIC v. Customs and Border Protection (Analytical Framework for Intelligence) Complaint (Filed 18 Jul 
2014) Civil Action No. 14-1217 US District Court for the District of Columbia  
<https://epic.org/foia/dhs/cbp/afi/>  
 
EPIC, ‘In the Matter of Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., ‘Compliant, Request for investigation, Injunction, 
and other relief to the Federal Trade Commission’ (24 Feb 2015) 
<https://epic.org/privacy/internet/ftc/Samsung/EPIC-FTC-Samsung.pdf>;  Motion to Dismiss The 
Amended Class Action Complaint, United States District Court for the Southern District of Illinois, Case 
No. 3:15-Cv-855 (Filed 19 Feb 2016) <http://www.Liabilitydesk.Com/Wp-Content/Uploads/2016/02/15-
Cv-00855-Mjr-Dgw-Document-71-1.Pdf> 
 
EPIC, ‘In the Matter of Genesis Toys and Nuance Communications, ‘Complaint and Request for 
Investigation, injunction, and other relief’, Submitted by The Electronic Privacy Information Center, The 
Campaign for a Commercial Free Childhood, The Center for Digital Democracy and the Consumers 
Union (6 Dec 2016 accessed 12 Dec 2016) https://epic.org/privacy/kids/EPIC-IPR-FTC-Genesis-
Complaint.pdf 
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Table of Legislation  
 
Australia  
 
Bills  
 
Privacy Amendment (Re-identification Offence) Bill 2016 
 
Regulations 
Competition and Consumer Regulations 2010 (Cth). 
 
Commonwealth 
Administrative Decisions (Judicial Review) Act 1977 (Cth) 
Administrative Appeals Tribunal Act 1975 (Cth)  
Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth) 
Australian Consumer Law  
Australian Information Commissioner Act 2010 (Cth)  
Australian Securities and Investments Commission Act 2001 (the ASIC Act)  
Competition and Consumer Act 2010 (Cth)  
Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) 
Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) 
Crimes Act 1914 (Cth) 
Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth)  
Cybercrime Act 2001 (Cth) 
Cybercrime Legislation Amendment Act 2012 (Cth) 
Data-matching Program (Assistance and Tax) Act 1990 (Cth)   
Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth) 
Do Not Call Register Act 2006 (Cth)   
Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth) 
Electronic Transactions Act 1999 (Cth)  
Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act 2001 (Qld)  
Federal Court of Australia Act 1976 (Cth) 
Healthcare Identifiers Act 2010 (Cth)  
Insurance Contracts Act 1984 (Cth) 
National Consumer Credit Protection Act 2009 (Cth). 
National Health Act 1953 (Cth)  
Personally Controlled Electronic Health Records Act 2012 (Cth) 
Personal Property Securities Act 2009 (Cth)  
Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) 
Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Protection) Act 2012 (Cth)  
Privacy Amendment (Notifiable Data Breaches) Act 2017 (Cth) 
Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth) 
Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth) 
Spam Act 2003 (Cth)  
Surveillance Devices Act 2004 (Cth)  
Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) 
Telecommunications (Consumer Protection and Services Standards) Act 1999 (Cth) 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Amendment (Data Retention) Act 2015 (Cth) 
Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) 
Treasury Legislation Amendment (Small Business and Unfair Contract Terms) Act 2015 (Cth) 
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Current Commonwealth legislation is found in the Federal Register of Legislation 
<https://www.legislation.gov.au/> 
 
State  
Anti-Discrimination Act 1977 (NSW) 
Anti-Discrimination Act 1996 (NT) 
Anti-Discrimination Act 1991 (Qld) 
Anti-Discrimination Act 1998 (Tas) 
Discrimination Act 1991 (ACT) 
Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (SA) 
Equal Opportunity Act 2010 (Vic) 
Equal Opportunity Act 1984 (WA) 
Electronic Transactions Act 2001 (ACT) 
Electronic Transactions Act 2000 (NSW)  
Electronic Transactions Act 2000 (SA)  
Electronic Transactions Act 2000 (Tas)  
Electronic Transactions (Victoria) Act 2000 (Vic)  
Electronic Transactions (Northern Territory) Act 2000 (NT)     
Electronic Transactions Act 2003 (WA). Electronic Transactions (Queensland) Act (Qld) 
Fair Trading Act 1989 (Qld) 
Information Privacy Act 2014 (ACT)  
Information Privacy Act 2009 (Qld) 
Criminal Code Act 1899 (Qld) 
Motor Vehicles (Trials of Automotive Technologies) Amendment Act 2016 (SA)  
Public Records Act 2002 (Qld) 
Telecommunications Interception Act 2009 (Qld) 
 
New Zealand 
Fair Trading Act 1986 (NZ)    
United Kingdom & European Union 
Consumer Rights Act 2015 (UK)  
Data Protection Act 1998 (UK) 
 
European Council Data Protection Directive 95/46 EC (to be replaced by GDPR in 2018) 
European Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on unfair terms in consumer contracts, OJ 1993, 
L 095/29. 
EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2016/679 (27 Apr 2016) 
EU General Product Safety Directive (GPSD) 2001/95/EC (3 Dec 2001) 
 
United States 
 
Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act, 15 USC § 6501 (COPPA) 
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 
  
Federal bills:  
Autonomous Vehicle Privacy Protection Act of 2015 (HR3876) [Federal bill] 
<https://www.congress.gov/114/bills/hr3876/BILLS-114hr3876ih.pdf>  
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[Defunct] Consumer Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2015, 
<https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/legislative/letters/cpbr-act-of-2015-discussion-
draft.pdf> 
 
Developing Innovation and Growing the Internet of Things (DIGIT) Act,  
<http://www.fischer.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/03de7771-088b-45ac-8552-f82ddc0aa480/digit-
2016---final-bill-for-filing.pdf>  
 
State consumer protection legislation example: California* 
 
Senate Bill 327 (Calif.) (‘Teddy Bear & Toaster Act’)  
 
Unfair Competition Law (“UCL”), Cal. Bus. Prof. Code  
Consumers Legal Remedies Act (“CLRA”), Cal. Civ. Code  
False Advertising Law (“FAL”), Cal. Bus. Prof. Code  
Implied Warranty of Merchantability, Cal. Com. Code  
Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act, Cal. Civ. Code  
 
 
 
 
* Example statutes drawn from California as pleaded in the Cahen smart car litigation. Note US state 
approaches vary, but some have equivalent forms of legislation.
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Schedule 1: ACL unfair terms review  
S1.1 Smart home1910 
 
Smart home: potentially applicable device terms1911  
 
GOOGLE ‘NEST’1912 
 
AMAZON ‘ALEXA’ 
 
SAMSUNG SMART THINGS HUB 2 
 
UK Terms of Service1913* 
EULA (software) * 
Terms of Sale* 
Limited Warranty* 
Privacy Statement for Nest products* 
Website Privacy Policy* 
Privacy Policy for Nest Web Sites  
Open Source Compliance   
Sales Terms   
Intellectual Property and Other Notices   
Community Forum Agreement   
FCC Compliance Notice   
Customer Agreements for Rush Hour Rewards  
Customer Agreements for Rebates & Safety rewards  
Alexa Terms of Use*1914 
Amazon.com Conditions of Use & Sale*1915 
Amazon Device Terms of Use *1916  
Amazon.co.uk Privacy Notice*  
Amazon.co.uk Conditions of Use (EULA)*  
PLUS “other applicable rules, policies, and terms posted on the 
Amazon.co.uk website, available through your Amazon Alexa App, 
or provided with Alexa Enabled Products” including: 
• Cookies & Internet Advertising*  
• Amazon Prime Terms and Conditions*  
• Amazon Music Terms of Use*  
• Kindle Terms of Use*  
• Audible Conditions of Use*1917 
 
 
Samsung SmartThings Terms of Use1918* 
Samsung Service Terms and Conditions1919* 
EULA* 
Privacy Policy* 
Copyright Dispute Policy* 
Security policy* 
LiveTrack EULA* 
Livetrack Privacy policy” 
Copyright* 
 
Table S1.1 Smart home: potentially applicable device terms  
 
 
                                                          
Important Reader Note: All comments on these terms are illustrative only and do not imply contravention of the ACL. Terms cited are included for discussion purposes and are not necessarily or 
impliedly in breach of the provisions against which they are tabulated. Versions used are best available but may not apply to the Australian market. Not all products cited are yet sold in Australia. 
Terms quoted are copyright their respective owners. 
1910 Devices reviewed feature regularly on the Amazon.com ‘best sellers’ list, but are otherwise selected randomly. 
1911 As discerned from web searches and following links within terms. It is difficult to conclude that these are the complete set however. Those asterisked above are expressly incorporated into the ‘contract’. 
1912 All appear here (UK): https://nest.com/uk/legal/privacy-policy-for-nest-web-sites/?from-chooser=true   
1913 TOS https://nest.com/uk/legal/terms-of-service/ (10 Mar 2016); Privacy <https://nest.com/uk/legal/privacy-policy-for-nest-web-sites/>; EULA <https://nest.com/legal/eula/> (10 May 2016). 
1914 https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201809740 
1915 https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=1040616 
1916 https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=202002080> 
1917 Persons who “use or access” Alexa “agree” to 8 sets of terms plus those who “purchase or register an Amazon device” agree to the Device terms of Use (making 9 all up). 
1918 Samsung, ‘SmartThings Terms’ (3 Sept 2015) <https://www.smartthings.com/uk/terms> and Privacy (3 Sept 2015) <https://www.smartthings.com/uk/privacy> UK terms are used. 
1919 Samsung, ‘Samsung Service Terms and Conditions’ https://account.samsung.com/membership/terms 
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Smart home: selective terms review 
 
 
ACL SECTION 25  
Examples of terms 
that are likely to be 
unfair include terms 
which: 
 
 GOOGLE ‘NEST’1920 
 
UK Terms of Service 
EULA (software) 
 
 
AMAZON ‘ALEXA’1921 
 
Alexa Terms of Use  [TOU] 
Amazon.com Conditions of Use & Sale [COU]  
Amazon Device Terms of Use [DTOU]  
 
 
SAMSUNG SMART THINGS HUB 21922 
 
Samsung SmartThings Terms of Use 
 
a) allow only one 
party to avoid or 
limit the 
performance of the 
contract; 
 
 [TOU] 3.2 Functionality; Content. We do not guarantee 
that Alexa or its functionality or content … is accurate, 
reliable, or complete. 
 
Comment: this clause may mislead consumers as to 
their rights under the ACL consumer guarantees s 54 
acceptable quality and s 55 fit for purpose which are 
non-excludable: s64. It may also be unfair if for 
example, marketing and sales techniques represent 
that product accuracy. 
Preamble: Will these terms ever change? 
We reserve the right to change the Terms at any 
time… 
 
Comment: changing terms entitles them to 
avoid or limit contract performance. There is no 
equivalent right to the consumer. This clause 
enables a potential unfair term breach, 
depending upon the facts as to the nature of 
the change. 
b) allow only one 
party to terminate 
the contract; 
 
1(d) Term and Termination. At any time, Nest 
may (i) suspend or terminate your rights to 
access or use the Services, or (ii) terminate these 
Terms with respect to you if Nest in good faith 
believes that you have used the Services in 
violation of these Terms… 
 
Comment: broad unilateral termination right 
dependent upon Nest good faith “belief” 
whether that belief is fair or accurate. Right 
has low threshold- there are many violations 
which may be trivial and do not justify 
termination. No mandated accountability as to 
‘belief’. 
   SmartThings is also free to terminate (or suspend 
access to) your use of the Services or your 
account, for any reason in our discretion… 
 
Comment: Mutual termination rights exist 
(elsewhere), but Samsung’s unilateral right to 
determine breach without notice or appeal may 
be unfair. 
c) penalise only one 
party for breach or 
Preamble: IF YOU DO NOT AGREE WITH ANY 
OF THE PROVISIONS OF THESE TERMS, YOU 
[AU] 3.5 [DU d.] Termination. Your rights under this 
Agreement will automatically terminate without notice if 
Will these Terms ever change? 
                                                          
1920 The Nest website lists 15 legal ‘documents’, including those reviewed. Terms cover: Learning Thermostat™, Protect: Smoke + Carbon Monoxide™ Alarm, Cam™, Dropcam™, Works with Nest™, 
MyEnergy™, and ‘other products’. 
1921 Alexa has 9 sets of potentially-relevant terms covering Amazon's Alexa voice services, which “includes Third Party Services, digital content, Software, the Amazon Alexa App, and support and other related 
services.” The UK terms were reviewed: <https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201566380>   
1922 Samsung has 9 sets of potentially-relevant terms. 
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termination of the 
contract; 
 
SHOULD … CEASE ACCESSING OR USING 
THE SERVICES… 
 
2(b) (b) Automatic Software Updates…. You 
consent to this automatic update. If you do not 
want such Updates, your remedy is to terminate 
your Account and stop using the Services and the 
Product 
 
Comment: limited remedy without refund may 
‘penalise’ consumer for termination of the 
contract, so operates as a disincentive to 
termination. Note however that product 
updates- especially as to home hubs – are an 
important security requirement so in the 
public interest. 
you fail to comply with any of its terms… Amazon may 
immediately revoke your access to Alexa without refund 
of any fees… 
 
Comment: there is no criteria to determine ‘failure’, 
no limit to important terms only nor any requirement 
that a consumer be notified. There is no equivalent 
penalty (refund of fees) should Amazon breach 
terms. Also, no reference to a consumer retrieving 
their (personally valuable) data which may be lost if 
the Service is immediately revoked, which denies 
portability. 
 
If you don't agree with the new Terms, you are free 
to reject them; unfortunately, that means you will 
no longer be able to use the Services. 
 
Comment: No overt termination penalty (in the 
technical sense) but practically penalises 
consumers if their device (or home system) is 
useless without services, so they lack 
bargaining power to reject. No direct court 
authority on that question; but e.g. traditional 
approaches may include where the consumer 
must pay a sum, regardless of who terminates.  
d) allow only one 
party to vary the 
contract; 
 
13 (a) Changes to these Terms. Nest reserves 
the right to make changes to these Terms. We'll 
post notice of modifications to these Terms on 
this page. You should ensure that you have read 
and agree with our most recent Terms when you 
use the Services. Continued use of the Services 
following notice of such changes shall indicate 
your acknowledgment of such changes and 
agreement to be bound by the revised Terms. 
 
Comment: unilateral variation rights plus low 
level notice to consumers. It is arguably unfair 
to expect consumers to check the website for 
changes and imposes a grey area as to which 
terms apply where consumers reasonably 
have not yet ‘seen’ a notice online. 
[TOU] 3.3 Changes to Alexa; Amendments. We may 
change, suspend, or discontinue Alexa, or any part of it, 
at any time. We may amend any of this Agreement's 
terms at our sole discretion by posting the revised terms 
on the Amazon.co.uk website. You will be subject to the 
terms of this Agreement in force at the time you use 
Alexa. 
[DTOU] General c. Changes to Services; 
Amendments. [as above except ‘the Services’ in lieu of 
Alexa] 
 
Comment: unilateral variation rights plus low level 
notice to consumers. It is arguably unfair to expect 
consumers to check the website for changes and 
imposes a grey area as to which terms apply where 
consumers reasonably have not yet ‘seen’ a notice 
online. 
 
[CU] 15. [COS 9] ALTERATIONS TO SERVICE OR 
AMENDMENTS TO THE CONDITIONS OF USE 
We reserve the right to make changes to any Amazon 
Services, policies, terms and conditions … at any time. 
You will be subject to the terms and conditions, policies 
Will these Terms ever change? …We reserve 
the right to change the Terms at any time, but if we 
do, we will bring it to your attention by placing a 
notice on the Services and/or by sending you an 
email… 
If you don't agree with the new Terms, you are free 
to reject them; unfortunately, that means you will 
no longer be able to use the Services. If you use 
the Services in any way after a change to the 
Terms is effective, that means you agree to all of 
the changes. 
… no other amendment or modification …. will be 
effective unless in writing and signed by both you 
and us. 
 
Comment: unilateral variation rights plus low 
level notice to consumers. Unclear when which 
form of notice applies. No remedy if consumers 
reject a change. 
 
Does SmartThings cost anything?... 
SmartThings reserves the right to change its price 
list and to institute new charges at any time, upon 
ten (10) days prior notice to you, …by email or 
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and Conditions of Use in force at the time that you use 
the Amazon Services… 
 
Comment: as above. Use does not equate to 
acceptance if consumers are unaware of a change, 
so this clause is potentially unfair, especially as it 
does not prescribe notice or offer remedy where the 
consumer does not accept the change. 
 
posted on the Services. Use of the Services by you 
following such notification constitutes your 
acceptance... 
 
Comment: While the ACL s 24 does not apply 
to the ‘upfront price payable’, this clause 
allows for subsequent new charges or changes 
on short notice. Use may be an unfair form of 
acceptance unless notice is very clear. 
Question where consumers are no longer able 
to use their devices due to unreasonable “new 
charges” on little notice – this could be unfair. 
 
e) allow only one 
party to vary the … 
characteristics of the 
goods or 
services to be 
supplied … under 
the contract; 
 
3(i) Modification. Nest reserves the right, at any 
time, to modify, suspend, or discontinue the 
Services or any part thereof with or without 
notice. You agree that Nest will not be liable to 
you or to any third party… 
Comment: This confers unfettered rights 
upon Nest and may be unfair insofar as there 
is no apparent notice requirement or 
restriction upon their capacity to modify, 
suspend or discontinue the Services. This 
may leave consumers with a useless device, 
or one so changed from that which they 
purchased as to be a different product. 
Depending upon the facts, this is likely to be 
unfair. 
[CU] As above. 
 
 
As above. 
 
 
 
g) allow only one 
party to vary the 
upfront price 
payable under the 
contract without the 
right of the 
counterparty to 
terminate the 
contract; 
 
(d) Temporary Suspension. The Services may 
be suspended temporarily without notice for 
security reasons, system failure, maintenance 
and repair, or other circumstances. You agree 
that you will not be entitled to any refund or 
rebate for such suspensions. Nest does not offer 
any specific uptime guarantee for the Services. 
 
Comment: This may be unfair, particularly as 
the decision to terminate can only be 
exercised once the length of suspension is 
known. Note however, consumers (largely) 
[CU] as above 
Comment: as above 
Does SmartThings cost anything?... 
SmartThings reserves the right to change its price 
list and to institute new charges at any time, upon 
ten (10) days prior notice to you, …by email or 
posted on the Services. Use of the Services by you 
following such notification constitutes your 
acceptance... 
 
Comment: While the ACL s 24 does not apply 
to the ‘upfront price payable’, this clause 
allows for subsequent new charges or changes 
on short notice. Use may be an unfair form of 
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tolerate internet dropouts, usually without 
recompense, so query if this clause would be 
challenged. 
acceptance unless notice is very clear. 
Question where consumers are no longer able 
to use their devices due to unreasonable “new 
charges” on little notice – this could be unfair. 
h) allow one party to 
unilaterally 
determine whether 
the contract has 
been breached or to 
interpret its 
meaning; 
 [TOU] 3.5 Termination. Your rights under this 
Agreement will automatically terminate without notice if 
you fail to comply with any of its terms. In case of such 
termination, Amazon may immediately revoke your 
access to Alexa without refund of any fees… 
 
Comment: as stated above. Also, note there is no 
criteria to determined failure to comply nor gradation 
as to serious breach or minor breach, which may be 
unfair given the punitive consequence. 
What if I want to stop using the Services?… 
SmartThings has the sole right to decide whether 
you are in violation of any of the restrictions set 
forth in these Terms. 
 
Comment: unilateral determination lacks 
reasonable criteria and may be exercised in a 
manner which renders reliance upon this 
clause unfair. 
i) limit one party’s 
vicarious liability 
for its agents; 
 
2(c) Nest is not responsible for your use of any 
Third Party Product or Service or any personal 
injury, death, property damage (including, without 
limitation, to your home), or other harm or losses 
arising from or relating to your use of any Third 
Party Products or Services. 
 
5(d) Nest is not responsible for your use of any 
Third Party Product or Service or any personal 
injury, death, property damage (including, without 
limitation, to your home), interruption of service, 
downtime, data loss, or other harm or losses 
arising from or relating to your use of any Third 
Party Products or Services. 
 
Comment: third parties are not necessarily 
agents but the ACL may view them as such 
where Nest marketing promotes and 
recommends ‘Works with Nest’ products to 
create that perception. Then the exclusion 
may be unfair. Note given the careful legal 
contracts surrounding the Works programme, 
it is unlikely such an argument would 
succeed. 
 
[TOU] 2.2 Third Party Alexa Enabled Products. Alexa 
Enabled Products include third party products that 
Amazon does not manufacture or develop. Amazon has 
no responsibility or liability for such products. 
 
Comment: as per Nest. 
 
You agree that SmartThings shall not be 
responsible or liable for any loss or damage of any 
sort incurred as the result of any such [third party] 
dealings. 
 
Indemnity. You agree to indemnify and hold 
SmartThings, its affiliates, officers, agents, 
employees, and partners harmless for and against 
any and all claims, liabilities, damages (actual and 
consequential), losses and expenses (including 
attorneys' fees) arising from or in any way related 
to any third party claims relating to (a) your use of 
the Services…, and (b) your violation of these 
Terms… 
 
Comment: Very broad clause which imposes 
an indemnity without tying it to consumer fault. 
No reciprocity or mutual indemnities suggest 
this clause may be found to be unfair in the 
right factual circumstances. 
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j) allow one party to 
assign the contract 
to the 
counterparty’s 
detriment without 
the counterparty’s 
consent; 
(f) Assignment. These Terms … may not be 
assigned or otherwise transferred by you without 
Nest’s prior written consent. These Terms may be 
assigned by Nest without restriction. 
 
Comment: clear potential breach which seems 
to lack justification and evidence inequality of 
bargaining power. 
 Assignment. You may not assign, delegate or 
transfer these Terms or your rights or obligations 
hereunder … We may transfer, assign, or delegate 
these Terms and our rights and obligations without 
consent. 
 
Comment: The question is whether ‘detriment’ 
can be demonstrated; this is unlikely unless for 
example, Samsung sold the business to a 
competitor (who without compensation, bricks 
their system).   
k) limit one party’s 
rights to sue 
another party; 
 
4(g) The Services provide you with information 
(“Product Information”) regarding the Products in 
your home and their connection with other 
products and services. All Product Information is 
provided “as is” and “as available”. We cannot 
guarantee that it is correct or up to date. 
 
4(h) You acknowledge that all Content accessed 
by you using the Services is at your own risk and 
you will be solely responsible for any damage or 
loss to any party resulting therefrom… you 
hereby release us from all liability for you having 
acquired or not acquired Content through the 
Services. 
 
Comment: the application of these clauses in 
the event of (e.g.) a fire where alarms are 
controlled through Nest may be unfair – given 
the product representations and marketing. 
 
5(h) Release Regarding Third Parties. Nest is 
not responsible for third parties or their products 
and services, including, without limitation, the App 
Stores, Third-Party Products and Services, Third-
Party Sites, Referred Vendors, Equipment, ISP 
and Operators. Nest hereby disclaims, and you 
hereby discharge, waive and release Nest and its 
licensors and suppliers from any past, present 
and future claims, liabilities and damages, known 
[TOU] 3.7 Exclusion of Liability. Without limiting the 
exclusion of liability in the Amazon.co.uk Conditions of 
Use and Sale, our or our licensor’s aggregate liability to 
you for compensation under this Agreement with respect 
to any claim (in addition to any rights to obtain a repair, 
replacement or refund via your statutory rights) will not 
exceed fifty pounds sterling (£50.00). Nothing in this 
paragraph affects your statutory rights as a consumer or 
any liability for death, personal injury, or fraud. 
 
Comment: assuming this were modified to meet the 
ACL s 64 as to non-exclusion of the consumer 
guarantees, then this clause is acceptable, unless 
the link other limitations clauses is regarded as 
lacking in transparency or otherwise ‘unfair’ given 
consumers may have difficulty reconciling the two. 
 
[DTOU] General e. Applicable Law. Any dispute or 
claim arising from or relating to this Agreement, an 
Amazon Device, the Software, the Digital Content, or the 
Services is subject to the Applicable Law, liability and all 
other terms in the Amazon.co.uk Conditions of Use. You 
agree to those terms by entering into this Agreement, or 
using an Amazon Device or the Services. 
 
Comment: again, referral reduces clarity and may 
expect too much of consumers to cross reference 
multiple contracts and to adduce what applies in 
which priority. 
What else do I need to know? 
Warranty Disclaimer… THE SERVICES (AND 
ALL PRODUCTS, SOFTWARE, SERVICES, 
INFORMATION AND CONTENT) ARE PROVIDED 
ON AN "AS-IS" BASIS, WITHOUT WARRANTIES 
OR ANY KIND, EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, 
INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, IMPLIED 
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY, 
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, NON-
INFRINGEMENT, OR THAT USE OF THE 
FOREGOING WILL BE UNINTERRUPTED OR 
ERROR-FREE. SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW 
LIMITATIONS ON HOW LONG AN IMPLIED 
WARRANTY LASTS, SO THE ABOVE 
LIMITATIONS MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. 
 
Comment: may breach ACL s 64 as to non-
excludable consumer guarantees and remedies 
of repair, replacement or refund depending 
upon whether a failure is major or minor. This 
may mislead consumers into thinking 
otherwise. Query whether the underlined 
portion (my emphasis) overrides the dominant 
impression of the bulk of the text, as well as 
whether these carve outs adequately or fairly 
inform consumers or may mislead or deceive 
them - this may go to fairness. (Note UK clause 
terminology ‘implied warranty’ is relevant to 
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or unknown, arising out of or relating to your 
interactions with such third parties and their 
products and services. … 
 
Comment: this broad release may mislead 
and deceive consumers as to their rights 
under the ACL, or be unfair under s 24 as too 
broad, especially as Nest ‘recommends’ 
certain products and suppliers. 
 
7. Indemnity 
You agree to defend, indemnify and hold Nest 
and its licensors and suppliers harmless from any 
damages, liabilities, claims or demands (including 
costs and attorneys’ fees) made by any third 
party due to or arising out of (i) your use and 
each Authorized User’s use of the Products or 
Services, (ii) your or your Authorized Users’ 
violation of these Terms, (iii) any User 
Submissions or Feedback you provide; or (iv) 
your or your Authorized Users’ violation of any 
law or the rights of any third party.  
 
Comment: excessively broad indemnity 
against third party claims (regardless of 
consumer control over them) may be unfair.  
 
8. Warranty Disclaimers 
(a) … 
(b) THE SERVICES ARE PROVIDED FOR 
YOUR CONVENIENCE, “AS IS” AND “AS 
AVAILABLE” AND NEST AND OUR LICENSORS 
AND SUPPLIERS EXPRESSLY DISCLAIM ANY 
WARRANTIES AND CONDITIONS OF ANY 
KIND, WHETHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, 
INCLUDING THE WARRANTIES OR 
CONDITIONS OF MERCHANTABILITY, 
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, 
ACCURACY, AND NON-INFRINGEMENT. 
 
[DTOU] General  
f. Exclusion of Liability. Without limiting the exclusion 
of liability in the Amazon.co.uk Conditions of Use, (1) 
unless otherwise provided by Amazon, your Amazon 
Device may be subject to a limited warranty (in addition 
to any rights to obtain a repair, replacement or refund via 
your statutory rights); and (2) our or our licensor’s 
aggregate liability to you for compensation under this 
agreement with respect to any claim (in addition to any 
rights to obtain a repair, replacement or refund via your 
statutory rights) will not exceed the greater of fifty pounds 
sterling (£50.00) and the amount you paid for your 
Amazon Device. Nothing in this paragraph affects your 
statutory rights as a consumer or any liability for death, 
personal injury, or fraud. 
 
Comment: clear as to ACL s 64 but again cross 
referral to another agreement diminishes clarity. Best 
practice would suggest a link to an explanation of 
consumer’s statutory rights (which is on the website 
but not linked) 
 
[COUS] 13. Our Liability … Amazon will not be 
responsible for (i) losses that were not caused by any 
breach on our part, or (ii) any business loss (including 
loss of profits, revenue, contracts, anticipated savings, 
data, goodwill or wasted expenditure), or (iii) any indirect 
or consequential losses that were not foreseeable to both 
you and us when you commenced using the Amazon 
Services.  
 
We will not be held responsible for any delay or failure to 
comply with our obligations under these conditions if the 
delay or failure arises from any cause which is beyond 
our reasonable control. This condition does not affect 
your legal right to have goods sent or services provided 
within a reasonable time or to receive a refund if goods 
or services ordered cannot be supplied within a 
Australian common law but not ACL statutory 
guarantees.)  
 
Limitation of Liability. TO THE FULLEST 
EXTENT ALLOWED BY APPLICABLE LAW, 
UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES AND UNDER NO 
LEGAL THEORY (INCLUDING, WITHOUT 
LIMITATION, TORT, CONTRACT, STRICT 
LIABILITY, OR OTHERWISE) SHALL 
SMARTTHINGS BE LIABLE TO YOU OR TO ANY 
OTHER PERSON FOR (A) ANY INDIRECT, 
SPECIAL, INCIDENTAL, OR CONSEQUENTIAL 
DAMAGES OF ANY KIND, INCLUDING 
DAMAGES FOR LOST PROFITS, LOSS OF 
GOODWILL, WORK STOPPAGE, ACCURACY OF 
RESULTS, OR FAILURE OR MALFUNCTION OF 
ANY DEVICE CONNECTED TO THE SERVICES, 
OR (B) ANY AMOUNT, IN THE AGGREGATE, IN 
EXCESS OF THE GREATER OF (I) $100 OR (II) 
THE AMOUNTS PAID BY YOU TO 
SMARTTHINGS IN CONNECTION WITH THE 
SERVICES IN THE TWELVE (12) MONTH 
PERIOD PRECEDING THIS APPLICABLE CLAIM, 
OR (III) ANY MATTER BEYOND OUR 
REASONABLE CONTROL. SOME STATES DO 
NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION 
OF CERTAIN DAMAGES, SO THE ABOVE 
LIMITATION AND EXCLUSIONS MAY NOT 
APPLY TO YOU. 
 
Comment: as above. 
 
Risk of Loss; Insurance. YOU ACKNOWLEDGE 
AND AGREE THAT YOUR USE OF THE 
SERVICES (INCLUDING, WITHOUT LIMITATION, 
USING THE SERVICES TO SECURE OR 
OTHERWISE CONTROL ACCESS TO ANY REAL 
OR PERSONAL PROPERTY) IS SOLELY AT 
YOUR OWN RISK, AND THAT YOU ACCEPT 
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(c) NEST AND OUR LICENSORS AND 
SUPPLIERS MAKE NO WARRANTY THAT 
DEFECTS WILL BE CORRECTED OR THAT 
THE SERVICES: (I) WILL MEET YOUR 
REQUIREMENTS; (II) WILL BE COMPATIBLE 
WITH YOUR HOME NETWORK, COMPUTER 
OR MOBILE DEVICE; (III) WILL BE AVAILABLE 
ON AN UNINTERRUPTED, TIMELY, SECURE, 
OR ERROR-FREE BASIS; OR (IV) WILL BE 
ACCURATE OR RELIABLE. NO ADVICE OR 
INFORMATION, WHETHER ORAL OR 
WRITTEN, OBTAINED BY YOU FROM NEST 
OR THOUGH THE SERVICES SHALL CREATE 
ANY WARRANTY. 
 
Comment: clauses may breach ACL s 64 as to 
non-excludable consumer guarantees. The 
ACL guarantees entitle consumers to a repair, 
replacement or refund depending upon 
whether a failure is major or minor. This may 
mislead consumers into thinking otherwise.  
… 
 
9. Limitation of Liability 
Nothing in these Terms and in particular within 
this "Limitation of Liability" clause shall attempt to 
exclude liability that cannot be excluded under 
applicable law. 
 
TO THE MAXIMUM EXTENT PERMITTED BY 
APPLICABLE LAW… IN NO EVENT WILL  
(A) NEST BE LIABLE FOR ANY INDIRECT, 
CONSEQUENTIAL, EXEMPLARY, SPECIAL, OR 
INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, INCLUDING ANY 
DAMAGES FOR LOST DATA OR LOST 
PROFITS, ARISING FROM OR RELATING TO 
THE SERVICES OR THE PRODUCTS, EVEN IF 
NEST KNEW OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF 
THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGES, AND  
reasonable time owing to a cause beyond our reasonable 
control.  
 
The laws of some countries do not allow some or all of 
the limitations described above. If these laws apply to 
you, some or all of the above limitations may not apply to 
you and you might have additional rights.  
 
Nothing in these conditions limits or excludes our 
responsibility for fraudulent representations made by us 
or for death or personal injury caused by our negligence 
or wilful misconduct. 
 
Comment: restrained limitations clause reflecting UK 
laws which carves out reasonable goods delivery 
times, refunds and contemplates Amazon 
responsibility for events within its reasonable 
control. A good example of the positive effect of 
regulation. But rather than a general reference to 
‘other laws’, specific reference should be made to 
countries whose laws differ so that consumers 
clearly understand if the clause applies or not. 
 
[TOU] 3.6 Applicable Law [COU] 14. APPLICABLE 
LAW 
These conditions are governed by and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, and the application of the United Nations 
Convention of Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods is expressly excluded. We both agree to submit to 
the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the district 
of Luxembourg City, which means that you may bring a 
claim to enforce your consumer protection rights in 
connection with these Conditions of Use in Luxembourg 
or in the EU country in which you live. The European 
Commission provides for an online dispute resolution 
platform, which you can access here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/odr/. If you would like to 
bring a matter to our attention, please contact us. 
 
RESPONSIBILITY FOR ALL LOSSES, DAMAGES 
AND EXPENSES ARISING OUT OF SUCH USE. 
 
Comment: as above. ‘Services’ are also subject 
to statutory guarantees and ‘software’ is 
defined as ‘good’ so falls subject to the 
relevant consumer guarantees for goods. 
 
EULA re Garmin Connect Mobile App™ 
No warranty 
This application is provided to you ‘as it is’ and you 
agree to use it at your own risk. Garmin makes no 
guarantees… 
Disclaimer of warranty 
GARMIN… DISCLAIM ANY WARRANTIES, 
ESPRESS OR IMPLIED, OF QUALITY, 
PERFOMANCE OR MERCHANTABILITY, 
FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE OR 
NON-INFRINGEMENT, NO ORAL OR WRITTEN 
ADVICE OR INFORMATION BY GARMIN SHALL 
CREATE A WARRANTY, AND YOU ARE NOT 
ENTITLED TO RELY UPON SUCH ADVICE OR 
INFORMATION. THIS DISCLAIMER OF 
WARRANTIES IS AN ESSENTIAL CONDITION 
OF THIS AGREEEMENT. Some regions and 
countries do not allow certain warranty exclusions, 
so to the extent the above exclusion may not apply 
to you. 
 
Disclaimer of Liability. … GARMIN AND ITS 
AFFILIATES SHALL NOT BE LIABLE TO YOU: IN 
REPSECT OF ANY CLAIM…. Some regions and 
countries do not allow certain warranty exclusions, 
so to the extent the above exclusion may not apply 
to you. 
 
Comment:  The above clauses are problematic 
potentially in terms of software as ‘goods’ and 
the non-excludable consumer guarantees. 
Whether they are fair given their breadth, the 
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(B) NEST’S TOTAL CUMULATIVE LIABILITY … 
EXCEED THE FEES ACTUALLY PAID BY YOU 
TO NEST OR NEST’S AUTHORIZED 
RESELLER FOR THE SERVICES OR THE 
PRODUCT AT ISSUE IN THE PRIOR 12 
MONTHS (IF ANY). .. 
 
Comment: Question if the oft-used lower case 
initial sentence sufficiently informs 
consumers or overrides the dominant 
impression of the capitalised sections above 
and below. Absent the Regulation 90 
statement, this may be sufficient to render 
this clause unfair as it does not sufficiently 
alert consumers to their rights. 
 
Comment: TOU 3.6 is possibly unfair by requiring 
consumers to link across to other agreements and to 
locate the relevant term, rather than stating it 
outright. The EU provision proposed seems fair 
insofar as while jurisdiction is in one country, 
consumers may bring claims in their own (EU) 
country. Best practice would require a similar clause 
as to an Australian dispute resolution service. 
emphasis of capitals, placement and the 
relative inconsequence of the carve out, is also 
an open question. 
l) restrict one party’s 
right to commence 
dispute 
proceedings 
against another 
party; 
 
Preamble: These Terms “…require the use of 
binding arbitration to resolve disputes rather than 
jury trials or class actions. Please follow the 
instructions …below if you wish to opt out of this 
provision.” … 
11. Dispute Resolution and Arbitration 
PLEASE READ THIS SECTION CAREFULLY. 
FOLLOW THE INSTRUCTIONS BELOW IF YOU 
WISH TO OPT OUT OF THE REQUIREMENT 
OF ARBITRATION ON AN INDIVIDUAL BASIS. 
11(a) Arbitration. Nest and you agree to arbitrate 
all disputes and claims that arise from or relate to 
these Terms or the Services in any way, except 
for claims arising from bodily injury…  by entering 
into this agreement, we are each waiving the right 
to a trial by jury or to participate in group litigation 
or collective procedures. 
11(f) 30-Day Opt-Out Period. If you do not wish 
to be bound by the arbitration and class-action 
waiver … you must notify Nest in writing within 30 
days of the date that you first accept these Terms 
(unless a longer period is required by applicable 
law)... Your written notification must be mailed to 
Nest … if you do not notify Nest … you agree to 
[TOU] 3.6 Applicable Law. Any dispute or claim arising 
from or relating to this Agreement, Alexa, the Amazon 
Alexa App and the Software is subject to the Applicable 
Law, liability and all other terms in the Amazon.co.uk 
Conditions of Use. You agree to those terms by entering 
into this Agreement, or using Alexa. 
 
COU] 14. APPLICABLE LAW 
These conditions are governed by and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, and the application of the United Nations 
Convention of Contracts for the International Sale of 
Goods is expressly excluded. We both agree to submit to 
the non-exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the district 
of Luxembourg City, which means that you may bring a 
claim … in Luxembourg or in the EU country in which you 
live. The European Commission provides for an online 
dispute resolution platform, which you can access here: 
http… 
 
Comment: Clause proposes a reasonable approach 
in an EU environment but Australian equivalent 
would require jurisdiction in Australia with dispute 
resolution jurisdiction available in the consumer’s 
Choice of Law; Arbitration. These Terms are 
governed by and will be construed under the laws 
of the State of California… Any dispute arising 
from or relating to the subject matter of these 
Terms shall be finally settled in San Francisco 
County, California, … by one commercial arbitrator 
…(etc.) 
… the parties consent to exclusive jurisdiction and 
venue in the state or federal courts located in, 
respectively, San Francisco County, California, or 
the Northern District of California. 
 
Comment: This (clearly US) UK clause restricts 
certain consumer access to the courts save for 
injunctive or equitable relief. The UK High 
Court has found mandatory arbitration to be 
unfair. The forum and jurisdiction clearly 
restricts Australian consumers from 
commencing proceedings for cost and 
convenience reasons.   
[403] 
be bound by… these Terms, including such 
provisions in any Terms revised after the date of 
your first acceptance… 
 
Comment: This (clearly US) UK clause 
restricts certain consumer access to the 
courts and class actions. The UK High Court 
has found mandatory arbitration to be unfair.  
Nest carve out certain types of disputes, 
retain small claims entitlements, pay certain 
costs, include local venue (US related) and 
offer a 30 day opt out in specific form. The 
question is whether their capitalised notice 
and complex opt out clause remain ‘unfair’? 
Multiple factors:  possible transparency 
issues; questions as to Nest’s legitimate 
interest; party imbalance; consumer detriment 
legal rights restriction; & US AAA jurisdiction 
is problematic, as is some confusion as to 
venue and in-person format. A best practice 
solution may be an open opt-in with a check 
box or simple link to a page for completion to 
overcome rigorous notice requirements. It 
may be fairer to use arbitration services 
within consumer jurisdiction not just a US 
process. Finally, as a practical matter, 
behavioural economics suggests that 
consumers are unlikely to opt out within 30 
days- so the time limit may seem ‘unfairly’ 
self-serving. 
state. An online dispute resolution system may be 
offered but not as the sole option. 
m) limit evidence 
counterparty can 
adduce in contract 
proceedings;  
As above.  
 
Comment: Arbitration rules and (uncertain) 
forum may restrict consumer rights to adduce 
evidence. 
 As above. 
 
Comment: Arbitration rules and (uncertain) 
forum may restrict consumer rights to adduce 
evidence. 
n) impose evidential 
burden on one party 
in proceedings re 
contract. 
As above.  
 
Comment: Arbitration rules and US forum are 
unlikely to offer consumers the advantageous 
presumptions such as those within section 
 As above. 
 
Comment: Arbitration rules and US forum are 
unlikely to offer consumers the advantageous 
presumptions such as those within section 
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 24(4) that a term is presumed not to be 
reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate 
interests of the party who is advantaged by 
the term, which in this case would be Nest’s 
burden to rebut. 
24(4) that a term is presumed not to be 
reasonably necessary to protect the legitimate 
interests of the party who is advantaged by the 
term, which in this case would be Nest’s 
burden to rebut. 
 
 
s 24(2) In determining if a term is unfair, court must take into account:  
 
 
reasonably plain 
language 
 
☺☺ 
 
☺☺ Language moderately plain though very 
complex in places 
 Very Long: 12107 words to 16308 [including 
privacy] 
Comment: 
 Multiple contracts means consumers must 
read across contracts  
 Extensive and (overly) broad & complex 
indemnities 
 Legalese 
☺☺☺ 
 
☺☺☺ Language: reasonably plain, little legalese 
 Very long: 30,940 words1923 
Comment:  
 Multiple contracts and many links means 
consumers must read across contracts and terms which 
creates complexity and reduces clarity. 
 Legalese 
  
 
 
                                      ☺☺ 
 
☺☺ Language: initially colloquial and consumer 
friendly, reverts to legalese for Samsung-significant 
terms 
Very long: 4887; to 14182 [including Service 
Terms & Privacy] 
Comment: 
 Multiple contracts means consumers must 
read across contracts and terms which creates 
complexity and reduces clarity. 
 Extensive and (overly) broad & complex 
indemnities 
 Legalese 
Legible1924  ☺☺☺ 
 
                          ☺☺☺                 ☺☺☺ 
presented 
clearly1925 
☺ 
 
☺ Contract follows conventions as to clause 
placement; clear font and use of capitals attempts 
to draw consumer’s attention to important aspects 
(though emphases may favour Nest’s over 
consumer interests) 
 BUT consumers must read across multiple 
contracts AND complexity both within and across 
these is significant.  
                         ☺ 
 
☺ ☺ Contract follows conventions as to clause 
placement; clear font, headings, clause numbers and 
each is reasonably short form. 
 BUT consumers must read across eight sets of 
terms (excluding links) AND complexity both within and 
across these is significant. Reduces clarity. 
                 ☺ 
 
☺☺☺ Contract follows usual conventions as to 
clause placement; clear font, headings, clause 
numbers. 
  BUT consumers must read across four 
contracts 
 Important terms located mid bulky text reduces 
clarity 
 
                                                          
1923 See <https://www.amazon.co.uk/gp/help/customer/display.html?nodeId=201566380> 
1924 This is usually defined to mean “clear enough to read”: Collins English Dictionary. Interestingly  
1925 While there is no authority on the point, the author infers this means form and layout (i.e. presentation) or else it would be duplicative. 
Subjective ratings key  
☺ okay       ☺☺ good         ☺☺☺ very good+   
 <okay      poor           very poor+ 
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 Important terms located mid bulky text reduces 
clarity 
readily available1926  
☺ Overseas (UK) terms online used for review 
No Australian terms online though product 
is sold in Australia 
☺☺☺ 
☺ Overseas (UK) terms online used for review 
☺ Products not officially sold in Australia yet  
☺☺☺ 
☺ Overseas (UK) terms online used for review 
☺ Products not officially sold in Australia yet  
 
Overall rating: 
 
 
☺☺ / 
 
☺☺☺/  
 
☺☺/ 
Table S1.2 Smart home selective terms review   
Source: author   
                                                          
1926 Accessible via the internet should suffice. 
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S1.2 Smart self 
 
 
Smart self: potentially applicable device terms  
 
FITBIT Charge 2 Band1927 
 
MILO Champions band 
 
GARMIN Vivomove 
 
 Contract:1928 
Fitbit Website Terms and Conditions*1929 (TOS) 
Privacy Policy1930 
Product care;  
Safety instructions  
Cookie policy 
Wellness Community Pledge Premium Membership Terms and 
Conditions  
Community Guidelines 
Terms of Sale 
Returns and Warranty 
Copyright Policy  
Feedback and Submission Policy 
 
Contract: 
Terms and conditions of Sale1931* 
Milo Champions App v 3.31932* 
Condensed Privacy Policy** 
Full Privacy Policy**  
Nestle Website Disclaimer1933  
FAQs 
 
**Discussed in Ch. 5 
 
Contracts:  
Terms of Use1934* 
Garmin Connect App1935* 
Garmin Important Safety and product information (2016) & Owner’s 
Manual1936 
Privacy Policy1937 
 
Table S1.3 Smart self: potentially applicable device terms   
Source: author 
                                                          
Important Reader Note: All comments on these terms are illustrative only and do not imply contravention of the ACL. Terms cited are included for discussion purposes and are not necessarily or 
impliedly in breach of the provisions against which they are tabulated. Versions used are best available but may not apply to the Australian market. Not all products cited are yet sold in Australia. 
Terms quoted are copyright their respective owners. 
1927 Derived randomly from Amazon Best Sellers, <https://www.amazon.com/Best-Sellers-Sports-Outdoors-Fitness-Trackers/zgbs/sporting-goods/5393958011> Note Fitbit Alta came third but is not included as its 
terms are the same as those for the Charge 2. 
1928 Fitbit’s Legal Policy page <https://www.fitbit.com/au/legal> 
1929 https://www.fitbit.com/au/legal/terms-of-service Last update 22 Oct 2015. 
1930 https://www.fitbit.com/au/legal/privacy 
1931 <https://shop.milo.com.au/terms-conditions> 
1932 https://app.milo.com.au/champ-squad; in Itunes linked to <https://itunes.apple.com/au/app/milo-champions-anz/id1049268402> 
1933 http://www.nestle.com.au/info/disclaimer 
1934 http://www.garmin.com/en-AU/legal/terms-of-use (updated 3 Apr 2014) 
1935 https://connect.garmin.com/en-US/privacy> Note there is a privacy statement on the Au website but it refers users of Garmin Connect App to this US policy in lieu. 
1936 These appear online here: https://support.garmin.com/support/manuals/searchManuals.faces?refresh=true> Note the device box contains the Information but not the Manual which is here: 
http://static.garmin.com/pumac/vivomove_OM_EN.pdf 
1937 Privacy Statement is here: <http://www.garmin.com/en-AU/legal/privacy-statement> but a link in this directs users of Garmin Connect products to this document: <https://connect.garmin.com/en-US/privacy> 
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Smart self: selective terms review 
 
ACL SECTION 24 
Examples of terms 
that are likely to be 
unfair include terms 
which: 
FITBIT Charge 2 Band 
 
Fitbit Website Terms and Conditions (TOS) 
Privacy Policy 
 
MILO Champions band 
 
Terms and conditions of Sale 
Milo Champions App v 3.3 
 
 
GARMIN Vivomove 
Terms of Use 
Garmin Connect App 
Garmin Important Safety and product information 
(2016) & Owner’s Manual 
 
 
a) allow only one 
party to avoid or 
limit the 
performance of 
the contract; 
 
TOS. Changes to the Fitbit Service. Fitbit may change or 
discontinue, temporarily or permanently, any feature or 
component of the Fitbit Service at any time without notice. 
Fitbit is not liable to you or to any third party for any 
modification, suspension or discontinuance of any feature or 
component of the Fitbit Service.  
 
Comment: unilateral variation of contract without 
reference to customer right to terminate. [Note however 
customers may terminate through ceasing device use 
at any time, but are left with a redundant product, and 
may not have retrieved data for portability purposes] 
 
APP 8. Termination … Nestle also reserves the right to stop 
supporting the App and may terminate use of it at any time 
without giving notice to you. 
 
Comment: consumers who buy the fitness band want the 
App analytics; cessation of support or Service by Nestle 
avoids or limits contract performance as analytics and 
stored data history are a part of the services integral to 
the device purchase. Arguably, the App should be 
available for a reasonable period, perhaps consistent 
with the reasonable device life cycle (by analogy to 
ACL’s spare parts requirements). Failure to do so may 
lead to an action under ACL section 18 such that any 
inconsistent term enabling App termination might in that 
context, be found to be unfair. 
TOU Accounts 
 
…We may suspend or terminate your account and 
your ability to use any Garmin Site or portion thereof 
for failure to comply with these Terms of Use or any 
special terms related to a particular service. 
 
Comment: suspicion of account may limit 
Garmin’s performance of its contract as to 
provision of the App services. As the basis for 
suspension is so broad (even for minor breach) 
this term may be unfair in certain circumstances. 
b) allow only one 
party to terminate 
the contract; 
   As above. TOU as above. 
 
Comment: No criteria are provided as to the 
determination which may render the clause unfair 
in certain factual situations. 
c) penalise only 
one party for 
breach or 
termination of the 
contract; 
Termination 
If you violate these Terms, we reserve the right to 
deactivate your account or terminate these Terms, at our 
sole discretion, at any time and without notice or liability to 
you. Upon any such termination, we may delete Your 
Content and other information related to your account. 
 
Comment: there is no equivalent provision should Fitbit 
breach or terminate the contract – save for the 
consumer’s right to cancel their account. 
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d) allow only one 
party to vary the 
contract; 
 
These Terms May Change 
These Terms will change over time. If we make minor 
changes to the Terms without materially changing your 
rights, we will post the modified Terms on www.fitbit.com. 
We will notify you by email, through the Fitbit Service, or by 
presenting you with a new Terms of Service to accept if we 
make a modification that materially changes your rights. 
 
Comment: unilateral as to changes. Unilateral 
determination as to “materiality” and therefore whether 
notified directly to consumers or otherwise 
APP TERMS  
7. Changes Nestle reserves the right to make changes to 
these terms of use. Please refer to this page from time to 
time to review these terms of use and any new information. 
TOU …We may suspend or terminate your account 
and your ability to use any Garmin Site or portion 
thereof for failure to comply with these Terms of Use 
or any special terms related to a particular service. 
 
 
e) allow only one 
party to vary the 
… characteristics 
of the goods or 
services to be 
supplied … under 
the contract; 
 
Changes To The Fitbit Service 
Fitbit may change or discontinue, temporarily or 
permanently, any feature or component of the Fitbit Service 
at any time without notice. Fitbit is not liable to you or to any 
third party for any modification, suspension or 
discontinuance of any feature or component of the Fitbit 
Service.  
 
Comment: unilateral variation of contract without 
reference to customer right to terminate. [Note however 
customers may terminate through ceasing device use 
at any time, but are left with a redundant product, and 
may not have retrieved data for portability purposes] 
 
 
 
 
TOU Garmin's Liability 
… Garmin makes no representations or warranties 
about the accuracy, reliability, completeness, or 
timeliness of the Content or about the results to be 
obtained from using the Garmin Sites and the 
Content. Any use of the Garmin Sites and the 
Content is at your own risk. Changes are periodically 
made to Garmin Sites and may be made at any time. 
h) allow one party 
to unilaterally 
determine 
whether the 
contract has been 
breached or to 
interpret its 
meaning; 
 
See (d) above 
 
We reserve the right (but are not required) to remove or 
disable access to the Fitbit Service, any Fitbit Content, or 
Your Content at any time and without notice, and at our sole 
discretion, if we determine that the Fitbit Content, Your 
Content, or your use of the Fitbit Service is objectionable or 
in violation of these Terms.  
 
Comment: unilateral determination permitted at any 
time, without notice and Fitbit determine standard as to 
breach by “objectionable” use. This may be unfair 
depending upon how it is applied on given facts. 
 
It is Fitbit’s policy to terminate in appropriate circumstances 
account holders who repeatedly infringe the rights of 
copyright holders. 
 
 TOU Accounts 
 
…We may suspend or terminate your account and 
your ability to use any Garmin Site or portion thereof 
for failure to comply with these Terms of Use or any 
special terms related to a particular service. 
 
Comment: unilateral determination permitted at 
any time, without notice and Garmin (it seems) 
determine standard as to breach of their Terms, 
without criteria or notice requirements. This may 
be unfair depending upon how it is applied on 
given facts. 
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Comment: there is no consultation or appeals process; 
Fitbit is the sole determinant. This may be unfair 
depending upon how it is applied on given facts. 
 
If you violate these Terms, we reserve the right to 
deactivate your account or terminate these Terms, at our 
sole discretion, at any time and without notice or liability to 
you. Upon any such termination, we may delete Your 
Content and other information related to your account… 
 
Comment: unilateral determination as to “violation’ and 
potentially unreasonable right to delete account 
information without a right for consumers to retrieve 
data. This may be unfair depending upon how it is 
applied on given facts. 
i) limit one party’s 
vicarious liability 
for its agents; 
  TOU Garmin's Liability 
… Some Content on the Garmin Sites may be 
provided by third parties and Garmin will not be held 
responsible for any such Content provided by third 
parties. 
 
Comment: are these entities agents at law – may 
depend on the facts. 
 
j) allow one party 
to assign the 
contract to the 
counterparty’s 
detriment without 
the 
counterparty’s 
consent; 
General Terms … You may not assign or transfer these 
Terms, by operation of law or otherwise, without Fitbit’s 
prior written consent. Any attempt by you to assign or 
transfer these Terms, without such consent, will be null. 
Fitbit may freely assign or transfer these Terms without 
restriction. 
 
Comment: this clause clearly enables such an 
assignment, by unilateral right favouring Fitbit.  
 
  
k) limit one 
party’s rights to 
sue another 
party; 
 
We are not responsible for the accuracy, reliability, 
effectiveness, or correct use of information you receive 
through the Fitbit Service…If you rely on any Fitbit Content 
or the Fitbit Service, you do so solely at your own risk. 
 
Comment: seeks to limit consumer rights to sue where 
the device is inaccurate, unreliable or ineffective. May 
potential breach the consumer guarantee non-
exclusion under s. 64 
 
APP 5. Liability While Nestle uses all reasonable efforts to 
ensure the accuracy of materials on our App and to avoid 
disruptions, we are not responsible for inaccurate 
information, disruptions, discontinuance of other events 
which may cause you damage, either direct (e.g. computer 
failure) or indirect (e.g. loss of profit). Any reliance upon 
materials on this App shall be at your own risk… 
 
Comment: this clause attempts to exclude liability which 
may potentially conflict with the ACL obligations as to 
TOU Use of Content 
… UNLESS OTHERWISE SPECIFICALLY AND 
EXPRESSLY STATED ELSEWHERE, GARMIN 
HEREBY DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES WITH  
REGARD TO THE SOFTWARE, INCLUDING 
WITHOUT LIMITATION ALL WARRANTIES OF 
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A 
PARTICULAR PURPOSE, TITLE AND NON-
INFRINGEMENT, WHETHER SUCH WARRANTIES 
ARE EXPRESS, IMPLIED OR STATUTORY… (etc.) 
[410] 
You acknowledge sole responsibility and assume all risk 
arising from your use of any Third-Party Services. 
 
Comment: while commonplace, this clause may not 
apply if ACL s. 18 is breached where the provider may 
be recommending the services.  
 
Disclaimers 
THE FITBIT SERVICE AND FITBIT CONTENT ARE 
PROVIDED “AS IS,” WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY 
KIND. WITHOUT LIMITING THE FOREGOING, WE 
EXPLICITLY DISCLAIM ANY WARRANTIES OF 
MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR 
PURPOSE, QUIET ENJOYMENT OR NON-
INFRINGEMENT, AND ANY WARRANTIES ARISING OUT 
OF COURSE OF DEALING OR USAGE OF TRADE. We 
make no warranty that the Fitbit Service or Fitbit Content 
will meet your requirements or be available on an 
uninterrupted, secure, or error-free basis. We make no 
warranty regarding the quality, accuracy, timeliness, 
truthfulness, completeness or reliability of the Fitbit Service 
or any Fitbit Content. You acknowledge and agree that if 
you rely on any Fitbit Content or the Fitbit Service, you do 
so solely at your own risk. 
 
Comment: this clause may breach ACL section 64 as to 
non-exclusion of consumer guarantees. It may also 
infringe ACL sections 18 and 29 if the product 
marketing (etc.) conveys a different impression to 
consumers as to product performance. 
 
Indemnity 
You will indemnify and hold harmless Fitbit and its officers, 
directors, employees and agents, from and against any 
claims, disputes, demands, liabilities, damages, losses, and 
costs and expenses, including, without limitation, 
reasonable attorneys’ fees arising out of or in any way 
connected with (i) your access to or use of the Fitbit 
Service, (ii) Your Content, or (iii) your breach of any 
warranties made by you hereunder or your violation of any 
other provision of these Terms. We reserve the right to 
assume control of the defense of any third-party claim that 
is subject to indemnification by you, in which event you will 
cooperate with us in asserting any available defenses. 
software being fit for purpose and of acceptable quality. 
Query whether the overall product marketing and 
representations align to the product “Purpose” clause 1: 
“The App is intended to impart information of a general 
nature only and all calculations are approximate’. In that 
context liability exclusions as to accuracy seem 
reasonable- unless overall impressions created 
elsewhere in marketing, etc. override that., rendering it 
potentially an unfair term and also, in breach of sections 
18 and 29 (quality standard etc.). 
 
MILO Sale Terms:  
8.1 [Regulation 90 statement] 
 
8.2 To the extent permitted by law, Nestlé’s only liability is as 
expressly stated in these terms and in the Australian 
Consumer Law and all other guarantees, warranties and 
conditions are excluded. 
 
8.3 To the extent permitted by law, then except as provided 
under the Australian Consumer Law, Nestlé will not be liable 
to you (whether in contract, tort, or otherwise) for any 
consequential, special, incidental or indirect loss or damage 
including loss of profit. 
 
Comment: these terms reflect ACL rights, exclude any 
other warranty & perhaps evidence the efficacy of 
legislation to compel compliance. 
 
9. INDEMNITY 
9.1 You indemnify and must keep Nestlé, its officers, 
employees and agents indemnified against all reasonable 
damages, losses, costs and expenses suffered by them 
arising out of any breach by you of these terms or arising out 
of your use, possession or sale of the Goods or Services, or 
the use, possession or sale of the Goods or Services by 
someone with your authority or permission. 
… 
10.7 These terms are governed by and must be construed in 
accordance with the laws of New South Wales. 
 
Comment: as these terms also apply to NZ consumers, 
this clause may limit NZ rights to sue based upon cost 
and inconvenience, and so be unfair.  
…. IF ANY OF THE ABOVE PROVISIONS ARE 
VOID UNDER APPLICABLE LAW, GARMIN'S 
LIABILITY SHALL BE LIMITED TO THE FULL 
EXTENT PERMITTED BY LAW. 
(author emphasis) 
 
Comment: The presentation and placement of the 
underlined portion may obscure its impact and is 
not transparent, especially after provisions which 
may mislead consumers as to the existence and 
effect of non-excludable consumer guarantees s 
64 as to ‘software’ which is a defined ‘good’. Reg 
90 para does not appear to clarify Australian 
rights. 
 
  
TOU Garmin's Liability 
Garmin makes no representations or warranties 
about the accuracy, reliability, completeness, or 
timeliness of the Content or about the results to be 
obtained from using the Garmin Sites and the 
Content. Any use of the Garmin Sites and the 
Content is at your own risk. … THE GARMIN SITES 
AND CONTENT ARE PROVIDED ON AN 'AS IS' 
BASIS WITHOUT ANY WARRANTIES OF ANY 
KIND. GARMIN, TO THE FULLEST EXTENT 
PERMITTED BY LAW, DISCLAIMS ALL 
WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED 
TO, THE WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY, 
NON-INFRINGEMENT OF PROPRIETARY OR 
THIRD PARTY RIGHTS, AND THE WARRANTY OF 
FITNESS FOR PARTICULAR PURPOSE. 
Disclaimer of Certain Damages 
Your use of the Garmin Sites is at your own risk. If 
you are dissatisfied with any of the Content or other 
contents of the Garmin Sites or with these Terms and 
Conditions, your sole remedy is to discontinue use of 
the Garmin Sites. IN NO EVENT WILL GARMIN OR 
ANY THIRD PARTIES MENTIONED AT THE 
GARMIN SITES BE LIABLE FOR ANY DAMAGES 
WHATSOEVER … SOME STATES DO NOT ALLOW 
THE EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF INCIDENTAL 
OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, SO THE ABOVE 
LIMITATION OR EXCLUSION MAY NOT APPLY TO 
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Comment: broad indemnity applies to consumer 
warranties even where Fitbit disclaim their (statutory) 
warranties.  
 
Limitation of Liability 
…SOME JURISDICTIONS DO NOT ALLOW THE 
EXCLUSION OR LIMITATION OF LIABILITY FOR 
CONSEQUENTIAL OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES, SO THE 
ABOVE LIMITATION MAY NOT APPLY TO YOU. 
 
Comment: above clause appears after an extensive 
limitation clause in capitals, merges into the text and is 
not transparent as to whether it applies. As these terms 
appear on the Australia website, they should not 
mislead consumers as to the applicable law or confuse 
them as to what applies. 
 
YOU, IN WHICH CASE SUCH EXCLUSION OR 
LIMITATION APPLIES TO THE FULLEST EXTENT 
ALLOWABLE UNDER THE APPLICABLE LAW. 
(author emphasis) 
 
Comment: The presentation and placement of the 
underlined portion may obscure its impact and is 
not transparent, especially after provisions which 
may mislead consumers as to the existence and 
effect of non-excludable consumer guarantees s 
64 
 
TOU Indemnity 
You agree to defend, indemnify, and hold harmless 
Garmin, its officers, directors, employees and agents, 
from and against any claims, actions or demands, 
including without limitation reasonable legal and 
accounting fees, alleging or resulting from your 
breach of these Terms of Use. 
 
DEVICE BOOKLET July 2016 
Limited Warranty1938 
One Year Consumer Products Limited Warranty 
 
Our goods come with guarantees that cannot be 
excluded under the Australian Consumer Law. You 
are entitled to a replacement or refund for a major 
failure and for compensation for any other reasonably 
foreseeable loss or damage. You are also entitled to 
have the goods repaired or replaced if the goods fail 
to be of acceptable quality and the failure does not 
amount to a major failure. 
The benefits under our Limited Warranty are in 
addition to other rights and remedies under 
applicable law in relation to the products….  
 
[then cites manufacturer’s limited warranty… 
concluding with exclusions cited above again] 
 
THE WARRANTIES AND REMEDIES CONTAINED 
HEREIN ARE EXCLUSIVE AND IN LIEU OF ALL 
OTHER WARRANTIES EXPRESS, IMPLIED, OR 
                                                          
1938 Under Support on the AU website: <http://www.garmin.com/au/support/warranty> 
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STATUTORY, INCLUDING ANY LIABILITY ARISING 
UNDER ANY WARRANTY OF MERCHANTABILITY 
OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE, 
STATUTORY OR OTHERWISE. THIS WARRANTY 
GIVES YOU SPECIFIC LEGAL RIGHTS, WHICH 
MAY VARY FROM STATE TO STATE.  
IN NO EVENT SHALL GARMIN BE LIABLE FOR 
ANY INCIDENTAL, SPECIAL, INDIRECT, OR 
CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES…  SOME STATES 
DO NOT ALLOW THE EXCLUSION OF 
INCIDENTAL OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES, 
SO THE ABOVE LIMITATIONS MAY NOT APPLY 
TO YOU.  
(author emphasis) 
 
 
Comment: multiple conflicting sources and 
content is potentially problematic. This statement 
potentially confuses the Reg 90 requirements and 
effect of consumer guarantees with the limited 
warranty, through placement and content. The 
heading and capitalised sections (of the LW) may 
dominate in impression and override the ACL 
requirements or at least, the conflicting 
information without distinguishing the difference, 
may confuse consumers. As such it is potentially 
misleading and may be unfair as well.  
 
l) restrict one 
party’s right to 
commence 
dispute 
proceedings 
against another 
party; 
 
Governing Law: The Terms of Service and the resolution 
of any Disputes shall be governed by and construed in 
accordance with the laws of the State of California without 
regard to its conflict of laws principles. 
Comment: this may restrict Australian consumer’s 
rights to institute due to cost barriers. 
 
We Both Agree To Arbitrate: You and Fitbit agree to 
resolve any Disputes through final and binding arbitration, 
except as set forth under Exceptions to Agreement to 
Arbitrate below. 
 
Opt-out of Agreement to Arbitrate: You can decline this 
agreement to arbitrate by contacting legal@fitbit.com within 
30 days of first accepting these Terms of Service and 
APP Governing Law  & Jurisdiction. You and Nestle agree 
that any claim or dispute relating to the App shall be 
governed by the law of New South Wales and brought before 
the courts of New South Wales. 
 
Comment: From an Australian and NZ consumer 
perspective (the target markets) home purchase 
jurisdiction and law would better facilitate the right to 
commence proceedings, due to cost or inconvenience; 
this especially applies as Nestle is in multiple locations 
across both countries. 
TOU General 
Except to the extent provided below in this 
paragraph, all legal issues arising from or related to 
the use of any Garmin Site will be construed in 
accordance with and determined by the laws of the 
State of Kansas applicable to contracts entered into 
and performed within the State of Kansas without 
respect to its conflict of laws principles. By using a 
Garmin Site, you agree that the exclusive forum for 
any claims or causes of action arising out of your use 
of the Garmin Site is the United States District Court 
for the District of Kansas, or any Kansas State court 
sitting in Johnson County. You hereby irrevocably 
waive, to the fullest extent permitted by law, any 
objection which you may now or hereafter have to the 
laying of the venue of any such proceeding brought in 
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stating that you (include your first and last name) decline 
this arbitration agreement. 
 
No class actions: …Class arbitrations, class actions, 
private attorney general actions, and consolidation with 
other arbitrations aren't allowed under our agreement. 
 
Comment:  Two potential concerns: (1) Terms imposing 
arbitration have been found to be unfair in the UK in 
Mylcrist Builders Ltd v Mrs G Buck. While the UK 
statute contains an express ‘good faith’ requirement 
unlike Australia’s, other ACL factors requiring 
consideration are similar and if a court agrees a short 
opt out of otherwise mandatory ‘arbitration’ (save for 
small claims) restricts the right to commence 
proceedings, then the term may be unfair. The opt out 
clause may overcome that analysis unless a court were 
of the view that its (unnecessary) limited time frame 
and the inconvenient actions required (in lieu of a 
simple check box for example) constitutes a restriction. 
 (2) Terms imposing foreign arbitration (and choice of 
law) may be void to the extent they exclude restrict or 
modify statutory guarantees: ACL s 64(1). 
 
Judicial Forum for Disputes: In the event that the 
agreement to arbitrate is found not to apply to you or your 
claim, you and Fitbit agree that any judicial proceeding 
(other than small claims actions) will be brought in the 
federal or state courts of San Francisco County, California. 
Both you and Fitbit consent to venue and personal 
jurisdiction there. We both agree to waive our right to a jury 
trial. 
 
Limitation on Claims: Regardless of any statute or law to 
the contrary, any claim or cause of action arising out of or 
related to your use of the Fitbit products or Fitbit Service 
must be filed within one (1) year after such claim or cause 
of action arose, or else that claim or cause of action will be 
barred forever. 
 
Comment: Both clauses may have the effect of 
restricting an Australian consumer’s rights (which 
otherwise exist) to institute proceedings, so may be 
unfair. 
such a court and any claim that any such proceeding 
brought in such a court has been brought in an 
inconvenient forum. 
 
Comment: practically such a provision entails 
expense which could not be justified by an 
Australian litigant and may unfairly have the 
effect of limiting the consumer’s right to sue. 
Note may conflict with ACL ss. 64 and 68 and the 
Valve decision. 
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m) limit the 
evidence that the 
counterparty can 
adduce in 
proceedings 
relating to the 
contract 
Arbitration Procedures: The American Arbitration 
Association (AAA) will administer the arbitration under its 
Commercial Arbitration Rules and the Supplementary 
Procedures for Consumer Related Disputes. The arbitration 
will be held in the United States county where you live or 
work, San Francisco, California, or any other location we 
agree to. 
 
Comment: the AAA Rules may limit evidence which 
may be adduced. The unilateral right of Fitbit to decide 
forum may also limit consumer capacity to present 
evidence due to time, cost, inconvenience reasons; 
depending upon arbitration terms and conduct. 
 Above re General. 
 
Comment: US (Kansas) jurisdiction may entail 
limitations upon evidence a consumer may 
adduce depending upon Kansas rules. 
 
 
s 24(2) In determining if a term is unfair, court must take into account:  
 
 
reasonably plain 
language 
 
☺☺☺ 
 
☺☺ Language plain and mostly clear 
 Very Long:  7397 [incl privacy]  
Comment: 
 Multiple contracts mean consumers must read 
across contracts though Website Terms and privacy cover 
most aspects  
 Extensive, broad & complex indemnities 
 Legalese 
☺☺☺ 
 
☺☺☺ Language:  plain, little legalese 
 Long 5,500 (approx. incl privacy)  
 
Comment:  
☺☺ Simpler terms as warranty/ guarantee and liability is 
limited to ACL requirements (though these are not explained) 
 Multiple contracts and some links means consumers must 
read across contracts and terms, which creates complexity 
and reduces clarity. 
 Legalese 
                                      ☺☺ 
 
☺ Language is plain but some legalese  
 Very long: 7834 words [incl privacy] 
Comment: 
 Contracts and terms across multiple locations 
may affect their efficacy legally, and for consumers, 
creates confusion, complexity and reduces clarity. 
 Extensive, broad & complex indemnities 
 Legalese 
 
Legible1939  ☺☺☺ 
 
                          ☺☺☺ ☺☺☺ 
presented 
clearly1940 
☺☺ 
 
☺☺☺  Contract follows conventions as to clause 
placement; clear font, layout and use of capitals attempts 
to draw consumer’s attention to the liability limitation 
clause 
☺☺☺ headings simple and easy to locate 
                         ☺ 
 
☺ ☺ Contract follows conventions as to clause placement; 
clear font, headings, clause numbers and each (excluding 
privacy policy) is relatively short form. 
 BUT privacy policy is long and condensed policy 
contains potential inconsistency with long form policy as to 
 
 
 Organisation of all relevant terms is unclear 
and quite difficult to locate 
Contracts do not follow usual formats and overall 
organisation across website pages may prejudice 
meaning/ consistency in some contexts 
                                                          
1939 This is usually defined to mean “clear enough to read”: Collins English Dictionary.   
1940 While there is no authority on this, the author infers this means form and layout (i.e. presentation) or else it would be duplicative. 
Subjective ratings key  
☺ okay       ☺☺ good         ☺☺☺ very good+   
 <okay      poor           very poor+ 
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 BUT consumers must read across multiple contracts 
and links which increases complexity and decreases 
clarity 
children’s private information which may confuse consumers. 
(See Sched. 2.2 for details) 
 
Multiple terms and conditions are very difficult to 
locate: e.g. the website refers to TOU and privacy; 
then TOU refer to Connect App terms and privacy; 
but consumers must go to Support (without prompt) 
for product manuals (which contain EULA) and 
Important Information, both of which contain 
significant clauses. 
 
readily available1941 ☺ 
 US terms apply as per Australian website: 
https://www.fitbit.com/au/legal/terms-of-service 
 
☺☺☺ 
Website and app store. Note app terms are not available 
online – only via mobile phone which limits screen size and 
readability. 
☺ 
 Australian web pages and App but some terms 
appear US in origin 
 
 
Overall rating:1942 
 
 
☺☺ / 
 
☺☺☺/  
 
☺/  
Table S1.4 Smart self selected terms review   
Source: author  
                                                          
1941 Accessible via the internet should suffice. 
1942 This rating is subjective but attempts to address questions of overall contract content, length, complexity, organisation, legalise, layout, legal accuracy, clarity and overall consumer friendliness; under the 
headings contained within section 25 of the ACL.  
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Schedule 2: Privacy 
S2.1:  Australian Privacy Principles 
  
 
 
Graphic S2.1: Australian privacy principles – a summary for APP entities 
Source: OAIC 
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S2.2: Global consumer internet of things privacy sweep 
 
 
International Results Summary: 314 CIOT devices 
 
 
Indicator 
 
International Outcome 
“NO"(unless specified) 
 
Indicator 1: Do privacy communications adequately explain how personal information is collected, used and disclosed? 
 
59% 
Are privacy communications specific to the device? 69% 
Do privacy communications mention disclosure to other companies? 48% 
Is the user told which companies? 76%+ 
Do privacy communications match the user experience? 62% 
(24% don’t know) 
Does the company collect the following information? 
- - Location 68% YES 
- - Photo/video/audio files 41% YES 
- - Date of birth 64% YES 
Does the company explain why the device collects certain information? (+Canada response only) 
- - Location 47%+ 
- - Photo/video/audio files 75%+ 
- - Date of birth 89%+ 
Indicator 2: Are users fully informed about how personal information collected by the device is stored and safeguarded 68% 
Indicator 3: Do privacy communications include contact details for individuals wanting to contact the company about a privacy-
related matter? 
38% 
Indicator 4: Do privacy communications explain how a user can delete their information? 72% 
Indicator 5: Did the company provide a timely, adequate and clear response to follow up questions? 43% 
  
Table S2.2 International consumer internet of things privacy sweep   
Source: Author using Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada data1943 
 
  
                                                          
1943 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘Results of the 2016 Global Privacy Enforcement Network Sweep’ (22 Sept 2016 accessed 25 Sept 2016) <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-news/news-and-
announcements/2016/bg_160922/> 
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Schedule 3: Australian software-related recalls1944  
S3.1 Vehicle recalls: 2014- Mar 20171945   
 
Brand/ vehicle Software defect 
 
Dealer 
software 
update fix 
Consumer hazard/ risk 
Vehicle damage (V) personal 
injury (PI) 
Subaru Impreza  
PRA2017/15954  
Reverse camera screen may freeze misrepresenting view, deceiving driver & endangering road users   
 
✓  ✓  
Maserati Quattroporte  
PRA  2017/1593022 
Gearshift may misrepresent the vehicle is in park when it is in drive  
 
✓  ✓  
VW Golf/ Passat 
PRA 2017/15890 
Software error may cause inoperative lights & indicator bulb warning-lights so driver is misled 
 
✓  ✓  
Chevrolet Silverado & GMC Sierra  
PRA 2017/15825 
Sensing and diagnostic module control software defect may prevent front airbag deployment 
 
✓  PI 
Mercedes-Benz GLE/GLS  
PRA  2016/15819 
Incorrect software coding may prevent front passenger seat occupancy-recognition control unit from 
working resulting in airbag not deploying. 
✓  PI 
Mercedes-Benz "S" Class  
PRA No: 2016/15792 
“Incorrect software coding” may impair front seatbelt operation and expose sharp edges. 
. 
? PI 
Suzuki Vitara 
PRA 2016/15747 
Ambient Temperature Sensor Malfunction Indicator Light may not illuminate ✓  ADR breach (emissions) 
Peugeot 4008 
PRA  2016/15716 
Transmission may delay acceleration (unexpectedly). 
 
✓  ✓  
Ford Mondeo 
PRA 2016/15710 
Headlamps may switch off. ✓  ✓  
Mitsubishi Lancer, ASX and ZK 
Outlander  
CVT may delay acceleration (unexpectedly). 
 
✓  ✓  
Mercedes-Benz GLE  
PRA 2016/15488 
Engine may stall when braking at low speed. ? ✓  
Mitsubishi  i-MiEV  
PRA 2016/15469 
Brake booster vacuum may fall, diminishing brakes and increasing stopping distance. ✓  ✓  
Hyundai Elantra  
PRA 2016/15385  
Unnecessary front airbags unnecessarily including at zero or low speeds.  
 
✓  ✓  
Jeep Renegade  
PRA 2016/15169 
Park Assist Mode may not stop vehicle as intended. 1946 
 
✓  ✓  
Mercedes-Benz S63  Engine may stall when coasting to a stop. ✓  ✓  
                                                          
1944 Raw data from https://www.productsafety.gov.au/ Software defect descriptions reflect manufacturer notices. 
1945 There are 81 software-based recalls cited; by manufacturer these are - Chrysler (15), Mercedes-Benz (12), Peugeot (11), Volvo (7), Other brands (5), Jaguar (4), Audi, Citroen (3) Volkswagen, Honda, 
Hyundai, Landrover, Mitsubishi, Nissan, Subaru, Suzuki, Toyota (2), Fiat, and Ford (1). Note: the only Tesla recall was not software-related. 
1946 NHTSA assert that 266 crashes had injured 68 people as at June 2016. In May 2016, a software update “no later than July or August” was promised, illustrating that defects may lack immediate fixes. 
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PRA 2015/15065  
Honda City & Jazz 
PRA  2015/14908 
CVT programming may stress & break drive shaft, causing loss in acceleration or front wheel lock-up. ✓  ✓  
Hyundai Elantra & i30  Unexpected loss of power steering reduces control ? ✓  
Toyota Prius V  ECU software may overheat sensors causing vehicle to stop unexpectedly.  ✓  ✓  
Honda Accord &  CR-V 
PRA 2015/14764 
Collision Mitigation Braking System (CMBS) may unexpectedly activate while driving & misinterpret  
roadside objects, such as metal fences or guardrails, as obstacles requiring emergency braking. 
✓  ✓  
Subaru Liberty and Outback 
PRA 2015 
Brake lamp switch (BLS)software failure may compromise brakes  
 
✓  ✓  
Land Rover Discovery  
PRA No. 2015/14651 
ABS Software may falsely detect a fault, lowering suspension & disabling stability and maximum 
speed systems  
✓  ✓  
Mercedes-Benz C200  Engine may stall in warm up phase. ✓  ✓  
Chrysler Jeep Cherokee 
PRA No. 2015/14575 
Occupant Restraint Control Module software may activate unwanted airbag deployment.  ✓  ✓  
Mahindra XUV500  
PRA 2015/14564 
Side curtain airbag may not deploy. ✓  ✓  
Jaguar XK  
PRA 2015/14526 
Front park lights turn off without warning. ✓  ✓  
Chrysler Jeep  
PRA 2014/14439 
“A loss of ESC function during certain driving conditions could cause a crash without warning.” ✓  ✓  
Nissan Infiniti  
PRA 2014/14335 
Unexpected acceleration.  ✓  ✓  
Infiniti V37 Q50 
PRA  2014/14333 
Software error may cut power to electric vehicle. 
 
✓  ✓  
Chrysler Jeep  
PRA 2014/14284 
Rear turn lamp outage detection system may not work. ✓  ✓  
Jaguar F-Type  
PRA 2014/14250 
Software fails to restrict road speed if deployable rear spoiler (DRS) fails to deploy, compromising 
stability and control. 
✓  ✓  
Chrysler Jeep   
PRA 2014/14139 
Unprompted acceleration may result in “very high vehicle speeds and make it difficult to stop or slow 
the vehicle”. 
✓  ✓  
Volvo V40  Rear light may fail due to a software failure posing a traffic hazard due to reduced visibility. ✓  ✓  
Toyota Prius  
PRA 2014/13991 
Software defect may cause hybrid system shut down causing the vehicle to stop unexpectedly.  
 
✓  ✓  
Table S3.1 Vehicle recalls: software defects 2014- 2016 
Source: author using Australian government data  
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S3.2 Smart self recalls: software defects 1998- 2016 
Product Software defect 
 
Action proposed   
Medtronic  
insulin pumps 
PRA  2017/15938  
 
 
Charging issue may stop therapy after alarm. “If the alarm is ignored and no action is taken to correct the problem, the 
user could develop dangerously high blood sugar levels (hyperglycaemia) which can cause serious health problems.”1947 
 
 
Letter to customers and advice to call 
Helpline if error appears. 
GolfBuddy GPS 
Wristband 
PRA 
No.2016/15241 
 
Sweat may result in a skin burn between the wrist and the unit due to a firmware issue. 
  
Customer to upgrade firmware via 
weblink 
Acauanaut 
Suunto Diving 
Instruments 
 
PRA 2006/8580 
 
A software bug may result in incorrect tracking of dive time, resulting in a drowning risk. Nil. 
Return to retailer. 
Scubapro-Uwatec 
Dive Computers 
 
PRA 2003/6335 
A software programming error in these computers may stop alert signals and/ or freeze the screen, showing inaccurate 
information as to water depth, tank pressure, ascent rate etc. 
Nil. 
Return to retailer. 
Citizen Eco-Drive  
Watches 
PRA  1998/3746 
 
Software defect may result in incorrect depth indicator readings. Nil. 
Return to retailer. 
Table S3.2 Australian smart self product recalls: software defects 1998- 2016 
Source: author using Australian government data  
 
                                                          
1947 Ibid. 
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Annexure A Thesis scope 
A1 Research outline   
A1.1 Research questions  
This thesis is designed to investigate the following: 
 
 
 
 
A1.2 Research purpose 
  This thesis was undertaken to: 
➢ stimulate discussion amongst government, industry and stakeholders as to consumer IOT 
issues; 
➢ review certain regulation, identify gaps based upon the policy objective, key issues and to provide 
options for evaluation;  
➢ respond to public reviews, with respect to the CIOT as an “emerging technology”;  
➢ provide a range of complementary recommendations or more broadly, principles, respecting the 
policy objective. 
 
A1.3 Content scope & exclusions 
CIOT legal and policy issues are voluminous. This thesis illustrates many of these in an Australian 
consumer law context, using the smart car, home and self as illustrative examples. It does not consider 
other significant areas, such as extant technical constraints, the (massive) industrial IOT, smart retail, 
health, cities, and so on. The constraints of topic and word limit guided this excision, together with a focus 
upon applications most proximate to Australian consumers.  
This paper excludes: 
- Legal areas including certain federal and state laws pertaining to discrimination,1948 
surveillance,1949 intellectual property, telecommunications,1950 common and criminal law aspects, 
                                                          
1948 For a summary, see AHRC, above n 779. For legislation, see above n 777.  
1949 See VLRC, above n 1480.  
1950 Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth); Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979; and 
Radiocommunications Act 1992 (Cth) for example. CIOT providers are not defined carriers or carriage services so are not 
How can Australian regulators and policy makers best fulfil the objectives of the Australian 
Consumer Policy Framework to improve consumer wellbeing through empowerment and 
protection, cognisant of Australian consumer laws and privacy principles, while fostering the 
twenty-first century consumer internet of things, as exemplified by smart cars, homes and self? 
 
 
 
 
[422] 
 
and international trade instrument implications.1951 Many of these are flagged as issues are 
discussed, and are important topics for future work, such as that underway by the Australian IOT 
Alliance;1952 and 
 
- Competition policy issues arise given the emerging CIOT-dominance of companies such as 
Apple, Google, Microsoft and Samsung. While fascinating, this is particularly complex to assess 
at this early stage of market development. 
 
The paper also does not discuss the following areas, many of which absent government intervention or 
technical evolution, will impact CIOT delivery and impose consumer access constraints: 
 
- Internet capacity: the IOT will add significantly to consumer demand, through the connection of 
billions of networked devices. This steep demand escalation, combined with the interconnected 
nature of internet architecture and physical spectrum limits, threatens future congestion and other 
management issues. 
 
- General technical issues: Network neutrality, wider network access (increased connection 
points in more widespread locations, IPv6; spectrum management; etc.) are all salient issues 
well-ventilated by the Communications Alliance Report.1953  
 
- IOT (technical) standards are necessary to ensure that connected devices ‘talk’ to each other; 
that is, exhibit interoperability and interconnectivity.  While discussed broadly if consumers are 
misled or to exemplify takeover-related obsolescence, the thesis excludes the currently vexed 
technical questions surrounding network, communication and sensor standards. Suffice to say 
the industry are active:  numerous international bodies are working on standards,1954 and 
reputable private industry consortiums have already developed their own ecosystems and 
frameworks,1955 which enables consumers to ‘buy’ interoperable ‘works-with’ devices, although 
may create lock-in as an ongoing consumer issue, which is briefly discussed.    
                                                          
under the telecommunications regime – CIOT communications usually pass over public fixed or cellular networks of mobile 
carriers. But this may evolve:  Baker, above n 776.  
1951 Baker, Ibid. 
1952 The author is a member of Working Party 3 as to data and privacy matters. 
1953 Above n 119. 
1954 For example, the Internet Engineering Taskforce (IETF), International Telecommunications Union (ITU) and Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers Standards Association (IEEE-SA). 
1955 For example, Thread, Apple HomeKit, Apple HealthKit and the Open Internet Consortium. 
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- Other consumer-related issues such as power consumption costs, environmental implications 
of device power consumption and sustainability (disposal, lifecycle and the like) are not 
considered. 
 
A.1.4 Disclaimer 
The author is a lawyer and does not purport to evidence technical expertise in the IOT, consumer IOT or 
computing or information technology, beyond that of an average Australian consumer. Errors in these 
areas are intended to be avoided, but may be inevitable.  
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A2 Methodology & research design 
 
This thesis employs six main research methods: a desktop literature review, impacts assessments, a 
framing methodology, theoretical perspectives, validation, risk and solutions scenario verification through 
selected key stakeholder interviews, author participation in the lead Australian IOT-related group, and 
doctrinal legal analysis by reference to legislative criteria and international cases. 
 
A2.1 Background research (Comparative literature review) 
A desktop literature review process was undertaken to broadly scope the state of the art as to evaluating 
the consumer IOT in Australia from 2010- (late) 2016. Due to a paucity of Australian CIOT-specific legal 
literature, this led to an expanded international review, with selective emphasis upon the United States 
and the European Union. The search was restricted to English and utilised search terms for IOT literature 
from science, industry, legal and policy-based fields, including research publications from government, 
industry, analysts, consumer groups and the specialist and lay media.  
The initial review yielded voluminous results so was refined through a Rapid Evidence Assessment 
process1956 with a focus upon the ‘internet of things’ (or name variants) and all or any of ‘consumer law’, 
‘privacy’, ‘security’,’ regulation’, ‘policy’ and ‘ethics’, confined to law, peer reviewed articles and selected 
jurisdictions.  The search strategy then followed a simplified Systematic Literature Search technique, 
which included identifying and further refining search terms (and combinations thereof) through 
sequential variation, based upon refining result outcomes and a review of scholarly and other 
bibliographies. The process was augmented by a more traditional broad search, especially as to news-
related articles online. 
Resources reviewed (on an ongoing basis) included: 
➢ Research databases in law (Westlaw, Austlii, Lexis Nexis, Lexology, Google Scholar and 
Mondaq) and scientific databases such as J-Stor and IEEE;  
➢ Australian government websites were monitored manually throughout 2016;  
➢ Regulator websites such as the ACCC, OAIC, US FTC, Ofcom and Digital Europe were (where 
possible) subscribed to and monitored;  
➢ Research bodies such as the Productivity Commission, were also manually monitored; 
                                                          
1956 UK Civil Service, ‘What is Rapid Evidence Assessment’ (2014 accessed 2 Feb 2016) 
<http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20140305122816/http://www.civilservice.gov.uk/networks/gsr/resources-and-
guidance/rapid-evidence-assessment/what-is>  
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➢ Australian industry IOT-stakeholder websites were also monitored including those of the 
Communications Alliance, the Australian IOT Alliance, the ADMA, ACMA, and ACCC Product 
Recall;  
➢ International entities were monitored including the US National Security Telecommunications 
Advisory Committee, the FTC, NTIA, EPIC, UK’s Ofcom, the European Research Cluster of the 
Internet of Things and Working Party 29, and the (EU) Alliance IOT;  
➢ Submissions to relevant Australian enquiries were reviewed;  
➢ Leading Australian law firm sites, such as those of G+T, as well as industry analysts such as 
Deloitte and Accenture, and consumer bodies such as the US Consumer Reports, the EU’s 
BUEC and Australia’s CHOICE were monitored; and 
➢ Google was also used as a search back-up. 
  
Given the rapidly evolving and technical nature of the CIOT, the technical media and lay media were 
monitored through web searches, online email-subscribed updates and direct searches for articles of 
relevance, including in WIRED, Mashable, and ComputerWorld. Lay media CIOT articles were searched 
weekly using the leading online news resources. 
The systematic review process generated the thesis bibliography of approximately 1500 documents.1957  
A2.2 Framing method 
Consistent with other IOT studies,1958 it was necessary to examine the “self and co-regulatory nature of 
IOT governance”,1959 as well as formal regulation.  The study was thus framed using a stakeholder 
analysis to identify key IOT entities including both formal1960 and informal1961 regulatory groupings 
(Annex. B2).  
In analysing stakeholder literature, policy positions and (where applicable) ‘soft law’ instruments,1962 it 
was necessary to consider it: 
➢ may or may not fulfil public policy objectives where stakeholders have competing or conflicting 
purposes;  
                                                          
1957 The thesis was delayed months into 2017 to await various Australian enquiries and reports; as such it contains those 
selective updates which also appear in the bibliography. 
1958 EC, above n 52.  
1959 Ibid. 
1960 For example, government, regulators, standards bodies, etc. 
1961 For example, industry groups, lobbyists, alliances, etc. 
1962 For example, non-mandatory standards, codes of practice, etc. 
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➢ may devise solutions which serve other overriding (for example, industry-based) objectives or 
may be designed to (tactically) avoid imposed regulation; 
➢ may rely upon members’ voluntary, self-audited, “self-interested” participation and compliance 
behaviours, which may lack the authority, resources and effectiveness of formal regulatory 
interventions; 
➢ may lack exclusive power and so compete, overlap or collaborate with other entities; and 
➢ may be shaped by political or other institutional power influences. 
As such, the research was framed to analyse the literature and to understand the stakeholders’ market 
role and to interpret the likely influences upon them, within the IOT policy landscape. 
A2.3 Theoretical perspectives 
The thesis uses a range of theoretical perspectives to liberate ideas as to CIOT public policy approaches. 
It employs a ‘reform-oriented’ research approach,1963 that is, it intensively evaluates existing rule 
adequacy and recommends changes to better achieve certain legal or policy objectives. To establish 
those objectives, it adapts the Australian Consumer Policy Framework, 1964  to analyse whether the CIOT 
presents public policy issues requiring regulatory solutions. 
 
The thesis also utilises selected multi-disciplinary theoretical frameworks to analyse certain aspects of 
Australian law and public policy relevant to the CIOT. These include: 
 
➢ the normative approaches to Australian consumer policy gleaned from the Australian 
Government companion guide to the OECD Consumer Policy Toolkit;1965  
➢ aspects of behavioural economic theory to enhance the Ch. 5 analysis; and  
➢ regulatory policy options are considered drawing upon the precautionary principle, privacy/ 
security by design, Thierer’s ‘permissionless innovation’, and command and control versus 
alliance or self-regulatory theories.  
 
The thesis concludes by employing a principles-based regulatory approach, 1966  in attempting to identify 
certain broadly-accepted norms to promote fundamental consumer protective obligations relevant to the 
consumer IOT. 
                                                          
1963 Terry Hutchinson and Nigel Duncan, ‘Defining and Describing What We Do: Doctrinal Legal Research’ Deakin Law 
Review 17: 1 (2012) https://ojs.deakin.edu.au/index.php/dlr/article/view/70  
1964 Australian Government, above n 501. 
1965 Australian Government, above n 501. 
1966 J Black, above n 1788, cited at ALRC, above n 1480: ‘Regulating Privacy’. 
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A2.4 Additional validation 
A series of unstructured interviews were conducted by telephone and email with experts in a range of 
fields and from a range of organisations. The interviewees were derived from selected key stakeholders, 
and are identified in the Introduction.  
A2.5 Legal analysis 
This research strategy was complemented by using legal profession doctrinal research methods.1967  An 
analysis of relevant Australian consumer and privacy legislation and case law, was undertaken within the 
context of the political and institutional enforcement practices, to locate possible CIOT ‘gaps’. This 
included reviewing cases from federal and state courts and statutory-based enforcement actions of the 
ACCC and OAIC, and determinations of the Privacy Commissioner. Further, international CIOT product 
‘defect’ case reports (some un-litigated) were used to evidence key CIOT problem themes, through a 
snapshot of smart cars, homes and self.  
Identified CIOT issues are analysed and linked to the known body of Australian consumer, privacy and 
contract law.1968 This informed an analysis of unfair contract terms law and privacy laws, to illustrate 
potentially infringing terms and privacy statement attributes. CIOT-related recall activity was also 
evaluated to assess (largely) software-based product issues in Australia. 
In summary, an overview of Australian legislation relevant to the CIOT, together with its application to 
CIOT cases and risk scenarios (identified by mostly international cases and examples) is provided. Gaps 
or potential deficiencies in the law are identified. Related international jurisprudence or policy approaches 
that may be of relevance to Australia or of use in assessing its policy options, is discussed and evaluated 
where relevant. 
A2.6 Impact assessment 
Non-quantitative impacts were assessed using analyses drawn from the scholarly literature and the 
ACPF, consultation with expert interviewees and expert industry literature. 
Absent examples of clear consumer detriment in Australia, this assessment is largely subjective insofar 
as it assesses ‘potential’ impacts. However, its strength is bolstered by utilising international examples to 
project those potential Australian issues and impacts, and by interview findings.  Those interviews 
                                                          
1967 This term may be defined as a systematic exposition of the normative rules and principles governing consumer law as a 
legal category, analysing the relationship between rules, explaining areas of difficulty (‘gaps’) and predicting future 
developments: Dennis Pearce, Enid Campbell and Don Harding, ‘Australian Law Schools: A Discipline Assessment for the 
Commonwealth Tertiary Education Commission’, AGPS,1987 (‘Pearse Committee’) cited in Terry Hutchinson, Researching 
and Writing the Law (Reuters Thomson, 3rd ed, 2010): 7. 
1968 Terry Hutchinson, above n 1963: 113. 
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confirmed research findings of a lack of Australian federal policy, differing state-related actions, and a 
general lack of Australian research, consumer education or other engagement with respect to CIOT 
issues as at 2016. 
A3. Conclusion 
In summary, this research is extensive in a rapidly-developing area. Its contents relate to the consumer 
IOT generally, the challenges it presents, its costs and benefits and how these are to be appraised, 
together with related issues such as big data, privacy, security, consumer ‘consent’ and regulation, and 
all relevant Australian governmental and industry reports, and selected international offerings.  Utilising 
the research framework above, the thesis provides a discussion of key CIOT problems and risks in 
Australia, extant Australian legislative approaches, gap assessment and potential regulatory options to 
enhance consumer protection in a CIOT context, together with a narrative summary of the political and 
public policy environment, and recommended approaches, including draft CIOT policy principles to 
address the key issues identified. 
Unless references reveal otherwise, the research as presented is accurate to 2016 end.  
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Annexure B Background 
B1 Literature review 
"When we look overseas … it is utterly evident that they are more advanced in their IOT narrative 
and strategy than we are. You can read it, you can see it, and here you don't read about it… 
There is nothing..."1969 
An Australian CIOT literature and policy review supports this contention. Aside from excellent but non- 
CIOT specific work into the internet,1970 3D printing,1971 privacy1972, talent analytics,1973 drones,1974 big 
data1975 and consumer regulation,1976 Australian legal research, reports and scholarly articles on this topic 
are few.1977 Fortunately, 2016 has seen several scholarly articles and multiple potentially-related 
enquiries emerge, as well as the first signs of regulatory interest in a topic which has engaged overseas 
regulators for some years. However, there remains no other scholarly consideration of how Australian 
consumer protection laws respond to the CIOT at present. This thesis seeks to help fill that gap. 
  
European legal research into the internet of things is voluminous, and its policy work, world leading. 
United States regulators are playing a rapid catch-up since 2014, while Australian literature has only just 
emerged in 2016.1978  It seems probable that factors such as CIOT inexperience, definitional difficulties 
and genuine uncertainties as to scope and content, as well as a slower purchase and implementation 
rate, few (if any) practical complaints and no litigation, together with lesser mainstream media interest, 
and inadequate academic research funding, may form the basis for this temporary vacuum.  
                                                          
1969 Frank Zeichner cited in Stuart Comer, ‘Australian government set to tackle the Internet of things’ ZDNet (21 Aug 2015 
accessed 13 Apr 2016) <http://www.zdnet.com/article/australian-government-set-to-tackle-internet-of-things/> A  
Department of Communications website search on 13 April 2016  revealed “no results” for ‘internet of things’ or variants, 
other than two externally-uploaded non-government submissions. 
1970 See for example, Forder, above n 148.  
1971 <http://www.utas.edu.au/law-and-genetics/research-and-projects/3d-printing-research> 
1972 See for example, a critique of the Privacy Commissioner’s weak enforcement practices (which this author has also 
argued previously): Siganto above n 1529.  See also the SalingerPrivacy blog: <https://www.salingerprivacy.com.au/blog/> 
1973 An analysis of talent analytics (predictive recruiting) recommends that “snapshots, insights … into the behavioural 
existence of individuals which can be used for infer predictions of future behaviours” be treated as ‘personal information; and 
should be protected in anti-discrimination law: Burdon, above n 336.   
1974 Des Butler, ‘The Dawn of the Age of Drones: An Australian Privacy Law Perspective’ 37:2 (2014) UNSWLJ 434- 470 < 
http://www.unswlawjournal.unsw.edu.au/sites/default/files/g2_butler.pdf> In 2002, Australia was the first country to formally 
regulate drones for commercial and civilian use, and new reduced-red-tape regulations commence at September 2016. 
1975 M. De Zwart, Sal Humphreys and Beatrix van Dissel, ‘Surveillance, Big data and democracy: Lessons for Australia from 
the US and UK’, University of NSW Law Journal, (2014) 37:2: 713-747. 
1976 Justin Malbon & Luke Nottage (eds) ‘Consumer Law & Policy in Australia & New Zealand’, The Federation Press, 2013. 
The Introduction discusses policy from behavioural economics, rights-based approaches, fairness and social psychology 
perspectives. 
1977 One interesting IT privacy study of 24 individuals emerged post 2016: above n 1817.   
1978 Australia’s major IOT-specific papers include: Communications Alliance, above n 119 and ACMA, ‘The Internet of Things 
and the ACMA’s areas of focus:  Emerging issues in media and communications’ Occasional Paper (Nov 2015 accessed 26 
Nov 2015) file:///C:/Users/Kate/Desktop/ACMA%20Internet%20of%20Things_occasional%20paper%20pdf.pdf>CIOT-
specific papers include: Vulkanovski, above n 110; Manwaring, above n 88 and n 836; Leonard, above n 98.  
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Structurally, this literature review has three sections: Australian work is considered in detail, then a briefer 
overview is conducted as to the main institutional European Community and United States CIOT 
literature, and other selected resources. While differing in their approaches, these jurisdictions were 
considered for reasons of socio- cultural similarity, (some) legal similarity and for their internationally-
significant role in IOT policy leadership.  Reference is also made to selected Canadian privacy studies 
which reflect their privacy regulator’s international standing. 
 
B1.1 Australia 
 
Categories of literature reviewed are as follows: 
 
- Australian statutes, rules and regulations; 
- Government and regulator reports and enquiries;  
- Stakeholder submissions to public enquiries, and related materials; 
- Peer-reviewed academic journals; 
- Private sector and consumer/ privacy body reports; 
- Industry analytical or stakeholder reports; 
- International case law or (non-litigated) case reports; and 
- Specialist and lay media reports. 
 
B1.1.1 Scholarly (peer reviewed) Papers 
 
There are no scholarly legal books and few peer-reviewed journal papers expressly directed toward the 
consumer IOT in Australia as at late 2016. Of the few, one disclaims legal analysis, but uses a selective 
literature review process to consider the extent to which Australia’s Privacy Principles protect CIOT data 
from a thematic perspective.1979 The paper concludes that the Privacy Act will be deficient in ensuring 
privacy in an CIOT context. Another is a 2015 article by Manwaring and Clarke, which identifies key IOT 
attributes and proposes a research framework for “eObjects”.1980 The paper identifies the certain core 
                                                          
1979 Caron, above n 1466; and Richardson, above n 1817.        
1980 Manwaring, above n 88.  
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attributes,1981 and coupled with a 2015 working paper,1982 proposes a legal analysis of the socio-
technological change and attribute-related harms. This work continues, as does other PhD work on 
autonomous vehicles (smart cars) at QUT and extensive industry-connected work at UNSW. Queensland 
state accident liability and criminal laws regarding smart cars have also been studied,1983 with the 
conclusion that most laws are adaptable to tackle the issues as to “operation” and “control”, though certain 
anomalies requiring reform exist. It specifically excludes privacy concerns, which this thesis addresses. 
 
It is important to clarify that there is significant Australian work in related or overlapping areas, but which 
does not mention the CIOT. While this review excludes scholarly security, discrimination, consent and 
privacy law papers,1984 some are analogously used to support various arguments. For example, an 
Australian (medical) Consent Study1985  is referenced to identify low prose-literacy levels  which implies, 
even disregarding the ‘signing-without-reading’ problem,1986 that almost half of Australians may have 
difficulty in providing informed consent to CIOT data collection and use. This study is cited in chapter 6 
to evidence certain contentions from behavioural economics. Similarly, reliance was also placed upon 
(for example) Australian textbooks such as Miller1987 and Malbon & Nottage on consumer law1988 and a 
2014 UNSW journal edition on ‘big data’ and privacy featuring respected Australian academic writers. 
Professor Greenleaf writes that all contributors are “united in pessimism” showing “little enthusiasm for 
[its] promises … many concerns about its dangers and shared dismay at the inadequacy of privacy laws 
to deal with the problems raised by big data, or by surveillance practices.” 1989 This paper largely concurs 
but in a CIOT context, and in chapter 5, justifies the call for the concerted effort to which Professor 
Greenleaf refers: 
 
                                                          
1981 Ibid: 2- 3. These include (technically) volatility and vulnerability, and (functionally), factors such as greater object/ people 
mobility, changed geographical extent, the rise of contextually-aware and autonomous decision-making technology and the 
“decreased visibility” of implicit human: computer interaction. 
1982 Manwaring, above n 836.  
1983 Kieran Tranter, ‘The Challenges of Autonomous Motor Vehicles for Queensland Road and Criminal Laws’ 16:2 (2016) 
QUT Law Review 59- 81 < https://lr.law.qut.edu.au/article/view/626/591> 
1984 See for example, ALRC, above n 1235; Megan Richardson and Andrew Kenyon, ‘Privacy Online: Reform Beyond Law 
Reform’ in Normann Witzleb et al (eds), Emerging Challenges in Privacy Law: Comparative Perspectives (Cambridge 
University Press, 2014); Graham Greenleaf, ‘Is it too late to protect privacy? Pessimism reigns over big data and the law’ 
UNSWLJ (15 Sept 2014 accessed 8 Aug 2016) <http://newsroom.unsw.edu.au/news/law/it-too-late-protect-privacy-
pessimism-reigns-over-big-data-and-law>; Angela Adrian, ‘Has a digital civil society evolved enough to protect privacy?’ 
Alternative Law Journal, 37:3 (Jul 2012 accessed 2 Mar 2016) 183-185.  
1985 McWhirter above n 1644.  
1986 Michael G. Faure, & Hanneke A. Luth, ‘Behavioural Economics in Unfair Contract Terms: Cautions and Considerations’ 
J Consum Policy (2011) 34:337 358. 
1987 Miller, above n 1071.  
1988 Malbon, above n 1976. 
1989 Greenleaf, above n 1984. 
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“The prevailing US model of an internet where the user is the product is not necessarily 
permanent. However, to stop it becoming so, it will take either a second internet bubble to burst, 
or a concerted effort by the rest of the world to reject privacy-invasive business practices… 
Neither is impossible, nor likely to occur rapidly.”1990  
 
B1.1.2 Law firm outputs 
 
Searches of law firm article repositories such as Lexology revealed only seven brief Australian CIOT-
related articles by mid-2016, although these have increased after the NTC Enquiry was announced. All 
are largely descriptive, ‘newsy’ and reflect overseas client-focussed commentary of similar ilk. There are 
four more scholarly papers from larger firms: Baker and McKenzie1991  issued a broad overview of various 
CIOT issues, though with little consumer law analysis. In August, Clayton Utz released a specific report 
as to smart cars, which, reflecting their business client base, identified “… an urgent need to address the 
issue of a legal framework [citing liability, insurance and federal minimum safety standards] that supports 
the testing, introduction and safe operation of driverless vehicles”.1992 In contrast to the many NTC 
submissions which (without evidence) assert that Australia’s privacy regime is adequate for the smart car 
future, the Report also warns:  
“Given the technology involved, consideration also needs to be given to how the law deals with 
issues around access to data generated by automated and driverless vehicles, privacy, and of 
course, the very real concern of cybersecurity.”1993 
 
G+T’s Peter Leonard also issued a brief IOT paper in August 2016, dealing with business risk and 
opportunities, but which also flags greater consumer interest in transparency and data privacy 
management practices.1994 Finally, Minter Ellison released a cyber security report which outlines best 
practice compliance approaches, many of which are relevant to the CIOT.1995  
 
B1.1.3  Australian Government Research and Enquiries 
 
There are only two reports referencing the IOT by government or statutory bodies – the ACMA and the 
Productivity Commission (PC).1996 In late 2015, ACMA’s 2015 ‘The Internet of Things and the ACMA's 
                                                          
1990 Ibid: Foreword. 
1991 Baker, above n 776; Clayton Utz, above n 1743; Leonard, above n 98.   
1992 Utz, Ibid. 
1993 Ibid. 
1994 Leonard, above n 98. 
1995 Minter Ellison, ‘Perspectives on cyber risk’ (Jan 2016. accessed 10 Mar 2016) < 
http://www.minterellison.com/files/uploads/documents/publications/newsletters/15%200189%20Cyber%20Report_Final%20
v1.pdf> 
1996 This excludes technical research reports from CSIRO’s Data61 collaboration with National ICT Australia. 
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area of focus’1997 was released, but (perhaps) reflective of low IOT awareness, received only three (brief) 
industry-based submissions.1998 In terms of IOT security, the Australian Cyber Security Centre’s 2015 
‘Threat Report’1999 cited the IOT as a new risk factor and part of escalating critical infrastructure threats; 
a factor potentially addressable though not mentioned, in the Commonwealth’s Cyber-Security Strategy 
2016.2000 
 
There are no government enquiries, research or papers, explicitly considering the IOT by Terms of 
Reference. Two are important as to consumer protection: the ACL review2001 focussed upon ACL legal 
efficacy, the extent to which it satisfies the National Consumer Policy Framework and most relevantly, 
“…the flexibility of the ACL to respond to new and emerging issues to ensure that it remains relevant into 
the future as the overarching consumer policy framework in Australia”.2002  Few submissions mentioned 
CIOT issues at all, and none comprehensively.2003 The complementary PC review titled ‘Consumer Law 
Enforcement and Administration’ is also to (inter alia) report on overseas models seeking improvements 
to ensure Australian consumer protection remains  “…flexible and responsive in addressing new and 
emerging issues”.2004 CAANZ reported in December 2016 and the PC,  in April 2017, and those reports 
were reviewed for this thesis, although neither contained CIOT-specific recommendations. 
     
In 2016, the following potentially CIOT- relevant enquiries were announced: 
    
Entity 
 
Enquiry Papers Dates 
National 
Transport 
Commission 
 
Regulatory Options for Automated 
vehicles (smart car enquiry) 
Issues Paper 
Discussion Paper 
Draft Report due 
Final report 
Feb 2016 
May 2016 
Nov 2016 
April 2017 
                                                          
1997 ACMA, above n 1978.  
1998 Of these, two were from Telstra and NBN Co., both urged resolution of technical (spectrum) issues and little (or no) 
comment as to CIOT issues. 
1999 ACSC, above n 559. 
2000 Australian Government, above n 316.  
2001 Intergovernmental Agreement for the Australian Consumer Law (IGA), 2 Jul 2009 provides for a CAANZ review after 7 
years.  
2002 Above n 496.  
2003 Submissions closed in June 2016, and 180 were publicly available in late August: very few deal with the IOT or with the 
question of “future threats”. 
2004 Scott Morrison & Kelly O’Dwyer, ‘Productivity Commission to examine arrangements supporting Australian Consumer 
Law’ (29 Apr 2016 accessed 3 May 2-16) <http://kmo.ministers.treasury.gov.au/media-release/048-2016/>; Productivity 
Commission, Consumer Law Enforcement and Administration (May 2016) < http://www.pc.gov.au/inquiries/current/consumer-
law/terms-of-reference> 
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Consumer 
Affairs Australia 
and New 
Zealand  
 
Australian Consumer Law Review 
 
Issues Paper 
Interim report 
Final report 
May 2016 
Dec 2016 
March 2017 
Productivity 
Commission 
(PC) 
 
Digital disruption: What do 
government’s need to do? 
Research Paper 
(self-initiated) 
June 2016 
PC Consumer Law Enforcement and 
Administration 
 
Issues Paper 
Submissions 
Draft Report 
Final Report 
15 July 2016 
30 Aug 2016 
Nov 2016 
Mar 2017 
PC Data Availability and Use Issues Paper 
Draft Report 
Report 
18 Apr 2016 
Nov 2016 
Mar 2017 
House of 
Representatives 
Standing 
Committee  
Social Issues relating to Land-based 
Driverless Vehicles in Australia 
Submissions 
 
June 2017 
 
 
Table B1.1 Australian enquiries 2015- 7 
Source: author 
 
Other than those concerning smart cars, the only enquiry to reference the IOT is the PC’s concluded 
Digital Disruption Report,2005 and then, in an infrastructure or manufacturing context.2006 It refers to vehicle 
telematics and its relation to the IOT briefly, and Case Study E references transport technologies, but 
overall, the report does not identify or analyse CIOT issues. That may reflect the research purpose and 
methodology: it was informed by government and industry roundtables only, so the critical economic 
question identified by the Chair is left unanswered:  
 
“… whether the current economic lassitude is primarily a delay before the onset of 
significant social and economic changes driven by digital disruption; whether 
government policies (or lack of them) might themselves be frustrating the 
realization of the benefits; or whether the effects of this disruption are less fundamental 
than initially thought.”2007 [author emphasis] 
 
                                                          
2005 PC, above n 680.   
2006 See passing references at pages 14, 16, 25, 39, 58, 103, 119, 163. Page 164 cites an IOT definition; others relate to 
size, standards, interconnectivity, security and improved monitoring capacity of the industrial IOT. 
2007 PC, above n 680 Foreword.  
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While labelling Australian government as “reactive” to digital technologies and Australians, as 
“unremarkable” adopters, the Chair pointedly disclaims the Report findings’ accuracy, saying: “…absence 
of conjecture in this space would be both timid and unhelpful to the development of a productivity policy 
agenda.”2008  He concludes (beyond scope):  
 
Broader protections for an individual's rights (such as with control of personal information) 
and to support society's moral and ethical mores (relevant to …artificial intelligence, remote 
sensing…) will require ongoing government attention…2009 [author emphasis] 
 
In framing the consumer IOT policy discussion, the 2011 Australian Government ‘companion’2010 was 
used, which adopts the more detailed OECD Toolkit2011 and outlines policy review process, assessing 
“consumer detriment” and regulatory policy2012 (Annex C). Together with specific OECD 
recommendations2013 and the behavioural economics articles discussed below, these papers provided 
the framework to consider the CIOT from a policy perspective.  
 
B1.1.4 Industry groups 
 
The Communications Alliance aims to be the leading ICT-industry initiative shaping the CIOT regulatory 
framework and released a comprehensive 2015 report entitled ‘Enabling the Internet of Things for 
Australia’. It is a very useful overview resource and makes numerous recommendations from a 
(predominantly) industry or technical perspective. ADMA have also produced its '2016 Regulatory 
Landscape'2014 which briefly addresses IOT data use in an advertising context.  In February 2016, the 
ACCAN released an entertaining 2016 intern’s paper on the CIOT which is the first Australian report to 
scope the potential issues, but is largely descriptive and does not undertake legal analysis.2015 As such, 
a ‘gap’ in the literature remains. 
 
B1.1.5 Regulators 
 
                                                          
2008 Ibid. 
2009 Ibid.  
2010 Australian Government, above n 499. 
2011 OECD, above n 505.  
2012 Lunn, above n 1659.  
2013 OECD, above n 523.  
2014 Association for Data-driven Advertising and Marketing, '2016 Regulatory Landscape' (1 Mar 2016 accessed 2 Mar 2016) 
<http://www.adma.com.au/comply/regulatory-newsletter/2016-regulatory-landscape/> 
2015 Vulkanovski, above n 110.  
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The Australian Competition and Consumer Commission (ACCC) has no explicit CIOT policy, but will 
continue to “concentrate on emerging systemic issues”2016 in the online marketplace.2017 There is no 
explicit reference to the CIOT, but absent consumer complaints or obvious detriment, this seems 
justifiable.  The author found the Deputy Chair very concerned about the topic and it seems likely that the 
ACCC is monitoring overseas developments. 
 
The Office of the Australian Information Commissioner (OAIC) has produced little on the IOT,2018 despite 
significant international regulator interest since (at least) 2014.2019 In September 2016, it participated in 
a Global Privacy Enforcement Network sweep of 314 CIOT devices internationally. The OAIC examined 
45 fitness and health monitors, thermostats and smart travel locks and found that 71% of them “did not 
adequately explain how privacy is managed”.2020 The OAIC cautioned that businesses should adopt 
privacy-by-design practices to protect personal information and promised resources to help start-ups 
“shortly”.2021  The Privacy Commissioner has previously foreshadowed guidance as to big data, data de-
identification and the IOT within the 2016-17 financial year, but its zeal may be dampened by the recent 
Grubb2022 metadata decision, which is arguably suggestive of the courts taking a narrow approach to 
defining “personal information” unresponsive to modern technology, nor reflective of broader European 
and other international approaches. Further while greater OAIC action would be privacy positive, the 
regulator must overcome its apparent reluctance to take proactive regulatory action, which would 
influence its efficacy and industry compliance practices in a CIOT (and many other) contexts.2023 
 
 
 
                                                          
2016 Corporate plan or priorities 2015- 2016. 
2017 ACCC, ‘ACCC and AER Corporate Plan 2015- 16’ <https://www.accc.gov.au/publications/corporate-plan-
priorities/corporate-plan-priorities-2015-16> This includes examining sharing economy regulation and promoting informed 
consumer purchasing through big data (e.g. by comparator tools). 
2018 The OAIC has released a data breach guide: above n 577. An OAIC website search reveals only a passing mention of 
IOT in Privacy Commissioner speeches. 
2019 ICPEN, above n 736. 
2020 Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada, ‘Global Internet of Things Sweep finds connected devices fall short on 
privacy’ News Release (22 Sept 2016 accessed 23 Sept 2016) <https://www.priv.gc.ca/en/opc-news/news-and-
announcements/2016/nr-c_160922/> 
2021 OAIC, ‘Privacy shortcomings of Internet of Things businesses revealed’ OAIC News (23 Sept 2016 accessed 25 Sept 
2016) <https://www.oaic.gov.au/media-and-speeches/news/privacy-shortcomings-of-internet-of-things-businesses-revealed> 
Oddly the author was told the OAIC does not have a “position” on the IOT yet. Note that the promised materials were not 
released as at April 2017. 
2022 The original determination: Ben Grubb v Telstra Corporation Limited [2015] AICmr 35 went to the AAT on appeal by 
Telstra and was then unsuccessfully appealed by the Privacy Commissioner in January 2016. 
2023 The author has criticised the OAIC in this regard as to online behavioural advertising: above n 185; as have others: 
Siganto, above n 1529. Note however that the OAIC experienced several years of budgetary and organisational uncertainty 
due to government decisions. However, its press release did not suggest it was taking any action after the Sweep. 
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B1.1.6 Private Sector Analysis  
 
Australian-specific CIOT analytics reports are few. Telsyte,2024 has produced several market reports, 
covering smart home, smart selves (wearables) and consumer digital, which assert a positive picture as 
to increased Australian interest and adoption practices. Others may be commercially available, but were 
not accessible to the author. Other valuable resources used are (mostly) international private-sector 
research or white papers, marketing documents and statistical and predictive research, discussed below.  
  
B1.2 International materials 
 
This section considers selected international literature, with a focus upon the OECD, EU, UK, Canada 
and the USA. This was undertaken to augment the Australian literature search, choosing jurisdictions or 
organisations with a similarity in consumer law provisions,2025 and/ or public policy positioning, and with 
similar types of consumer issues to be addressed.  
 
International group reports such as the OECD on consumer policy and UN as to its consumer protection 
guidelines2026 and privacy2027 were also considered. An April 2016 Consumers International report2028 
provides a comprehensive international analysis of CIOT and foreshadows broad regulatory issues, and 
as such, is the first of its kind internationally and a valuable contribution to the literature. 
 
Literature produced by regulators as to the IOT has been extensive in the EU since (at least) 2008, and 
since 2014, is growing in the US. The IOT is policy-ingrained in the EU Digital Agenda for Europe 2020 
and coordinated high quality research occurs via the European Research Cluster of the Internet of 
Things,2029 and the independent Article 29 Data Protection Working Party (WP29).2030 Reports cover all 
                                                          
2024 Telsyte, above n 300; Telsyte, ‘Cut through: how the Internet of things is sharpening Australia’s competitive edge’ (Feb 
2015 accessed 17 Mar 2016) <http://mscorpnews.blob.core.windows.net/ncmedia/2015/02/Microsoft_IoT_Whitepaper.pdf> 
2025 Corones, above n 845. 
2026 United Nations, ‘Guidelines on Consumer Protection’ Resolution 70/186 on Consumer Protection, adopted by the 
General Assembly on 22 December 2015 (2015 accessed 26 Jun 2016) < 
http://unctad.org/meetings/en/SessionalDocuments/ares70d186_en.pdf> 
2027 United Nations Human Rights Council, ‘The right to privacy in the digital age’ Report of the Office of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Human Rights (30 Jun 2014 accessed 13 Apr 2016) 
http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/RegularSessions/Session27/Documents/A.HRC.27.37_en.pdf 
2028 Above n 44.  
2029 For example, as to the IOT, see Ian G Smith et al (eds), ‘The Internet of Things 2012 New Horizons’ Internet of Things 
European Research Cluster <http://www.internet-of-things-research.eu/pdf/IERC_Cluster_Book_2012_WEB.pdf> There are 
many other papers also here: http://www.internet-of-things-research.eu/ 
2030 There is a plethora of other EU materials, which perhaps reflects the long-standing EU commitment to digitisation, data 
protection and to consumer privacy – all of which are amplified in the IOT context. 
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IOT aspects, with a global implementation view: including technical, public policy, industrial and consumer 
issues and the data economy. Selected recent reports considered include the Cluster’s “Internet of 
Things’ (2013),2031 the Rand policy options report (2015),2032 ‘IOT opportunities and challenges’ 
(2015),2033 and ‘Opinion 8/ 2014’ 2034 - all of which evaluate the policy complexities and seek solutions 
respectful of European values. WP29’s Opinion also sought to locate “high level” protections against the 
“many privacy and security challenges” presented by the IOT.2035 In the UK, national strategy, initiatives 
and financial support2036 for IOT development and realisation followed the excellent 2014 Blackett 
Report2037 and OFCOM’s 2015 enquiry.2038   In the US, NSTAC’s 2014 Presidential Report2039 warned of 
a convergence, if not “collision”, between IT and IOT, with resulting governance and security implications, 
and urged policy action warning that time to influence IOT governance was short. The FTC has been 
especially active since that time: conducting a CIOT workshop,2040 issuing a Staff Report2041 and industry 
guidance, entitled ‘Careful Connections Building Security into the Internet of Things’.2042 Since then, US 
government enquiries and related testimony have accelerated, including relevantly: 
 
➢ US Senate Committee “The Connected World: Examining the Internet of Things”2043 (Feb 2015); 
➢  House of Representatives Committee, ‘IOT hearing’2044 (Mar 2015); 
➢ Senate IOT resolution passed (23 June 2015);2045  
                                                          
2031 Above n 103.  
2032 EC, above n 52. 
2033 European Parliamentary Research Service, ‘The Internet of things: opportunities and challenges’ (May 2015 accessed 2 
Jan 2016) http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/557012/EPRS_BRI(2015)557012_EN.pdf 
2034 EU, above n 103. (Art 29)  
2035 Ibid.  
2036 IOTUK has set aside £40 million (AUD83million) in an ‘integrated’ three-year programme seeking to advance the UK as 
a global IOT leader and to increase technology and service adoption in both business and the public sector. In January 
2016, the PETRAS Consortium, set up nine universities to work on significant IOT issues such as ethics, privacy, trust, 
security, acceptability, and reliability.  
2037 Above n 19. (Blackett Review) 
2038 OFCOM, ‘Promoting investment and innovation in the Internet of Things: Summary of responses and next steps’ (27 Jan 
2015 accessed 23 Feb 2016) <http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/IOT/statement/IOTStatement.pdf> 
2039 NSTAC, above n 66.  
2040 FTC, above n 449.   
2041 Ibid.  
2042 FTC, above n 118; FTC, ‘Start with Security: A Guide for Business’ <https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-
center/guidance/start-security-guide-business?utm_source=govdelivery> 
2043 US Senate Committee of Commerce, Science and Transportation ‘The Connected World: Examining the Internet of 
Things’ (11 Feb 2015 accessed 7 Mar 2016) <http://www.commerce.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2015/2/the-connected-
world-examining-the-internet-of-things> 
2044 United States House of Representatives, Committee on Energy and Commerce, ‘Examining Ways to Improve Vehicle 
and Roadway Safety’ Commerce, Manufacturing, and Trade Sub-Committee (114th Congress) (21 Oct 2015 accessed 29 
May 2016) < https://energycommerce.house.gov/hearings-and-votes/hearings/examining-ways-improve-vehicle-and-
roadway-safety> 
2045 Senator Deb Fischer, ‘Senate passes ‘The Internet of Things’ Resolution’ (24 May 2015 accessed 3 Jun 2016) < 
http://www.fischer.senate.gov/public/_cache/files/6c5693ae-dc0c-448b-ae9a-12e2eb154804/internet-of-things-bill-
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➢ Senators’ GAO request to study interoperability and other IOT standards;2046  
➢ House of Representatives, Subcommittee hearing on the challenges facing the Internet of 
Things,2047 (29 Jul 2015); 
➢ NTIA on “the benefits challenges and potential roles for government in fostering the advancement 
of the Internet of Things’ (April 2016); and 2017 green paper.2048 
 
These resulted in testimony, reports and other literature, adding to available IOT materials, including the 
Markey Report as to smart cars.2049 Similarly, The Canadian Privacy Commissioner has released several 
excellent studies providing stern warnings as to adverse privacy implications of smart cars,2050 smart 
self2051 and smart home devices,2052 which are very useful in the case study context. 
 
Non-governmental groups producing relevant high quality reports, include the IEEE,2053 the Internet 
Society,2054 and the International Telecommunications Union.2055  Interestingly, the literature is also 
enhanced by groups such as ‘I Am the Cavalry’,2056 ‘BuildITSecurely’2057 and other expert volunteer 
initiatives. DEFCON have also highlighted CIOT security issues through widely-publicised “white hat” 
hacking,2058 which has informed manufacturers and consumers of apparently latent vulnerabilities, but 
                                                          
language.pdf> Note the resolution refers to consumers only as empowered by the CIOT and as recipients of cost savings. It 
does not mention consumer protection. 
2046 United States Government Accountability Office, (GAO) ‘Intelligent transportation Systems: vehicle-to-vehicle 
technologies Expected to offer Safety benefits, but a Variety of Deployment challenges exist’ GAO-14-13, Report to 
congressional requesters <http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-14-13 > 
2047 US Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property, and the Internet, ‘IOT Hearing - U.S. House of Representatives 
Judiciary Committee’ (29 Jul 2015 accessed 3 Mar 2016) < http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/5378eb3d-fc2a-48e6-
b45d-0a7ff050ec3d/114-38-95686.pdf> 
2048 NTIA, above n 48.  
2049 Edward Markey, “Tracking and Hacking: Security and Privacy Gaps Put American Drivers at Risk’ (Feb 2015 accessed 
16 Mar 2016) < http://www.markey.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/2015-02-06_MarkeyReport-
Tracking_Hacking_CarSecurity%202.pdf> 
2050 Lawson, above n 36. 
2051 Hilts, above n 204; Canada, above n 340. 
2052 Canadian Privacy Commission, ‘An introduction to privacy issues with a focus on the retail and home environments’, 
Research paper prepared by the Policy and Research Group (February 2016 accessed 16 Aug 2016) < 
https://www.priv.gc.ca/media/1808/IOT_201602_e.pdf> 
2053 IEEE, above n 87.  
2054 ISOC, above n 10.   
2055 ITU, above n 175. 
2056 It corroborated to produce:  Atlantic Council, above n 211.   
2057 BuildITSecurely, ‘Our Goals for the Internet of things’ (n.d. accessed 7 Apr 2016) <https://builditsecure.ly/> 
2058 DEFCON is one of the oldest annual hacking conventions. See Daron Pauli, ‘DEFCON 23 to host Internet of Things 
Slaughterfest’ The Register  (6 May 2015 accessed 3 Mar 2016) 
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2015/05/06/defcon_23_to_host_internet_of_things_slaughterfest/>; and Anderson, above n 
391.  
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also provided the technical information and alert for regulator prosecutions, such as the first smart home 
case, ASUSTek.2059  
There is a plethora of high quality research-based, private-industry reports, most of which support the 
view that the CIOT has enormous potential for social and economic benefit, but also carries consumer 
costs which require resolution. Starting with McKinsey’s oft-cited 2015 report, ‘The Internet of things: 
Mapping the Hype’,2060 other lengthy and scholarly reports of value include (for example) Lux Research 
(2015),2061 Accenture Digital/ Fjord’s ‘The Era of Living Services’ (2015),2062 Verizon (2016)2063 - all of 
which tackle hard questions as to the nature of the potentially adverse consumer impacts. Symantec,2064 
GSMA2065 and others authoritatively report on security vulnerabilities. Research reports also reveal some 
serious adverse implications for consumers:2066 for example, Acquity Group2067 has reported negative 
survey results as to consumer trust. Cisco and Intel,2068 as potentially major IOT suppliers, has also 
produced a range of largely pro-enablement reports, suiting their marketing focus,2069 whereas Intel have 
taken a pro-policy approach.2070  In terms of market analytics, Gartner,2071 ABI research,2072 Statista2073 
                                                          
2059 File No. 142 3456, Agreement containing Consent Order (26 Feb 2016) 
<https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/160222asusagree.pdf> 
2060 McKinsey, above n 22.  
2061 Lux, above n 26. 
2062 Accenture, above n 24.   
2063 Verizon, above n 312.  
2064 M. Barcena,. & Candid Wueest, ‘Insecurity in the Internet of Things’ Symantec (12 Mar 2015 accessed 23 Mar 2016) < 
http://www.symantec.com/content/en/us/enterprise/media/security_response/whitepapers/insecurity-in-the-internet-of-
things.pdf> 
2065 GSMA, above n 583; and above n 113.   
2066 See Accenture, above n 1.   
2067 Acquity, above n 46.   
2068 Intel, ‘Internet of Things (IoT) Policy (n.d. accessed 2016) http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/policy/policy-internet-
of-things-iot.html; Intel, ‘Policy framework for the Internet of things (IoT)’ (2014 accessed 2 Jan 2016) < 
http://www.intel.com/content/dam/www/public/us/en/documents/corporate-information/policy-iot-framework.pdf>; Intel, ‘The 
Internet of things (IoT) and Automotive and Transport Policy Principles’’ (2014 accessed 2 Jan 2016) < 
http://www.intel.com/content/www/us/en/policy/policy-iot-automotive-transportation.html> 
2069 See for example, Cisco, above n 98; 13 and 106. 
2070 Intel, above n 2068.                                                  
2071 Gartner, ‘Gartner Says Worldwide IOT Security Spending to Reach $348 Million in 2016’ (25 Apr 2016 accessed 30 Apr 
2016) < http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3291817> 
; Gartner, ‘Gartner Says 4.9 Billion Connected "Things" Will Be in Use in 2015’ Press Release (11 Nov 2014 accessed 5 Mar 
2016) http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/2905717; Gartner, ‘‘Gartner Says Worldwide Wearable Devices Sales to Grow 
18.4 Percent in 2016’ Press Release (2 Feb 2016 accessed 29 Mar 2016) <http://www.gartner.com/newsroom/id/3198018>; 
Gartner, above n 273.  
2072 For example: ABI Research, ‘The Internet of Things will drive Wireless Connected devices to 40.9 Billion in 2020’ Press 
Release (20 Aug 2014 accessed 26 Mar 2016) https://www.abiresearch.com/press/the-internet-of-things-will-drive-wireless-
connect/>; ABI, above n 275.  
2073 For example: Statista, above n 273; Statista, ‘Projected size of the global connected car market in 2016 and 2021, by 
segment (in billion euros)’ (2016 accessed 20 Jun 2016) http://www.statista.com/statistics/297816/connected-car-market-
size-by-segment/>; Statista, above n 276; Statista, ‘Percentage of car customers in selected countries willing to share 
connected car data as of August 2015, by country and application type’ (2016 accessed 20 Jun 2016) 
http://www.statista.com/statistics/256157/drivers-willing-to-share-connected-car-data-with-oems-and-dealers/ 
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and others provide exponential projections with varying assumptions, although Accenture’s recent 
analysis suggests that the IOT market is not growing sufficiently to meet many of these.2074   
In the US, scholarly legal articles as to CIOT (alone) as distinct from the IOT remain relatively few. In 
2014, FTC Commissioner Julie Brill has published several articles2075 which are a valuable contribution 
to the CIOT privacy discussion, and spawned articles from two fellow commissioners contesting her 
precautionary principle approach.2076   Adam Thierer has also written extensively and thoughtfully on 
CIOT regulatory policy, privacy and security, from a pro-innovation or “permissionless innovation” 
perspective.2077  In 2015, Scott Peppet published a now widely-cited article as to the CIOT, which he 
describes as the “first [US CIOT] legal work”2078 and addresses CIOT discrimination, privacy, security 
and consent issues. He suggests that it continues the initiation of “…a conversation that is already 
overdue”.2079 Other US academic literature, as to general privacy, security, product liability and the 
difficult legal questions surrounding (for example) smart cars is voluminous and often context-specific,2080 
so is consulted very selectively, with a focus upon practical case studies.2081 There are also several UK 
articles of relevance to smart homes and privacy terms by Walden et al,2082 which were also consulted. 
Research for specific chapters has also involved selected literature as to the case studies,2083 regulatory 
approaches and behavioural economics (BE), which is foundational to the OECD consumer policy toolkit, 
as well as useful in understanding why informed consent in an CIOT context is highly problematic. 
                                                          
2074 Accenture, above n 427.  
2075 Brill, above n 446.  
2076 Maureen K. Ohlhausen, ‘The Internet of Things and the FTC: Does Innovation Require Intervention?’ Remarks before 
the US Chamber of Commerce (18 Oct 20913 accessed 1 Mar 2016) < 
http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/ohlhausen/130725section5speech.pdf.>; FTC, ‘How to Regulate the Internet of Things Without 
Harming its Future: Some Do’s and Don’ts’, Remarks of Joshua D Wright, Commissioner FTC at the US Chamber of 
Commerce (21 May 2015 accessed 2 Jan 2015) < 
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/644381/150521IOTchamber.pdf> 
2077 See for example Thierer, above n 161.   
2078 Peppet, above n 283. There are older articles of peripheral relevance cited in Manwaring, above n 88: 587 [footnote 8].  
2079 Peppet, above n 283: 96. 
2080  See for example, the bibliographies of Tranter, above n 73; Adam Thierer & Ryan Hagemann, ‘Removing Roadblocks to 
Intelligent Vehicles and Driverless Cars’ Mercatus Center (17 Sept 2014 accessed 3 Mar 2016) < 
http://mercatus.org/sites/default/files/Thierer-Intelligent-Vehicles.pdf> 
2081 As to smart cars: Thierer, Ibid; Brendan Gogarty and Meredith Hagger, ‘The Laws of Man Over Vehicles Unmanned: 
The Legal Response to Robotic Revolution on Sea, Land and Air’ (2008) 19 Journal of Law, Information and Science 73, 
124–32; Muhammad Usman Iqbal and Samsung Lim, ‘Privacy Implications of Automated GPS Tracking and Profiling’ (2010) 
29 Technology and Society Magazine, IEEE 39; Nick Belay, ‘Robot Ethics and Self-Driving Cars: How Ethical 
Determinations in Software Will Require a New Legal Framework’ (2015) 40 Journal of the Legal Profession 119. 
2082 La Diega, above n 328.   
2083 Atlantic Council, above n 211; Morley Strengers, Nichols & Hazas, ‘The hidden cost of smart homes’ (13 Jun 2016 
accessed 23 Jun 2016) The Conversation <http://theconversation.com/the-hidden-energy-cost-of-smart-homes-60306>; 
Ibrahim, above n 334; IEEE, ‘Wearfit: Security Design Analysis of a Wearable Fitness Tracker’ (2016 accessed 29 Apr 2016) 
http://www.computer.org/cms/CYBSI/docs/Wearfit.pdf; Hilts, above n 204; Anderson, above n 391; Mark Rechtin,‘Early build 
Tesla Models face quality issues’ ConsumerReports (19 Apr 2016 accessed 21 Apr 2016) 
<http://www.consumerreports.org/tesla/tesla-model-x-quality-issues/> 
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Explanatory materials such as the OECD Toolkit and articles explaining the policy influence of BE on the 
policy were reviewed,2084 together with more general economics articles as to consumer law,2085 
privacy2086 and those finding flaws with ‘notice and choice’ such as Friedman,2087 and Hoofnagle, using 
a transaction cost economics analysis. 2088  BE analyses as to unfair contract terms2089 were all also 
useful and include Bailey’s 2016 article as to IOT ‘privacy-trading’.2090 
Finally, preparing the draft principles required consideration of a broad range of recommendations. 
Taking the security context alone, that included analyses of ‘security by design’,2091 the OTA ‘IOT Trust 
framework’ (2016)2092 creating a human centred IOT2093 and its early 2017 revision, as well as 
approaches proposed by government bodies such as the FTC,2094 NIST,2095 NHTSA,2096 DOT,2097 
GSMA2098 and the FBI;2099 industry offerings;2100 as well as private groups such as OWASP,2101 the 
EWF,2102 OTA,2103  I Am the Calvary,2104 research papers;2105 security update practices,2106 academic 
contributions2107 and so on. 
                                                          
2084 Lunn, above n 1659; Maria Lissowska,‘Overview of Behavioural Economics Elements in the OECD Consumer Policy 
Toolkit’  34 J Consum Policy (2011): 393- 398;  
2085 Alain Samson (ed), The Behavioural Guide, behaviouraleconomics.com (2016 accessed 16 Apr 2016); Hans-W. 
Micklitz, Lucia A. Reisch and Kornelia Hagen, An Introduction to the Special Issue on "Behavioural Economics, Consumer 
Policy, and Consumer Law" Journal of Consumer Policy (September 2011) 34(3): 271-276.  
2086 Acquisti, above n 579.   
2087 David Adam Friedman, ‘Free Offers: A New Look’ (2008) 38 N.M. L. Rev. 49.  
2088 Whittington, above n 55.   
2089 Bar-Gill, above n 51; Faure, above n 1986.                              
2090 Bailey, above n 51.  
2091 Cavoukian, above n 1319; Deloitte, ‘Privacy by Design: setting a new standard for privacy certification’ 
<https://www2.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/ca/Documents/risk/ca-en-ers-privacy-by-design-brochure.PDF>; Louise 
Taylor, ‘Privacy by design – essential for the growth of the Internet of Things?’ Taylor Wessing (Feb 2014 accessed 19 Nov 
2015) < http://united-kingdom.taylorwessing.com/download/article_privacy_design.html> 
2092 OTA, above n 1857.  
2093 EU, above n 49.  
2094 FTC, above n 2042.                                                            
2095 NIST, above n 587.  
2096 Above n 399. (Best practices). 
2097 DOT, above n 716.  
2098 GSMA, above n 113. 
2099 FBI, above n 554. 
2100 Auto Alliance, above n 399; ADMA, ‘Best Practice Guideline: Big Data’ (2013 accessed 2 Jan 2016) 
<https://www.adma.com.au/sites/default/files/Big%20Data%20Best%20Practice%20Guidelines%20%5BADMA%202013%5
D.pdf> 
2101 OWASP above n 558.  
2102 Alta, above n 1224.   
2103 OTA, ‘Diffusing-the-IoT-Time-Bomb-Security-and-Privacy Trust Code of Conduct’ (3 Jan 2016 accessed 3 Mar 2016) 
(RSAC 2016 Deck from Panel Session) <https://otalliance.org/system/files/files/initiative/documents/ast2-w02-diffusing-the-
iot-time-bomb-security-and-privacy_trust_code_of_conduct_v3.pdf> 
2104 Above n 586.  
2105 Above n 1692.  
2106 FTC, above n 138, 139 and 2042.   
2107 Daniel Castro and Joshua New, ’10 Policy Principles for Unlocking the Potential of the Internet of things’ Information 
Technology and Innovation Foundation (4 Dec 2014 accessed 2 Jan 2016) <http://www2.datainnovation.org/2014-IOT-
policy-principles.pdf> 
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B1.3 Case law 
There is no explicitly CIOT-related case in Australia,2108 although the ACCC has instituted proceedings 
against Volkswagen, Audi and SKODA over its (alleged) diesel emissions software fraud and a related 
private class action has commenced.2109 These cases arguably illustrate a smart car case or at least, an 
example of how manufacturers may leverage information asymmetry, lack transparency and deceive 
consumers by product complexity and (latent) software. There are also of course, several OAIC cases of 
note in relation to data security, but few cases of direct relevance. ASIC approaches to directors’ duty to 
address cybersecurity,2110 perhaps presage potential ACCC action in this area; which in turn would reflect 
relatively recent FTC cases focussing upon security as a compliance obligation.2111 
In the US, there are a range of IOT-relevant cases: the first so-called CIOT case concerned security.  
TRENDnet,2112  involved internet-connected SecurView cameras sold for smart home security and baby 
monitor purposes – but which used defective software enabling hackers to post nearly 700 live feeds on 
the internet. Another recent FTC settlement is AsusTek Computer Inc. (2016)2113 in which ASUS were 
alleged to have failed to secure its home routers and cloud service, such that thousands were 
compromised, smart homes became hackable and consumers suffered detriments including disclosure 
of personal information, financial fraud and identity theft. The case also illustrates inadequate security by 
design, and flawed post-sales service - Asus failed to react to defect warnings and to provide timely 
software updates as well.  
Others are at class action stage, such as Cahen,2114 alleging that smart cars are hackable, and McLellan 
arguing that fitness devices are inaccurate;2115 but both are meeting defences that no detriment has been 
shown entitling redress, which raises the US Spokeo question as to “injury in fact”,2116 and for Australians, 
the question of whether IOT device accuracy or security flaws alone – without more, such as false 
representation – is actionable at law. Other potential examples of consumer detriment are found in formal 
                                                          
2108 IOT is not a commonly-used court-room term so cases are not readily searchable. The author has searched the main 
manufacturers as defendants, as well as a range of smart device names, permutations and combinations. 
2109 ACCC, ‘ACCC takes action against Volkswagen over diesel emission claims’ Press Release (1 Sept 2016 accessed 4 
Sept 2016) < https://www.accc.gov.au/media-release/accc-takes-action-against-volkswagen-over-diesel-emission-claims> 
2110The Australian Securities and Investments Commission (ASIC) considers board participation important to a strong cyber 
resilience culture, and that director/ officer failure to manage cyber risks may be disqualifying: ASIC, Cyber resilience: Health 
Check‘ Report No. 429 (Mar 2015 accessed 4 Jan 2016) < http://download.asic.gov.au/media/3062900/rep429-published-
19-march-2015-1.pdf> 
2111 ASIC’s approach reflects FTC V Wyndham, above n 656.  
2112 TRENDnet, above n 629.   
2113 ASUSTek, above n 635.  
2114 Cahen above n 688.  
2115  McLellan, above n 898.   
2116 Spokeo v Robins, 136 S.Ct. 1540 (2016)  
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requests for FTC investigation filed by groups such as EPIC, which include Samsung’s smart TV which 
allegedly ‘eavesdrops’ on consumers in their smart homes.2117 
There are a range of other data breach cases which propose obligations to secure data, including 
Wyndham,2118 together with numerous data breach examples, many of which affected Australians – 
including the Home Depot (50 million credit cards) and Target cases (40 million credit card numbers and 
70 million customer’s data) and the recent Yahoo case (half a billion email addresses). There are also 
cases concerning data brokers on-selling data without consumer authorisation,2119  and undisclosed 
online tracking,2120 which have analogous relevance to CIOT. Others concern unauthorised data 
collection: for example, Path2121 involved an app which collected data from mobile phone address books 
without consent – which has obvious implications for any CIOT device.  
There are also a wide range of media-reported issues and hacks, which are cited to illustrate alleged 
smart car, home or self device defects, and to illustrate potential sources of consumer detriment. Novel 
studies undertaken by the author include a hypothetical adaption of the 2016 Tesla fatality, a review of 
selected terms from an unfair contract terms perspective, a review of software recalls in Australia, and a 
review of the Nestle Milo kid’s fitness band app v1.0, using the Australian privacy regime.  
Conclusion: Literature Review 
This literature review captures the state of Australian CIOT research, cases and materials as to consumer 
laws as at 2016 end. It does not capture the vast array of international research, reports and many articles 
which discuss the IOT in non-consumer specific contexts. Rather it identifies the main reports and those 
which more holistically consider the CIOT from a legal perspective. In summary, at this point, while the 
EU has a comprehensive research framework and strategy, it seems that the US is playing a rapid catch-
up as to its regulatory and public policy position, while Australian policy work is really, just starting out.   
  
                                                          
2117 In the Matter of Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd., Complaint, Request for Investigation, Injunction and Other Relief 
Submitted by the Electronic Privacy Information Center, Case, (24 Feb 2015 accessed 10 May 2016) < 
https://epic.org/privacy/internet/ftc/Samsung/EPIC-FTC-Samsung.pdf> Note this allegation is supported by Wikileaks’ 2016 
dump as to CIA hacking capacities. 
2118 Wyndham, above n 656.   
2119 FTC v. Sitesearch Corporation, Doing Business as LeapLab, et al (United States District Court for the District of Arizona, 
Phoenix Division) FTC Matter/ File No: 142 3192 (23 Dec 2014) 
<https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/cases/141223leaplabcmpt.pdf> 
2120 In the Matter of ScanScout Inc., No. C-4344 (F.T.C. Matter/ File No. 102 3185 (21 Dec 2011) < 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/102-3185/scanscout-inc-matter>   
2121 United States of America v Path, Inc. FTC Matter/ File No. 122 3158 (1 Feb 2013) 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/casesproceedings/122-3158/path-inc  
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B2  Key stakeholder identification 
B2.1 Key sectoral players 
 
Consumer IOT stakeholders were identified to map the key Australian IOT players, as well as current and 
potential regulatory or governance bodies. Selected key international stakeholders and regulatory or 
governance bodies were also searched to facilitate comparative literature analysis.  
 
 
Australia  
Australian Communications Media Authority 
Australian Communications Consumer Action Network 
Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
Australian Cyber Security Centre 
Austroads & state roads bodies 
Association for Data-driven Advertising and Marketing 
Australian Federal Police 
ALRC 
CAF (Legislative and Governance Forum on 
Consumer Affairs) 
CHOICE 
Commonwealth Consumer Affairs Advisory Council 
Consumer Affairs Australia and New Zealand  
(Former) Department of Broadband Communications 
& the Digital Economy 
Department of Communications and the Arts 
Department of Prime Minister and Cabinet 
Federal Chamber of Automotive Industries (FCAI) 
Insurance Council of Australia 
Law Council of New South Wales  
National Transport Commission 
Office of the Australian Information Commissioner 
(OAIC) 
Productivity Commission 
State Motoring Clubs (RACV, RACQ, NRMA etc.) 
State and Territory governments 
 
 
Private sector research/ analysts/ industry entities 
ABI Research 
Accenture Digital 
Acquity Group  
Alliance of Automobile Manufacturers Inc 
Association of Global Automakers, Inc 
Automotive information Sharing and Analysis Center 
(Auto-ISAC) 
Baker & McKenzie 
CEDA  
Clayton Utz 
Center for Data Innovation 
Cisco 
Communications Alliance 
Davies Collison Cave 
Deloitte  
DLA Piper 
EY 
Ferrier Hodgson 
Fortinet 
Gartner 
G+T 
Griffith Hack 
Hewlett Packard 
IBM Institute  
IDC 
IDG 
IEEE 
Intel 
IOTUK 
ISACA 
Lloyds 
King & Wood Mallesons 
McKinsey 
Mason Hayes and Curran 
Online Trust Alliance 
OWASP (Open Web Application Security Project)  
Oxford Economics 
Philips Fox 
Privacy Impact Assessment Project 
Rand Corporation 
SAE International 
Stuart Corner, IOT Alliance website 
Sweeney Research 
Canada  
Canadian Privacy Commission 
 
Europe (EU)/ International other  
Commission for the Protection of Privacy (BE) 
Consumers International 
Director-General for Internal Policies 
European Commission 
European Commission Article 29 Working Group 
European Court of Human Rights 
European Data Protection Commissioner 
European Research Cluster on the Internet of Things 
European Union Agency for Network and Information 
Security (ENISA) 
Europol 
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GSMA (Groupe Spécial Mobile) 
IEEE Computer Society 
International Consumer Protection and Enforcement 
network (ICPEN) 
International Telecommunications Union (ITU) 
OECD 
The Internet Society (ISOC) 
United Nations Human Rights Council 
SYMANTEC 
Taylor Wessing 
Telsyte 
Verizon 
Verto Analytics 
Wilson Elser 
United States 
Consumer Federation of America 
Consumer Reports [US] 
EPIC - Electronic Privacy Information Center 
Executive Office of the President  
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) 
Federal Communications Commission (FCC) 
Federal Trade Commission 
Department of Commerce 
Department of Transportation 
International Transport Forum 
(US) National Safety Council (NSC) 
National Highway Traffic Safety Administration 
(NHTSA) 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
National Security Telecommunications Advisory 
Committee (NSTAC) 
National Telecommunications Information 
Administration (NTIA) 
National Transport Safety Board 
US Chamber of Commerce Foundation 
United States Government Accountability Office 
(GAO) 
United States Senate Committee on Commerce, 
Science and Transportation 
United States House of Representatives, Committee 
on Energy and Commerce 
 
United Kingdom 
Competition and Markets Authority 
Dept of Business, Innovation and Skills  
Information Commissioner’s Office 
OFCOM 
Table B2.1 Key sectoral players 
Source: author 
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B2.2 Key Australian IOT stakeholders 
Table B2.2 below represents a non-exhaustive, high-level overview of the principal Australian entities 
relevant to IOT regulation, together with consumer and industry group stakeholders. It identifies their 
role, work and relationship to other bodies in the IOT ecosystem.  
 
Public Sector 
 
 
Regulatory 
role or other 
objective 
 
 
IOT Objectives 
 
Relationships 
Australian 
Communications 
Media Authority  
 
Regulator 
Licensing 
Research 
Telecommunications  
Spectrum 
Devices (smart TVs) 
Consumer protection (communications) 
Impacts retail 
residential or 
wholesale 
business 
consumers, and 
telecommunicatio
ns industry 
groups and 
government 
Australian 
Competition and 
Consumer 
Commission 
 
Regulator 
Strategy 
Education 
IOT consumer protection 
IOT consumer product safety 
Promote competition and education 
Independent Cth 
statutory 
authority 
engages across 
consumers, 
industry, 
government and 
representative 
bodies 
Austroads & state 
roads bodies 
 
 
Policy 
development 
Research 
(ARRB) 
Guides 
Smart car enablement 
C-ITS planning 
Infrastructure development 
Transport system management 
Represents 
Australasian 
(govt) road 
transport and 
traffic agencies. 
Australian 
Government 
 
Department of 
Communications 
and the Arts  
 
National Policy 
Regulatory 
Statutory 
legislation (e.g. 
privacy, 
consumer law) 
No public IOT policy  
Innovation economy policy 
Open government data policy 
? permissionless innovation approach 
 
 
National and 
international, 
industry and 
consumer liaison 
Consumer Affairs 
Forum (Legislative 
and Governance 
Forum on Consumer 
Affairs) 
 
Policy  
Regulatory 
strategy 
Consumer protection law implementation 
Strengthen consumer protection framework 
Education and information 
Compliance and dispute resolution 
National product safety consistency 
Commonwealth, 
State, Territory 
and New 
Zealand 
Ministers 
responsible for 
fair trading and 
consumer 
protection laws 
National Transport 
Commission 
 
Policy 
Research 
Smart car promotion 
Regulatory strategy for testing 
Promote IOT for productivity and efficiency 
Independent 
statutory inter-
governmental 
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Implementation 
Planning 
agency reporting 
to Transport & 
Infrastructure 
Council 
Office of the 
Australian 
Information 
Commissioner 
(OAIC) 
Regulator 
Strategy 
Dispute 
resolution 
None known 
IOT position will be consistent with the Privacy 
Act 1988 (Cth) 
Independent Cth 
statutory 
authority 
engages across 
consumers, 
industry, 
government and 
representative 
bodies 
Productivity 
Commission 
Public inquiries 
Research 
studies 
Self-initiated 
research 
Annual reports 
Competitive 
neutrality 
complaints 
No IOT-specific policy or research 
Digital Disruption (self-initiated) (2015)  
Data availability and Use Inquiry (2016) 
Consumer Law Enforcement and 
Administration Review (2016) 
Advice and 
research for 
government and 
public policy 
purposes 
State and territory 
governments 
Policy 
Regulatory 
Statutory 
legislation (e.g. 
road laws as to 
smart car 
testing) 
Various approaches 
 
National and 
international, 
industry and 
consumer liaison 
 
CONSUMER 
GROUPS 
 
 
Regulatory 
role or other 
objective 
 
IOT Objectives 
 
Relationships 
Australian 
Communications 
Consumer Action 
Network 
Advocacy 
Policy 
Research 
Focus on goods and services in the internet, 
telecommunications, broadcasting, online 
services 
Liaises with govt 
to promote 
interests of 
individuals, small 
businesses and 
not-for-profits to 
policy makers. 
Funded by 
statutory 
scheme. 
 
CHOICE Product 
testing/ review 
Consumer 
advocacy 
Investigation 
IOT product testing/ reviews 
Consumer advocacy to government 
Consumer complaints 
 
Not for profit with 
consumer 
membership, 
consumer 
bodies, industry 
and government 
Consumers' 
Federation of 
Australia 
Advocacy 
Policy 
Standards 
inputs 
Consumer policy  Consumer 
organisations 
body liaises 
across consumer 
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 groups, industry, 
government and 
internationally 
 
INDUSTRY 
GROUPS 
 
Regulatory 
role or other 
objective 
 
IOT Objectives 
 
Relationships 
IOT Alliance 
Australia 
 
Advocacy 
Policy 
development 
Regulatory 
recommendatio
ns 
Lobbying 
 
 
IOT acceleration, promotion, enablement 
Promoting enabling evidence-based policy and 
regulation 
Promoting government action for enablement 
Cross business, 
industry, 
academic, 
business and 
government 
liaison – OAIC 
and ACCC 
observer status 
Association for 
Data-driven 
Advertising and 
Marketing 
Soft-law 
regulator 
(Codes) 
Lobbying 
Education 
Promotes data-driven advertising/ marketing 
Data security and privacy 
Industry body 
liaises with 
members, 
industry and 
government 
Communications 
Alliance 
Policy 
Advocacy 
Represents all IOT players 
IOT growth 
Consumer interests 
Promotes soft law self-governance 
Powerful 
consumer 
industry 
advocacy and 
policy body -
liaises across all 
sectors 
 
Federal Chamber of 
Automotive 
Industries (FCAI) 
Policy 
Industry 
advocacy 
Facilitate introduction of C-ITS and autonomous 
vehicle testing in Australia. 
Represents 
companies 
wholly owned by 
global 
manufacturers - 
liaison 
government and 
consumer groups 
Insurance Council of 
Australia 
 
Policy  
Advocate 
Soft law 
regulator 
(Codes of 
Practice) 
 Insurance 
industry 
representative 
liaised with 
government and 
consumer groups 
 
OTHER 
 
 
Regulatory 
role or other 
objective 
 
IOT Objectives 
 
Relationships 
Standards Australia Peak non-
government 
national 
standards body 
Responsible for standards (if any) pertaining to 
IOT devices – for example under the Motor 
Vehicle Standards Act (Cth) 
Cooperative 
MOU with the 
ACCC  
 
OTHER: CANADA 
 
Regulatory 
role or other 
objective 
 
IOT Objectives 
 
Relationships 
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Canadian Privacy 
Commission 
Regulator 
 
IOT privacy and data security Government, 
industry and 
consumer 
 
 
OTHER: EUROPE 
 
Regulatory 
role or other 
objective 
 
IOT Objectives 
 
Relationships 
BEUC the European 
consumer 
organisation 
 
(Bureau Européen 
des Unions de 
Consommateurs) 
Consumer 
protection 
 
Consumer policy review 
Consumer protection 
Influential EU-
funded, consists 
of 43 
independent 
national 
consumer 
organisations 
from 31 
European 
countries. 
European 
Commission 
Promotional 
Regulatory 
Statutory 
legislation 
(privacy, etc.) 
Rapid advance to stimulate economy 
Relationships national and international 
Promotes 
cooperative work 
of member 
States, EU and 
globally 
European Data 
Protection 
Commissioner 
Monitoring 
Privacy policy 
Independent 
EU authority 
Data protection 
Privacy 
IOT policy guidance 
 
https://secure.edps.europa.eu/EDPSWEB/edps
/EDPS 
Influential; works 
with EU 
institutions, 
Member States, 
non EU countries 
and other 
national or 
international 
organisations. 
European Research 
Cluster on the 
Internet of Things 
(Art 29 WP) 
Independent 
Advisory 
Opinions/ 
recommendatio
ns 
 
IOT impacts on data  
 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice/data-
protection/article-29/documentation/opinion-
recommendation/index_en.htm 
Works across EU 
states, 
authorities and 
with an EC 
representative 
European Union 
Agency for Network 
and Information 
Security (ENISA) 
Recommendati
ons 
Policy-making 
 
IOT security 
Privacy 
Network and information security 
Works with 
member States & 
private sector 
ITU-T Regulation 
standards 
Working groups technical) Works with tech 
bodies 
internationally 
 
National EU member 
states 
Regulatory Rapid advance to stimulate economy 
Relationship with EC and states 
Rule makers for 
State market 
 
OTHER: USA 
 
   
Consumer Reports Product 
testing/ review 
Consumer 
advocacy 
IOT product testing/ reviews 
Consumer advocacy to government 
Consumer complaints 
 
Liaises with govt 
to promote 
interests of 
individuals, small 
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Investigation  
 
businesses and 
not-for-profits to 
policy makers.  
Federal 
Communications 
Commission 
Regulator – 
spectrum, ISP 
privacy 
Internal US policy-maker 
Positions may influence other states 
Works with all 
entities 
Federal Trade 
Commission 
Independent 
administrative 
agency  
Regulator 
Educator 
Consumer protection incl. privacy and data 
security 
Competition regulation 
Consumer choice and education 
Works with 
consumer, 
government and 
private sector 
NHTSA, US 
Department of 
Transport 
 
Promotional 
Regulator 
Safety performance standards 
Investigator 
Researches traffic safety and driver behaviour 
Consumer information 
Works with 
industry and 
government and 
consumers 
Department of 
Commerce, National 
Telecommunications 
and Information 
Administration 
(NTIA) 
 
Executive 
adviser 
Policy maker 
 
Telecommunications adviser 
Information policy adviser 
Promotes internet access, spectrum & internet 
growth and innovation 
Executive branch 
agency 
Advises 
president 
Works across 
agencies 
Table B2.2 Key IOT stakeholders 
Source: author 
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Annexure C Consumer policy diagrams 
C1 OECD Consumer Policy Toolkit process 
 
Graphic C1.1 Consumer policy making steps  
Source: OECD2122  
 
                                                          
2122 Above n 505. Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 IGO (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 
IGO) licence. 
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C2 Productivity Commission Policy Flowchart  
 
Graphic C1.2 Identifying and evaluating policy instruments  
Source: OECD2123 Licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-ShareAlike 3.0 IGO (CC BY-NC-SA 3.0 
IGO) licence. 
                                                          
2123 PC, above n 531.  
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Annexure D  OTA & OWASP consumer guidance 
D1 Online Trust Alliance CIOT Consumer Checklist 
 
Graphic D1.1 Enhancing the Security, Privacy & Safety of Connected Devices 
Source: OTA2124 
                                                          
2124 OTA, above n 1885.  
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D2 OTA IOT Trust Framework minimum requirements 
 
 
Graphic D2.1 OTA IOT Trust framework 
Source: IOTAA2125 
                                                          
2125 Extract from Australian IOT Alliance, ‘IoT Security Guideline V1.0’ (Feb 2017 accessed 2 Mar 2017): 17- 18 excluding 
two technical notes.   
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D3 OWASP Consumer IOT Security Guidance 
“…The goal of this section is help consumers purchase secure products in the Internet of 
Things space. The guidance below is at a basic level, …[but]…  will greatly aid the consumer in 
purchasing a secure IoT product.” 
Category  IOT Security Consideration  
1: Insecure 
Web Interface  
• If your system has the option to use HTTPS, ensure it is enabled  
• If your system has a two factor authentication option, ensure that it is enabled  
• If your system has web application firewall option, ensure that it is enabled  
• If your system has a local or cloud-based web application, ensure that you change the 
default password to a strong one and if possible change the default username as well  
• If the system has account lockout functionality, ensure that it is enabled  
• Consider employing network segmentation technologies such as firewalls to isolate IoT 
systems from critical IT systems  
2: Insufficient 
Authentication/ 
Authorization  
• If your system has a local or cloud-based web application, ensure that you change the 
default password to a strong one and if possible change the default username as well  
• If the system has account lockout functionality, ensure that it is enabled  
• If the system has the option to require strong passwords, ensure that is enabled  
• If the system has the option to require new passwords after 90 days for example, ensure 
that is enabled  
• If your system has a two factor authentication option, ensure that it is enabled  
• If your system has the option to set user privileges, consider setting user privileges to the 
minimal needed for operation  
• Consider employing network segmentation technologies such as firewalls to isolate IoT 
systems from critical IT systems  
3: Insecure 
Network 
Services  
• If your system has a firewall option available, enable it and ensure that it can only be 
accessed from your client systems  
• Consider employing network segmentation technologies such as firewalls to isolate IoT 
systems from critical IT systems  
4: Lack of 
Transport 
Encryption  
• If your system has the option to use HTTPS, ensure it is enabled  
5: Privacy 
Concerns  
• Do not enter sensitive information into the system that is not absolutely required, e.g. 
address, DOB, CC, etc.  
• Deny data collection if it appears to be beyond what is needed for proper operation of the 
device (If provided the choice)  
6: Insecure 
Cloud Interface  
• If your system has the option to use HTTPS, ensure it is enabled  
• If your system has a two factor authentication option, ensure that it is enabled  
• If your system has web application firewall option, ensure that it is enabled  
• If your system has a local or cloud-based web application, ensure that you change the 
default password to a strong one and if possible change the default username as well  
• If the system has account lockout functionality, ensure that it is enabled  
• If the system has the option to require strong passwords, ensure that is enabled  
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• If the system has the option to require new passwords after 90 days for example, ensure 
that is enabled  
7: Insecure 
Mobile 
Interface  
• If the mobile application has the option to require a PIN or password, consider using it for 
extra security (on client and server)  
• If the mobile application has the option to use two factory authentication such as Apple's 
Touch ID, ensure it is enabled  
• If the system has account lockout functionality, ensure that it is enabled  
• If the system has the option to require strong passwords, ensure that is enabled  
• If the system has the option to require new passwords after 90 days for example, ensure 
that is enabled  
• Do not enter sensitive information into the mobile application that is not absolutely required, 
e.g. address, DOB, CC, etc.  
8: Insufficient 
Security 
Configurability  
• If your system has the option, enable any logging functionality for security-related events  
• If your system has the option, enable any alert and notification functionality for security-
related events  
• If your system has security options for passwords, ensure they are enabled for strong 
passwords  
• If your system has security options for encryption, ensure they are set for an accepted 
standard such as AES-256  
9: Insecure 
Software/ 
Firmware  
• If your system has the option to verify updates, ensure it is enabled  
• If your system has the option to download updates securely, ensure it is enabled  
• If your system has the ability to schedule updates on a regular cadence, consider enabling 
it  
10: Poor 
Physical 
Security  
• If your system has the ability to limit administrative capabilities possible by connecting 
locally, consider enabling that feature  
• Disable any unused physical ports through the administrative interface  
“General Recommendations 
If you are looking to purchase a device or system, consider the following recommendations:  
• Include security in feature considerations when evaluating a product  
• Place Internet of Things devices on a separate network if possible using a firewall  
[NOTE: Given the fact that each deployment and every environment is different, it is important to weigh the pros and cons of 
implementing the advice above before taking each step.]…”  
Graphic D3.1 OWASP Consumer IOT Security Guidance 2126  
Source: OWASP2127     
                                                          
2126 OWASP, above n 1899. 
2127 All materials in Annex.D3 are licensed by OWASP under Creative Commons 3.0 License: 
<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/>  
[458] 
 
Annexure E Glossary 
app A software application which operates on a device to fulfil a purpose or function - for 
example, to provide data analysis of smart self data collected by a smart band. 
AI or artificial 
intelligence* 
technology that appears to emulate human performance typically by learning, drawing 
conclusions, appearing to understand complex content, engaging in natural dialogs with people, 
enhancing human cognitive performance (also known as cognitive computing) or replacing 
people on execution of non-routine tasks e.g. voice recognition technologies. 
Australian 
Standard 
Specifications, procedures and guidelines, designed to ensure products, services and systems 
are safe, reliable and consistent. International standards are developed by ISO, IEC, and ITU, 
and are adopted by Standards Australia if possible.2128 For example, IT and cybersecurity are 
covered by ISO 27000 series. 
big data ‘the practice of combining huge volumes of diversely sourced information and analysing them, 
often using self-learning algorithms to inform decisions’.2129 
Bluetooth* a low-power wireless networking technology   
cloud computing* a style of computing in which scalable and elastic IT-enabled capabilities are delivered as a 
service using Internet technologies. 
consumer 
telematics* 
end-user-targeted vehicle information and communication technologies and services. Used in 
smart cars to provide in-vehicle services, such as emergency assistance, Global Positioning 
System (GPS) navigation, traffic information, local search (e.g. restaurant locations) and 
manufacturer concierge services. 
cyber-attack 
(‘hacking’) 
any offensive activity designed to obtain unauthorised access to and/ or degrade, damage, 
disrupt or destroy, or expose vulnerabilities within, IT 
cyber security technical and compliance-based safeguards or actions to protect against cyber-attack and to 
manage cyber risk.  
data breach the loss of or unauthorised access to data or the modification, disclosure or other misuse or 
interference of data, (which may contain personal information) and often because of a cyber 
attack 
data broker* a business that aggregates information from many sources; processes it to enrich, cleanse or 
analyse it; and (usually) licenses it to other organizations. 
data fusion Collective term to cover all data amalgamation, including data matching, data linking and any 
other technologies or approaches which merge data and may thereby, generate more 
personally-identifying information.  
data linking linking identified and anonymous databases to de-anonymise or re-identify anonymous data by 
identifying data fingerprints, which may often then be linked to other data sets. 
data matching comparing multiple systems of records to aggregate data about an already identified subject.  
data portability^ the ability to move data stored on one IOT/cloud service to another or to download data 
device (CIOT)2130 “… equipment with the mandatory capabilities of communication and the optional capabilities of 
sensing, actuation, data capture, data storage and data processing”. Examples include a smart 
watch, TV or car. Note that while smartphones are not generally IOT devices, they become a 
part of the IOT when they are the ‘remote’ control for a CIOT system. 
hub  a central device that coordinates CIOT devices such as lights, locks etc. to work together, or to 
be automated as required.  
internet of things   See Ch. 1. See also consumer internet of things (CIOT or consumer IOT) in Ch 1. 
 
interoperability^ the capacity of devices from one manufacturer to work and interact with those of another 
 
IP or Internet 
Protocol* 
Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) tracks the address of nodes, routes 
outgoing messages, and recognizes incoming messages. In smart homes, IP refers to a device 
sending information using the internet or a computer network. 
IPv6* Internet Protocol version 6 replaces IPv4, and greatly increases IP address space, as required 
by the IOT. 
IT Information technology, including software, hardware, communications and related services.  
                                                          
2128 http://www.standards.org.au/standardsdevelopment/what_is_a_standard/pages/default.aspx 
2129 EDPS, ‘Opinion 4/2015 Towards a new digital ethics’ (11 Sept 2015 accessed 8 Feb 2016) < 
https://edps.europa.eu/sites/edp/files/publication/15-09-11_data_ethics_en.pdf> 
2130 ITU-T, above n 101. 
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M2M* automated data transmission and measurement between mechanical or electronic devices; e.g. 
CIOT devices which ‘sense’ (e.g. an empty fridge) and automatically order goods or services. 
Most consumer versions are mediated via smartphone approvals pre-order or payment. 
metadata “metadata” describes and gives information about other data 
Moore’s Law the number of transistors that can be put on a microchip doubles about every 18 months: 
Gordon E. Moore (19 Apr 1965)  
mosaic effect or 
data fusion  
the integration of big data whereby personally identifiable information can be derived or inferred 
from supposedly de-identified datasets, using processes such as data matching or linkage. 
open standards “open standards” are written requirements for technical systems that are free and available for 
all to read and use.  They enable interoperability and data exchange.  
privacy by design 
or PBD 
A compliance-based system which creates privacy as a default mode of corporate operation, 
rather than requiring mere legislative and regulatory framework adherence. PBD is proactive: it 
anticipates to prevent privacy invasive events; so is a preventative form of risk management.   
profiling or 
predictive 
analytics 
any form of automated processing of personal data, (e.g. data mining, data visualization, 
algorithm clustering, and neural networking) to evaluate personal attributes and to analyse or 
predict aspects as to a person’s performance at “work, economic situation, health, personal 
preferences, interests, reliability, behaviour, location or movements…” [GDPR, Art 4 (4) 
(adapted)]. 
RFID* Radio frequency identification; this is automated data collection technology using radio 
frequency waves to transfer data between a reader and a tag to identify, track and locate the 
tagged item.  
sensor A device which generates an electronic signal in response to a physical event or condition.2131 
smart car Motor vehicle with advanced software and electronics, including driver-assist technology, GPS 
navigation, reverse sensing systems, night vision, assisted parking, internet and e-mail access, 
voice control, smart card activation (in lieu of keys) and decreasing driver-control requirements 
– leading to a fully autonomous vehicle.  
smart home A networked home consisting of multiple interlinked and integrated devices, sensors, tools and 
platforms, to provide multiple services and analysed-data usually via apps, including security, 
climate-control, and home automation both in-home and remotely.   
smart self devices attached to or implanted inside the human body – in this thesis, they include devices 
which monitor human health. fitness and wellness. Note it excludes ‘smart health’ devices 
which improve monitor and improve disease management and identification and are therapeutic 
in nature. 
sustainability  this incorporates the life-cycle issues related to long- term supportability of the device and 
service, transfers of ownership of devices and the control and usage of the data collected. 
telematics*  the use of pre-installed or after-market wireless devices and “black box” technologies to 
transmit data in real time back to the car manufacturer; including vehicle use, maintenance 
requirements, servicing, air bag deployments or car crash information. It may use GPS to locate 
stolen vehicles and is used for usage-based, pay-per-use, pay as you drive, and pay how you 
drive insurance. 
trust mark A third-party mark, logo, picture, or symbol provided to reflect firm-specific compliance 
standards and promote trust. 
vendor or device 
“lock-in” 
where consumer switching costs inhibit changing devices (e.g.)  the cost of changing providers, 
adverse contractual terms or technical difficulties such as device or data non-portability or non-
interoperability   
‘Wi-Fi’ Wireless fidelity; this is the most common smart home device protocol via routers which 
become Wi-Fi-enabled device hubs.  
Table E Glossary 
Sources: author & various 
 
 
                                                          
2131 Jonathan Holdowsky, Monika Mahto, Michael E. Raynor and Mark Cotteleer, ‘Inside the IOT: a primer on the 
technologies building the IoT’ Deloitte (21 Aug 2015 accessed 5 Feb 2016) <https://dupress.deloitte.com/dup-us-
en/focus/internet-of-things/iot-primer-iot-technologies-applications.html> 
